THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 
LOS  ANGELES 


!i 


Jlriie  (Economic  ©ssaps 


THE  CAUSE  AND  EXTENT  OF  THE  RECENT  INDUS- 
TRIAL PROGRESS  OF  GERMANY.    By  Earl  D.  Howard. 

THE  CAUSES  OF  THE  PANIC  OF  1893.  By  William  J. 
Lauck. 

INDUSTRIAL    EDUCATION.     By  Harlow  Stafford  Person, 
Ph.D. 

FEDERAL  REGULATION  OF  RAILWAY  RATES.  By  Al- 
bert N.  Merritt,  Ph.D. 

SHIP  SUBSIDIES.  An  Economic  Study  of  the  Policy  of  Sub- 
sidizing Merchant  Marines.     By  Walter  T.  Dunmore. 

SOCIALISM:  A  CRITICAL  ANALYSIS.     By  O.  D.  Skelton. 

INDUSTRIAL  ACCIDENTS  ANDTHEIR  COMPENSATION. 
By  Gilbert  L.  Campbell,  B.  S. 

THE  STANDARD  OF  LIVING  AMONG  THE  INDUSTRIAL 
PEOPLE  OF   AMERICA.     By   Frank  H.  Streightoff. 

THE    NAVIGABLE   RHINE.     By  Edwin  J.  Clapp. 

HISTORY  AND  ORGANIZATION  OF  CRIMINAL  STATIS- 
TICS IN  THE  UNITED  STATES.  By  Louis  Newton 
Robinson. 

SOCIAL  VALUE.     By  B.  M.  Anderson,  Jr. 

FREIGHT  CLASSIFICATION.     By  J.  F.  Strombeck. 

WATERV/AYS  VERSUS  RAILVI/AYS.  By  Harold  Glenn 
Moulton. 

THE  VALUE  OF  ORGANIZED  SPECULATION.  By  Harri- 
son H.  Brace. 

INDUSTRIAL  EDUCATION:  ITS  PROBLEMS,  METHODS 
AND  DANGERS.     By  Albert  H.  Leake. 

THE  UNITED  STATES  INTERNAL  TAX  HISTORY  FROM 
I  86  I  TO  I  87  I .     By  Harry  Edwin  Smith- 

WELFARE  AS  AN  ECONOMIC  QUANTITY.  By  G.  P.  Wat- 
kins. 

CONCILIATION  AND  ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COAL  IN- 
DUSTRY IN  THE  UNITED  STATES.  By  Arthur  E.  Suf- 
fern. 

THE  CANADIAN  IRON  AND  STEEL  INDUSTRY.  By  W.  J. 
A.  Donald. 

THE  TIN   PLATE  INDUSTRY.     By  D.  E.  Dunbar. 

THE  MEANS  AND  METHODS  OF  AGRICULTURAL  EDU- 
CATION.    By  Albert  H.  Leake. 

THE  TAXATION  OF  LAND  VALUE.     By  Yetta  Scheftel. 

RAILROAD  VALUATION.     By  Homer  Bews  Vanderblue. 

RAILWAY  RATES  AND  THE  CANADIAN  RAILWAY  COM- 
MISSION.    By  D.  A.  MacGibbon. 

THE  CHICAGO  PRODUCE  MARKET.  By  Edwin  Griswold 
Nourse. 

THE  ARBITRAL  DETERMINATION  OF  RAILWAY  WAGES. 
By  J.  Noble  Stockett. 

THE  RESULTS  OF  MUNICIPAL  ELECTRIC  LIGHTING 
IN    MASSACHUSETTS.     By  Edmond  Earle  Lincoln. 

FAIR  VALUE.  The  Meaning  and  Application  of  the  Term 
"Fair  Valuation"  as  used  by  Utility  Commissions.  By 
Harleigh  H.  Hartman. 

A  HISTORY  OF  THE  ATLANTIC  COAST  LINE  RAIL- 
ROAD.    By  Harold  Douglas  Dozier. 


^axt,  ^c^affnetr  &  (YUatx  ^xxT^t  ^b&(Xi& 


XIII 

WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 


WATERWAYS  VERSUS 
RAILWAYS 


BY 


HAROLD  G.  MOULTON 

INSTRUCTOR  IN  POLITICAL  ECONOMY  IN 
THE  UNIVERSITY  OP  CHICAGO 


BOSTON  AND  NEW  YORK 

HOUGHTON  MIFFLIN  COMPANY 

^ftc  IMttxiitit  pcc^^  CambriUgt 


COPYRIGHT,    1912,    BY   HART,   SCHAFFNER    &    MARX 
ALL   RIGHTS   RESERVED 

Published  June  igi2 


10  m 

m 


:.  w 


TO 
MY  MOTHER 


1491078 


PREFACE 

This  series  of  books  owes  its  existence  to  the  generosity  of 
Messrs.  Hart,  Schaffner  &  Marx,  of  Chicago,  who  have 
shown  a  special  interest  in  trying  to  draw  the  attention  of 
American  youth  to  the  study  of  economic  and  commercial 
subjects.  For  this  purpose  they  have  delegated  to  the  un- 
dersigned committee  the  task  of  selecting  or  approving  of 
topics,  making  announcements,  and  awarding  prizes  annu- 
ally for  those  who  wish  to  compete. 

For  the  year  ending  June  1,  1911,  there  were  offered:  — 
In  Class  A,  which  included  any  American  without  re- 
striction, a  first  prize  of  $1000,  and  a  second  prize  of  $500. 
In  Class  B,  which  included  any  who  were  at  the  time 
undergraduates  of  an  American  college,  a  first  prize  of 
$300,  and  a  second  prize  of  $200. 

Any  essay  submitted  in  Class  B,  if  deemed  of  suflScient 
merit,  could  receive  a  prize  in  Class  A. 

The  present  volume,  submitted  in  Class  A,  was  awarded 
the  first  prize  in  that  class. 

J.  Laurence  Laughlin,  Chairman, 

University  of  Chicago. 
J.  B.  Clark, 

Columbia  University. 
Henry  C.  Adams, 

University  of  Michigan, 
Horace  White, 

New  York  City. 
Edwin  F.  Gay, 

Harvard  University. 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE 

When  this  investigation  was  undertaken  the  writer  shared 
in  the  common  belief  that  traffic  of  certain  kinds  can  be 
carried  at  substantially  less  cost  by  water  than  by  rail. 
He  inclined  to  the  view,  however,  that  in  the  case  of  many 
of  the  waterway  projects  before  the  country  the  traffic 
available  was  not  sufficient  to  warrant  the  contemplated 
expenditures,  and  it  was  thought  that  the  chief  contribu- 
tion to  be  made  would  lie  in  an  investigation  of  the  traffic 
possibilities  of  certain  proposed  water  routes. 

A  reading  of  the  literature  of  the  subject,  however,  soon 
made  it  evident  that  no  adequate  analysis  of  the  cost  of 
transportation  by  water  had  ever  been  made;  that  it  was 
merely  tacitly  assumed  that  water  transportation  is  cheaper 
than  that  by  rail;  and  that  the  rate  comparisons  some- 
times presented  in  support  of  this  assumption  were  virtu- 
ally meaningless.  This  discovery  led  to  a  shifting  of  em- 
phasis to  the  cost  aspect  of  the  problem,  the  question  of 
traffic  assuming  a  secondary  place. 

The  constant  reference  by  writers  on  the  subject  to  the 
apparently  successful  experience  of  European  countries  in 
maintaining  harmony  and  mutual  cooperation  between 
waterways  and  railways  made  an  investigation  of  Euro- 
pean transportation  conditions  imperative  to  a  compre- 
hensive treatment  of  the  subject.  When  the  author  went 
to  Europe  he  shared,  again,  in  the  general  belief  that  water 
transportation  on  the  Continent  was  of  undoubted  eco- 
nomic advantage,  and  it  was  believed  that  the  chief  con- 
tribution to  be  made  from  a  study  of  foreign  transporta- 
tion would  lie  in  contrasting  the  geographical,  industrial, 
and  governmental  conditions  of  Europe  and  the  United 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE 

When  this  investigation  was  undertaken  the  writer  shared 
in  the  common  belief  that  traflSc  of  certain  kinds  can  be 
carried  at  substantially  less  cost  by  water  than  by  rail. 
He  inclined  to  the  view,  however,  that  in  the  case  of  many 
of  the  waterway  projects  before  the  country  the  traffic 
available  was  not  sufficient  to  warrant  the  contemplated 
expenditures,  and  it  was  thought  that  the  chief  contribu- 
tion to  be  made  would  lie  in  an  investigation  of  the  traffic 
possibilities  of  certain  proposed  water  routes. 

A  reading  of  the  literature  of  the  subject,  however,  soon 
made  it  evident  that  no  adequate  analysis  of  the  cost  of 
transportation  by  water  had  ever  been  made;  that  it  was 
merely  tacitly  assumed  that  water  transportation  is  cheaper 
than  that  by  rail;  and  that  the  rate  comparisons  some- 
times presented  in  support  of  this  assumption  were  virtu- 
ally meaningless.  This  discovery  led  to  a  shifting  of  em- 
phasis to  the  cost  aspect  of  the  problem,  the  question  of 
traffic  assuming  a  secondary  place. 

The  constant  reference  by  writers  on  the  subject  to  the 
apparently  successful  experience  of  European  countries  in 
maintaining  harmony  and  mutual  cooperation  between 
waterways  and  railways  made  an  investigation  of  Euro- 
pean transportation  conditions  imperative  to  a  compre- 
hensive treatment  of  the  subject.  When  the  author  went 
to  Europe  he  shared,  again,  in  the  general  belief  that  water 
transportation  on  the  Continent  was  of  undoubted  eco- 
nomic advantage,  and  it  was  believed  that  the  chief  con- 
tribution to  be  made  from  a  study  of  foreign  transporta- 
tion would  lie  in  contrasting  the  geographical,  industrial, 
and  governmental  conditions  of  Europe  and  the  United 


X  PREFACE 

States.  It  was  doubted,  in  other  words,  if  conditions  aV  ""^ 
were  sufficiently  similar  to  those  in  this  country  to 
the  conclusions  commonly  drawn  from  European  oxpt-  lence. 
But  to  the  surprise  of  the  author  it  soon  became  apparent 
that  in  Europe,  as  in  the  United  States,  Httle  considera- 
tion had  ever  been  given  to  the  inclusive  cost  of  transpor- 
tation by  water,  as  compared  with  that  by  rail,  and  that 
the  rate  comparisons  usually  made  proved  nothing  what- 
soever. Consequently,  here  again,  the  question  of  cost  as- 
sumed the  foremost  place;  and  the  comparison  of  condi- 
tions became  incidental. 

Because  the  writer's  own  views  were  thus  constantly 
undergoing  revision  in  the  course  of  the  investigation,  and 
because  of  a  growing  consciousness  that  he  was  becoming 
more  and  more  at  outright  loggerheads  with  the  advocates 
of  waterway  development,  the  arrangement  of  the  subject- 
matter,  the  method  of  attack,  and  even  the  style  is  not  all 
that  he  could  wish.  It  has  seemed  preferable,  on  the  whole, 
however,  to  leave  it  in  its  present  form  rather  than  to  un- 
dertake a  thoroughgoing  revision.  It  may  be,  indeed,  that 
the  conclusions  will  be  more  readily  accepted  if  the  reader 
goes  through  the  same  stages  of  evolution  that  the  writer 
passed  through. 

The  waterway  question  is  closely  related  to  the  whole 
movement  for  the  conservation  of  natural  resources;  and  it 
is  foreseen  that  this  work  will  probably  be  attacked  by  con- 
servationists on  the  ground  that  it  has  not  given  sufficient 
attention  to,  or  made  adequate  allowance  for,  allied  bene- 
fits of  waterway  development,  such  as  the  prevention  of 
floods,  the  reclamation  of  riparian  lands,  the  development 
of  water  power,  etc.  It  is  true  that  the  main  emphasis  has 
been  placed  upon  the  transportation  aspect  of  the  case, 
and  the  author  recognizes  that  he  has  not  adequately 
treated  the  other  phases  of  the  subject.  He  would  point 
out  here,  however,  that  so  far  as  canal  transportation  is 
concerned  these  allied  benefits  do  not  figure  largely  in  the 


PREFACE  xi 

case'^.  And  it  is  believed,  moreover,  that  as  regards  river 
impc;.  7  ment  the  burden  of  proof  has  been  placed  upon  the 
conse-ivat.wists.  It  has  been  generally  assumed  that,  since 
the  cost  of  river  improvement  will  be  more  than  paid  for 
by  transportation  advantages  alone,  the  allied  benefits  will 
constitute  a  net  gain  to  society.  But  if  the  conclusions 
reached  in  this  volume  be  sound,  it  becomes  necessary  (in 
most  cases)  to  establish  the  value  of  river  improvement  on 
these  incidental  grounds  alone.  If  this  can  be  done,  well 
and  good.  There  is  no  objection  to  conservation,  provided 
the  thing  conserved  is  worth  what  it  costs  to  conserve  it. 
It  should  be  observed  further,  however,  that  river  im- 
provement for  the  sole  purposes  of  reclaiming  flooded  lands, 
developing  water  power,  etc.,  may  well  take  an  altogether 
different  form  than  when  transportation  is  a  primary  con- 
sideration. Independent  investigations  of  these  aspects  of 
the  waterway  question  are  badly  needed. 

This  opportunity  is  taken  to  express  appreciation  of  the 
kindness  shown  the  writer  by  the  various  consulates  of 
Europe  in  giving  him  access  to  all  their  data  on  the  subject, 
and  to  the  Department  of  Public  Works  of  Germany,  who 
extended  every  courtesy,  even  to  the  use  of  the  department 
library.  Especial  acknowledgment  of  thanks  is  also  due 
to  M.  Colson,  Director  of  Roads  and  Bridges,  and  Minis- 
ter of  State  of  France.  Mr.  A.  C.  Goodrich  rendered  valu- 
able assistance  in  the  preparation  of  maps  and  charts.  I 
am  under  great  obligation  to  Messrs.  Hart,  Schaffner  & 
Marx,  whose  financial  assistance  made  the  European  in- 
vestigation possible.  Above  all,  I  am  deeply  grateful  to 
Professor  J.  Laurence  Laughlin,  who  inspired  the  work, 
and  who  gave  his  searching  criticism  at  every  stage  of  the 
writing. 

Harold  G.  Moulton. 
Chicago,  February,  1912. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  I 

Introduction:  the  Revival  of  the  Agitation  for 
Waterways 

1.   Growth  of  the  waterways  movement.  —  2.  Projects  before 

the  country 1-9 

CHAPTER  II 

Causes  of  the  Revival 

1.  Our  natural  resources  should  be  conserved  and  used.  —  2.  By- 
effects  of  waterway  development:  a.  Industrial  and  sani- 
tary benefits;  b.  Development  of  water  power;  c.  Prevention 
of  floods  and  reclamation  of  land. —  3.  Water  transportation 
cheaper  than  rail.  —  4.  Railways  should  be  subjected  to 
competition.  —  5.  Waterways  should  serve  as  auxiliaries  to 
railways.  —  6.  Example  of  foreign  waterways.  —  7.  Influ- 
ence of  former  success  of  American  waterways. —  8.  Political 
and  special  interests 10-17 

CHAPTER  in 

Analysis  of  Current  Arguments 

1.  Introductory.  —  2.  The  break-down  of  the  railway  service. 
—  3.  Explanation  of  the  attitude  of  railway  men.  —  4.  Com- 
petitive regulation  of  railway  rates.  —  5.  Canals  as  aids  [to 
railways.  —  6.  The  contention  that  traflSc  moves  more 
rapidly  by  water  than  by  rail.  —  7.  The  greater  cheapness  of 
water-borne  traflSc.  —  8.  Benefits  to  farmers,  laborers,  etc.  — 
9.  Reasoning  from  foreign  example.  —  10.  Conclusion     .    .       18-44 

CHAPTER  IV 

A  Nation- Wide  System  of  Waterways 

1.  Introduction.  —  2.  Effects  of  geographic  conditions  upon 
industrial  development.  —  3.  Water  transportation  confined 
to  natural  valleys.  —  4.  Territorial  expanse  as  affecting 


xiv  CONTENTS 

water  transport.  —  5.  River  currents,  floods,  and  droughts. 
—  6.  Interruptions  to  navigation  on  account  of  ice.  —  7.  The 
distribution  of  traffic  in  relation  to  natural  water  routes. 
The  question  of  transshipment.  —  8.  Density  of  traffic.  — 
9.  Extent  of  railway  development.  — 10.  The  influence  of 
sectionalism.  —  11.  Conclusions 45-66 


CHAPTER  V 

Brief  History  of  Water  Transportation  in  the  United 

States 

1.  Expenditures  upon  canals  and  rivers  of  the  United  States.  — 
2.  Movement  of  traffic  on  An.erican  waterways.  —  3.  Char- 
acter of  water-borne  freight.  —  4.  Causes  of  the  decline  of 
water  traffic:  a.  Inadequate  development  of  water  routes; 

b.  Railway  advantages  in  the  carriage  of  high  grade  freight; 

c.  Cutting  of  rates  on  competitive  traffic  by  the  railways; 

d.  Refusal  of  railways  to  cooperate  with  water  lines;  e.  Rail- 
way control  of  terminal  and  transfer  facilities;  /.  Railway 
control  of  waterways;  g.  The  shifting  of  routes  of  trade  and 
the  development  of  new  regions;  h.  Efficient  organization  of 
the  railway  service;  i.  Special  advantages  offered  by  the  rail- 
ways for  certain  kinds  of  bulky  freight;  j.  Exhaustion  of 
supply  of  waterway  commodities;  k.  The  heavy  cost  of  trans- 
shipment. —  5.  Conclusion 67-97 

CHAPTER  VI 

The  Barge  Canals  of  Great  Britain 

1.  Introduction :  England  offers  an  unusually  favorable  field  of 
study.  —  2.  Early  canal  history  in  England.  —  3.  Decline  of 
water  traffic  since  1850.  —  4.  The  waterways  revival. — 
6.  The  Royal  Commission  on  Canals  and  Inland  Navigations. 
—  6.  Present  status  of  English  waterways.  —  7.  Decline  of 
water  traffic  in  general.  —  8.  Waterways  ill  adapted  to  the 
needs  of  coal  shippers.  —  9.  Building-materials  often  more 
conveniently  shipped  by  rail.  —  10.  Raw  cotton  more  satis- 
factorily distributed  to  inland  cities  by  rail.  —  11.  Railways 
serve  the  needs  of  farmers  better  than  canals.  —  12.  Surviv- 
ing traffic  due  to  special  conditions,  to  inertia,  and  to  the 
peculiar  character  of  the  labor  employed.  —  13.  The  strug- 
gle for  supremacy  between  canals  and  railways.  —  14.  Spe- 
cific improvements  recommended  by  the  commission.  — 
15.  Cost  of  carrying  out  the  improvements.  —  16.  Amount  of 
traffic  necessary  to  yield  a  direct  return  on  the  outlay.  — 
17.  Possibilities  of  increased  traffic.  —  18.  Criticism  of  cost 


CONTENTS  XV 

estimates.  —  19.  Capacity  of  the  proposed  waterways  insuf- 
ficient for  the  traffic  required.  —  20.  Indirect  benefits  to 
trade.  —  21.  Reasons  why  shippers  would  not  extensively  use 
improved  waterways.  —  22.  The  evident  bias  of  the  Royal 
Commission.  —  2.3.  The  proposed  improvements  will  prob- 
ably never  be  undertaken.  —  24.  Comparison  of  English 
and  American  transportation  conditions 98-145 


CHAPTER  VII 

The  Manchester  Ship  Canal 

1.  General  description.  —  2.  Financial  results.  —  3.  Reasons 
for  failure.  —  4.  Indirect  benefits  few.  —  5.  Conditions  were 
exceptionally  favorable 146-162 

CHAPTER  \TII 

The  Forth  and  Clyde  Ship  Canal 

1.  Arguments  for  the  proposed  canal.  —  2.  Alternative  routes 
suggested.  —  3.  The  canal  will  probably  never  be  con- 
structed. —  4.  It  is  not  commercially  feasible 163-169 

CHAPTER  IX 

The  Waterways  of  Germany.   Cost,  Traffic  Development, 
and  Financial  Success 

1.  Brief  history  of  waterway  development  in  Germany.  — 
2.  Waterway  development  has  kept  good  pace  with  the  gen- 
eral growth  of  the  country  in  last  thirty  years.  —  3.  Develop- 
ment of  traffic  not  uniform.  —  4.  The  Rhine  River,  because 
of  exceptional  conditions,  has  shown  a  great  increase  in 
traffic.  —  5.  Traffic  on  the  Main  River  developed  only  by 
means  of  enormous  subsidies.  —  6.  The  Saar  River  has  failed 
to  develop  the  resources  along  its  banks.  —  7.  Traffic  on  the 
Rhine-Marne  Canal  mainly  coal  and  ores.  —  Development 
slow.  —  8.  The  Main-Danube  Canal  a  complete  failure.  — 
9.  Traffic  on  the  Danube  very  small,  and  but  slowly  increas- 
ing. —  10.  The  "Mark  Waterways"  economically  a  failure. 
—  11.  The  new  Berlin-Stettin  Canal  to  involve  a  heavy 
economic  loss.  —  12.  Waterways  of  eastern  Prussia  unim- 
portant. —  13.  The  Weser  River  —  a  complete  failure.  — 

14.  The  Dortmund-Ems  Canal  not  an  economic  success.  — 

15.  The   Kiel  Canal  military  in   its   aim.  —  16.  The  new 
Rhine- Weser  Canal  a  probable  economic  failure      ....  170-227 


xiv  CONTENTS 

water  transport.  —  5.  River  currents,  floods,  and  droughts. 
—  6.  Interruptions  to  navigation  on  account  of  ice.  —  7.  The 
distribution  of  traffic  in  relation  to  natural  water  routes. 
The  question  of  transshipment.  —  8.  Density  of  traflBc.  — 
9.  Extent  of  railway  development.  — 10.  The  influence  of 
sectionalism.  —  11.  Conclusions 45-66 

CHAPTER  V 

Brief  History  of  Water  Transportation  in  the  United 

States 

1.  Expenditures  upon  canals  and  rivers  of  the  United  States.  — 
2.  Movement  of  traffic  on  American  waterways.  —  3.  Char- 
acter of  water-borne  freight.  —  4.  Causes  of  the  decline  of 
water  traffic:  a.  Inadequate  development  of  water  routes; 
6.  Railway  advantages  in  the  carriage  of  high  grade  freight; 

c.  Cutting  of  rates  on  competitive  traffic  by  the  railways; 

d.  Refusal  of  railways  to  cooperate  with  water  lines;  e.  Rail- 
way control  of  terminal  and  transfer  facilities;  /.  Railway 
control  of  waterways;  g.  The  shifting  of  routes  of  trade  and 
the  development  of  new  regions;  h.  Efficient  organization  of 
the  railway  service;  i.  Special  advantages  offered  by  the  rail- 
ways for  certain  kinds  of  bulky  freight;  j.  Exhaustion  of 
supply  of  waterway  commodities;  k.  The  heavy  cost  of  trans- 
shipment. —  5.  Conclusion 67-97 


CHAPTER  VI 

The  Barge  Canals  of  Great  Britain 

Introduction :  England  offers  an  unusually  favorable  field  of 
study.  —  2.  Early  canal  history  in  England.  —  3.  Decline  of 
water  traffic  since  1850.  —  4.  The  waterways  revival. — 
5.  The  Royal  Commission  on  Canals  and  Inland  Navigations. 
—  6.  Present  status  of  English  waterways.  —  7.  Decline  of 
water  traffic  in  general.  —  8.  Waterways  ill  adapted  to  the 
needs  of  coal  shippers.  —  9.  Building-materials  often  more 
conveniently  shipped  by  rail.  —  10.  Raw  cotton  more  satis- 
factorily distributed  to  inland  cities  by  rail.  —  11.  Railways 
serve  the  needs  of  farmers  better  than  canals.  —  12.  Surviv- 
ing traffic  due  to  special  conditions,  to  inertia,  and  to  the 
peculiar  character  of  the  labor  employed.  —  13.  The  strug- 
gle for  supremacy  between  canals  and  railways.  —  14.  Spe- 
cific improvements  recommended  by  the  commission.  — 
15.  Cost  of  carrying  out  the  improvements.  —  16.  Amount  of 
traffic  necessary  to  yield  a  direct  return  on  the  outlay.  — 
17.  Possibilities  of  increased  traffic.  —  18.  Criticism  of  cost 


CONTENTS 


XV 


estimates.  —  19.  Capacity  of  the  proposed  waterways  insuf- 
ficient for  the  traffic  required.  —  20.  Indirect  benefits  to 
trade.  —  21.  Reasons  why  shippers  would  not  extensively  use 
improved  waterways.  —  22.  The  evident  bias  of  the  Royal 
Commission.  —  23.  The  proposed  improvements  will  prob- 
ably never  be  undertaken.  —  24.  Comparison  of  English 
and  American  transportation  conditions 98-145 

CHAPTER  VII 

The  Manchester  Ship  Canal 

1.  General  description.  —  2.  Financial  results.  —  3.  Reasons 
for  failure.  —  4.  Indirect  benefits  few.  —  5.  Conditions  were 
exceptionally  favorable 146-162 

CHAPTER  VIII 

The  Forth  and  Clyde  Ship  Canal 

1.  Arguments  for  the  proposed  canal.  —  2.  Alternative  routes 
suggested.  —  3.  The  canal  will  probably  never  be  con- 
structed. —  4.  It  is  not  commercially  feasible 163-169 

CHAPTER  IX 

The  Waterways  of  Germany.   Cost,  Traffic  Development, 
and  Financial  Success 

1.  Brief  history  of  waterway  development  in  Germany.  — 
2.  Waterway  development  has  kept  good  pace  with  the  gen- 
eral growth  of  the  country  in  last  thirty  years.  —  3.  Develop)- 
ment  of  traffic  not  uniform.  —  4.  The  Rhine  River,  because 
of  exceptional  conditions,  has  shown  a  great  increase  in 
traffic.  —  5.  Traffic  on  the  Main  River  developed  only  by 
means  of  enormous  subsidies.  —  6.  The  Saar  River  has  failed 
to  develop  the  resources  along  its  banks.  —  7.  Traffic  on  the 
Rhine-Marne  Canal  mainly  coal  and  ores.  —  Development 
slow.  —  8.  The  Main-Danube  Canal  a  complete  failure.  — 
9.  Traffic  on  the  Danube  very  small,  and  but  slowly  increas- 
ing. —  10.  The  "Mark  Waterways"  economically  a  failure. 
—  11.  The  new  Berlin-Stettin  Canal  to  involve  a  heavy 
economic  loss.  —  12.  Waterways  of  eastern  Prussia  unim- 
portant. —  13.  The  Weser  River  —  a  complete  failure.  — 

14.  The  Dortmund-Ems  Canal  not  an  economic  success.  — 

15.  The  Kiel  Canal  military  in  its  aim.  —  16.  The  new 
Rhine- Weser  Canal  a  probable  economic  failure      ....  170-227 


xvi  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  X 

Examination  of  the  German  Transportation  Policy 

1.  Transportation  by  water  believed  to  be  cheaper  than  by 
rail.  —  2.  Canals  as  a  relief  to  railways  in  areas  of  congested 
traffic.  —  3.  The  military  argument  for  waterways.  —  4.  De- 
centralization of  industry.  —  5.  The  aid  to  agriculture  only 
incidental.  —  6.  Summary  statement.  —  7.  Reasons  for  con- 
tinuing the  waterway  policy 22S-257 

CHAPTER  XI 

A  Comparison  op  German  and  American  Transportation 
Conditions 

1.  Geographic  conditions  unusually  favorable  to  water  trans- 
portation in  Germany.  —  2.  German  industrial  conditions 
likewise  favorable  to  water  traffic.  —  3.  Administrative  con- 
ditions incomparably  more  favorable  in  Germany  than  in 
the  United  States.  —  4.  Conclusion 258-270 

CHAPTER  Xn 

Transportation  in  France 

1.  Historical  sketch  of  waterway  development.  —  2.  French 
railway  policy.  —  3.  The  Government  prevents  competition 
for  waterway  commodities.  —  4.  Waterways  entirely  sup- 
ported at  public  expense;  railways  yield  a  large  revenue  to 
the  Government.  —  5.  Waterways  carry  only  about  one 
fourth  the  slow  freight,  and  their  proportion  decreasing.  — 
6.  Four  fifths  of  the  waterway  traffic  in  one  fifth  the  area. 

—  7.  Transshipments  are  rare.  —  8.  When  railways  have 
been  permitted  to  lower  their  rates  they  have  diverted  traf- 
fic from  the  waterways.  —  9.  Dividing  traffic  between  two 
agents  of  transport  involves  a  heavy  economic  loss.  —  10. 
French  railway  rates  much  higher  than  those  of  the  United 
States.  French  water  rates  higher  than  American  rail  rates. 

—  11.  Reasons  for  the  continuation  of  the  waterway  pol- 
icy. —  12.  Comparison  of  French  and  American  transporta- 
tion conditions 271-297 

CHAPTER  Xin 

The  Waterways  of  Belgium 

1.  Brief  historical  statement.  —  2.  Traffic  development.  — 
S.  Waterways  conducted  at  a  heavy  annual  loss.  —  4.  Deficit 


CONTENTS  xvii 

paid  out  of  railway  earnings.  —  5.  Railways  not  allowed  to 
compete  with  the  waterways.  —  6.  Railways  cooperate  with 
the  waterways.  —  7.  Conditions  in  Belgium  exceptionally 
favorable  to  waterway  development 298-808 

CHAPTER  XIV 

The  Canals  of  the  Netherlands 

Extent  of  the  canal  system,  and  ownership.  —  2.  Ship- 
canals  of  Holland.  —  3.  The  Rhine  canals.  —  4.  Interior 
canals.  —  5.  The  lateral  canals.  —  6.  Influence  of  custom 
on  present  waterway  policy.  —  7.  Contrast  with  American 
transport  conditions.  —  8.  Railway  development  in  Holland 
difficult.  —  9.  Tolls  and  dues.  —  10.  Conclusion      ....  309-323 


CHAPTER  XV 

The  Lakes-to-Gulf  Ship  Canal 

Introduction.  —  2.  Probable  cost  of  the  undertaking;  en- 
gineering difficulties.  —  3.  Traffic  necessary  to  yield  returns 
on  the  investment.  —  4.  Ocean  vessels  would  not  use  the 
route.  —  5.  The  project  visionary  in  the  extreme    ....  324-352 

CHAPTER  XVI 

"Fourteen  Feet  through  the  Valley" 

Introduction:  ocean  and  lake  vessels  could  not  use  the  route. 

—  2,  The  coasting  trade  in  winter  would  not  be  undertaken 
by  Lake  boats.  —  3.  A  depth  of  fourteen  feet  unnecessary  for 
the  barge  traffic.  —  4.  Sufficient  water  power  could  not  be  de- 
veloped to  warrant  the  enormous  expenditures  involved      .  353-369 

CHAPTER  XVII 

A  Depth  of  Eight  Feet  from  Lakes  to  Gulf 

Introduction.  —  2.  Traffic  necessarily  of  low  grade.  —  3. 
Agricultural  produce  would  make  little  use  of  the  waterway. 

—  4.  Coal  and  ores  not  so  located  as  to  use  this  water  route. 

—  5.  Not  necessary  for  the  carrying  of  building-materials.  — 
6.  The  traffic  in  lumber  would  be  very  small  at  best.  —  7. 
Cotton  would  not  use  the  waterway  extensively.  —  8.  Few 
manufactured  commodities  are  shipped  by  water.  —  9.  Traf- 
6c  with  South  America,  on  the  whole,  not  adapted  to  water 
transportation.  —  10.  Conclusion 370-391 


xviii  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  XVm 

Improvement  of  the  Ohio  River 

1.   Introduction.  —  2.  It  is  hoped  to  develop  traffic  of  all  kinds. 

—  3.  General  manufactures  not  adapted  to  water  transporta- 
tion. —  4.  Agricultural  produce  would  not  use  the  route.  — 
6.  Traffic  in  lumber  necessarily  small.  —  6.  Considerable 
traffic  in  building-materials.  —  7.  Raw  materials  of  manu- 
facture more  conveniently  assembled  by  rail.  —  8.  Coal 
traffic  very  extensive.  —  9.  Some  traffic  in  manufactures  of 
iron  and  steel.  —  10.  Nature  of  the  proposed  improvement. 

—  11.  Comparison  of  rates  by  the  river  and  by  rail.  —  12. 
Capacity  of  the  river  no  greater  than  that  of  a  railway.  — 

13.  Total  cost  of  transport  greater  by  river  than  by  rail.  — 

14.  The  Ohio  in  its  present  state  an  Important  carrier.  — 

15.  From  standpoint  of  transportation  the  proposed  expendi- 
tures not  justiBed.  —  16.  The  proposed  plan  of  improve- 
ments will  not  prevent  floods  or  purify  the  water  ....  392-416 

CHAPTER  XIX 

The  Enlargement  of  the  Erie  Canal 

1.  Introduction:  Brief  histcwy  of  the  old  canal.  —  2.  The  cam- 
paign for  enlarging  the  Erie.  —  3.  Sectional  and  political  in- 
terests at  work.  —  4.  The  cost  to  greatly  exceed  $101,000,000. 
The  terminal  question.  —  5.  Grain,  and  iron  and  steel  pro- 
ducts chief  sources  of  traffic.  —  6.  Grain  exported  from 
North  America  to  go  mainly  through  Canadian  ports  in  the 
future.  —  7.  Conditions  at  Buffalo  not  favorable  to  the  de- 
velopment of  iron  and  steel  manufactures.  —  8.  The  cost  of  a 
canal  several  times  that  of  a  railway.  —  9.  The  capacity  of  an 
all  freight  railway  far  greater  than  of  the  canal.  —  10.  The 
cost  of  maintenance  greater  on  a  canal  than  on  a  railway.  — 

11.  Canal  may  enjoy  slight  advantage  in  cost  of  operation.  — 

12.  Rates  could  be  greatly  lowered  on  existing  railways  if  the 
government  were  to  assume  all  fixed  charges.  —  13.  Conclu- 
sion      417-438 

CHAPTER  XX 

Explanation   of    the   Waterways  Movement   and 

Conclusion 439-467 

Bibliography 459-465 

Index 467-468 


WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

CHAPTER  I 

introduction:  the  revival  of  the  agitation 
for  waterways 

1.  Not  since  the  great  period  of  internal  improvements 
following  the  close  of  the  second  war  with  Great  Britain, 
when  our  attention  was  first  earnestly  directed  toward  the 
West,  have  we  witnessed  such  an  agitation  for  national  de- 
velopment as  exists  at  present.  And  now,  as  then,  the  cen- 
tral programme  in  the  movement  is  the  improvement  of 
rivers  and  harbors  and  the  construction  of  canals  as  con- 
necting links  in  a  great  chain  of  inland  waterways.  The 
early  movement  was  marked  with  all  the  enthusiasm  of  a 
young  people  just  becoming  cognizant  of  a  national  unity. 
The  present  movement  is  regarded  as  a  great  awakening  to 
the  need  of  national  economy,  and  the  conservation  as  well 
as  the  development  of  our  natural  resources.  In  the  ex- 
tent of  interest  and  in  the  intensity  of  agitation  the  pre- 
sent equals  if  it  does  not  exceed  the  early  movement. 

The  great  revival  may  be  said  to  have  begun  about 
fifteen  years  ago.  In  1895  there  was  held  in  Cleveland 
an  International  Waterways  Convention  composed  of 
over  three  hundred  delegates,  representing  Canada  and 
all  sections  of  the  United  States.  In  1901  the  first  Na- 
tional Rivers  and  Harbors  Congress  met  in  Baltimore. 
The  assembling  of  these  two  conventions,  together  with 
the  work  of  various  commercial  associations,  greatly 
stimulated  and  widened  interest  in  the  subject;  and  in 
1903  the  people  of  New  York  voted  $101,000,000  for  the 
improvement  of  the  Erie  Canal.    But  the  real  revival 


2  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

dates  from  1906.  In  that  year  two  history-making  meet-' 
ings  were  held,  —  the  St.  Louis  Convention  and  the 
Washington  Session  of  the  Rivers  and  Harbors  Congress. 
Out  of  the  former  grew  the  organization  known  as  the 
Lakes-to-Gulf  Deep  Waterway  Association;  while  the 
latter  led  directly  to  the  appointment  by  President  Roose- 
velt on  March  14,  1907,  of  the  Inland  Waterways  Com- 
mission. 

The  movement  then  began  in  earnest.  During  the  sum- 
mer of  1907  members  of  the  new  commission  studied  the 
possibilities  of  water  transportation  on  the  Atlantic  Coast, 
in  the  Mississippi  Valley,  in  the  Southwest,  and  in  the 
valley  of  the  Columbia.  In  the  early  fall,  accompanied  by 
the  President,  the  commission  floated  down  the  Mississippi 
from  Keokuk  to  Memphis  in  one  long  celebration.  Wrote 
Secretary  McGee  of  the  commission:  "Nearly  all  the  water 
craft  of  the  river  system  were  assembled;  railways  aban- 
doned schedules  and  stopped  freight  traflSc  to  accommo- 
date specials;  entire  towns  were  evacuated  that  the  inhab- 
itants might  gather  on  the  river  front.  On  the  average 
each  river  town  from  Keokuk  to  Memphis  showed  more 
spectators  standing  out  to  salute  the  presidential  party 
than  its  entire  population;  while  day  and  night  the  air  was 
rent  with  acclamations  of  voices,  steam  whistle,  shrieking 
siren,  salvo  of  guns,  and  roar  and  rattle  of  fireworks."^ 

The  autumn  of  1907  saw  a  veritable  harvest  of  conven- 
tions and  congresses  ;2  and  in  the  next  two  years  there  was 

^  Popular  Science  Monthly,  April,  1908. 
^  They  were:  — 

The  Lakes-to-Gulf  Meeting  at  Memphis,  Tennessee. 

The  Upper  Mississippi  Improvement  Convention  at  Moline,  Illinois. 

The  Interstate  Waterways  Convention  at  Victoria,  Texas. 

The  Irrigation  Congress  at  Sacramento,  California. 

The  Celebration  of  the  Opening  of  the  Hennepin  Canal  at  Sterling, 
Illinois. 

The  Trans-Mississippi  Congress  at  Muskogee,  Oklahoma. 

The  Atlantic  Deeper  Waterways  Conference  at  Philadelphia. 

The  Drainage  Congress  at  Baltimore. 


AGITATION  FOR  WATERWAYS  3 

no  cessation  of  activity.  Rather  the  agitation  became  pro- 
gressively enthusiastic,  almost  violent,  especially  in  the 
Middle  West,  —  culminating  in  the  Deep  Waterways  Con- 
vention at  New  Orleans  late  in  October  of  1909.  Another 
holiday  party,  led  by  St.  Louis  business  men,  floated  down 
the  Mississippi,  with  President  Taft  and  Speaker  Cannon 
the  honored  guests  in  place  of  Mr.  Roosevelt.  Tremen- 
dous enthusiasm  marked  the  daily  sessions  of  the  meeting. 
Five  thousand  delegates  at  the  greatest  popular  conven- 
tion ever  assembled  in  America  were  there  to  declare 
their  unchangeable  conviction  that  construction  should 
be  begun  at  once  on  a  channel  "fourteen  feet  through  the 
valley."  Impatient  criticism  of  opposition  and  dogmatic 
assertion  of  feasibility  characterized  the  addresses.  The 
telegram  of  Governor  Ansell  of  South  Carolina  to  the 
convention  seemed  to  sound  the  keynote:  "We  want  water, 
more  water,  and  deeper  water."  The  issue  of  the  conven- 
tion was  a  long  series  of  resolutions,  drawn  up  in  Jeffer- 
sonian  phraseology,  demanding  of  Congress  financial  aid 
for  the  immediate  construction  of  the  waterway.  "To  the 
enforcement  of  this  demand"  —  the  resolutions  concluded 
—  "we  pledge  our  individual  effort  and  our  united  support, 
and  we  hereby  publicly  pledge  our  personal  honor,  each 
for  himself,  and  to  each  other,  to  support  no  candidate  for 
public  office  who  will  not  unqualifiedly  indorse  and  main- 
tain that  policy." 

The  Rivers  and  Harbors  Congress,  which  met  at  Wash- 
ington in  December,  1909,  for  the  purpose  of  demanding 
enormous  appropriations,  or  bond  issues,  for  waterway 
development,  met  with  a  decided  rebuff.  Influenced  by 
the  unfavorable  Engineers'  Report  on  the  Lakes-to-Gulf 
proposition,  and  confronted  with  a  delicate  political  situa- 

The  Gulf  States  Waterway  Convention  at  Birmingham,  Alabama. 
The  Ohio  Improvement  Association  Meeting  at  Wheeling,  West  Vir- 
ginia. 
The  National  Rivers  and  Harbors  Congress  at  Washington. 


4  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

tion,  President  Taft  announced  that  he  would  veto  any 
waterway  measures  that  might  then  be  presented.  In  the 
summer  of  1909  the  National  Waterways  Commission, 
appointed  by  President  Taft,  visited  Europe  and  investi- 
gated transportation  conditions  on  the  Continent.  A  pre- 
liminary report  was  submitted  to  Congress  by  Chairman 
Burton  in  January,  1910.  This  report  placed  somewhat 
of  a  damper  upon  the  enthusiasm,  or  at  least  checked  the 
possibility  of  the  immediate  Government  appropriations 
that  were  demanded.  The  Lakes-to-Gulf  Association 
meeting  in  St.  Louis  in  October,  1910,  resulted  in  a 
fierce  factional  fight  over  the  question  whether  the  State 
of  Illinois  or  the  National  Government  should  assume  the 
lead  in  making  appropriations  for  the  waterway;  while  at 
the  Chicago  meeting  a  year  later  the  chief  bone  of  conten- 
tion was  whether  resolutions  should  be  drawn  up  in  criti- 
cism of  the  President's  apparent  apathy  in  regard  to  water- 
way improvement.  All  factions  were,  however,  united  in 
depicting  the  benefits  to  come  from  the  carrying-out  of  the 
great  project. 

The  year  1911,  however,  was  in  general  more  encour- 
aging to  the  advocates  of  waterway  improvement.  Con- 
gress gave  sanction  to  a  scheme  for  improving  the  Ohio 
River  at  a  cost  of  approximately  $60,000,000,  and  made 
appropriations  for  the  commencement  of  the  work.  And 
in  a  message  to  Congress  late  in  the  year  President  Taft 
expressed  himself  as  favorable  to  an  early  undertaking  of 
the  Lakes-to-Gulf  project.  While  there  may  be  now  and 
then  a  lull  in  the  storm,  the  waterways  movement  is 
nevertheless  firmly  rooted,  and  will  command  attention 
for  years  to  come.  A  large  number  of  waterway  associa- 
tions^ are  active  propagandists  and  supporters  of  water- 

^  They  are:  — 

The  Western  Waterways  Association  —  embracing  the  entire  Missis- 
sippi Valley. 

The  Lake  Carriers  Association  —  for  the  furthering  of  all  shipping 
interests  connected  with  the  Great  Lakes. 


AGITATION  FOR  WATERWAYS  5 

way  development.  These  may  be  relied  upon  to  keep  up 
a  constant  agitation;  and  they  give  an  aspect  of  perma- 
nency to  the  movement  which  would  not  exist  in  the 
absence  of  organization. 

2.  The  projects  that  are  talked  of,  written  of,  and 
dreamed  of  are  well-nigh  too  many  for  enumeration.  It  is 
quite  impossible  to  give  an  accurate  description  of  all  the 
waterway  schemes  before  the  country  for  the  reason  that 
many  of  them  are  ill-defined  and  more  or  less  chimerical. 
There  are,  however,  a  large  number  of  projects  which  have 
taken  definite  shape  and  which  may  be  grouped  to  show 
the  tremendous  extent  of  the  movement.  These  are  given 
below  with  sufBcient  data  to  indicate  their  nature  and 
importance:  ^  — 

1.  Lakes-to-Gulf  Deep  Waterway. 

A  channel  fourteen  feet  deep,  connecting  Lake  Michigan 
with  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  via  the  Chicago  Drainage  Canal,  the 
Illinois  and  the  Mississippi  Rivers.  Already  $55,000,000 
has  been  expended  in  the  State  of  Illinois.  The  estimated 
further  expenditure  is  $159,000,000. 

A  ship  canal  twenty-four  feet  deep  is  the  ultimate  goal,  but 
no  engineering  estimates  of  the  probable  cost  have  yet  been 

The  Lakes-to-Gulf  Deep  Waterways  Association  —  for  the  connect- 
ing of  the  Great  Lakes  with  the  Gulf  of  Mexico. 

The   Atlantic   Deeper   Waterways   Association  —  devoted   to   the 
waterways  of  the  Atlantic  Coast. 

The  Interstate  Inland  Waterways  Association  —  embracing  mainly 
Texas  and  Louisiana. 

The  Upper  Mississippi  River  Improvement  Association. 

The  Ohio  Valley  Improvement  Association. 

The  Interstate  Mississippi  River  Levee  Association  —  covering  the 
territory  from  Cairo  to  the  Gulf. 

The  Columbia  River  Improvement  Association. 

A  host  of  other  smaller  river  improvement  associations  in  the  South 
and  West. 
^  While  all  of  these  are  by  no  means  new  projects,  they  are  beinp 
pushed  now  as  never  before  with  the  cry,  "We  have  waited  long  enough; 
it  is  time  to  act." 


6  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

made.  The  Government  engineers,  however,  urge  that  a  depth 
of  eight  feet  is  preferable  to  either  of  the  deeper  channels. 

2.  Upper  Mississippi  River  Improvement. 

Canalization  of  the  Mississippi  River  from  St.  Paul  to  St. 
Louis,  there  to  connect  with  the  Lakes-to-Gulf  waterway. 
The  estimated  cost  is  $53,000,000  for  a  depth  of  six  feet. 

3.  Missouri  River  Improvement. 

Canalization  of  the  Missouri  River  from  Kansas  City  to 
Sioux  City.  The  estimated  cost  of  the  improvement  is 
$43,500,000.  From  Sioux  City  to  Fort  Benton,  $40,000,000 
more. 

4.  Ohio  River  Improvement. 

Canalization  of  the  Ohio  River  for  its  entire  length.  The 
estimated  expenditure  is  $63,000,000  for  a  depth  of  nine  feet. 
The  project  was  authorized  by  Congress  in  1911. 
6.  Lake  Michigan  to  Lake  Erie. 

A  canal  connecting  the  southern  end  of  Lake  Michigan 
with  Lake  Erie  in  order  to  avoid  the  long  lake  route  via  the 
Straits  of  Mackinac.  The  estimated  cost  is  $100,000,000. 

6.  The  Grand  and  Saginaw  Valleys'  Waterway. 

A  canal  across  central  Michigan,  connecting  Lake  Michi- 
gan with  Lake  Huron  via  Grand  and  Saginaw  Rivers.  The 
estimated  cost  is  $20,000,000. 

7.  Eric  Barge  Canal. 

Deepening  of  the  present  Erie  Canal  from  seven  to  twelve 
feet.  The  State  of  New  York  in  1903  voted  an  expenditure  of 
$101,000,000  for  the  project.  The  work  of  construction  is  well 
under  way.  It  is  expected  to  be  completed  by  the  end  of  1914. 

8.  Lakes-to-Atlantic  Deep  Waterway. 

A  ship  canal  from  the  Great  Lakes  to  the  Atlantic  Ocean, 
probably  by  the  present  Erie  route.  The  estimated  cost  is  in 
round  numbers  $200,000,000.  This  has  probably  been  aban- 
doned for  all  time  now  that  the  barge  canal  project  has  been 
decided  upon. 

9.  Lake  Erie  and  Ohio  River  Ship  Canal. 

A  canal  fourteen  feet  deep  from  the  mouth  of  Beaver  River, 
twenty-six  miles  below  Pittsburg,  to  Indian  Creek  on  Lake 
Erie,  a  distance  of  103  miles.  The  estimated  cost  is  $53,000,- 
000.  A  private  company  has  been  chartered  for  this  purpose, 
but  the  work  of  construction  has  never  been  started. 


AGITATION  FOR  WATERWAYS  7 

10.  New  York,  Brockton,  and  Boston  Waterway. 

A  canal  twenty-five  feet  deep  from  Boston  through  Brock- 
ton and  Fall  River  to  Narragansett  Bay.  The  estimated  cost 
is  $50,000,000,  and  no  Government  aid  is  asked.  A  private 
corporation  has  been  chartered  for  the  purpose,  but  no  work 
has  been  done. 

11.  Boston  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico. 

An  Atlantic  Coast  inland  waterway  which  will  cost  more 
than  $100,000,000.  It  has  the  following  divisions:  — 

a.  Cape  Cod  Canal. 

A  ship  canal  twenty-five  feet  deep  across  Cape  Cod,  a 
distance  of  eight  miles.  The  estimated  cost  is  $12,000,000. 
Construction  work  has  been  begun  by  the  Cape  Cod  and 
New  York  Canal  Company,  a  private  corporation. 

b.  Rhode  Island  Canal. 

A  canal  connecting  Narragansett  Bay  with  Long  Island 
Sound,  a  distance  of  thirty-one  miles,  of  which  twenty- 
four  miles  is  now  flowed  by  tide  water. 

c.  Delaware  and  Raritan  Canal. 

Deepening  and  widening  of  the  present  Delaware  and 
Raritan  Canal,  connecting  New  York  with  the  Delaware 
River,  a  distance  of  thirty-one  miles.  It  is  estimated  that 
a  channel  twenty  feet  deep  will  cost  $15,000,000. 

d.  Delaware  and  Chesapeake  Canal. 

An  enlargement  of  the  old  Delaware  and  Chesapeake 
Canal,  connecting  Delaware  and  Chesapeake  Bays.  The 
estimated  cost  for  a  ship  canal  thirty  feet  deep  is  $17,- 
312,000. 

e.  Norfolk  and  Beaufort  Inlet  Waterway. 

A  canal  connecting  Chesapeake  Bay  and  Beaufort  Inlet, 
North  Carolina,  a  distance  of  204  miles.  It  would  avoid 
the  dangers  off  Capes  Hatteras  and  Lookout.  The  esti- 
mated cost  for  a  depth  of  ten  feet  is  $2,500,000,  and  for  a 
ship  canal,  $35,000,000.  Congress  appropriated  $550,000 
for  the  project  in  1907  and  construction  is  now  under 
way. 
/.  Beaufort  Inlet  to  Jacksonville,  Florida. 

A  protected  waterway  for  more  than  three  hundred  miles 
along  the  Carolina  and  Georgia  coasts.  A  small  amount  of 
dredging  will  give  a  depth  of  six  feet  for  the  entire  distance. 


8  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

g.  Jacksonville  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico. 

A  waterway  five  hundred  miles  long  across  Florida, 
utilizing  the  St.  Johns  and  Oklawaha  Rivers.  It  is  already 
open  for  a  distance  of  326  miles  at  a  depth  of  six  feet. 

12.  Interstate  Inland  Waterway. 

A  waterway  nine  feet  deep  connecting  the  numerous  bays, 
passes,  and  lakes  along  the  Gulf  Coast,  and  extending  from 
near  the  month  of  the  Rio  Grande  River  to  the  Missis- 
sippi at  Donaldsonville,  Louisiana.  The  estimated  cost  is 
$4,000,000.   It  is  already  under  construction. 

13.  Trinity  River  Improvement. 

Canalization  of  the  Trinity  River  in  Texas  from  Dallas  to 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  a  distance  of  fifty-one  miles.  The  esti- 
mated cost  for  a  depth  of  six  feet  is  $6,000,000. 

14.  Sabine  Lake  Ship  Canal. 

A  canal  ten  feet  deep,  with  a  hope  of  twenty-five  feet 
eventually,  from  Sabine  Lake  in  eastern  Texas  to  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico,  Congress  appropriated  $536,500  in  1904,  and  the 
work  of  construction  has  been  commenced. 

15.  Black  Warrior  and  Tombigbee  Rivers'  Improvement. 

Canalization  of  these  rivers  to  obtain  navigation  from  the 
Alabama  coal-fields  to  Mobile  Bay.  The  estimated  cost  is 
$6,000,000. 

16.  The  Atlantic  and  Great  Western  Waterway. 

A  waterway  connecting  St.  Louis,  Missouri,  with  Bruns- 
wick, Georgia,  n'a  the  Mississippi,  Ohio,  Tennessee,  Ocmulgee, 
and  Altamaha  Rivers,  through  the  heart  of  the  South,  a  dis- 
tance of  1508  miles,  of  which  265  miles  would  consist  of 
canal  and  of  slack-water  navigation.  It  is  estimated  that 
a  depth  of  five  feet  would  cost  $40,000,000. 

17.  Columbia  River  Improvement. 

Canalization  of  the  Columbia  River  above,  and  a  canal 
with  locks  around,  the  Dalles. 

The  above  cost  estimates  are  merely  tentative,  and  in 
most  part  are  not  based  on  careful  engineering  investiga- 
tions. They  may  possibly  be  excessive;  but  the  history  of 
public  expenditures  would  rather  lead  one  to  believe  that 
they  are  much  too  low.   It  is  a  part  of  political  wisdom 


AGITATION  FOR  WATERWAYS  9 

for  those  who  seek  government  subsidies  to  have  their 
demands  appear  moderate.  At  any  rate,  the  amounts 
are  staggering  enough.  In  addition,  almost  every  little 
stream  and  creek  in  the  land  perennially  asks  modestly 
for  its  handful  of  aid  from  the  "pork  barrel"  appro- 
priation for  waterway  development.  And  besides  all  of 
these  projects,  which  are  mainly  in  the  nature  of  special 
and  sectional  interests,  comprehensive  plans  for  the  sys- 
tematic nationalization  of  our  waterways,  for  the  connec- 
tion of  all  our  lakes  and  rivers,  forming  one  grand  system 
of  standard  depth,  are  here  and  there  outlined.  Any  esti- 
mate of  the  cost  of  such  an  undertaking  cannot  be  given. 
It  belongs  to  the  field  of  speculation. 

The  sudden  recurrence  of  the  movement  for  the  devel- 
opment of  internal  waterways  in  this  country,  the  remark- 
able extent  and  earnestness  of  the  agitation,  and  the  tre- 
mendous money  outlays  contemplated,  may  well  bid  us 
pause  before  taking  up  the  question  of  feasibility,  to  in- 
quire what  are  the  causes  that  have  precipitated  so  re- 
markable a  movement. 


CHAPTER  II 

CAUSES    OF    THE    REVIVAL 

1.  It  is  always  diflScult,  at  the  time  of  a  great  popular  agi- 
tation, to  assign  accurate  values  to  the  many  causes  under- 
lying it.  Consequently,  no  attempt  will  be  made  here  to 
weigh  the  forces  in  this  movement  for  the  resuscitation  of 
our  waterways.  There  has  been  a  conjunction  of  influ- 
ences, however,  which  should  be  understood  before  we 
can  hope  to  discuss  intelligently  the  feasibility  of  water- 
way development.  No  attempt  will  be  made  in  this  chap- 
ter to  pass  judgment  upon  any  phase  of  the  movement. 
The  effort  will  be  merely  to  analyze  the  present  situation 
in  the  hope  that  it  may  help  to  clarify  subsequent  discus- 
sion. 

The  revival  of  the  agitation  for  waterways  is  a  part  of 
the  general  movement  for  the  conservation  of  our  national 
resources.  Until  the  last  decade  American  orators  and 
writers  have  almost  universally  regarded  our  resources  as 
unlimited  in  extent.  But  we  have  recently  been  forced  to 
face  the  cold  fact  that  there  is  a  limit  to  the  prodigality  of 
nature,  even  in  America,  that  we  are  not  a  country  of  "in- 
exhaustible resources,"  and  that  out  of  regard  to  poster- 
ity extravagant  waste  must  be  checked.  The  nation  has 
paused  at  last  to  reflect,  and  to  lament  the  waste  and  wreck- 
age strewn  along  the  pathway  of  its  progress.  Our  water- 
ways are  conspicuous  reminders  of  our  improvident  past. 
"At  Cincinnati  and  Pittsburg  hundreds  of  boats  have 
given  place  to  tens.  Where  once  on  the  Missouri  there 
were  sixty,  there  now  remains  but  one  to  remind  us  of  the 
departed  glory  of  our  waterways.  Along  our  wharves  — 
old  gang-planks,  anchors,  and  broken  machinery  are  tan- 


CAUSES  OF  THE  REVIVAL  11 

gled  in  the  grass  growing  in  the  crevices  between  the  cob- 
blestones." ^  Railways  parallel  the  banks  of  great  rivers, 
deserted  save  for  a  few  small  boats  of  uncertain  schedule,  or 
run  in  the  very  channels  of  abandoned  canals.  Such  spec- 
tacles compel  reflection,  and  they  recall  the  early  days  of 
water  transportation  in  this  country.  There  is  a  lingering 
glory  about  our  great  navigable  rivers  and  inland  seas  that 
is  not  easy  to  dissipate.  The  waters  which  led  Marquette 
and  La  Salle  to  the  heart  of  an  unexplored  continent,  the 
rivers  which  carried  the  American  pioneer  beyond  the 
Alleghanies  to  the  great  Middle  West,  and  on  whose  banks 
he  built  his  home  and  reared  his  family,  are  associated 
with  a  most  romantic  history. 

Fiu-thermore,  a  vast  amount  of  money  has  already  been 
expended  upon  our  rivers  and  upon  artificial  canals.  At 
present  this  is  largely  wasted  investment;  and  it  will  prove 
almost  a  total  loss  unless  more  be  added  to  it,  and  our 
waterways  fully  developed.  Then,  it  is  believed,  the  whole 
will  yield  large  financial  returns.  Consequently,  we  should 
conserve  the  work  already  done. 

2.  Associated  with  the  development  of  our  waterways 
for  transportation  purposes,  and  for  consequent  rapid  in- 
dustrial development,  are  various  by-effects  which  play  an 
important  part  in  the  current  thought  and  agitation. 

The  deepening  and  improving  of  our  rivers  would  purify 
our  water  supply.  This  is  of  great  importance  for  indus- 
trial and  sanitary  purposes.  Many  lines  of  manufacture, 
such  as  paper,  woolens,  distilleries,  creameries,  etc.,  are 
greatly  benefited  by  a  supply  of  pure  water;  while  the  im- 
portance of  pure  water  for  public  health  is  inestimable. 

The  building  of  canals  and  the  improving  of  rivers,  it  is 

thought,  would  make  possible  the  development  of  large 

amounts  of  water  power,  the  sale  of  which  would  in  a  few 

years  cover  the  entire  cost  of  the  water  routes.    Governor 

1  Moody's  Magazine,  December,  1907. 


12  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

Denecn  and  the  supporters  of  the  Lockport-to-Utica  divi- 
sion of  the  Lakes-to-Gulf  Deep  Waterway  estimate  that 
the  $20,000,000  bond  issue  voted  by  the  people  of  Illinois 
can  be  paid  off  in  the  short  space  of  fourteen  years  from  a 
sinking  fund  derived  from  the  sale  of  water  power  along 
the  canal,  ^  The  chief  hydrographer  of  the  United  States 
has  estimated  that  the  power  developed  along  the  Ohio 
River  alone,  if  his  reservoir  system  be  established,^  would 
yield  a  three  per  cent  income  on  $73,000,000.^ 

The  improvement  of  our  waterways  is  further  urged  as 
a  preventiA'e  of  floods,  and  the  consequent  annual  loss  of 
property  and  life,  especially  in  the  valley  of  the  Missis- 
sippi. With  this  would  come  the  reclamation  of  great  areas 
of  riparian  lands,  at  present  valueless  because  of  the  peri- 
odic overflows  and  inundations,  but  of  incomparable  rich- 
ness for  agricultural  purposes. 

3.  There  is  a  well-nigh  universal  belief  that  water  trans- 
portation is  very  much  cheaper  than  transportation  by 
land.  The  argument  for  cheap  transportation  seems  to  be, 
indeed,  the  chief  of  reasons  advanced  in  favor  of  waterways. 
And  it  may  well  be  argued  that  the  fundamental  considera- 
tion should  be  that  of  cost.  Various  estimates  of  the  great 
reduction  in  transportation  charges  to  be  eflfected  by 
means  of  waterways  have  been  made.  The  following  quo- 
tation well  illustrate  the  general  belief:  "  From  the  best 
information  I  can  get,  after  a  careful  study  of  the  subject, 
I  am  convinced  that  waterway  transportation  in  this  coun- 
try, under  favorable  conditions,  costs  about  one  sixth  as 
much  as  the  average  cost  by  rail."^  The  estimated  cost  of 

'  Prospectus  of  the  Plan  proposed  by  the  Internal  Improvement  Com- 
mission of  Illinois.    For  a  criticism  thereof,  see  chapter  xiv. 

*  Preliminary  Report  of  the  Inland  Waterways  Commission,  pp.  451-87. 
»  Ibid.,  p.  490. 

*  U.  S.  Representative  Joseph  E.  Ransdell,  President  of  the  National 
Rivers  and  Harbors  Congress.  Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of  Politi- 
tal  and  Social  Science,  vol.  31,  y.  39. 


CAUSES  OF  THE  REVIVAL  13 

carrying  upon  the  Erie  Barge  Canal,  now  being  con- 
structed, is  .52  mills  per  ton-mile.  Statistics  of  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  for  1903  show  that  the  aver- 
age freight  rate  per  ton-mile  received  by  the  railroads  was 
7.5  mills.  Transportation  by  rail,  therefore,  it  is  urged,  is 
some  fourteen  times  more  costly  than  by  water.  ^  If  this  be 
true,  national  economy  would  certainly  justify  the  devel- 
opment of  water  transportation  facilities. 

4.  Accompanying  the  belief  that  water  transportation 
is  inherently  more  economical  than  railway  transportation 
is  the  conviction  that  the  railroads,  having  monopolized 
the  transportation  of  the  country,  are  charging  extortion- 
ate rates,  which  an  unwilling  but  helpless  public  must  pay. 
It  is  pointed  out  that  wherever  railroads  are  subjected  to 
water  competition  the  rates  are  substantially  lower  than 
elsewhere;  that  the  winter  rates  on  grain  from  Buffalo  to 
New  York  are  about  one  cent  a  bushel  higher  than  when 
the  Erie  Canal  is  open.  The  railways  should  therefore  be 
subjected  to  competition  from  Government  waterways. 
Whether  the  waterways  carry  the  traffic  or  not,  the  po- 
tential water  competition  will  force  the  railroads  to^  carry 
at  a  low  rate,  to  the  benefit  of  American  shippers.  Water- 
ways are,  consequently,  a  means  of  railroad  rate  regula- 
tion. President  Roosevelt  said,  in  his  Memphis  address 
in  October  of  1907,  —  "Wherever  a  navigable  river  runs 
beside  railroads,  the  problem  of  regulating  the  rates  on  the 
railroads  becomes  far  easier,  because  river  regulation  is 
rate  regulation."  ^  President  Taft,  in  a  message  to  Con- 
gress,^  reemphasized  this  feature.  Speaking  of  the  rivers 
and  canals  of  Europe,  he  said  that  "it  is  certain  that  the 
existence  of  such  methods  of  traffic  materially  aflFects  the 

^  Moody^s  Magazine,  August,  1907. 

*  Annals  0/  the  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science,  vol. 
81.  p.  3. 

*  January  14,  1910. 


14         WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

rates  which  the  railroads  charge,  and  it  is  the  best  regula- 
tor of  those  rates  that  we  have,  not  even  excepting  the 
governmental  regulation  through  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission." 

5.  Again,  it  is  often  maintained  that  waterways  and  rail- 
ways, rather  than  compete  for  the  same  traffic,  should 
complement  each  other,  to  their  mutual  advantage,  and  of 
course  to  the  benefit  of  the  shipping  public.  That  is,  the 
waterways  should  carry  the  heavy,  bulky,  and  slow-mov- 
ing traffic,  and  the  railroads  should  specialize  on  the  higher 
grades  of  commodities.  Thus  relieved  of  the  heavy  traffic, 
which,  it  is  said,  they  must  carry  at  small  profit,  the  rail- 
ways would  be  given  the  opportunity  of  devoting  their 
efforts  to  the  developing  of  the  better  paying  classes  of 
freight.  The  railroads  should  accordingly  favor  the  con- 
struction of  waterways.  And,  in  fact,  some  railroad  men 
are  not  opposed  to  the  movement.  In  a  speech  which  has 
been  everywhere  quoted  and  which  has  given  great  im- 
petus to  the  movement  for  waterways,  James  J.  Hill  said 
that  he  was  glad  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  the  relation  of 
the  railways  to  waterways  "is  one  of  harmony,  of  help- 
fulness, and  of  cooperation."  * 

This  idea  of  a  harmony  of  interests  in  transportation 
agencies  had  its  beginning  in  this  country  in  the  conges- 
tion of  traffic  preceding  the  panic  of  1907.  The  railways  at 
that  time  were  unable  to  meet  the  demands  made  upon 
them,  and  their  operations,  along  with  those  of  the  entire 
industrial  machinery  of  the  country,  were  seriously  ham- 
pered. It  was  easy  under  such  conditions  to  draw  the  con- 
clusion that  water  transportation  facilities  would  be  an 
aid,  rather  than  a  hindrance,  to  the  railroads.  The  be- 
lief has  spread  generally  that  the  railway  service  of  the 
country  has  broken  down,  and  has  failed  to  keep  apace  of 

>  Address  before  the  Lakes-to-Gulf  Deep  Waterway  Association  at  the 
•Chicago  Conveotion,  October  8,  1908. 


CAUSES  OF  THE  REVIVAL  15 

expanding  business.  Unquestionably  there  was  gross  in- 
adequacy of  service  at  the  height  of  the  prosperity  period. 
Cars  were  not  to  be  had  at  any  cost,  produce  could  not  be 
marketed,  and  everywhere  industries  suffered  for  want  of 
transportation  means.  Mr.  Hill  concretely  stated  the  sit- 
uation, when  he  called  attention  to  the  fact  that,  "in  the 
ten  years  between  1895  and  1905,  the  railroad  mileage  of  the 
country  had  increased  but  21  per  cent,  while  the  passenger 
business  had  grown  95  per  cent  and  the  freight  business 
118  per  cent.  By  the  decade  ending  in  1907  the  increase 
of  mileage  as  compared  with  1897  had  crept  up  to  24.7 
per  cent;  but  in  the  same  time  the  increase  in  passenger 
business  had  leaped  to  126.1  per  cent,  and  that  of  freight 
traffic  to  148.7  per  cent."  ^  There  would  seem,  then,  to  be 
an  imperative  need  for  increased  means  of  transportation. 

6.  Finally,  the  example  of  foreign  waterways  has  had  a 
great  influence  upon  the  movement  in  this  country.  It  is 
well  known  that  in  Germany,  France,  and  Belgium  water- 
ways have  continually  served  as  public  carriers.  They 
exist  along  with  the  railroads,  complements  one  of  the 
other.  The  Manchester  Ship  Canal  is  said  to  have  solved 
the  great  transportation  problem  of  that  city,  and  through- 
out England  there  has  been  for  some  time  a  movement  for 
the  resuscitation  of  inland  waterways.  Vast  sums  of  money 
have  been  spent  upon  these  European  waterways,  with 
success  apparently  sufficient  to  warrant  the  present  in- 
creasing appropriations  in  nearly  every  country  on  the 
Continent.  Nearer  home,  Canada  is  bestirring  herself,  and 
planning  a  great  ship  canal  to  the  Lakes.  If  waterways  are 
successful  abroad,  it  is  reasoned  that  they  should  prove 
likewise  successful  in  America.  It  is  accordingly  urged 
that  we  should  no  longer  lag  far  behind  other  countries; 
we  should  not  continue  the  suicidal  policy  of  permitting 
our  great  natural  highways  to  lie  neglected.  Efficient 
*  Hill,  Address,  ibid. 


16  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

transportation  facilities  mean  much  in  the  race  for  in- 
dustriul  supremacy.  The  United  States  must,  therefore, 
awake  ami  utilize  her  twenty-five  thousand  miles  of  navi- 
gable waters. 

7.  Again,  the  very  great  part  waterways  have  played  in 
the  development  of  our  own  country  is  used  as  a  strong  ar- 
gument for  their  continued  support.  In  our  early  history 
they  long  served  as  the  chief  unifying  agencies  in  our  na- 
tional life  as  well  as  the  great  avenues  of  commerce.  Where 
canals  were  built,  villages  and  cities  sprang  up  as  by  magic, 
wealth  poured  into  the  contiguous  territory,  and  industry 
thrived  in  the  entire  region.  To-day,  the  inhabitants 
along  proposed  water  routes  again  see  visions  of  reviving 
industries,  of  booming  towns  and  cities,  of  fleets  of  barges 
laden  with  the  commodities  of  commerce  borne  swiftly  along 
upon  the  surface  of  the  waters.  It  is  an  alluring  picture; 
and  it  is  widely  believed  that  all  that  is  needed  to  make 
that  picture  a  reality  is  the  improving  and  connecting  of 
our  rivers  and  lakes. 

The  benefits  to  accrue  to  all  classes  of  society  are  set 
forth  in  detail  in  the  reports  of  practically  every  water- 
way association.  A  quotation  from  one  will  serve  for  all :  — 

To  your  entire  business  interests  it  means  cheaper  freight 
rates.  To  the  manufacturer  it  means  direct  touch  with  the  great 
markets  of  the  South  and  Southwest,  by  a  cheap,  dependable, 
competing,  and  at  all  times  freight-regulating  route  for  their  fin- 
ished output  and  the  cheaper  assembling  of  their  raw  materials. 

To  the  wholesaler  and  jobber  it  means  opportunity  for  the 
extension  of  trade.  It  means  that  the  great  markets  of  commerce 
will  be  open  to  them  to  make  of  such  opportunity  what  they  will. 

To  the  retailer  it  means  increased  population,  increased  oppor- 
tunity and  an  expansion  in  business  beyond  any  limit  now  pos- 
sible. 

To  the  wage-earner  it  means  dwelling  in  a  prosperous  district 
under  most  advantageous  conditions;  an  increase  of  opportunity 
and  lower  cost  of  living.  To  the  man  who  owns  a  little  home  would 


CAUSES  OF  THE  REVIVAL  17 

come  a  rise  in  value  that  would  make  him  more  independent,  and, 
with  greater  security  of  steady  and  remunerative  employment, 
he  could  further  improve  his  surroundings. 

To  the  landowner  and  real-estate  dealer  there  will  come  a 
greater  demand,  and  with  greater  demand  greater  valuation  and 
greater  sales. 

It  will  mean  that  your  city  will  be  a  greater  and  more  prosper- 
ous city,  a  better  one  to  live  in. 

Much  as  it  will  mean  to  all  other  classes  throughout  the  entire 
valley  of  the  Ohio,  the  farming  interests  will  be  the  greatest 
beneficiary.  Indeed,  as  agriculture  is  the  foundation  of  all 
industrial  and  commercial  growth,  it  is  first  affected.  It  will 
mean  increased  markets  and  better  and  surer  prices;  it  will  mean 
greater  earning  capacity;  greater  social  and  educational  advan- 
tages, through  increased  wealth.  The  growth  of  the  cities  along 
the  river  will  ever  assure  a  home  market  for  home  produce  and 
elimination  of  freight  charges  now  deducted  from  receipts  for 
long  hauls  over  the  railroads.^ 

8.  There  is  still  another  element  in  this  movement,  to 
which  attention  should  be  called.  Though  it  must  be  re- 
garded as  an  emanation  from  the  movement,  rather  than 
as  an  underlying  cause,  it  is  none  the  less  an  active  force. 
Good  statecraft  requires  constant  feeling  of  the  public 
pulse  and  active  support  of  the  popular  vrill.  Accordingly, 
whenever  a  movement  shows  evidence  of  coming  popu- 
larity, the  wise  politician  devotes  himself  immediately  to 
the  agitation  of  the  question,  and  inaugurates  forthwith  a 
great  campaign  of  education.  Interested  parties,  contract- 
ors hoping  to  be  permitted  to  build  the  works,  and  special 
interests  directly  to  be  benefited,  join  hands  with  the  poli- 
ticians in  educating  the  public  to  its  needs.  A  flood  of  liter- 
ature is  spread  broadcast,  and  oratorical  effusion,  perhaps 
less  patriotic  than  political  and  pecuniary,  is  heard  on  every 
hand,  until  the  populace  reaches  a  high  state  of  enthusi- 
asm. The  waterways  movement  is  no  exception  to  the  rule. 

*  Proceedings  of  the  Fifteenth  Annual  Convention  of  the  Ohio  Valley  Inu 
pavement  Association,  Cincinnati,  Ohio,  October  14  and  15, 1909,  p.  9. 


CHAPTER  III 

ANALYSIS   OP  CURRENT  ARGUMENTS 

1.  In  the  minds  of  many  people  the  feasibility  of  waterway 
development  in  the  United  States  is  hardly  a  debatable 
proposition.  The  arguments  which  were  briefly  sketched 
in  the  preceding  chapter  have  been  widely  accepted  by  the 
general  public  as  conclusive  evidence  of  the  need  of  restor- 
ing water  transportation  in  this  country.  There  has  been 
no  really  scientific  investigation  of  the  subject,  and,  as  the 
present  chapter  will  show,  many  of  the  arguments  that 
have  been  advanced  are  entirely  fallacious.  The  reader 
should  bear  in  mind  that  no  attempt  is  here  being  made  to 
arrive  at  final  conclusions.  The  intent  is  merely  to  demon- 
strate the  need  of  a  scientific  study  of  the  question,  and 
to  prepare  the  way  for  the  detailed  discussion  which  is  to 
follow. 

2.  As  has  been  noted,  one  of  the  chief  causes  of  the  agi- 
tation in  favor  of  waterways  is  the  belief  that  the  railway 
service  has  become  inadequate  to  meet  the  transportation 
needs  of  the  country.  Beginning  in  1898  and  lasting  till 
1907  the  United  States  experienced  a  period  of  the  most 
remarkable  prosperity  ever  known.  Year  after  year  of 
bountiful  harvests  gave  a  basis  for  extended  operations  in 
every  branch  of  industry.  Production  in  all  lines,  anticipa- 
tive  of  growing  demands,  was  pushed  as  never  before,  and 
wealth  increased  with  amazing  rapidity.  In  fact,  the  re- 
markable material  prosperity  had  developed  a  situation 
which  was  overtaxing  the  machinery  of  the  entire  industrial 
system;  and  it  required  a  financial  panic  and  serious  indus- 


ANALYSIS  OF  CURRENT  ARGUMENTS     19 

trial  depression  to  restore  more  normal  conditions.  It  was 
at  the  height  of  this  period  of  unusual  production  that  the 
railways  were  unable  to  meet  the  needs  of  trafEc,  The 
transporting  facilities  of  the  country  were  unquestionably 
overtaxed. 

Furthermore,  during  these  years  there  developed  an 
agitation  against  the  railways  which  led  to  wholesale  legis- 
lation tending  toward  lower  rates  and  stricter  Government 
supervision.  Whether  the  antagonism  to  the  railroads  was 
justified  and  whether  the  legislation  was  wise  or  not,  is 
apart  from  the  present  consideration.  The  fact,  however, 
that  within  a  period  of  five  years,  from  1902  to  1907,  thirty- 
three  states  enacted  a  total  of  three  hundred  and  thirty- 
four  laws  affecting  railroads,  as  to  car  service,  train  serv- 
ice and  connections,  maximum  passenger  and  freight  rates, 
and  general  corporate  affairs,  does  have  a  direct  bear- 
ing upon  the  situation  in  question.  This  legislation  had 
little  scientific  basis,  and  it  varied  as  the  number  of  states 
passing  regulative  acts.  In  addition  to  the  activity  of  the 
various  states  at  this  time,  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission was  given  increased  powers,  and  federal  regulation 
became  far  more  efficient  than  it  had  been  hitherto.  The 
result  of  all  this  hostile  legislation  was  to  render  railway 
investment  precarious,  and  at  the  very  time  when  there 
was  the  greatest  demand  for  new  lines  of  road,  double 
tracks,  better  terminal  facilities,  and  more  rolling-stock,  the 
railways  found  it  hardest  to  secure  funds  with  which  to 
extend  their  operations.  And  it  was  the  large  investors  who 
were  the  most  chary  of  railway  investments;  they  feared 
the  results  of  restrictive  legislation  upon  the  earning  power 
of  roads. 

Thus  in  two  ways  were  the  railways  confronted  with  an 
unusual  situation.  There  was  an  abnormal  amount  of 
traffic  to  be  handled,  and  it  was  abnormally  difficult  to 
secure  the  funds  necessary  to  meet  the  increased  needs  of 
traffic.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  congestion  on  the 


20 


WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 


railways  was  rendered  exceptionally  severe  by  this  coinci- 
dence of  events.  It  will  be  interesting  now  to  consider  the 
evidence  that  has  been  brought  forward  in  proof  of  the 
contention  that  we  can  no  longer  depend  upon  the  railways; 
and  that  the  breakdown  is  permanent. 

The  belief  that  the  railways  are  failing  to  meet  the  trans- 
portation needs  of  the  country  in  a  satisfactory  manner  is 
apparently  based  on  the  well-known  statement  of  James 
J.  Hill  ■  that,  in  the  ten  years  from  1895  to  1905,  population 
grew  more  rapidly  than  the  number  of  miles  of  single  track 
and  that  the  growth  of  traffic  was  out  of  all  proportion  to 
the  increase  in  railway  mileage  in  this  country.  These  sta- 
tistics appear  significant  at  first  glance,  but  a  more  care- 
ful analysis  of  railway  conditions  during  these  years  will 
show  that  they  are  far  from  proving  the  case.  Below  is 
presented  a  tabular  exhibit  of  the  railway  situation  in  1895 
and  1905:2  — 


Elements 

1895 

1905 

Increase 

Per  cent 
of  in- 
crease 

Population 

69,458,470 

86,128,871 

16,670.401 

24 

Railro&d  Mileage: 

Single  track 

Second,  third,  and 

fourth  track  .  . . 

Yards  and  sidings 

177,746 

12,348 
43,181 

216.973 

19.881 
69,941 

39,227 

6.533 
26.760 

22 

53 
62 

Total  tracks  . 

233,275 

306.796 

73.521 

31 

Tonnajte  carried .... 

755,799,883 

88.567.770,801 

4.362 

36,610 

1.230,798 

13.700 

10 

1.435,321,748 

187.375.621,537 

6.681 

49,616 

1.757,105 

28,700 

15 

679,521,865 

98,807.850.736 

2.418 

13,006 

626,307 

15.000 

5 

90 
111 

57 

35 

43 

109 

50 

Tons  per  mile 

Rolling-stock: 

Locomotives 

Freight  cars 

Tractive  power. . . 
Tons  per  capita. 

Ton-miles  per  capita 

1,160 

2,000 

840 

72 

*  See  quotation,  p.  15. 

«  These  statements  were  compiled  from  the  reports  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission. 


ANALYSIS  OF  CURRENT  ARGUMENTS     21 

It  appears  from  this  table  that  while  the  increase  in  miles 
of  single  track  did  not  quite  keep  pace  with  the  increase  of 
population,  22  per  cent,  as  against  24  per  cent,  the  total 
trackage  increased  31  per  cent.  But  the  increase  in  miles 
of  track  is  not  the  sole  criterion  of  the  growth  in  efficiency 
of  a  railway  system.  Notice  that  the  number  of  freight 
cars  increased  by  43  per  cent  (at  the  same  time  their  carry- 
ing capacity  increased  by  120  per  cent) ;  that  the  number 
of  locomotives  increased  35  per  cent,  and  the  tractive  power 
109  per  cent.  Sm*ely,  in  determining  whether  the  railway 
service  is  breaking  down,  these  fundamentally  important 
factors  ought  to  be  given  consideration. 

To  argue  that  the  number  of  miles  of  single  track  must 
keep  pace  with  the  growth  of  population  and  with  the  in- 
crease of  ton-mileage  on  the  roads  is  wholly  to  ignore  the 
nature  of  the  railway  industry.  The  argument  proceeds 
upon  the  assumption  that  in  1895  the  railways  were  car- 
rying at  their  full  capacity.  A  railroad,  by  its  nature, 
hopes  to  increase  its  profits  when  once  the  main  line  is 
constructed,  not  mainly  by  building  more  miles  of  track- 
age, which  always  involves  tremendous  initial  outlay, 
but  by  utilizing  to  the  full  its  existing  tracks.  Consider 
the  history  of  a  railway.  It  pushes  out  its  tracks  across 
a  continent  to  connect  markets;  it  goes  into  uninhabited 
wilds;  carrying  there  settlers  to  produce  the  commodi- 
ties for  eventual  traffic,  so  that  in  time  the  railway  may 
run,  not  one,  two,  or  four  trains,  but  ten,  twenty,  or  forty 
trains  a  day  to  carry  the  freight  it  has  created.  The 
profits  in  railroading  come,  not  from  the  extensiveness 
of  trackage,  but  from  intensity  of  traffic.  Thus,  during 
the  period  of  most  rapid  railway  building  in  the  United 
States,  lines  were  spread  out  over  the  country,  extending 
to  every  corner  of  the  land.  Then,  when  once  a  network 
of  roads  was  secured,  the  need  for  more  miles  of  trackage 
relatively  declined,  though  admittedly  still  increasing  at 
a  very  rapid  rate.    During  the  past  ten  or  fifteen  years 


22  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

the  railways  naturally  have  devoted  more  attention  to 
the  haudHng  of  traffic  than  earlier,  when  they  were  con- 
structing the  great  trunk  lines  of  their  systems.  They  have 
done  this  by  increasing  the  amount  and  capacity  of  their 
rolling-stock,  by  laying  heavier  rails,  and  building  sidings, 
yards,  and  terminals.  The  more  densely  populated  a 
country  is,  the  less  need  be  its  per  capita  railway  mileage. 
The  very  fact  that  with  an  increase  in  the  miles  of  single 
track  in  this  country,  during  the  period  under  considera- 
tion, of  only  22  per  cent,  the  railways  carried  an  increased 
ton-mileage  of  111  per  cent,  would  seem  to  prove  the  point 
in  question.  The  items  of  most  significance  in  the  above 
table  are  those  showing  the  large  increase  in  facilities  with 
which  to  carry  the  enlarged  traffic. 

An  attempt  has  not  been  made  here  to  show  that  the  rail- 
ways have  actually  at  all  times  fully  met  the  transporta- 
tion needs  of  the  country.  It  has  already  been  noted  that 
the  carrying  capacity  of  the  roads  was  overtaxed  at  the 
height  of  the  period  of  great  prosperity.  The  discussion  has 
been  merely  for  the  purpose  of  pointing  out  that  the  meagre 
statistics  commonly  presented  to  prove  that  the  railways 
have  fallen  behind  the  needs  of  commerce,  in  reality  throw 
no  light  whatever  on  the  situation  under  consideration. 

Now,  let  us  consider  the  condition  of  the  railway  service 
during  the  four  years  that  have  elapsed  since  the  panic  of 
1907.  Have  events  proved  that  the  railways  have  perma- 
nently fallen  behind  the  times,  or  do  they  indicate  that  their 
condition  in  1906  and  1907  was  rather  an  abnormal  and 
temporary  one?  The  situation  is  illustrated  in  the  chart  on 
the  accompanying  page.  The  year  1907  is  also  given  in 
order  to  show  the  extent  of  the  congestion  at  that  time, 
and  for  purposes  of  comparison  with  the  years  following. 

The  apparent  contradiction  of  both  a  shortage  and  sur- 
plus should  be  explained. ^  At  any  given  moment  one  road 
may  have  a  shortage  of  cars,  while  another  may  have  a 
'  See  chart  opposite  p.  22. 


BOX  CARS 
ALL  CARS 


COMPARAF 
OF    SURPLUSESlfi^ 


SHORTAGE 


50,000      100,IKI0       150,(X)0       200,(J00      250,000        300,IX)0 


E    CHART 

ND    SHORTAGES 


SURPLUS 


SHORTAGE 


1911 


SURPLUS 


KIO         l()l),()(>ll        l.jl(,IIOU 


.■■(O.OOO        lUU.IHtU       150,(KII)        1!(IO,0(IO        2.10,(1(10 


ii 


ANALYSIS  OF  CURRENT  ARGUMENTS     23 


surplus.  In  other  words,  cars  cannot  always  be  properly  dis- 
tributed to  meet  the  needs  of  shippers.  Consequently,  we 
have  both  shortages  and  surpluses  at  the  same  time.  To  find 
the  net  shortage  or  surplus,  it  is  only  necessary  to  subtract 
the  one  from  the  other,  as  the  case  may  be- 

The  chart  for  1907  shows  a  very  great  shortage  of  cars 
for  the  greater  part  of  the  year.  Observe,  however,  the  im- 
mediate effect  of  the  panic  in  causing  a  surplus  of  over 
200,000  cars  at  the  end  of  the  year.  The  extraordinary  sur- 
plus throughout  1908  is  doubtless  due  largely  to  the  indus- 
trial depression  which  followed  the  panic.  But  conditions 
during  the  three  following  years  may  fairly  be  regarded  as 
normal.  In  1909  we  find  a  surplus  of  cars  in  the  country  as 
a  whole  during  the  entire  year,  except  for  a  brief  period  in 
October.  The  variations  in  seasonal  demands  is  clearly 
shown  on  the  chart.  It  is  of  course  as  impossible  for  the 
railways  to  forecast  exactly  how  many  cars  are  to  be  needed 
to  move  the  fall  crops  as  it  is  for  them  always  to  have  their 
cars  distributed  exactly  according  to  traffic  needs.  The 
rather  small  surplus  at  the  very  end  of  the  year  is  explained 
by  the  severe  weather  conditions  that  prevailed  at  that  time, 
blocking  up  the  traffic  of  the  roads  for  many  days  in  some 
sections.  Below  are  given  the  net  totals  for  1909:^  — 


Period 

Number  of  roads 
reporting 

Surplus 

Shortage 

1-20 

162 

311,318 

2-17 

159 

300,971 

a-31 

158 

296,201 

4-28 

161 

281,831 

5-26 

158 

272,470 

6-23 

166 

262,117 

7-21 

165 

243,015 

8-18 

169 

157,415 

»-29 

174 

38,806 

10-27 

174 

5,740 

11-24 

163 

12,032 

12-22 

177 

34,300 

»  Statistical  Bulletin  of  the  American  Railway  Association,  no.  103  A. 


24  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

The  severe  weather  conditions  in  the  early  part  of  1910 
account  for  the  relatively  small  net  surplus  indicated  on  the 
chart.  Trains  were  snowbound  to  such  a  degree  that  in  the 
great  Northwest  there  was  serious  difficulty  in  obtaining 
cars  when  desired.  Throughout  the  year,  however,  there 
was  a  net  surplus  of  all  cars.  Only  during  the  crop-moving 
of  September  and  October  was  there  a  net  shortage  of  box 
cars.  At  no  time  during  the  year  was  there  a  serious  conges- 
tion, and  the  general  situation  during  the  months  of  heavi- 
est traffic  was  perceptibly  better  than  in  1909.  The  year 
1911  shows  an  even  better  record  than  1910.  In  the  four 
years  since  the  panic,  therefore,  it  must  be  said  that  the  rail- 
way service  has  been  reasonably  satisfactory. 

3.  If  what  has  been  indicated  above  be  true, — that  is,  if 
the  congestion  of  the  railway  traffic  was  but  temporary, 
and  if  the  fact  that  the  railway  mileage  is  not  keeping  pace 
with  the  growth  of  population  is  no  evidence  that  the  rail- 
ways are  becoming  unable  to  meet  the  needs  of  commerce,  — 
the  question  may  well  be  asked,  W^hy  is  it,  then,  that  rail- 
way men  are  themselves  advocates  of  waterway  develop- 
ment? In  the  first  place,  not  all  railway  men  are  in  favor 
of  wholesale  waterway  improvement.  Probably  the  great 
majority  are  apathetic  in  regard  to  the  whole  question. 
Some,  at  least,  are  opposed  to  the  idea.  At  any  rate,  Mr. 
James  J.  Hill  is  the  one  railway  man  who  has  openly  cham- 
pioned the  movement,  and  his  attitude  is  easily  explained. 
Just  at  present  there  is  a  very  perceptible  tendency  on 
the  part  of  railway  men  to  curry  favor  with  the  public, 
whereas  a  dozen  years  ago  they  were  prone  almost  wholly 
to  disregard  popular  opinion.  They  have  been  forced  to 
recognize  that  the  public  is  in  earnest  in  this  matter  of 
railway  regulation,  and  that  it  is  indeed  possible  to  restrict 
very  seriously  the  operations  of  the  railroads.  Such  men 
as  Mr.  Hill  and  Mr.  Ripley  have  accordingly  taken  to 
conciliating  the  public,  to  meeting  us  more  than  halfway 


ANALYSIS  OF  CURRENT  ARGUMENTS     25 

in  frank  discussion  of  railway  matters,  in  the  hope  of  dis- 
couraging the  hostile  legislation  that  has  been  so  com- 
mon in  recent  years.  ^  Railway  men  fear  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  more  than  they  fear  waterways. 

Mr.  Hill  gave  the  address  from  which  we  have  quoted'^ 
before  a  Deep  Waterway  Convention,  before  an  audience 
that  did  not  care  to  listen  to  an  address  unfavorable  to  the 
Lakes-to-Gulf  project.  Besides,  he  saw  an  opportunity  to 
create  sympathy  for  the  railways,  thereby  perhaps  check- 
ing the  hostile  legislation  which  was  rampant  at  the  time. 
Accordingly,  while  skillfully  winning  the  favor  of  his  audi- 
ence by  indorsing  the  plan  of  a  deep  waterway  from  Chicago 
to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  he  found  opportunity  to  dwell  at 
length  upon  the  legislation  inimical  to  the  railways,  and 
upon  the  consequent  inability  of  the  railroads  to  develop 
with  sufficient  rapidity  to  meet  the  growing  needs  of  com- 
merce. Now  no  one  knows  better  than  Mr.  Hill  himself 
that  the  number  of  miles  of  track  is  not  the  measure  of  a 
railroad's  efficiency  and  ability  to  earn  profits.  And  no  one 
knows  better  than  he  that  the  railway  industry  is  peculiarly 
susceptible  to  the  law  of  increasing  returns  with  increasing 
traffic,  because  of  the  extraordinarily  large  amount  of  fixed 
capital  involved.  Mr.  Hill,  himself,  was  doubtless  as  little 
deceived  as  any  one  by  the  comparative  statistics  which 
were  presented.  Mr.  Hill  also  urged,  in  an  address  before 
the  Merchant's  Club  of  Chicago,'  that,  if  the  rails  and  money 
were  available,  it  would  be  impossible  to  procure  the  labor 
necessary  to  lay  the  additional  trackage,  said  to  be  neces- 
sary; and  that  consequently  the  need  of  constructing  the 
Lakes-to-Gulf  and  other  waterways  is  imperative,  and 
the  sooner  they  are  built  the  better  it  will  be  for  the  coun- 
try. Again,  he  knew  that  it  would  require  more  money  and 
more  labor,  if  not  more  structural  materials,  to  construct 

*  See  Ripley,  Atlantic  Monthly,  January,  1911. 

*  See  chapter  ii,  p.  15. 
»  November  10,  1906. 


26  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

waterways  adequate  to  meet  the  country's  needs  than  to 
build  the  necessary  railways.^  But  as  he  is  not  in  the  water- 
way business,  how  to  secure  the  means  with  which  to  build 
the  waterways  is  not  a  part  of  his  problem.^  There  would 
seem  to  be  little  doubt  that  Mr.  Hill's  advocacy  of  water- 
ways has  been  primarily  for  the  purpose  of  inducing  his 
hearers  to  regard  the  railways  with  less  disfavor,  if  not  to 
leave  them  alone  entirely.  Again,  it  should  be  remembered 
that  a  Lakes-to-Gulf  waterway,  were  it  successful,  would 
not  affect  the  Hill  lines  unfavorably.  Anything  that  would 
develop  Chicago  and  the  Upper  Mississippi  territory  would 
rather  work  out  as  an  aid  to  tlie  lines  leading  from  this 
region  to  the  Northwest.  Hence,  personal  interest  may 
explain  Mr.  Hill's  attitude. 

4.  In  enumerating  the  causes  of  the  waterway  move- 
ment in  the  preceding  chapter,  emphasis  was  laid  upon  the 
idea  of  railway  regulation  by  means  of  water  competition, 
and  quotations  were  given  from  the  addresses  of  Mr. 
Roosevelt  and  President  Taft  on  this  phase  of  the  trans- 
portation problem.  They  do  not  stand  alone  in  this  posi- 
tion. In  the  minds  of  many  people  the  waterways  will  have 
done  enough  if  only  they  force  the  railways  to  lower  trans- 
portation charges.  That  is,  even  though  no  freight  what- 
»  ever  should  actually  travel  over  the  waterways,  the  poten- 

tial competition  secured,  forcing  down  the  rates  charged 
by  the  railways,  would  make  the  construction  of  water- 
ways advisable. 

In  connection  with  this  idea  it  should  be  noted  that  the 

'  Mr.  Hill  advocates  a  depth  of  at  least  twenty  feet,  holding  that  it 
would  require  boats  of  at  least  10,000  tons  capacity  to  meet  the  compe- 
tition of  modern  railroads. 

«  It  is  interesting  to  recall  that  only  a  few  years  ago  Mr.  Hill  is  reported 
to  have  said  that  he  could  make  railway  rates  to  the  Pacific  Coast  so  low 
that  the  Panama  Canal  would  grow  up  to  pond  lilies;  and  that,  before  the 
Mississippi  River  could  compete  for  traffic  with  the  railways,  its  sides 
and  bottom  would  have  to  be  lathed  and  plastered. 


ANALYSIS  OF  CURRENT  ARGUMENTS     27 

monopolistic  rates  of  American  railways  are  not  on  through 
traffic.  Competition  with  each  other  and  with  existing 
water  routes,  and  attention  to  trade  conditions  have  forced 
our  railways  to  offer  much  lower  rates  on  long-distance 
traffic  than  exist  anywhere  else  in  the  world.  On  the  other 
hand,  for  short  hauls,  where  competition  is  absent,  our 
railway  charges  are  unquestionably  in  many  cases  ex- 
tremely high,  and  it  is  here  that  complaints  are  most  often 
heard.  In  so  far  as  complaints  are  made  on  through  rates, 
they  are  usually  on  grounds  of  discrimination,  rather  than 
on  grounds  of  exorbitance.  But  with  local  traffic,  charges 
are  sometimes  complained  of  as  being  excessively  high.  It 
is  on  local  traffic,  therefore,  that  we  should  wish  to  secure 
lower  freight  rates  by  means  of  water  competition.  But  it 
is  obviously  altogether  impossible  for  canals  to  reach  every 
local  point;  and  it  is  also  recognized  the  world  over  that 
it  is  only  on  long-distance  traffic  that  waterways  can  hope 
to  compete  with  the  railroads.  Unless  savings  in  hauling 
by  water  can  be  extended  over  a  considerable  distance  — 
and  a  considerable  part  of  this  distance  must  be  on  a 
natural  waterway,  rather  than  a  canal,  —  the  total  cost  of 
transportation,  including  charges  on  the  investment  in 
the  waterway  itself,  will  be  greater  than  that  by  rail.^  This 
is  a  cardinal  principle  in  transportation  in  Germany  and 
France.  At  precisely  the  place,  therefore,  where  railway 
rate  regulation  is  most  necessary,  namely,  on  local  traffic, 
the  waterways  are  wholly  unable  to  perform  the  service. 

But  granted  that  the  waterways  would  be  able  to  force 
lower  rates  on  local  traffic:  concretely  stated,  the  proposi- 
tion means  that  the  Government  should  spend  hundreds 
of  millions  of  dollars  in  order  to  secure  an  artificial  means 
of  regulating  the  business  of  a  public  service  corporation. 
Such  a  method  of  control  might  with  reason  be  resorted  to 
were  the  need  drastic  enough  and  were  there  no  other 
means  of  regulation  available,  but  so  long  as  we  possess  a 

*  This  point  will  be  brought  out  more  fully  in  succeeding  chapters. 


28  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

constitutional  method  of  direct  regulation  in  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  and  the  federal  judiciary, 
waterways  can  justify  themselves  only  as  actual  carriers 
of  traflSc.  A  much  less  expensive  means  of  railway  regula- 
tion is  to  extend  Government  control  as  it  is  needed,  and 
we  should  at  least  first  thoroughly  test  the  possibilities  of 
such  control  before  resorting  to  artificial  means  of  regula- 
tion. 

In  case  we  fail  to  control  our  railways  by  means  of  legis- 
lation, there  remains  another  alternative  to  the  competi- 
tion of  Government  waterways,  namely,  the  competition 
of  Government  railways.  Without  advocating  Govern- 
ment ownership  of  railroads,  the  point  may  nevertheless  be 
raised,  that  if  the  Government  is  eventually  forced  to  re- 
sort to  direct  competition  as  a  means  of  restraining  the  rail- 
roads of  the  country,  it  would  be  well  to  consider  whether 
the  more  economical  method  of  securing  the  desired  re- 
sults would  be  by  means  of  constructing  waterways  or  by 
means  of  constructing  railways.  The  idea  of  competition 
by  means  of  Government  railways  has  received  very  little 
attention  in  this  country,  though  it  may  contain  possibili- 
ties worthy  of  very  serious  consideration. 

Another  phase  of  this  competitive  idea  remains  to  be 
considered.  Government  ownership  of  the  boats  is  not  a 
part  of  the  present  waterway  plan.  The  idea  is  to  make 
our  rivers  and  canals  public  highways.  Might  it  not  be 
easily  possible  for  the  railways  to  prevent  damaging  com- 
petition by  securing  control  of  the  boat  lines?  That  this 
would  be  done  is  not  only  within  the  realm  of  possibility, 
but  altogether  probable.  While  they  do  not  find  it  profit- 
able to  incur  the  enormous  expense  of  building  great  canals, 
the  railways  might  very  conceivably  find  it  of  advantage 
to  appropriate  such  highways  after  they  have  been  con- 
structed at  public  expense.  Their  monopolistic  tenden- 
cies would  hardly  be  checked  in  this  manner.  It  is  well 
known  that  most  of  the  boats  on  the  Great  Lakes  are 


ANALYSIS  OF  CURRENT  ARGUMENTS     29 

owned  by  the  railways;  and  as  early  as  1801  it  was  found 
that  competition  between  the  Ohio  River  boats  and  the 
railroads  was  practically  nil.^ 

It  might  not  be  diflBcult  for  the  railways  to  secure  con- 
trol of  the  traffic  on  the  waterways.^  While  the  public, 
having  constructed  these  highways,  was  calmly  resting  on 
the  assumption  that  the  problem  of  low  freight  rates  was 
solved  for  all  time,  the  railway  men  might  either  be  building 
boats,  or  else  quietly  buying  up  the  stock  of  independent 
boat  companies  and  assuming  control  of  the  situation,  just 
as  they  have  purchased  the  stock  of  competing  electric 
railways  and  gained  control  of  their  operations.  By  gaining 
control  of  new  waterway  terminal  sites  and  facilities  in  the 
same  manner  that  they  have  acquired  many  of  the  present 
ones,  or  by  refusing  to  prorate  and  cooperate  with  the 
waterways,  the  railroads  might  easily  defeat  the  ends 
sought  by  the  construction  of  water  lines.  The  problem 
of  railroad  regulation  would  by  no  means  be  solved  the 
moment  the  waterways  were  equipped  for  traffic. 

'  ^  "The  understanding  between  the  railroads  and  the  steamboat  lines 
has  not  amounted  to  a  pooling  arrangement,  or  a  mutual  participation  in 
profits,  but  has  sought  to  effect  a  certain  distribution  of  freight,  and  has 
virtually  removed  competition  as  to  rates  between  the  two  methods  of 
transportation."    {Report  on  Internal  Commerce,  1881,  Appendix,  p.  56.) 

^  Indeed,  we  already  have  evidence  that  the  railroads  are  planning  to 
control  transportation  on  the  proposed  Lakes-to-Gulf  Waterway.  The 
Mississippi  Valley  Transportation  Company  was  organized  on  Septem- 
ber 19,  1909,  with  a  capital  stock  of  $10,000,000.  Its  prospectus  states: 
"We  expect  to  combine  with  a  number  of  railroads  to  issue  through  rates, 
and  some  of  the  railroads  have  already  agreed  to  this.  We  expect  to  re- 
ceive a  fair  differential  of  25  to  30  per  cent  under  railroad  rates."  Having 
this  agreement  with  the  railroads  and  a  monopoly  control  of  the  river 
traflSc,  the  company  promises  to  pay  dividends  of  39  per  cent  on  its  entire 
capitalization.  (Gross,  A  Discussion  of  the  Proposed  Deep  Waterway,  Chi- 
cago, p.  7.)  It  is  worthy  of  attention  that  W.  K.  Kavanaugh,  who  is  presi- 
dent of  the  Mississippi  Valley  Transportation  Company,  and  of  the  Lakes- 
to-Gulf  Waterway  Association  as  well,  is  also  president  of  the  Wiggins 
Ferry  Company  of  St.  Louis,  the  stock  of  which  is  controlled  by  an  as- 
sociation of  railroads  centring  in  that  city.  {Report  of  the  Inland  Water- 
ways Commission,  p.  129.) 


so  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

5.  Two  arguments  for  the  improvement  of  our  water- 
ways, which  ai)pear  somewhat  inconsistent,  have  been 
advanced  side  by  side.  One  is  that  the  waterways  will 
check  the  railroads  and  cut  down  their  monopolistic  earn- 
ings; and  the  other  that  they  will  serve  as  auxiliaries  to  the 
railways,  and  prove  a  blessing  in  disguise  by  leaving  the 
roads  free  to  devote  all  their  attention  to  the  carrying  of 
high-class  profitable  freight.  The  contradiction  may  perhaps 
be  explained  on  the  ground  that  the  one  argument  has  been 
advanced  by  the  enemies,  the  other  by  the  friends,  of  the 
railways.  But  if  it  should  work  out  that  waterways  would 
complement  the  railways  and  prove  a  blessing  in  disguise, 
it  is  apparent  that  it  could  not  then  well  be  maintained 
that  they  were  an  efiPective  means  of  regulating  the  rail- 
ways and  destroying  their  monopoly  profits. 

Nor  is  there  much  ground  for  a  belief  that  the  railways 
would  in  general  welcome  the  waterways  as  auxiliaries  in 
the  movement  of  freight.  The  very  fact  that  they  con- 
tinue to  charge  discriminating  rates  for  the  purpose  of 
securing  potential  water  traflSc  contradicts  such  an  idea. 
Moreover,  the  lack  of  congestion  at  present  does  not  argue 
a  change  of  attitude  in  the  near  future.  Indeed,  it  is  con- 
tended by  some  prominent  railway  men  that,  contrary  to 
the  general  belief,  the  so-called  low-grade  traflSc  is  about 
the  most  profitable  class  of  freight,  because  of  the  fact  that  it 
is  usually  handled  in  trainload  lots.  This  argument,  that 
the  railways  and  waterways  of  the  United  States  would 
work  together  in  harmony,  has  been  borrowed  from  Eu- 
rope. It  will  be  shown,  in  the  portion  of  this  work  devoted 
to  European  transportation,  that  the  railways  of  Europe 
do  not  cooperate  with  the  waterways  from  choice,  but 
only  from  compulsion. 

6.  No  less  a  personage  than  the  president  of  the  Na- 
tional Rivers  and  Harbors  Congress  has  advanced  the 
theory  that  traffic  moves  much  more  speedily  by  water 


ANALYSIS  OF  CURRENT  ARGUMENTS     31 

than  by  rail.  Arguing  from  the  premise  that  "the  best 
authorities  say  that  the  average  movement  of  freight  by 
rail  in  our  country  is  only  twenty-five  miles  a  day,"  he  at- 
tempts to  show  that  boats  move  much  faster  than  this. 
"  When  freight  is  loaded  in  boats,  on  lakes,  canals,  or  rivers, 
it  moves  promptly  at  a  speed  of  from  five  to  ten  miles  an 
hour  to  its  destination,  where  it  is  quickly  discharged  and 
the  boat  started  on  another  trip.  Boats  on  the  Great  Lakes 
make  the  round  trip  from  Buffalo  to  Duluth  —  two  thou- 
sand miles  —  every  eight  to  nine  days,  a  distance  of  con- 
siderably over  two  hundred  miles  a  day.  It  is  the  old 
story  of  the  race  between  the  tortoise  and  the  hare.  The 
former  won  in  spite  of  his  slow  movements  because  he  kept 
going.  And  the  boats  win  for  the  same  reason.  They  do 
not  slumber  on  side-tracks  as  the  hare  and  the  railroad  car, 
but  keep  moving  like  the  patient  tortoise  and  win  every 
time."  1 

The  method  employed  in  computing  the  average  dis- 
tance that  freight  moves  a  day  by  rail  cannot  give  a  result 
that  pretends  to  mean  anything  definite.  The  total  num- 
ber of  miles  traveled  by  all  freight  cars,  of  whatever  kind. 
is  divided  by  the  product  of  the  total  number  of  freight 
cars  in  the  country  and  the  number  of  days  in  a  year.  The 
general  result  derived  has  no  real  meaning.  In  the  com- 
putation are  included  the  hundreds  of  thousands  of  cars 
necessarily  idle  ^  during  a  large  portion  of  the  year.  Short 
and  long  hauls  are  not  differentiated.  No  allowance  is 
made  for  the  very  large  number  of  cars  used  mainly  for 
warehousing  purposes,  and  in  yard  business,  or  for  those 
in  shops  undergoing  repairs.  It  should  be  remembered, 
also,  that  railway  cars  serve  as  developers  as  well  as  car- 
riers of  traffic.  For  the  accommodation  of  shippers  they 
are  left  on  side-tracks  for  two  days  at  a  time  without  de- 

*  Joseph  E.  Ransdell,  Annals  of  American  Academy  of  Political  and  So- 
cial Science,  vol.  31,  p.  38. 
'  See  chart  opposite  p.  22. 


32         WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

murrage  charged.^  To  take  a  concrete  case,  a  gondola  car 
placed  on  a  side-track  in  the  lumbering  town  of  Cadillac, 
Michigan,  requires  two  days  for  loading  with  cord -wood. 
It  then  travels  a  hundred  miles  overnight  to  Grand  Rapids, 
is  switched  to  the  designated  siding  during  the  forenoon, 
is  unloaded  by  the  next  afternoon,  and  on  the  following 
night  is  returned  empty  to  Cadillac  for  another  load.  Ap- 
proximately four  days  are  thus  consumed  in  moving  this 
freight  a  distance  of  one  hundred  miles.  But  the  service  to 
the  shipper  at  the  time  of  loading  and  unloading  fully  com- 
pensated for  the  apparent  lack  of  speed.  Take  another 
case,  where  a  local  freight  train  carries  small  freight,  and 
sorts  out  of  broken  lots  the  various  commodities  to  be 
dropped  ofiF  at  each  way  station  on  the  route.  Here,  again, 
the  distance  covered  per  day  is  not  the  important  consid- 
eration. 

Strictly,  there  are  no  average  conditions  in  either  line 
of  transportation,  much  less  comparable  average  condi- 
tions. Even  if  there  were  average  conditions,  this  so-called 
twenty-five  miles  per  day  average  movement  by  rail  cannot 
fairly  be  regarded  as  a  basis  for  comparison  with  waterways 
under  the  most  favorable  conditions  that  exist.  If  a  com- 
parison be  attempted,  the  waterway  side  of  the  equation 
should  consider  not  merely  the  unusually  favorable  condi- 
tions existing  on  special  lines  on  the  open  lakes  in  the  sum- 
mer season,  but  all  the  boats  on  all  the  lakes,  rivers,  and 
canals  should  be  counted.  It  should  consider  the  low  speed 

^  A  demurrage  charge  is  a  daily  tax  for  the  use  of  cars  longer  than  two 
days  while  loading  or  unloading.  In  the  past  the  two  days'  exemption 
period  was  very  commonly  extended.  Roads  hired  each  others'  cars  and 
paid  according  to  the  number  of  miles  they  traveled.  It  made  little  dif- 
ference then  to  the  hiring  road  how  long  the  cars  lay  on  sidings.  The  rail- 
ways have  now,  however,  adopted  the  custom  of  requiring  payment  for 
the  use  of  their  cars  from  other  roads  by  the  day  instead  of  on  a  mileage 
basis,  and  extensions  of  the  time  of  free  use  are  accordingly  infrequent. 
Shippers,  however,  often  pay  the  demurrage  for  the  privilege  of  a  longer 
use  of  the  cars. 


ANALYSIS  OF  CURRENT  ARGUMENTS     33 

necessitated  on  narrow  canals  and  tortuous  rivers,  which, 
especially  with  the  dense  traffic  hoped  for,  present  almost 
unlimited  possibilities  for  collision.^  At  night  movement 
would  be  next  to  impossible.  Again,  the  tedious  delays  en- 
countered in  the  passage  of  locks,  with  the  attendant  danger 
of  mishaps,  tying  up  perchance  for  hours  or  days  the  traffic 
of  an  entire  canal,  should  be  included:  and,  finally,  all  the 
days  in  the  year  should  be  counted,  not  excluding  the 
months  when  transportation  must  wholly  cease  on  account 
of  ice,  floods,  or  low  water.  The  average  daily  speed  by 
water  thus  computed  would  appear  much  less  than  that 
by  rail.  The  idea  of  the  greater  swiftness  of  water  trans- 
portation is  indeed  a  novel  one,  and  must  have  been  pre- 
sented primarily  because  of  its  originality. 

7.  More  important  than  any  of  the  foregoing  arguments 
for  internal  waterways  is  the  contention  that  transporta- 
tion by  water  is  much  cheaper  than  by  rail.  Hardly  an 
article  has  appeared  in  the  press,  hardly  a  public  speech  has 
been  delivered  that  has  not  emphasized  this  phase  of  the 
subject.  Obviously,  that  transportation  system  which  can 
serve  the  country  efficiently  at  the  least  cost  is  the  system 
which  should  be  established.  The  cost  consideration  is  of 
primary  importance  and  merits  the  share  of  attention  it 
has  received.  But  in  support  of  the  contention  that  traffic 
moves  more  cheaply  by  water  than  by  rail  there  has  been 
unfortunately  only  the  loosest  sort  of  reasoning.  There  has 
been  not  only  an  utter  lack  of  proof,  but  also  a  general  dis- 
position to  discuss  it  in  an  ex  parte  manner.  A  few  com- 
parisons have  indeed  been  drawn,  but  in  no  case  have  the 
conditions  compared  been  fairly  comparable.  From  mere 
assumptions  of  the  inherent  cheapness  of  water  transporta- 
tion, supported  by  rate  comparisons  drawn  from  dissimilar 

^  It  is  not  true  that  boats  can  travel  on  canals,  as  Mr.  Ransdell  says, 
at  a  speed  of  from  five  to  ten  miles  an  hour.  In  Europe  it  averages 
only  two  Jf  three  miles  an  hour. 


34  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

conditions,  conclusions  have  been  deduced,  purporting  vlr- 
tuiilly  to  prove  the  entire  case  for  water  transportation. 

The  argument  that  water  transportation  is  incomparably- 
cheaper  than  transportation  by  rail  runs  somewhat  as  fol- 
lows :  The  average  price  received  by  all  the  railways  of  the 
country  for  the  calendar  year  1907  was  7,82  mills  per  ton- 
mile;  on  the  Great  Lakes  the  charge  was  .8  mills  per  ton- 
mile;  and  on  the  Erie  Canal,  about  3  mills  per  ton-mile. 
A  dollar,  then,  will  carry  a  ton  of  freight  the  following  dis- 
tances: by  rail,  127  miles;  on  the  Erie  Canal,  333  miles; 
and  on  the  Great  Lakes,  1250  miles.  ^  It  is  estimated  that 
the  cost  of  carrj'ing  upon  the  Erie  Barge  Canal,  now  under 
construction,  will  be  but  .52  mills  per  ton-mile.^  A  dollar 
will  carry  a  ton  of  goods  at  that  rate  nearly  2000  miles. 
President  Ransdell,  of  the  National  Rivers  and  Harbors 
Congress,  conservatively  estimates  water  traffic  to  be  about 
one  sixth  as  costly  as  rail.^  It  has  been  pointed  out  that 
"  the  expenditure  of  coal  necessary  to  drive  a  train  carrying 
1000  tons  eighteen  miles  per  hour  on  the  Michigan  South- 
ern Railway  would  drive,  on  the  Great  Lakes,  a  steamboat 
at  the  same  speed  with  a  load  of  5000  tons."*  This  is  said 
to  mean  that  water  transportation  is  only  one  fifth  as  ex- 
pensive as  transportation  by  rail. 

Let  us  analyze  these  comparisons  of  the  cost  of  trans- 
portation by  water  and  by  rail.  The  average  cost  of 
carrying  freight  on  the  Great  Lakes  or  on  the  Erie  Canal 
is  compared  with  the  average  freight  charge  on  all  the  rail- 
ways in  the  country.  All  that  was  said  about  the  impossi- 
bility of  obtaining  an  average  speed  which  was  accurate 
or  of  definite  meaning  is  equally  appliable  to  average 
cost.  The  computation  makes  no  distinction  between  high- 
class,  expensive  freight  and  bulky  commodities  traveling 

*  S.  A.  Thompson,  Outlook,  vol.  92,  p.  746. 

'  Franklin  Wood,  Moody's  Magazine,  August,  1907. 

*  See  quotations,  supra,  p.  12. 

*  Franklin  Wood,  swpra.  Taken  from  a  statement  of  Major  Townsend, 
of  the  Uai^''d  States  Engineering  Board. 


ANALYSIS  OF  CURRENT  ARGUMENTS     35 

at  low  rates.  It  makes  no  allowance  for  the  length  of  haul, 
severity  of  gradients,  or  expensiveness  of  terminals.  It 
does  not  consider  whether  the  consignment  be  in  trainload, 
carload,  or  broken  lots.  Speed,  kinds  of  cars,  degree  of 
care,  refrigeration,  —  none  of  the  varying  conditions  imder 
which  freight  traffic  moves  are  distinguished.  All  factors 
go  in  on  a  parity  in  determining  the  average  rate  charged 
by  the  railways.  It  ought  to  be  readily  apparent  that,  unless 
the  average  waterway  rate  is  determined  in  the  same  way, 
unless  it  is  derived  from  a  similar  complexity  of  conditions, 
the  comparison  is  imperfect.  No  one  would  regard  it  fair 
to  prove,  by  a  comparison  of  the  rates  on  a  railroad  that 
carried  only  coal  with  those  of  a  road  that  carried  all  classes 
of  freight  under  all  manner  of  conditions,  that  the  former 
road  was  the  more  eflScient  or  the  more  economical.  The 
lower  rates  on  the  coal  road  would  be  held  to  prove  nothing. 
In  like  manner,  the  low  water  rates  quoted  ought  to  be 
regarded  as  evidence  of  little,  if  anything.  The  waterways 
carry  practically  only  low-grade  freight,  which  must  travel 
at  low  rates  if  it  travels  at  all.  These  rates,  however,  are 
compared,  not  with  the  railway  rates  on  similar  freight, 
but  with  the  so-called  average  rate  on  all  freight  of  what- 
ever kind.  It  is  from  such  a  comparison  that  the  con- 
clusion has  been  reached  that  transportation  by  water  is 
cheaper  than  by  rail. 

Even  if  the  comparisons  of  cost  given  above  had  been 
based  upon  similar  classes  of  goods  moving  under  com- 
parable conditions,  it  would  still  be  necessary  to  ask  if  the 
term  "cost"  had  the  same  meaning  in  both  cases.  Unless 
the  same  elements  are  included  in"  cost "  as  applied  to  water 
transportation  as  are  included  in  transportation  by  rail, 
conclusions  drawn  from  a  comparison  of  these  costs  are 
worthless.  Now,  "cost,"  as  used  in  railway  parlance,  has 
several  meanings.  Sometimes  it  denotes  the  direct  cost  of 
moving  a  certain  commodity  a  given  distance,  that  is, 
merely  the  added  expense  of  handling  that  particular  com- 


S6  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

modity.  In  another  sense  it  means  both  the  direct  and  indi- 
rect cost  of  handling  the  commodity,  that  is,  the  haulage 
or  carrying  charges,  together  with  an  indirect  charge  to 
meet  a  portion  of  the  cost  of  building  and  maintaining 
the  railway.  Finally,  cost  may  include,  in  addition  to  the 
above,  whatever  is  necessary  to  insure  a  reasonable  profit 
upon  the  total  capital  of  the  road.  The  average  freight 
rate  which  we  have  been  considering  was  obviously  meant 
to  secure  at  least  a  reasonable  profit  upon  the  entire  capi- 
talization of  the  railways  of  the  country.  Cost  of  building 
the  roads,  cost  of  equipment,  of  maintenance,  and  of  oper- 
ation, —  all  were  considered  in  the  fixing  of  the  rates  on 
the  railways.  We  shall  now  consider  what  cost  concept  is 
used  in  connection  with  water  transportation. 

It  is  said  that  a  dollar  will  carry  a  ton  of  traffic  on  the 
Great  Lakes  a  distance  of  1250  miles,  as  against  127  miles 
on  the  railways.  Obviously,  since  the  Great  Lakes  are  a 
highway  readymade  by  nature,  the  rates  charged  there  need 
be  merely  sufficient  to  yield  a  reasonable  profit  on  the  in- 
vestment in  the  ships,  in  addition  to  meeting  the  expenses 
of  operation.  Naturally,  the  rates  under  such  conditions 
would  be  much  lower  than  if  they  had  to  earn  a  profit  on  a 
tremendous  investment  in  the  highway  itself.  A  compari- 
son of  railroad  rates  with  the  charges  on  canals,  which,  like 
the  railways,  are  artificial  highways,  clearly  affords  a  fairer 
basis  upon  which  to  make  comparisons. 

It  is  contended  that  one  dollar  will  move  a  ton  of  traffic 
on  the  railways  a  distance  of  127  miles,  as  against  333  miles 
on  the  present  Erie  Canal,  and  that,  with  the  opening  of  the 
new  barge  canal,  this  distance  will  be  extended  to  about 
2000  miles.  What  is  meant  by  "cost"  as  applied  to  the  Erie 
Canal?  It  was  built  by  the  State  of  New  York,  and  since 
1882  has  been  free  of  tolls.  Any  one  who  desires  can  build 
a  boat  and  engage  in  the  carrying-trade  free  of  charge,  on 
the  state's  highway.  If  he  can  earn,  in  addition  to  the  op- 
erating expenses,  a  reasonable  profit  on  the  cost  of  a  small 


ANALYSIS  OF  CURRENT  ARGUMENTS     37 

boat,  as  is  the  case  on  the  Great  Lakes,  he  is  satisfied. 
Thus,  whereas  the  railway  rate  is  fixed  to  earn  a  profit  upon 
the  total  cost  of  the  road,  upon  equipment,  upkeep,  and 
operation,  the  rate  on  the  Erie  Canal  covers  no  part  of  the 
enormous  expenditures  involved  in  the  construction  and 
maintenance  of  the  waterway.  In  a  comparative  study  of 
waterways  and  railways,  to  leave  out  of  the  computation 
of  cost  the  enormous  construction  and  maintenance  ex- 
penditures in  the  one  case,  and  to  include  them  in  the 
other,  is  totally  to  invalidate  the  conclusion  drawn  there- 
from. Yet  this  is  the  method  that  has  been  commonly  em- 
ployed in  proving  water  transportation  less  costly  than 
transportation  by  rail. 

Transportation  must  be  paid  for  by  some  one.  If  the 
State  builds  and  keeps  in  repair  a  transportation  system, 
donating  its  use  to  the  public,  the  cost  of  construction  and 
maintenance  is  paid  for  by  the  inhabitants  of  the  State  in 
the  form  of  taxes.  The  remaining  cost  —  of  equipment  and 
operation,  plus  a  reasonable  profit  on  this  investment  —  is 
paid  by  the  shippers  of  traflSc  to  the  carriers  thereof.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  the  means  of  transportation  are  privately 
constructed,  the  entire  cost  is  paid  by  the  shippers  who 
make  use  of  the  transportation  agencies.  In  the  former 
case,  a  large  part  of  the  cost  is  borne  by  the  general  public, 
the  apportionment  being  dependent,  not  upon  the  benefits 
derived  from  transportation,  but  upon  whatever  system  of 
taxation  chances  to  be  in  use.  In  the  latter  case,  the  cost 
is  borne  by  the  shippers  according  to  the  use  made  of  trans- 
portation. It  was  shown,  in  the  introductory  chapter,  that 
there  are  waterway  schemes  before  this  country  involving 
an  initial  expenditure  of  many  hundred  millions  of  dollars. 
This  amount,  plus  the  interest  which  would  accrue  from  a 
long  period  of  bonded  indebtedness,  would  constitute  no 
inconsiderable  taxation  burden  for  the  country  to  bear. 
If  the  National  Government  subsidizes  the  waterways,  the 
greater  part  of  the  cost  must  be  borne  by  the  consumers  of 


38         WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

tariff-protected  commodities,  regardless  of  benefits  derived 
from  transportation,  inasmuch  as  customs  duties  are  the 
chief  source  of  federal  revenue.  If  the  State  Governments 
finance  the  schemes,  the  owners  of  real  property  will  in 
most  cases  bear  the  brunt  of  the  expense,  because  such  is 
the  incidence  of  the  general  property  tax  so  largely  em- 
ployed in  raising  state  revenue.  We  should  not  be  de- 
ceived, and  be  led  to  believe  that  merely  because  the  cost 
is  divided,  part  going  to  the  Government  in  tax  payments, 
and  part  to  the  traffic  carriers  in  transportation  charges, 
that  the  total  cost  is  thereby  lessened.  It  may  be  added, 
also,  that  we  should  not  overlook  from  whom  is  to  come 
the  greater  part  of  the  cost,  and  to  whom  are  to  accrue 
the  chief  benefits. 

8.  We  come  now  to  a  consideration  of  the  remarkable 
benefits  which  it  is  thought  the  resuscitation  of  the  water- 
ways would  confer  upon  all  classes  of  society.  It  will  be  re- 
called '  that  the  manufacturer,  the  wholesaler,  the  retailer, 
the  wage-earner,  the  landowner,  the  real-estate  dealer,  and, 
above  all,  the  farmer,  are  promised  vastly  greater  possibil- 
ities of  gain  and  better  opportunities  for  development  than 
ever  before.  Now,  it  should  go  without  saying  that  the 
conferring  of  such  benefits  is  dependent  upon  the  cheap- 
ness of  water  as  compared  with  railway  transportation. 
The  foregoing  discussion  of  the  question  of  cost  showed  that 
it  is  by  no  means  established  that  traffic  does  move,  all 
things  considered,  more  cheaply  on  canals  and  canalized 
rivers  than  on  railroads.  In  the  event  that  it  be  subse- 
quently shown  that,  save  under  exceptional  conditions,  the 
railways  are  the  more  economical  carriers  of  the  two,  it  will 
be  obvious  that  these  promised  benefits  of  water  trans- 
portation are  a  delusion.  Granting,  however,  for  the  time 
being,  tliat  water  transportation  is  the  cheaper,  even  when 
all  factors  are  included,  but  granting  it  only  for  the  sake 
*  See  chapter  n,  pp.  16-17. 


ANALYSIS  OF  CURRENT  ARGUMENTS     39 

of  the  argument,  it  will  still  be  worth  our  while  to  analyze 
some  of  the  promised  rewards.  As  in  many  of  the  other 
arguments  for  waterways,  we  may  find  here,  also,  no  small 
amount  of  fallacious  reasoning. 

The  construction  of  the  Erie  Canal  through  the  State  of 
New  York  from  the  Hudson  River  to  Lake  Erie  in  1825  led 
to  a  period  of  remarkable  prosperity  along  the  entire  route, 
and  it  undoubtedly  made  New  York  City  the  metropolis 
of  America.  The  opening-up  of  the  Ohio  canals  shortly 
afterwards,  in  a  similar  way  gave  a  great  impetus  to  indus- 
try west  of  the  Alleghanies.  ^  It  secured  a  wider  market  and 
better  prices  for  commodities.  Land  advanced  rapidly  in 
value,  work  became  plentiful,  and  wages  greatly  increased. 
Beyond  any  question  the  opening-up  of  these  waterways 
was  of  unusual  benefit  to  the  inhabitants  of  all  the  contigu- 
ous territory.  "Previous  to  the  construction  of  the  [Erie] 
canal,  the  cost  of  transportation  from  Buffalo  to  New  York 
City  was  $100  a  ton  and  the  ordinary  length  of  passage 
twenty  days.  .  .  .  On  the  opening  of  the  Erie  Canal,  the 
cost  of  freight  fell,  according  to  its  class,  to  between  $15 
and  $25  a  ton,  and  the  time  of  transit  was  reduced  to  eight 
days.  Rates  from  Ohio  to  the  seaboard  were  steadily  les- 
sened until  they  were  only  about  one  tenth  of  the  former 
figures."^  Charges  by  wagon  and  stage  were  prohibitive, 
except  for  local  traffic,  and  a  region  without  waterway  con- 
nection was  utterly  unable  to  carry  on  trade  with  the  rest 
of  the  world.  Upon  such  sections  canals  conferred  unnum- 
bered benefits. 

To-day  the  situation  is  very  different.  Freight  rates  have 
now  become  so  small,  in  proportion  to  the  value  of  the  com- 
modities of  traffic,  that  in  most  cases  nothing  short  of  a 
tremendous  cheapening  of  transportation  would  be  reflected 
in  the  price  of  the  articles,  and  rate  reductions  now  usually 

*  Ohio  State  Archaeological  and  Historical  Society  Publications ;  C.  P. 
McCleland  and  C.  C.  Huntingdon,  History  of  Ohio  Canals,  1905. 

*  Bogart,  Economic  History  of  the  United  States,  pp.  191-92. 


40  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

accrue  almost  wholly  to  the  benefit  of  middlemen.  "The 
transportation  charge  on  the  material  entering  into  a  pair  of 
shoes  made  in  a  St.  Louis  factory  averages  one  and  one 
fourth  cents.  The  transportation  charge  required  to  place 
that  pair  of  shoes  in  the  hands  of  a  consumer  in  any  part  of 
the  United  States  averages  between  two  and  three  cents."^ 
This  makes  a  total  charge  of  approximately  four  cents. 
Suppose  our  waterways  should  effect  even  a  fifty  per  cent 
reduction  of  freight  charges,  we  should  have  a  saving  of 
only  two  cents  on  a  pair  of  shoes.  It  is  hardly  probable  that 
such  a  saving  would  cause  shoes  to  retail  at  two  cents  less 
than  formerly.  The  saving  would  be  absorbed  by  the  ship- 
pers and  middlemen,  and  the  consumer  would  be  benefited 
not  at  all.'^ 

"The  freight  rates  on  cantaloups  to  New  York  range 
from  less  than  a  cent  for  a  melon  from  the  Carolinas  to 
about  two  and  one  half  cents  for  that  from  California."  ' 
A  fifty  per  cent  reduction  would  not  cause  melons  to  be 
sold  in  New  York  at  34  instead  of  35  cents,  since  they  sell 
at  25, 30, 35,  and  40  cents,  and  not  at  odd  figures.  Again  the 
saving  would  be  absorbed  in  marketing.  A  bullock  that 
weighs  1200  pounds,  retailing  in  New  York  at  15  cents  a 
pound,  would  bring  $105.  The  freight  charge  for  transport- 
ing this  beef  alive  to  Chicago,  then  (dressed)  to  New  York, 
is  between  $3.50  and  $4.*  A  fifty  per  cent  reduction  would 
mean  a  saving  of  less  than  $2  on  $105,  or  about  1.8  per  cent. 
This  per  cent  reduction  on  a  selling  price  of  15  cents  a 
pound  is  about  one  fourth  of  a  cent.  "The  transportation 
charges  on  a  man's  suit  of  clothes  is  from  2  to  8  cents;  on 
calicos  and  ginghams  from  one  fiftieth  of  a  cent  to  one 
fifth  of  a  cent  a  yard.  The  freight  charge  paid  on  the  entire 

*  McPherson,  Railroad  Freight  Rates,  p.  61. 

'  These  charges  do  not  include  the  cost  of  shipping  to  market  the  orig- 
inal cattle  from  which  the  hides  came,  but  the  result  would  not  be  affected 
in  the  least  were  these  included. 

•  Ibid.,  p.  50. 

♦  Ibid.,  p.  40. 


ANALYSIS  OF  CURRENT  ARGUMENTS     41 

apparel  of  a  fully  dressed  man  or  woman  would  range  from 
perhaps  6  or  7  to  16  or  18  cents."  ^ 

Even  with  the  more  bulky,  low-class  freight,  the  case  is 
not  greatly  different.  The  railways  which  carry  coal  to 
Chicago  were  recently  permitted  to  make  a  flat  raise  of 
7  cents  a  ton  on  coal.  The  result  was  a  25-cent  increase 
in  the  price  of  coal,  18  cents  of  which  represents  the  in- 
creased profits  of  middlemen.  Is  it  reasonable  to  believe 
that  under  reversed  conditions  a  reduction  of  7  cents  a  ton 
in  the  railway  charge  on  coal  would  lead  the  coal  dealers  to 
lower  their  price  25  cents  a  ton,  or  indeed  at  all.'^  It  is  too 
well  known  that  dealers  are  always  looking  for  opj)ortun- 
ities  and  excuses  to  raise  prices,  and  always  resisting  any 
reductions,  to  warrant  a  belief  that  a  slight  lowering  of 
transportation  charges  would  benefit  the  consumer.  This 
is  fast  coming  to  be  an  age  of  monopolized  retail  trade. 

Enough  illustrations  have  been  given  to  indicate  how 
little  the  selling  price  of  most  commodities  is  affected,  even 
by  cutting  the  transportation  charges  in  two.  Even  in  the 
event  of  so  large  a  reduction  in  rates  as  fifty  per  cent,  the 
consumers  would  benefit  scarcely  at  all;  the  shippers  and 
middlemen  would  only  increase  their  margin  of  profit. 

9.  Attention  is  now  directed  to  the  current  reasoning 
from  analogy  in  support  of  inland  waterways.  It  is  argued 
that,  since  the  traffic  carried  on  the  Great  Lakes  is  tremen- 
dous in  amount,  we  have  there  ample  proof  of  the  practi- 
cability of  transportation  by  water.  But  a  little  reflection 
will  show  that  no  conclusions  in  support  of  river  and  canal 
transportation  ought  fairly  to  be  drawn  from  the  Great 
Lakes.  They  are  great  natural  highways  similar  to  the 
ocean  itself.  They  are  of  ample  depth,  free  from  current, 
and  of  great  width.  Moreover,  they  stretch  in  a  general 
east-and-west  direction  through  the  heart  of  the  continent, 
and  in  the  very  pathway  of  our  greatest  commerce.  Vast 
McPherson,  Railroad  Freight  Rates,  p.  52. 


42  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

forests  and  wondrously  rich  ore  deposits  on  their  very 
shores  have  always  furnished  a  traflSc  peculiarly  favorable 
to  movement  by  water.  These  factors  combined  have 
given  rise  to  an  enormous  lake  traffic,  in  a  few  particu- 
lar commodities.  On  the  other  hand,  many  of  the  pro- 
posed canals  have  no  advantages  in  common  with  these  of 
the  Great  Lakes.  They  extend  crosswise  to  the  prevailing 
trend  of  traffic;  they  do  not  tap  rich  ore  or  forest  regions; 
they  are  narrow  and  tortuous;  they  require  locks  at  fre- 
quent intervals,  and  constant  dredging  and  repair.  Under 
such  diversity  of  conditions  analogy  is  clearly  worthless. 
It  is  argued  further,  however,  that  the  St.  Mary's  Falls 
Canal  and  the  Suez  Canal  have  demonstrated  the  feasibility 
of  canals  beyond  any  doubt  whatsoever,  and  that  the 
Panama  Canal  gives  promise  of  more  than  rivaling  these 
in  importance.  Here  again,  however,  conditions  are  very 
exceptional.  The  St.  Mary's  Falls  Canal  is  a  short  channel, 
but  little  more  than  a  mile  in  length,  connecting  Lake 
Superior  and  Lake  Michigan,  and  making  possible  the  tre- 
mendous traffic  between  the  upper  and  the  lower  lakes. 
The  Suez  Canal,  connecting  the  deep  waters  of  the  Med- 
iterranean and  the  Red  Seas,  makes  it  possible  to  avoid 
the  great  ocean  voyage  of  thousands  of  miles  around  the 
southern  end  of  Africa.  The  Panama  Canal,  to  connect 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico  with  the  Pacific  Ocean,  will  obviate 
the  present  necessity  of  the  long  journey  around  South 
America.  In  every  case  they  are  short  channels  connect- 
ing deep  water,  and  in  the  line  of  great  traffic.  Such  un- 
dertakings can  hardly  prove  the  feasibility  of  a  great  in- 
land canal  like  the  Lakes-to-Gulf  Waterway,  which  would 
be  over  sixteen  hundred  miles  in  length,  not  in  the  line 
of  greatest  commerce,  of  insufficient  depth  to  permit  the 
passage  of  deep-water  vessels,  and  perennially  subject  to 
floods  and  shifting  bottoms.  One  would  be  regarded  as 
of  questionable  sanity  were  he  to  argue  that,  since  the 
Brooklyn  and  London  Bridges  have  proved  of  great  value. 


ANALYSIS  OF  CURRENT  ARGUMENTS     43 

bridges  should,  therefore,  be  constructed  across  the  Strait 
of  Florida  and  the  English  Channel.  Such  reasoning, 
nevertheless,  is  akin  to  that  heard  in  support  of  canals. 

Similarly,  there  is  folly  in  concluding  that,  since  canals 
have  apparently  been  satisfactory  in  one  country,  they 
will  prove  successful  everywhere.  Topography,  commercial 
conditions,  and  Government  policy,  both  as  to  railways 
and  waterways,  must  all  be  carefully  considered  before 
analogies  may  safely  be  drawn.  Such  factors,  however,  have 
been  almost  wholly  ignored  by  waterway  advocates  in 
this  country.  It  was  not  until  the  preliminary  report  of 
the  National  Water^^ays  Commission  sharply  called  at- 
tention to  the  many  differences  in  conditions  at  home 
and  abroad  that  it  was  generally  realized  that  our  trans- 
portation problem  is  somewhat  different  from  that  of  the 
countries  of  continental  Europe.  There  is  much  to  be 
learned  from  a  study  of  foreign  transportation  develop- 
ment; but  conclusions  based  on  inadequate  study  of  for- 
eign conditions  are  fraught  with  no  little  danger.^ 

10.  The  discussion  of  the  preceding  pages  has  shown  that 
most  of  the  arguments  advanced  in  favor  of  the  develop- 
ment of  water  transportation  in  the  United  States  have 
not  been  based  on  a  thorough  study  of  the  subject;  and 
that  many  of  the  contentions  are  supported  by  statistics 
which  are  wholly  misleading.  This  has  been  seen  to  be  par- 
ticularly true  in  connection  with  the  fundamentally  import- 
ant question  of  the  "  cost "  of  transportation  by  rail  and  by 
water.  It  should  be  emphasized  again  that  the  cost  com- 
parisons that  are  commonly  made  are  wholly  erroneous. 
Usually  they  do  not  compare  like  kinds  of  freight  traveling 
under  comparable  conditions,  and  they  always  leave  out  of 
the  computation  of  cost,  on  the  waterway  side  of  the  equa- 
tion, the  tremendous  initial  expenditures  and  the  mainten- 

*  A  full  discussion  of  the  waterways  of  Europe  is  given  in  subsequent 
chapters. 


44  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

ance  charges,  that  is,  the  cost  of  construction  and  upkeep  of 
the  highway  itself;  while  on  the  railway  side  of  the  equa- 
tion these  are  always  included.  The  unnumbered  benefits 
of  waterways  vanish  into  thin  air  unless  it  be  proved 
that,  all  factors  considered,  water  transportation  is  cheaper 
than  transportation  by  rail.  More  than  that,  it  must 
be  proved  substantially  cheaper,  because  transportation 
charges  have  become  so  small  a  part  of  the  value  of  articles 
of  commerce  that  nothing  short  of  a  remarkable  reduction 
of  charges  will  usually  be  reflected  in  the  prices  of  commodi- 
ties. Wholesale  benefits  to  all  classes,  like  those  conferred 
by  canals  before  the  days  of  railways,  can  come  only  by 
reductions  corresponding  to  those  of  that  period.  If  canal 
transportation  is  as  much  cheaper  than  railway  trans- 
portation as  it  was  cheaper  than  transportation  by  wagon 
and  stage,  proportional  benefits  will  flow  from  their  re- 
building, but  not  otherwise.  It  is  believed  that  the  pre- 
sent chapter  has  demonstrated  the  need  of  a  scientific  in- 
vestigation as  a  prerequisite  to  possible  appropriations  for 
waterway  development. 


CHAPTER  IV 

A  NATION-WIDE   SYSTEM  OF    WATERWAYS 

1.  There  are  occasional  individuals  who  hope  ultimately 
to  see  in  the  United  States,  a  great  ramifying  system  of 
internal  waterways,  of  uniform  depth  and  of  standard  gauge, 
a  system  so  perfected  that  it  would  be  possible  for  a  canal 
boat,  like  a  box  car,  to  travel  without  impediment  to  the  far- 
thest ends  of  the  country,  from  Maine  to  Oregon  and  from 
Montana  to  Florida.  In  general,  however,  the  advocates  of 
waterway  development  would  be  reasonably  satisfied  if  all 
or  even  the  greater  part  of  the  numerous  independent  canal 
projects  and  river  improvement  schemes,  which  were  enu- 
merated in  the  introductory  chapter  of  this  study,  were 
speedily  carried  to  completion.  It  is  obvious  that  even  such 
a  development  would  give  the  United  States  nothing  short 
of  a  remarkable  system  of  inland  navigable  waterways. 
The  question  now  before  us  is,  whether  waterway  develop- 
ment on  such  an  extensive  scale  is  feasible.  The  present 
chapter  will,  therefore,  be  devoted  to  certain  important 
general  considerations  which  affect  the  water  transporta- 
tion possibilities  of  any  country  whatsoever,  in  the  hope 
of  throwing  light  upon  the  problem  before  us.  The  con- 
siderations to  be  advanced  may  be  divided  into  geograph- 
ical and  non-geographical  classes. 

2.  The  recent  progress  that  has  been  made  in  what  may 
now  be  called  the  science  of  geography  has  been  of  much 
importance  in  leading  to  a  better  understanding  of  the  de- 
velopment of  peoples  and  of  institutions.  The  union  of  geo- 
graphy and  history,  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  geography  and 
economics,  on  the  other,  has  been  perhaps  the  most  fruitful 
development  of  recent  years  in  this  general  field  of  practical 


46  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

study.  In  no  branch  of  industrial  development  have  geo- 
graphic conditions  exercised  a  more  determining  influence 
than  in  that  of  transportation.  And  as  transportation  is  a 
basic  industry,  these  influences  have  indirectly  determined 
the  distribution  of  population  and  of  industrial  enterprise. 

The  early  history  of  American  development  reflects  on 
almost  every  page  the  influence  of  the  topography  of  the 
country  as  affecting  transportation.  Considerations  of 
transportation  confined  the  early  settlements  along  the 
Atlantic  Ocean  to  the  banks  of  the  coastal  rivers.  Con- 
siderations of  transportation  directly  affected  every  phase 
of  the  Western  movement.  Tbe  three  great  routes  to  the 
land  beyond  the  Alleghanies  —  by  way  of  the  Hudson  and 
Mohawk  depression  to  the  Great  Lakes;  up  and  down 
the  transverse  valleys  of  Pennsylvania,  utilizing  the  Sus- 
quehanna, the  Juniata,  and  the  Allegheny  Rivers  to  the 
Ohio  gateway;  and  the  Cumberland  gap  opening  in  the 
South  through  the  mountains  of  Tennessee  —  were,  for 
reasons  of  transportation,  necessarily  the  lines  of  first  set- 
tlement and  development.  In  the  great  Middle  West,  in 
turn,  population  always  kept  close  to  the  banks  of  rivers, 
and  it  followed  their  winding  courses  as  the  frontier  moved 
out  across  the  prairies.  And,  finally,  the  old  Santa  Fe  and 
Oregon  Trails  followed  the  natural  depressions  across  the 
Western  mountains  to  the  Pacific. 

Since  this  development  occurred  before  the  era  of  rail- 
ways, the  lines  of  advancement  and  of  development  were 
everywhere  conditioned  by  the  possibilities  of  water  trans- 
port. The  location  of  every  city  of  importance  in  the 
eastern  part  of  this  country,  save  one,^  and  hence  the  dis- 
tribution of  practically  all  our  industries,  was  in  this  earlier 
period  determined  by  possibilities  of  water  transportation. 

The  development  of  the  railways  naturally  followed,  in 

*  Indianapolis  owes  its  position  to  its  central  location  within  the  state. 
Its  subsequent  rapid  development  has  been  due  to  the  centering  of  rail- 
ways there. 


NATION-WIDE  SYSTEM  OF  WATERWAYS    47 

the  main,  the  banks  of  the  old  water  routes,  partly  because 
they  offered  the  lines  of  least  resistance,  but  more  because 
the  traffic  which  the  railways  were  seeking  was  almost 
wholly  confined,  in  these  early  days,  to  the  river  lines.  It 
was  not  until  the  possibilities  of  the  Great  West  became 
fully  realized  that  our  railroads  left  the  old  beaten  paths  of 
travel  along  the  watercourses  and  covered  the  prairies,  and 
even  the  mountains,  with  a  very  network  of  lines  of  com- 
munication. It  is  this  development  which  has  constituted 
the  revolution  in  transportation  of  which  we  so  frequently 
hear,  and  it  is  likewise,  as  we  shall  see,  mainly  this  develop- 
ment which  has  spelled  the  fate  of  water  transport.  With 
this  brief  historical  survey,  we  may  now  direct  attention  to 
a  consideration  of  the  various  geographic  conditions  which 
limit  the  possibility  of  successful  water  transportation  in 
competition  with  fully  developed  railways. 

3.  In  the  first  place,  transportation  by  water  is  neces- 
sarily mainly  confined  to  natural  valleys.  It  is  possible  to 
construct  canals  across  territory  of  considerable  elevation, 
but  it  is  impracticable,  for  the  reason  that  the  cost  of  con- 
struction is  much  more  than  proportionally  increased,  as 
the  elevation  to  be  overcome  increases.  Since  the  course 
of  an  artificial  waterway  must  be  maintained  in  a  series  of 
levels,  canal  construction  across  a  rough  country  involves 
enormous  outlays  in  making  deep  cuts  and  huge  fills  for 
the  purpose  of  securing  a  dead  level;  and  at  frequent  in- 
tervals (and  the  higher  the  elevation  to  be  overcome,  the 
more  frequent)  locks  for  the  control  of  the  water;  and 
either  sluice  gates,  lifts,  or  sharp  inclined  planes,  for  the 
purpose  of  raising  or  lowering  vessels  from  one  level  to 
another,  must  be  constructed.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
cost  of  railway  construction  in  overcoming  elevations  is 
increased  at  nothing  like  the  rate  prevailing  in  the  case  of 
canals.  The  railway  track  need  not  be  at  a  dead  level.  It 
can  be  constructed  across  long  undulations  without  seri- 


48  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

ous  impediment;  it  can  wind  around  and  up  a  mountain- 
side, and  by  merely  increasing  its  distance,  by  doubling  on 
its  tracks,  as  it  were,  often  almost  entirely  avoid  any  con- 
siderable excavation.  Or,  if  a  devious  surface  route  is  beset 
with  extraordinary  difficulties,  the  railway  has  the  alter- 
native of  tunneling  directly  through  the  mountain.  In 
view  of  these  considerations,  it  is  apparent,  and  it  prob- 
ably is  not  generally  doubted,  that  for  mountain  or  inter- 
valley  traffic  canals  cannot  hope  to  compete  on  even  terms 
with  railroads. 

4.  The  second  geographic  consideration  is  that  of  terri- 
torial extent.  The  greater  the  distance  freight  must  travel 
to  its  destination  the  fewer  are  the  commodities  which  can 
make  use  of  waterways.  Speedy  delivery  has  become  so 
important  to  modern  business  that  the  greater  dispatch 
afforded  by  railways  is  a  decided  advantage,  and  in  a  coun- 
try of  broad  extent  canals  must  rely  upon  a  comparatively 
few  commodities.  Even  coal,  especially  coal  for  household 
consumption,  is,  under  present  conditions,  to  a  surprising 
extent  delivered  in  small  quantities,  in  order  to  save  the 
cost  of  storage  in  urban  centres,  awaiting  delivery  to  cus- 
tomers. Hence  it  must  be  delivered  at  more  frequent  inter- 
vals, which  introduces  the  element  of  speed  as  an  important 
factor.  Even  where  it  has  to  travel,  at  most,  only  a  few 
hundred  miles,  as  to  London,  it  is  carried  largely  by  rail, 
even  though  waterway  facilities  exist,  because  by  rail  it 
can  be  shipped  in  quickly  and  in  quantities  as  desired.^ 
It  is  obvious  that  the  greater  the  distance  that  coal  must 
travel  to  market,  the  greater  need  there  is  for  speed,  and 
hence  the  greater  is  the  railway  advantage. 

Canals  are  at  another  disadvantage,  also,  in  a  country 
where  long  distances  have  to  be  reckoned  with.  The  com- 
petitive strength  of  a  canal  decreases  as  the  distance  be- 
tween important  centres  of  traffic  increases,  because  the 
cost  of  the  highway,  the  mere  road-bed,  if  you  please,  is 
^  See  chapter  vi,  p.  114. 


NATION-WIDE  SYSTEM  OF  WATERWAYS    49 

much  greater  in  the  case  of  a  canal  than  in  the  case  of  a 
railway.  This  is  true  even  where  the  intervening  territory 
to  be  traversed  between  the  source  and  destination  of 
traffic  is  perfectly  flat,  and  hence  relatively  favorable  to 
canal  building.  The  laying  of  a  railway  track  across  a  level 
stretch  of  country  is  comparatively  inexpensive.  The  heavy 
costs  of  railway  construction  are  those  involved  in  the  tun- 
neling of  mountains,  in  the  crossing  of  rivers,  in  the  elevat- 
ing or  laying  of  tracks  within  urban  centres,  and  in  the  ac- 
quirement of  expensive  terminal  sites.  The  capitalization 
of  the  railways  of  the  entire  country  averages  only  about 
sixty  thousand  dollars  a  mile,  much  of  which  is  commonly 
regarded  as  a  fictitious  valuation.  In  the  five  states  in  which 
physical  valuations  of  railways  have  been  made,  namely, 
W^ashington,  South  Dakota,  Michigan,  Minnesota,  and 
Wisconsin,  the  cost  of  reproduction  new,  as  estimated, 
varies  from  $25,946  per  mile  of  single  track  in  Michigan  to 
$64,343  in  Washington,  and  averages  but  little  more  than 
$40,000.^  The  method  employed  in  assigning  these  values 
varied  with  the  states,  and  they  were  not  as  scientific  as  one 
could  wish,  but  they  doubtless  approximate  the  correct 
figures.  On  the  other  hand,  the  estimated  cost  of  enlarging 
the  Erie  Canal  is  about  $300,000  per  mile.  Since  there  is 
this  enormous  disparity  in  the  construction  costs  of  railways 
and  canals,  it  is  evident  that  the  greater  the  distance  be- 
tween important  traffic  centres  the  less  is  the  probability 
of  successful  canal  competition.  It  is  only  where  such  dis- 
tances are  short,  or  where  relatively  short  canals  connect 
naturally  navigable  waters  that  canals  can  hope  to  com- 
pete on  even  terms. ^ 

^  Bureau  of  Railway  Economics,  Washington,  1911.  A  Comparative 
Statement  of  Physical  Valuation  and  Capitalization,  p.  13. 

^  On  page  27  we  remarked  that  it  was  only  with  long  distance  that 
water  transportation  could  be  economically  successful.  This  may  at  first 
appear  contradictory  to  what  has  just  been  said;  but  the  former  state- 
ment contained  the  important  qualification  that  a  part  of  the  long  dis- 
tance must  be  on  a  natural  water  route,  rather  than  on  a  canal. 


50  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

5.  In  the  third  place,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the  in- 
fluence of  geographic  conditions  upon  the  supply  and  the 
control  of  water  for  transportation  purposes.  The  influences 
in  this  connection,  of  course,  make  themselves  directly  felt 
upon  rivers;  the  effect  upon  canals,  whose  water  is  supplied 
from  river  sources,  being  only  indirect  in  this  case.  The 
present  considerations  will,  therefore,  have  reference  to 
river  transportation  only. 

The  geographic  considerations  here  referred  to  are  the 
character  of  river  currents  and  the  alternating  periods  of 
high  and  low  water.  The  short,  rapid  rivers  breaking  over 
the  Atlantic  "fall  line"  were  ntver  successfully  navigated 
very  far  inland.  Again,  streams  with  narrow  gorges  here 
and  there,  or  with  shifting  channels,  present  constant  men- 
aces to  navigation,  while  the  silting  or  choking-up  of  the 
courses  of  many  rivers  with  sediment  necessitates  incessant 
dredging  at  enormous  expenditure.  For  example,  on  the 
Mississippi  River  between  St.  Louis  and  Cairo,  a  distance 
of  only  190  miles,  the  surveys  of  a  special  Board  of  Engi- 
neers show  that  "there  existed  in  1908  as  many  as  68 
localities  that  would  require  dredging  to  obtain  a  14-foot 
channel,  and  that  to  dredge  a  channel  500  feet  wide  and  14 
feet  deep  at  low  water  would  necessitate  the  removal  of 
35,000,000  cubic  yards  of  material.  Channels  thus  formed 
would  have  a  tendency  to  refill,  not  only  on  every  rise  of  the 
river,  but  on  any  change  in  the  regimen,  such  as  would  be 
produced  by  an  ice  gorge,  so  that  extensive  dredging  oper- 
ations would  be  required,  not  only  on  a  falling  river,  but 
every  spring  at  the  opening  of  navigation."^  The  estimated 
cost  of  opening  such  a  channel  is  $6,000,000,  and  the  cost  of 
maintenance  is  $2,000,000  per  year.^  The  cost  here  for 
dredging  alone  would  in  ten  years  amount  to  $135,000  per 
mile.    From  such  statistics  it  seems  abundantly  evident 

*  Report  by  a  Special  Board  of  Engineers  on  Survey  of  the  Mississippi 
River,  1909,  p.  13. 
«  IHd. 


NATION-WIDE  SYSTEM  OF  WATERWAYS    51 

that  the  amount  of  dredging  required  is  a  very  important 
consideration  in  estimating  the  feasibility  of  any  given 
project. 

But  perhaps  of  even  more  consequence  than  silting  are 
the  considerations  of  alternating  floods  and  low  water  in 
river  courses.  In  a  country  where  the  annual  rainfall  is 
evenly  distributed  throughout  the  year,  or  where  the  rivers 
are  fed  by  the  gradual  melting  of  glacial  ice,  and  where  the 
river  banks  are  well  protected  and  the  descent  of  the  stream 
not  precipitous,  there  may  be  comparatively  little  impedi- 
ment to  river  navigation  at  any  portion  of  the  year.  On 
the  other  hand,  where  rivers  are  at  times  inordinately  swol- 
len by  the  sudden  melting  of  vast  accumulations  of  winter 
snows,  or  by  the  rapid  run-off  from  a  naked  territory  follow- 
ing tremendous  occasional  rains,  and  at  other  times  are  of 
scant  depth  on  account  of  protracted  droughts,  they  are 
proportionately  handicapped  as  transporting  agents.  While 
reforestation,  levees,  revetments,  or  great  reservoirs  may 
lessen,  they  cannot  wholly  remove,  the  risks  attending 
navigation  on  rivers  subjected  to  periodic  floods  and 
droughts;  and,  indeed,  the  necessary  regulative  works  may 
themselves  prove  so  costly  as  altogether  to  counterbalance 
the  advantages  otherwise  offered  by  river  transit.  At  any 
rate,  the  risks  connected  therewith  are  a  constant  deter- 
rent to  shipping.  No  less  than  speed,  the  business  man 
requires  certainty  of  delivery.  A  delay  of  even  a  few  hours 
in  the  arrival  of  a  cargo  of  fuel,  of  building-materials,  or 
what-not,  is  almost  sure  to  involve  heavy  losses.  Hence, 
where  water  navigation  is  attended  with  considerable  risks, 
other  things  being  equal,  the  shippers  are  naturally  inclined 
to  give  the  preference  to  the  railways. 

6.  The  closing  of  navigation  for  considerable  periods  of 
time  on  account  of  cold  weather  also  has  an  important  bear- 
ing upon  the  question  under  consideration.  If  a  waterway, 
either  canal  or  river,  is  closed  to  navigation  because  of  ice- 


52  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

for  one,  three,  or  six  months  during  the  year,  its  chance  of 
success  is  obviously  proportionally  less  than  if  it  suffers 
from  no  such  interruption  of  traffic  movement.  Other 
things  being  equal,  the  construction  expenditures  are  the 
same  in  a  cold  as  in  a  warm  land.  Moreover,  almost  as 
much  equipment  is  required  for  a  half  or  three  quarters  of  a 
year  as  for  an  entire  year.  It  is  a  plain  mathematical  propo- 
sition, then,  that  when  the  capital  invested  in  an  enter- 
prise must  lie  idle  for  one  half  or  one  fourth  of  each  year,  it 
should  yield  during  its  period  of  activity  proportionately 
higher  rates  of  return  than  would  otherwise  be  necessary. 
Moreover,  if  a  waterway  is  ai?nually  closed  for  several 
months  on  account  of  ice  (and  the  same  holds  true  of  any 
interruption  to  traffic),  the  proportion  of  the  traffic  that  it 
can  hope  to  carry,  even  during  the  months  of  navigation, 
is  usually  greatly  lessened.  Shippers  do  not  readily  change 
from  one  mode  of  transport  to  another.  If  they  cannot  ship 
by  water  except  during  a  part  of  the  year,  in  many  cases 
they  may  choose  to  make  no  use  of  the  waterways  at  all, 
preferring  to  forego  any  slight  advantages  that  might  come 
from  their  use  when  opened,  rather  than  change  back  and 
iorth  from  one  agent  to  the  other.  Where  industries  locate 
themselves  so  as  to  possess  certain  and  convenient  means  of 
transport,  this  consideration  is  of  vital  importance;  for  it 
would  be  sheer  folly  to  build  a  factory  where  the  sole  reli- 
ance for  transportation  was  a  waterway  open  to  navigation 
for  only  a  portion  of  each  year.  Where  factories  are  built 
along  waterways,  except  in  warm  countries,  they  must  also 
be  convenient  to  railway  transportation.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  railways  afford  almost  uninterrupted  service, 
and  are  hence  sufficient  in  themselves  to  meet  the  constant 
needs  of  traffic.  The  importance  of  the  above  considera- 
tion can  hardly  be  overestimated.  The  existence  or  non- 
existence of  ice  for  several  months  in  the  year  may  alone 
largely  determine  the  feasibility  of  constructing  a  water 
Toute. 


NATION-WIDE  SYSTEM  OF  WATERWAYS    53 

7.  The  next  question  to  be  considered  is  that  of  traffic. 
It  is  passing  strange  that,  in  the  discussion  of  waterway 
projects  in  the  United  States,  this  most  important  of  all 
considerations  has  been  largely  disregarded.  While  here 
and  there  estimates  of  the  amount  of  traffic  in  sight  have 
been  made,  there  has  nevertheless  been  comparatively  little 
investigation  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  whether  there  is 
a  reasonable  expectation  of  a  sufficient  traffic  development 
to  warrant  the  expenditures  involved  in  the  various  pro- 
jects, and  that  geographic  conditions  may  be  in  this  con- 
nection of  the  greatest  consequence  is  an  idea  which  seems 
scarcely  to  have  been  entertained.  We  shall  find,  however, 
that  they  are  of  decisive  importance. 

By  its  nature  a  canal  of  consequence  requires  a  very 
heavy  traffic  if  it  is  to  prove  remunerative.  Owing  to  the 
smaller  construction  cost  per  given  distance  a  railway  may 
earn  dividends  when  carrying  a  much  smaller  quantity  of 
traffic  than  can  a  canal  of  equal  length.  The  advantage  of 
the  railway  in  this  connection  is  further  increased  by  the 
fact  that  it  is  not  compelled  to  rely  upon  a  limited  number 
of  commodities  as  a  means  of  revenue.  A  railway  can  carry 
all  kinds  of  freight,  and  those  kinds  able  to  bear  a  large 
transport  charge  are  especially  important  from  a  revenue 
standpoint.  Again,  a  railway  may  defray  a  very  large  part 
of  its  permanent  or  fixed  charges  by  means  of  passenger 
traffic.  On  the  other  hand,  the  success  of  a  canal  is  almost 
wholly  dependent  upon  a  certain  few  bulky  commodities, 
chief  of  which  are  coal,  building-materials,  timber,  ores, 
and,  to  a  much  less  extent,  grain,  for  reasons  which  will 
soon  appear.  This  is  the  case  on  European  waterways  no 
less  than  on  those  of  this  country.  Now,  since  canals  re- 
quire an  exceptionally  heavy  traffic,  because  of  the  unusual 
amount  of  fixed  capital  involved  in  their  construction,  and 
since  they  must  rely  upon  a  limited  number  of  commodi- 
ties, it  is  evident  that  the  quantity  of  these  particular 
commodities  and  their  geographical  distribution  in  relation 


54  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

to  the  waterways  of  the  country  are  of  fundamental  im- 
portance. 

If  the  geography  of  a  country  is  such  that  a  waterway 
cannot  extend  in  the  direction  which  the  raw  materials 
constituting  its  possible  traflfic  must  take  in  order  to  reach 
the  centres  of  manufacture  or  consumption,  that  is,  if  it 
runs  crosswise  to  the  general  direction  of  such  traffic,  its 
chances  of  success  must  be  regarded  as  almost  nil.  And, 
moreover,  if  waterways  would  be  successful,  they  must  lie 
not  only  in  the  general  direction  that  bulky  traffic  must 
move,  but  they  must  also  actually  tap  the  sources  of  the 
traffic  which  they  would  handle,  and  reach  the  actual  des- 
tination thereof.  This  brings  us  to  one  of  the  most  deci- 
sive considerations  in  the  entire  transportation  problem, 
namely,  that  of  transshipment. 

If  a  navigable  river,  or  a  canal,  is  not  so  situated  in  re- 
lation to  coal,  building-materials,  and  other  waterway  com- 
modities that  it  can  receive  them  direct  without  transship- 
ment from  railways,  the  chances  are  that  it  will  not  receive 
them  at  all  in  any  considerable  degree.  For  if  the  traffic 
must  first  be  loaded  into  railway  cars,  then  hauled  to  the 
waterways,  and  there  transshipped  to  barges  or  canal 
boats,  this  transshipment  adds  a  heavy  item  to  the  cost  of 
transport.  If,  in  addition,  the  destination  of  the  traffic 
be  not  immediately  upon  the  waterway  or  within  very 
convenient  trucking  distance,  a  second  transshipment  is 
necessary  when  the  combined  rail  and  water  route  is  used, 
this  time  from  the  waterway  to  the  railway.  The  import- 
ance of  this  consideration  is  usually  overlooked  and  scarcely 
ever  fully  appreciated.^    A  shipper  is  not  primarily  con- 

*  It  is  only  recently  that  any  attention  has  been  given  to  the  trans- 
shipment phase  of  the  waterway  question.  When  the  waterway  move- 
ment first  started,  the  idea  that  terminal  and  transshipping  facilities  were 
an  absolute  necessity  was  apparently  not  thought  of.  Later,  since  learn- 
ing how  much  has  been  expended  in  Europe  upon  terminal  equipment, 
much  emphasis  has  been  laid  upon  the  need  of  such  facilities.  But  as  yet 
no  attention  has  been  given  to  the  question  whether  these  additional 
costs  may  not  destroy  the  supposed  economy  of  water  transportatioD. 


NATION-WIDE  SYSTEM  OF  WATERWAYS    55 

cerned  with  the  relative  freight  charges  on  waterways  and 
railways  for  given  distances.  He  is  concerned  rather  with 
the  total  charge  of  moving  his  goods  from  source  to  des- 
tination, including  handling  expenses  at  both  ends,  and 
at  intermediate  points,  where  necessary.  So  far  as  he  is 
concerned,  the  waterway  rate  may  be  only  one  seventh  as 
great  for  a  given  distance  as  that  by  rail,  yet  he  will  not  use 
the  waterway  if  the  added  costs  of  extra  handling,  trans- 
shipments, etc.,  more  than  counterbalance  the  haulage 
advantage  of  the  water  route.  Unless  waterways  can  effect 
a  cheaper  moving  of  goods,  from  the  very  source  of  the 
traflBc  to  its  ultimate  destination,  including  handling  and 
transshipping  expenses  en  route,  they  cannot  be  said  to 
have  reduced  the  cost  of  transportation. 

It  has  been  said  that  the  total  cost  of  hauling  coal  on  the 
Great  Lakes  from  Buffalo  to  Duluth  is  no  greater  than 
the  cost  of  shoveling  it  from  a  sidewalk  into  a  consumer's 
cellar,  and  the  statement  may  very  likely  be  true.  In  Eng- 
land, meat  arriving  at  Southampton  and  destined  for  Lon- 
don is  unloaded  from  the  importing  vessels  into  road  wagons 
which  have  been  placed  upon  railway  cars.  The  advantage 
of  this  is  that  it  saves  in  London  the  cost  of  unloading  from 
railway  cars  to  road  wagons  for  delivery  about  the  city. 
The  wagons  are  merely  removed  from  the  cars  as  they  stand 
and  an  extra  handling  is  thus  avoided.  In  this  case  but  one 
transshipment  is  eliminated,  but  the  saving  is  obviously 
sufficient  to  cover  the  cost  of  carrying  the  heavy  truck 
wagons  from  Southampton  to  London  and  return.  More- 
over, on  the  return  voyage  there  is  no  cargo. ^  To  take  an- 
other illustration,  nearer  home :  huge  ferries  carry  loaded 
freight  trains  for  a  distance  of  ninety-six  miles  across  Lake 
Michigan  from  Ludington  to  Milwaukee,  in  order  to  save 
the  cost  of  transshipment.  It  is  evidently  cheaper  to  carry 
the  tremendous  tonnage  of  a  complete  train  of  cars  than  to 

*  Chlsholm,  "Inland  Waterways,"  Annual  Report  of  the  Smithsonian 
Institution,  1907,  p.  350. 


56  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

transfer  the  cargo.  Again,  it  is  said  that  "the  terminal 
charges  against  railroad  freight  between  Philadelphia  and 
New  York  were  about  fourteen  times  the  cost  of  transport- 
ation alone,  and  that  the  terminal  charges  at  Chicago  and 
New  York  about  equaled  the  cost  of  transportation  be- 
tween these  cities."^ 

In  the  light  of  such  facts,  it  is  evident  that  the  handicaps 
to  water  transportation,  where  either  the  source  or  the  des- 
tination, or  both,  of  the  traffic  are  not  immediately  adja- 
cent to  the  waterway,  are  very  great.  Unless  the  waterway 
saving  from  the  standpoint  of  haulage  costs  alone  are  ex- 
ceptionally large,  the  costs  of  transshipment  under  such 
conditions  are  almost  certain  to  be  prohibitive  of  water 
transport.^  More  efficient  loading  and  unloading  ma- 
chinery would  substantially  reduce  these  costs,  but  they 
remain  in  any  case  a  very  important  handicap  to  water 
transportation. 

The  question  naturally  arises  at  this  point,  May  not  the 
obstacles  of  transshipment  be  overcome  by  the  develop- 
ment of  lateral  waterways?  In  answer  to  this,  it  should  be 
recalled  that  the  main  lines  of  waterways,  as  has  been 
shown,  are  usually  limited  to  natural  depressions  or  valleys, 
and  the  construction  of  branch  lines,  therefore,  except  in  a 
perfectly  flat  territory,  or  where  they  do  not  extend  outside 
the  limits  of  the  valley,  will  prove  perhaps  even  more  costly 
than  the  main  lines  themselves.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind 
that  such  branch  canals  must  be  of  the  same  size  as  the 

'  Harts,  "Governmental  Policies  for  River  Improvements,"  Bullelin 
of  American  Economic  Association,  Fourth  Series,  no.  2,  p.  163. 

^  It  may  be  argued  in  contradiction  of  the  above  that  the  ores  from 
the  mines  of  Lake  Superior  are  transshipped  from  railway  cars  to  Lake 
vessels.  Conditions  here,  however,  are  very  exceptional.  Not  only  is  the 
Lake  route  much  shorter  for  all  the  ore  going  to  the  Pittsburg  region,  but 
the  capacity  of  the  Lake  vessels  is  such  that  the  ore  can  be  handled  in 
enormous  quantities.  This  permits  specially  constructed  ore  boats  to  be 
used  and  labor-saving  machinery  to  be  extensively  employed.  It  is  alto- 
gether an  exceptional  situation,  and  general  conclusions  may  not  safely  be 
drawn  therefrom.- 


NATION-WIDE  SYSTEM  OF  WATERWAYS    57 

mainline,  if  they  would  serve  the  purpose  for  which  they  are 
constructed.  If  the  capacity  of  a  branch  is  sufficient  for 
boats  of  only  one  hundred  tons'  burden  and  that  of  the 
main  line  large  enough  for  boats  of  six  hundred  tons,  the 
cargo  must  be  transshipped  from  the  smaller  to  the  larger 
boats  and  back  again.  Otherwise  all  the  advantages  of  the 
large  capacity  of  the  main  line,  so  far  as  all  traffic  not 
originating  immediately  upon  its  banks  is  concerned,  are 
dissipated;  the  same  thing  obviously  holds  true,  in  like 
manner,  for  the  traffic  not  destined  for  consumption  on  the 
banks  of  the  main  route.  Now,  the  reason  that  branch 
lines,  of  equal  capacity  with  the  main  lines,  would  cost  per- 
haps more  than  the  main  lines  themselves,  is  that  as  a  rule 
they  must  be  constructed  across  rougher  country.  It  is  to 
be  considered,  also,  that  a  great  number  of  branches  would 
be  required.  A  characteristic  feature  of  modern  industry 
is  the  existence  of  a  large  number  of  important  collecting 
and  distributing  centres,  from  which  the  lines  of  trans- 
portation radiate  out,  like  spokes  from  the  hub  of  a  wheel. 
Under  almost  any  condition  branch  canals  would  needs  be 
numerous,  thus  greatly  swelling  the  total  cost  of  the  whole 
waterway  system ;  and  where  a  country  is  of  broad  extent, 
the  length  of  the  branch  lines  would  have  oftentimes  to  be 
very  great,  thereby  still  further  lessening  the  practicability 
of  economical  water  transportation.^ 

In  contrast  to  the  expensiveness  of  branch  waterway 
lines,  railway  branches  can  be  constructed  at  comparatively 
small  cost.  While  the  width  of  the  track  must  needs  be 
the  same  as  that  of  the  main  line,  in  no  other  regard  need 
a  branch  be  the  equal  of  a  main  railway  line.  There  is, 
comparatively,  much  less  wear  on  the  roadbed,  because  of 
the  relatively  small  amount  of  traffic,  and  the  engines  may 
be,  and  usually  are,  second-hand  ones  passed  down  from 
the  main  lines. 

^  This  is  due,  as  already  seen,  to  the  greater  cost  per  mile  of  a  canal 
than  a  railway.  When  the  distances  between  industrial  centres  are  great 
canals  are  therefore  under  a  heavy  handicap. 


58  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

The  practical  advantages  possessed  by  the  railways  may 
readily  be  seen  in  connection  with  the  carrying  of  such  com- 
modities as  coal,  ore,  and  building-materials.  The  tremen- 
dous scale  on  which  these  raw  materials  are  now  extracted 
from  the  earth  involves  very  frequent  shifting  of  the  sources 
of  supply.  Nothing  is  more  simple  than  continually  to  ex- 
tend spur  lines  of  railway  to  the  very  mouths  of  the  mines. 
It  is  obvious  that  ramifying  waterways  throughout  a  min- 
ing district  are  altogether  impracticable. 

The  advantages  of  the  railways  in  this  regard  are  even 
more  strikingly  to  be  seen  in  connection  with  agricultural 
products.  By  the  nature  of  the  industry,  agricultural 
produce  is  necessarily  scattered  over  a  wide  area.  Hence 
—  and  herein  lies  the  reason  that  agricultural  produce  sel- 
dom travels  extensively  by  water  —  the  lines  of  communi- 
cation with  the  collecting  centres  must  be  very  numerous 
and  of  unusual  length.  Accordingly,  the  cost  of  extend- 
ing a  great  ramifying  system  of  canals,  large  enough  to 
avoid  transshipment  to  the  main  line,  throughout  a  great 
agricultural  region,  even  in  a  level  country,  is  altogether 
prohibitive.  The  same  consideration  is  obviously  involved 
in  the  delivery  of  supplies  to  rural  communities. 

The  above  considerations  relating  to  branch  canals  seem 
conclusively  to  indicate  the  impracticability  of  their  exten- 
sive development.  Only  under  exceptionally  favoring  con- 
ditions could  they  hope  to  be  remunerative.  The  railways 
possess  decisive  advantages  in  this  regard.  Hence  we  must 
conclude  that  transshipment  is  not  to  be  overcome  by 
means  of  branch  lines. 

Much  has  been  written  about  the  harmony  of  interest 
between  waterways  and  railways.  It  has  been  contended 
that  not  only  should  the  two  modes  of  transport  aid  each 
other  by  means  of  a  mutually  advantageous  division  of 
traffic,  but  that  they  should  serve  each  other  as  feeders, 
discharging  their  traffic  back  and  forth,  from  railway  to 
canal  and  from  canal  to  railway.  This  idea  has  been  intro- 


NATION-WIDE  SYSTEM  OF  WATERWAYS   59 

duced  into  the  United  States  from  Europe.  Where  it  is 
practiced  in  Europe,  however,  it  is  made  possible  only  by  a 
resort  to  artificial  means,  and  in  most  cases,  as  we  shall 
later  see,  it  is  a  barrier  to  industrial  development.'  It  is 
only  under  unusually  favoring  conditions  that  transship- 
ment can  be  economically  made.  The  standard  gauge  of 
railways  makes  it  possible,  on  the  other  hand,  to  send  a 
loaded  freight  car  to  any  part  of  the  country  where  railways 
extend,  without  transshipment  of  the  cargo.  At  collecting 
and  distributing  centres,  except  in  the  case  of  broken  lots, 
it  is  merely  necessary  to  switch  cars  from  one  train  and 
track  to  another.  No  handling  of  the  goods  whatever  is 
required.  It  should  be  recalled,  moreover,  that  the  cost  of 
sending  a  car,  when  once  it  is  loaded,  a  somewhat  longer 
distance  is  inconsiderable  if  not  insignificant.  Hence,  under 
all  ordinary  conditions,  an  expectation  that  shippers  will 
prefer  the  risks,  inconveniences,  delays,  and  heavy  cost  of 
transshipment  to  a  through  routing  by  rail  is  the  height  of 
improbability. 

It  is  not  alone  in  the  case  of  transshipping  from  rail  to 
water,  moreover,  that  this  handling  charge  manifests  itself 
in  water  transportation.  In  comparatively  few  cases  is  it 
practicable  to  maintain  river  channels  of  uniform  depth. 
The  Upper  Mississippi,  the  Missouri,  and  the  Ohio  cannot 
be  given  a  depth  equal  to  that  of  the  Lower  Mississippi,  ex- 
cept at  a  cost  which  would  be  prohibitive.  In  the  absence 
of  a  uniform  depth,  transshipments  are  necessary  unless  the 
draught  of  boats  carrying  through  traflSc  over  the  entire 
system  is  to  be  regulated  by  the  depth  of  the  shallowest 
portions  of  these  rivers. 

It  is  not  expected  that  the  above  discussion  will  be  ac- 
cepted as  conclusive  proof  of  the  impracticability  of  trans- 

*  In  France,  transshipments  from  rail  to  water  lines  is  almost  unknown. 
In  Germany,  they  are  more  common,  but  the  expense  thereof  is  largely 
borne  by  the  Government  rather  than  by  the  shipper.  For  a  full  discus- 
sion of  the  German  methods  of  artificial  stimulation  of  transshipments, 
see  chapter  x. 


60  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

shipping  from  one  agent  of  transport  to  another  under  all 
circumstances.  It  may  be  that  under  especially  favoring 
conditions  it  can  be  done.  The  point  will  be  more  fully 
considered  in  the  discussion  of  specific  projects  in  later 
chapters. 

8.  Attention  may  now  be  directed  to  a  discussion  of  the 
second  class  of  considerations  which  aflFect  the  chances 
of  economical  water  transportation  in  any  country.  For 
want  of  a  better  name,  these  considerations  may  be  desig- 
nated as  non -geographic  in  nature.  The  first  to  be  taken 
up  is  that  of  the  quantity  of  traffic  within  the  country  in 
question,  in  conjunction  with  the  extent  of  railway  devel- 
opment. 

The  degree  to  which  the  capacity  of  railways  can  be  ex- 
tended is  not  usually  fully  recognized.  The  installation  of 
double  tracks  has  made  it  possible  to  run  trains  in  both 
directions  at  the  same  time  and  at  intervals  of  only  a  few 
minutes.  The  chief  interruption  to  freight  traffic  is  the 
running  of  passenger  trains  on  the  same  tracks  that  are 
used  for  freight.  But  when  the  need  becomes  imperative 
enough,  as  it  already  has  on  a  few  lines,  separate  double 
tracks  for  freight  and  passenger  service  can  be  installed. 
And  it  is  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  laying  of  additional 
tracks  costs  much  less  than  the  construction  of  the  original 
ones.  Little  or  no  surveying  is  required,  grading  is  usually 
much  less  difficult,  and  the  existing  tracks  can  be  utilized 
to  great  advantage  in  the  distributing  of  materials  or  the 
laying  of  the  roadbed,  the  ties,  and  the  rails. 

In  view  of  these  considerations  it  is  evident,  providing 
the  necessary  funds  and  materials  are  available,  that  the 
carrying  capacity  of  the  railways  can  be  very  greatly  if  not 
indefinitely  extended.  It  is  perhaps  well  to  remind  the 
reader  that  the  statement  of  James  J.  Hill,  of  which  so 
much  capital  has  been  made  by  waterway  advocates,  was 
not  that  railways  had  reached  the  limit  of  their  develop- 


NATION-WIDE  SYSTEM  OF  WATERWAYS    61 

ment,  but  merely  that  they  were  unable  to  secure  the 
necessary  capital  with  which  to  increase  their  rolling-stock 
and  equipment,  and  with  which  to  extend  their  tracking, 
and  that  suflScient  structural  materials  and  labor  force  were 
not  immediately  available  for  the  making  of  the  necessary 
improvements  in  traffic  facilities.  The  almost  constant  large 
surplus  of  cars  since  1907  ^  shows,  moreover,  that  the  rail- 
ways are  not  in  normal  times  by  any  manner  of  means  ex- 
tended to  the  limit  of  their  present  carrying  capacity.  Much 
less  have  they  reached  the  limit  of  their  possibilities.* 

We  are  now  in  position  to  understand  how  the  density 
of  traffic  within  any  given  country  and  the  extent  of  the 
railway  development  may  affect  the  question  of  extensive 
waterway  development.  If  there  is  not  sufficient  traffic  to 
be  handled  to  tax  fully  the  capacity  of  the  railways  alone, 
if  the  railways  are  constantly  seeking  to  develop  and  secure 
more  traffic,  it  is  evident  that  waterway  development,  even 
though  it  be  furthered  by  the  Government,  is  greatly 
handicapped  in  the  securing  of  a  tonnage  sufficient  to  make 
it  remunerative.  But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  there  chances 
to  be  a  very  dense  traffic  within  a  country,  it  might  then 
be  comparatively  easy  for  both  railways  and  canals  to 
earn  returns  upon  the  capital  invested.  Even  in  this  case, 
however,  it  should  be  observed  that  there  would  still 
remain  the  all-important  question  of  determining  whether 
it  would  be  economically  advisable  to  develop  both  agents, 
of  transport  at  the  same  time.  This  consideration  will  be 
dwelt  upon  at  length  in  later  chapters. 

9.  If  the  railway  freight  service  of  a  country  is  excel- 
lently cared  for  at  the  time  of  the  beginning  of  waterway 

*  See  chart  opposite  p.  22. 

*  American  railways  are  no  exception  in  this  regard.  The  dense  traffits 
of  England  is  almost  wholly  handled  by  the  railways,  and  there  has  been 
no  contention  there  that  the  service  is  inadequate.  On  the  Continent 
canals  are  extensively  used,  but,  as  we  shall  see,  not  for  the  reason  that 
the  Railways  are  overburdened. 


62  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

development,  the  railways  possess  the  enormous  advantage 
of  an  established  trade.  Industries  will  have  located  them- 
selves, so  long  as  their  sole  dependence  for  transportation 
is  the  railways,  without  regard  to  the  location  of  possible 
canal  routes.  The  heavy  losses  involved  in  rebuilding  their 
plants  on  new  sites  along  waterways  would  usually  far  out- 
weigh any  possible  advantages  afforded  by  water  transit. 
Hence,  in  the  main,  only  new  industries  could  be  expected 
to  choose  the  waterway  sites  in  preference  to  those  of  the 
railways.  Even  if  the  waterways  could  secure  the  traffic  of 
all  new  industrial  concerns  whose  products  are  adapted  to 
water  transport,  the  development  of  traffic  could  not  be 
expected  to  be  very  rapid. ^ 

Again,  the  waterways  may  have  to  face  certain  well- 
known  competitive  methods  of  the  railways.  Whether  it  is 
fair  or  unfair,  railways  are  able,  in  the  absence  of  restrict- 
ive legislation,  to  reduce  freight  rates  to  such  a  point  that 
would-be  competitors  find  it  almost  impossible  to  gain  head- 
way. The  ability  of  the  railways  to  do  this  arises  from  the 
fact  that  they  do  not  have  to  rely,  as  already  pointed  out, 
upon  merely  a  few  bulky  commodities  for  their  income.  If 
a  railway  can  defray  a  part  of  its  expenditures  by  means  of 
high-class  freight  and  passenger  traffic,  it  can  afford,  when 
necessary,  to  carry  low-class  freight  at  very  low  rates.  So 
long  as  the  charges  are  more  than  enough  to  cover  the  mere 
haulage  expenses,  the  railway  obtains  some  revenue  there- 
from which  it  can  apply  in  payment  of  constant  charges. 
"While  the  same  thing  is  true  of  a  canal,  in  a  way,  the  latter 
must  nevertheless  secure  a  much  larger  margin  above  the 
mere  haulage  cost  on  low-class  goods,  since  such  freight 
constitutes  practically  its  sole  source  of  revenue.  Railways 
may,  for  a  time,  carry  bulky  goods  even  at  a  loss,  for  the 
purpose  of  crushing  competition,  but  such  a  policy  is  sui- 

*  A  reversal  of  this  situation  is  well  illustrated  in  Holland,  where  the 
industries  are  largely  centred  around  the  old-time  waterways  of  the  coun- 
itry.  Railway  development  there  has  been  hampered  accordingly. 


NATIOX-WIDE  SYSTEM  OF  WATERWAYS    63 

cidal  to  a  waterway,  which  has  no  source  of  revenue  other 
than  these  same  bulky  commodities.  Again,  by  refusing 
to  cooperate  with  water  lines,  by  prorating  on  terras  fatal 
to  the  waterways,  or  by  gaining  control  of  water  terminal 
sites  or  equipment,  the  railways  can  seriously  cripple  water 
routes.  Unless  competition  is  checked  by  means  of  legis- 
lation in  countries  whose  railways  are  strong  and  vigorous, 
the  development  of  water  transportation  must  follow  a 
thorny  pathway. 

10.  There  remains  to  be  touched  upon  a  final  considera- 
tion affecting  the  successful  development  of  water  transport- 
ation. It  is  what  may  be  termed  sectionalism.  In  a  country 
which  is  divided  into  a  large  number  of  political  subdivis- 
ions, sovereign  states,  kingdoms,  or  principalities,  it  very 
frequently  happens  that  the  interests  of  the  different  divis- 
ions are  not  in  harmony  with  the  interests  of  the  whole, 
and  hence  the  situation  is  not  conducive  to  the  most  effi- 
cient development  of  a  transportation  system.  This  be- 
comes of  greatest  importance  in  connection  with  the  ques- 
tion with  which  we  are  dealing,  when  the  railways  of  a 
country  are  privately  owned  and  thus  largely  removed  from 
the  influence  of  sectionalism,  and  when,  on  the  other  hand, 
waterway  development  must  rely  upon  a  "pork-barrel" 
method  of  appropriation  from  the  Federal  Treasury.  To 
illustrate,  throughout  the  history  of  the  United  States, 
whenever  public  funds  have  been  appropriated  for  general 
internal  development,  whether  for  roads,  canals,  rivers,  or 
harbors,  the  different  sections  of  the  country  have  always 
vied  with  each  other  in  making  the  most  of  their  needs. 
Indeed,  even  the  minor  political  districts  usually  have  to  be 
considered  in  the  distribution.  The  political  representatives 
are  everywhere  expected  to  obtain  as  large  a  portion  of  the 
public  fund  as  possible  for  their  particular  districts,  and  the 
amount  secured  usually  depends  less  upon  the  needs  of 
the  district  than  upon  the  skill  or  "pull"  of  its  representa- 


64  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

tive.^  The  result  of  such  a  method  obviously  cannot  be  a 
systematic  development  of  the  waterways  of  the  country. 
In  a  similar  manner,  the  part  played  by  local  governments 
in  the  improvement  of  waterways  may  prove  a  handicap 
to  systematic  development.  For  instance,  in  Germany, 
before  the  Imperial  Government  assumed  supervision  of 
transportation,  the  various  Kingdoms  and  Grand  Duchies 
were  accustomed  to  compel  transshipment  at  their  borders, 
whether  necessary  or  not,  in  order  to  furnish  labor  to  their 
inhabitants;  and  some  of  them  constructed  indirect  routes 
across  their  territory,  in  order  that  through  traffic  would 
have  to  travel  the  further  within  their  borders.'^  The  custom 
of  taxing  traffic  passing  across  their  borders  was  a  well- 
recognized  prerogative  of  the  German  States.  The  various 
states  of  the  United  States  have  spent  several  hundred 
millions  of  dollars  upon  waterway  development,  and  they 
have  naturally  done  it  without  regard  to  the  interests  of 
the  country  as  a  whole.  Under  such  conditions  a  standard 
gauge  and  a  comprehensive  system  of  waterways  is  practi- 
cally impossible.  Unless  both  the  waterways  and  the  rail- 
ways of  a  country  are  similarly  unsystematically  developed 
along  lines  which  seek  to  further  sectional  rather  than 
national  ends,  or  unless,  when  the  railways  are  in  private 
hands,  the  waterways  are  systematically  developed  by  a 
strongly  centralized  national  government,  it  is  obvious  that 
the  chances  of  the  latter,  from  the  standpoint  of  a  com- 
petitive system,  are  comparatively  small. 

11.  Having  discussed  in  some  detail  the  many  consider- 
ations which  may  affect  the  extensive  development  of  the 
waterways  of  a  country,  it  only  remains  now  to  consider  to 
what  extent  the  possible  handicaps  that  have  been  enu- 

*  It  is  stated  on  good  authority  that  the  United  States  Government  has 
been  very  liberal  in  appropriations  for  the  waterways  in  the  South,  for  the 
reason  that  the  South  does  not  share  in  the  distribution  of  pension  funds. 

*  Schramm,  Grundzuge  Deutacher  Eisenbahnpolitik,  pp.  5-7.. 


NATION-WIDE  SYSTEM  OF  WATERWAYS    65 

merated  apply  to  the  United  States.  In  general,  the  appli- 
cations are  so  apparent  that  only  a  brief  statement  is 
necessary. 

Obviously,  in  the  United  States,  as  everywhere  else,  the 
waterways  must  be  confined  to  natural  valleys  and  to  the 
comparatively  level  portions  of  the  country.  In  the  matter 
of  territorial  expanse  we  are  subject  to  the  full  extent  of  the 
handicap  therein  contained.  Our  river  currents  are  noto- 
riously unruly,  and  the  annual  floods  and  droughts  work 
unusual  havoc  with  navigation.  The  interruption  to  traffic 
on  account  of  ice  lasts  from  three  to  five  months  a  year  on  all 
our  Northern  rivers  and  lakes.  While  no  general  statement 
can  be  made  as  to  the  location  of  traflSc  in  relation  to  water- 
ways (this  being  a  matter  which  must  be  considered  sepa- 
rately in  connection  with  particular  projects),  it  may  be 
said  that  the  density  of  traffic  in  the  United  States  is  much 
less  than  in  most  European  countries.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  is  generally  recognized  that  our  railways  are  more  effi- 
cient carriers  than  those  of  any  other  country.  At  the  same 
time  they  have  not  as  yet  been  subjected  to  sufficient  con- 
trol to  safeguard  the  waterways  from  a  ruinous  competi- 
tion. It  remains  to  be  seen  how  efficient  will  prove  the  new 
law  which  prevents  the  charging  of  more  for  a  shorter  than 
a  longer  haul  where  waterway  competition  is  present,  ex- 
cept by  consent  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission. 
Finally,  the  United  States  is  subject  to  sectionalism  to  an 
unusual  degree  on  account  of  our  dual  form  of  govern- 
ment and  the  nature  of  our  present  political  methods.  In 
the  light  of  these  considerations,  the  conclusion  is  unavoid- 
able that  a  vast  system  of  ramifying  waterways  in  this 
country,  of  standard  gauge  and  uniform  depth,  is  impossible. 

Waterway  development  in  the  United  States  must  at 
best  be  confined  to  a  few  particular  projects  where  condi- 
tions combine  in  a  very  favorable  manner.  From  what  has 
been  said  of  the  disproportionately  heavy  expense  of  canal 
construction,  and  of  the  consequent  handicap  of  great  dis- 


68  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

tances,  between  important  centres  of  traffic,  it  is  evident 
that  the  chances  of  success  are  greatest  where  the  distances 
to  be  traversed  are  shortest.  If,  moreover,  a  short  canal 
connects  naturally  navigable  waters,  and  makes  possible 
a  continuous  water  route  of  many  times  its  own  length, 
thereby  offering  the  advantages  of  the  low  haulage  rates  for 
great  distances,  it  may  well  prove  very  successful.  Such, 
for  example,  is  the  St.  Mary's  Falls  Canal,  connecting  Lakes 
Superior  and  Huron.  A  canal  a  little  more  than  a  mile  in 
length  makes  possible  an  uninterrupted  water  route  of  more 
than  a  thousand  miles.  To  some  extent  the  Lakes-to-Gulf 
Waterway  and  the  Erie  Canal  are  supposed  to  be  projects  of 
this  type.  They  will  constitute  the  subjects  of  later  chap- 
ters. 


CHAPTER  V 

BRIEF   HISTORY  OF    WATER  TRANSPORTATION  IN  THE 
UNITED   STATES 

1.  As  a  preliminary  to  the  discussion  of  the  future  of 
American  inland  waterways  it  will  be  profitable  to  devote 
some  attention  to  the  history  of  water  transportation  in 
this  country.  The  present  chapter  will  accordingly  have  to 
do  with  the  expenditures  which  have  been  made  on  in- 
ternal waterways  in  the  United  States;  the  amount  and 
the  character  of  the  present  water-borne  tonnage;  and, 
finally,  of  the  causes  which  have  been  operative  in  the 
decline  of  water  traffic  in  recent  years. 

The  construction  of  canals  and  the  improvement  of 
rivers  in  the  United  States  has  involved  an  outlay  of  large 
sums  of  money,  the  total  amount  of  which  is  not  gener- 
ally appreciated.  Indeed,  the  opinion  is  rather  prevalent 
that  in  this  country  we  have  been  on  the  whole  unmindful 
of  the  possibilities  of  water  transportation.  It  will  be  seen, 
however,  that  the  facts  do  not  bear  out  such  a  belief. 

Owing  to  the  fact  that  three  different  agents  have  par- 
ticipated in  the  building  of  canals  in  the  United  States, 
namely,  the  Federal  Government,  the  various  State  Gov- 
ernments, and  private  corporations,  and  that  unsatisfac- 
tory records  of  the  cost  of  building  canals  have  been  kept, 
it  is  impossible  to  set  down  with  absolute  accuracy  the 
total  expenditures  that  have  been  made.  The  approximate 
amounts,  however,  are  given  in  the  following  table.  For 
the  National  Government  they  are  precise. 

Expenditures  on  Canals  in  the  United  States 

Federal $  40,905,877.31* 

State  and  private 288,628,072.00 

Total $329,533,949.31 

•  Preliminary  Report  of  Irtland  Waterways  Commission,  pp.  193-95. 


68  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

Federal  expenditures  on  rivers  from  1790  to  1909 
amounted  to  $258,378,432.^  The  inadequate  records  of 
state  expenditures  on  river  improvement  render  it  impossi- 
ble to  give  an  accurate  statement  of  their  amount.  Omit- 
ting river  improvements  by  the  states,  there  has  been  ex- 
pended upon  canal  and  river  development  in  the  United 
States  the  sum  of  $587,912,381.31.  This  is  more  than  four 
times  the  amount  that  has  been  spent  upon  waterways  in 
Prussia  during  the  same  period  of  time,  and  more  than  a 
half  more  than  has  been  spent  in  France.  It  is  worthy  of 
mention,  also,  that  the  expenditures  upon  riv^er  improve- 
ment in  this  country  have  been  increasing  heavily  in  the 
last  twenty  years. 

Of  the  original  4633.31  miles  of  canals  in  the  entire 
country,  2444.26  miles,  representing  a  cost  of  $81,171,374,  ^ 
have  been  abandoned.  The  statement  below  shows  the 
mileage  and  cost  of  canals  now  in  operation : '  — 

Length  Cost 

Government  canals 194.49  $  40,905,877.31 

State  canals 1358.98  156,983,538.00 

Private  canals 635.58  50,573,160.00 

Total 2189.05  $248,462,575.31 

As  compared  with  the  canal  mileage  of  2189  miles  in  this 
country,  France  has  1073  miles  of  canals,  and  Germany, 
895  miles.  In  relation  to  territorial  area,  however,  France 
and  Germany  have  the  greater  mileage. 

The  number  and  mileage  of  navigable  streams  in  the 
United  States,  as  distinguished  from  canals,  is  sho^Ti  by 
groups  in  the  following  table :  *  — 

*  Report  of  National  Waterways  Commission,  Doc.  15,  p.  4. 

*  Report  of  the  Commissioner  of  Corporations  on  Water  Transportation, 
vol.  I,  p.  44. 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  36-44!;  and  Preliminary  Report  of  Inland  Waterways  Com- 
mission,  pp.  195-202. 

*  Report  of  the  Commissioner  of  Corporations  on  Water  Transportation, 
vol.  I,  p.  28. 


WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS  69 

Navigable  length 

Streams                                            Number  (miles) 

Tributary  to  Atlantic    148  5365 

Tributary  to  Gulf 

(exclusive  of  Mississippi) 53  5212 

Mississippi  and  tributaries   54  13912 

Flowing  into  Canada 2  315 

Tributary  to  Pacific SS  1606 

Total 295  26410 

The  majority  of  the  streams  included  in  this  table  are, 
however,  navigable  only  for  light  draft  boats.  Forty 
streams,  with  a  total  of  about  2600  miles  of  navigation, 
have  a  depth  of  10  feet,  and  seventy  streams,  with  about 
3200  additional  miles,  have  a  navigable  depth  of  from  6 
to  10  feet.  This  gives  a  total  of  about  5800  miles  of  river 
navigation  at  a  depth  of  more  than  6  feet. 

2.  The  era  of  greatest  canal  building  in  the  United 
States  was  between  1825  and  1840,  and  the  thirty  years 
following  this  latter  date  was  the  period  of  great  canal  and 
river  prosperity.  The  amount  of  water-borne  traffic  stead- 
ily increased  for  several  decades,  but  with  the  develop- 
ment of  railways,  especially  in  the  last  quarter  of  the  nine- 


1 

r^ 

/ 

K 

Aa 

K 

A 

r\ 

/ 

\ 

'  ^ 

^A 

A 

r 

\ 

i 

\ 

f\ 

/^ 

\   1 

/ 

V 

'\ 

A^ 

f 

V 

1855  1860  18C5  1870  1875  1S80  1885  1800  1895  1900  1905 

Chart  I 
Total  Tonnage  snJErie  Canal  (1850-1903) 


4.5 
4.0 
3.5 
3.0 
2.5 
2.0 
15 
1.0 


70 


WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 


teenth  century,  further  growth  of  water  traflBc  was  arrested. 
In  all  cases  the  traffic  on  the  waterways  failed  to  keep  pace 
with  that  on  the  railroads,  and  in  nearly  every  case  the 
tonnage  on  the  water  routes  declined  absolutely. 

Chart  I  shows  the  movement  of  freight  on  the  Erie  Canal 
from  1850  to  1908.  There  is  seen  to  have  been  a  general 


1855  1860 


1870  1875  1880 


1890  1895  1900  1905 


Chart  II 

Eailway  and  Canal  Tonnage-in,  tte  State  of  New  York 

growth  of  tonnage  on  the  Erie,  with  numerous  ups  and 
downs,  until  the  year  1880,  when  4,500,000  tons  were  car- 
ried. Although  tolls  were  abolished  in  1882,  the  entire  ex- 
pense of  maintenance  having  since  been  borne  by  the  state, 
traffic  has  steadily  declined  since  1880,  until  it  is  now  little 
more  than  it  was  a  half-century  ago. 

Chart  II  tells  the  story  of  railway  competition  with  the 
Erie  Canal.  ^  The  line  at  the  bottom  represents  the  ton- 
nage on  the  Erie,  being  the  line  in  the  preceding  chart  on 
a  reduced  scale,  which  gives  a  flattened  appearance,  it 
being  necessary  to  reduce  the  scale  in  order  to  get  the 
lines  representing  the  railway  tonnage  on  a  chart  of  con- 
venient size.  A  line  representing  the  tonnage  of  all  canals 

*  A  chart  of  this  sort  is  always  somewhat  misleading.  The  increase  in 
branch  railway  lines,  while  the  canal  system  remained  unchanged,  would 
naturally  cause  a  more  rapid  development  of  traflSc  on  the  railways. 
Since  the  canal  traffic  has  actually  declined  in  this  case,  however,  the 
chart  substantially  represents  the  true  situation.  This  comment  applies 
also  to  Chart  V. 


WATER  TRAFFIC  IN  UNITED  STATES      71 

of  the  state  would  closely  parallel  that  of  the  Erie  alone. 
In  1853  the  canal  system  of  the  state  was  carrying  81.1 
per  cent  of  the  total  traffic.  In  1873,  the  year  that  the 
lines  representing  the  traffic  on  the  railways  cross  the 
line  of  canal  traffic,  the  canals  of  the  state  were  carry- 
ing only  34.9  per  cent  of  the  total.    In  both  1907  and 


870     1875     1880     1885     1890     1895     1900     1905 



\ 

\ 

^^ 

"^ 

/ 

THOU- 
SAND 
TONS 


340, 


250, 


160, 


70, 


Chart  III 
Shipments  and  Receipts  in  Tons  on^tbe  Upper  Itlississippi  at  St.Louis 


1908,  the  percentage  carried  by  the  canals  was  only  3.9 
per  cent  of  the  total.  It  should  be  remembered  that  the 
railways  have  accomplished  this  wholesale  diversion  of 
traffic  without  any  aid  whatever  from  the  state  in  the 
building  or  maintaining  of  the  roads,  while  the  canals  have 
been  constructed  and,  since  1882,  maintained  entirely  at 
public  expense.  While  the  railway  men  have  been  obliged 
to  make  rates  calculated  to  earn  dividends  on  the  total 
capitalization  of  the  roads,  the  canal  operators  have  had 
to  attempt  to  make  returns  only  on  the  cost  of  canal  boats 
and  the  mules  which  draw  them. 

Charts  III  and  IV  indicate  the  traffic  movement  on  the 
Mississippi  River  both  above  and  below  St.  Louis.  Begin- 


72 


WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 


ning  with  1871  there  was  an  uninterrupted  decline  in  the 
traffic  above  St.  Louis  until  1905,  In  1906  and  1907  a 
slight  increase  is  shown,  doubtless  a  result  of  the  railway 
car  shortage  of  these  years.  Below  St.  Louis  the  high  mark 


?70     1875    1880     1885     1890    1895     1900     1905 

\ 

/ 

\ 

\ 

/ 

\ 

\ 

"" 

- 

THOU- 
SAND 
TONS 

1,047, 


141, 


Chart  IV 
Shipments  and  Receipts  in  Tons  on  tlie  Lower  Mississippi  at  St. Louis 


was  reached  in  1880,  since  which  time  the  decline  has  been 
continuous  to  the  present  day. 

The  cotton  trade  was  once  of  considerable  importance 
on  the  Lower  Mississippi,  but  the  railways  have  succeeded 
in  diverting  a  large  portion  of  this  traffic  to  themselves. 
The  receipts  of  cotton  at  New  Orleans  by  rail  and  by  river 
since  1873  are  shown  in  Chart  V.  Since  1881  the  railways 
have  carried  an  ever-increasing  proportion  of  this  tonnage. 
The  condition  of  this  cotton  traffic  is  typical ;  in  every  class 
of  commodities,  except  coal  coming  down  from  the  Ohio, 
the  railways  have  almost  driven  the  traffic  oflP  the  river. 

When  we  come  to  the  Ohio  River  system,  however,  the 
condition  of  water  traffic  is  found  to  be  much  better. 
Chart  VI  shows  the  movement  of  coal  through  the  locks 
on  the  Monongahela  River  in  western  Pennsylvania.  Since 


WATER   TRAFFIC   IN   UNITED   STATES    73 

a  large  portion  of  this  coal  is  sent  down  the  Ohio,  a  plot  of 
the  Ohio  River  coal  trade  would  closely  parallel  the  line  in 
the  present  chart.  ^  There  is  seen  to  have  been  a  continu- 
ous rapid  increase  here.  Statistics  of  all  the  traflSc  on  the 

THOU- 

1855  18G0  1865   1870   1875  1880  1885  ISDO  1895   1900  1905  Ial\°» 

2,000. 


^~ 

/ 

Lines  1 

9  follov 

8 

/ 

River 
Rail 

\ 

/ 

V 

/ 

/ 

A 

\ 

•-^ 

*» 

231, 


Chart  V 

Keceipts  of  Cotton  at  New  Orleans 

Ohio  would,  however,  not  appear  to  such  good  advantage. 
The  increase  in  coal  has  been  offset,  to  a  large  extent,  by 
the  decrease  in  miscellaneous  traffic  and  in  lumber.  Though 
there  has  been  a  slight  absolute  increase  in  the  total  traffic 
on  the  Ohio,  there  has  nevertheless  been  a  heavy  relative 
decline  compared  with  the  railways.  The  reason  for  the 
comparatively  good  showing  of  the  Ohio  River  system  will 
appear  elsewhere. 


3.  It  is  generally  recognized  that  water  traffic  now  con- 
sists, for  the  most  part,  of  what  is  called  bulky  or  low-class 
freight.  Precisely  what  percentage  of  the  traffic  on  exist- 
ing waterways  is  of  a  distinctly  bulky  nature,  and  what 
particular  commodities  predominate,  are,  however,  not  so 
well  known.  It  is  the  purpose  of  the  succeeding  paragraphs 
to  show  the  character  of  present  traffic  by  means  of  statis- 

*  Statistics  of  traffic  on  the  Ohio  are  usually  unreliable  for  the  reason 
that  the  receipts  and  shipments  at  all  the  river  ports  are  added  together, 
and  no  allowance  is  made  for  duplication.  Most  of  the  coal  traffic  is  thus 
counted  several  times. 


74 


WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 


1850  1855  1860  1869  1870  1875  1880  1885  1890  1895  1900  1905 


— —  — — -  — — — . y— 


USHEI.I 

257 


12 

Chart  VI 

Movement  of  Coal  through  Monongahela  River  Locks, 
destined  for  Pittsburgh  and  poinds  along  the  Ohio  River 

tical  data.  The  first  table  gives  the  total  tonnage  of  differ- 
ent commodities  through  the  St.  Mary's  Falls  Canal  for  a 
series  of  years,  and  the  percentage  each  bears  to  the  grand 
total :  — 


Coal 

Flour 

Wheat 

Other  grain 

Manufactured  and 

pig  iron 

Salt 

Copper 

Iron  ore 

Lumber 

Unclassified  freight 


1881 


296 

61 

104 


9 
29 

748 
94 

129 


Per 

cent 


18.2 


5.6 
.9 
1.8 
47.7 
6.0 
8.2 


1891 


2507 

378 

1164 

25 

70 

33 

69 

3560 

619 

417 


Per 
cent 


28.2 

4.2 

13.1 

.3 


40.0 
6.9 
4.7 


1901 


4593 
763 

1584 
594 

206 

62 

99 

18061 

1806 

605 


Per 
cent 


16.2 
2.7 
5.6 
2.1 

.7 

.2 

.3 

63.7 

6.5 

2.1 


1903 


6938 
709 

1841 
770 

193 

64 

113 

21655 

1710 

681 


Per 

cent 


20.0 
2.0 
5.2 
2.2 

.6 

.2 

.3 

62.5 

4.9 

2.0 


1905 


6509 
577 

2050 
941 

238 

59 

106 

31333 

1610 

848 


Per 
cent 


14.7 
1.3 
4.6 
2.5 

.5 

.1 

.3 

70.8 

3.7 

1.9 


1908 


9902 

573 

3184 

1042 

289 
77 
102 
24650 
782 
843 


Per 

cent 


23.9 
1.4 
7.7 
1.8 

.7 

.2 

.2 

59.6 

1.8 

2.0 


The  three  commodities,  iron  ore,  coal,  and  grain,  includ- 
ing flour,  made  up  the  following  percentages  of  the  total :  — 


Year 

Percentage 

Year 

Percentage 

1881 

77.6 

1904 

91.5 

1891 

85.8 

1905 

93.5 

1901 

90.3 

1906 

93.9 

1902 

91.7 

1907 

95.6 

1903 

92.0 

1908 

95.4 

WATER  TRAFFIC  IN  UNITED  STATES     75 

The  above  statistics  do  not  indicate  accurately  the  total 
amount  of  bulky  freight  passing  through  the  canal ;  for  while 
all  except  the  unclassified  freight  is  of  a  bulky  kind,  it  does 
not  follow  that  all  of  the  unclassified  is  of  high  grade.  In 
fact,  it  is  probably  for  the  most  part  of  a  distinctly  low 
class.  It  must  include  such  commodities  as  cement  and 
stone,  sand  and  clay,  sugar,  crockery,  and  tiling.  It  is 
therefore  likely  that  the  distinctly  high-class  freight  bears 
only  a  very  small  ratio  to  the  total  tonnage  passing  be- 
tween Lake  Huron  and  Lake  Superior. 

From  the  standpoint  of  value  the  showing  of  high-grade 
commodities  would  be  somewhat  better,  but  it  would  still 
be  relatively  unimportant.  There  is  a  considerable  traflBc 
in  package  freight  on  the  Lakes,  but  the  conditions  under 
which  this  is  carried  are  exceptional,  in  that  the  packet 
lines  are  almost  wholly  under  the  control  of  the  railways. 
There  is  thus  no  real  competition  in  operation.  The  rail- 
ways fix  the  rates  in  such  a  way  as  to  send  this  traffic  by 
water  or  rail  as  best  suits  their  convenience.  At  best,  how- 
ever, this  package  freight  is  unimportant.^  It  is  included 
under  the  unclassified  freight  listed  in  the  above  table. 

The  next  table  shows  the  tonnage  on  the  canals  of  New 
York  and  the  percentages  of  the  leading  classes  of  com- 
modities for  a  series  of  years :  ^  — 


Year 

Product  of 

a 

Agricul- 

Manufac- 

Merchan 

Other 

Total 

the  forest 

ture 

0^ 

tures 

dise 

articles 

1840 

687.647 

41 

393,780 

28 

100,367 

112,021 

222,231 

1,416,046 

1850 

1.261,991 

41 

965,619 

31 

200,218 

269,370 

379,419 

3,076,617 

1860 

1,509.977 

32 

1,682,754 

37 

268,759 

250,360 

938,364 

4,650,214 

1870 

1,916,511 

34 

1,309,153 

18 

352,497 

271,856 

2,323,752 

6,174,869 

1880 

1.566.764 

24 

2,408,358 

38 

278,114 

355,165 

1,849,255 

6,467,656 

1890 

1.397.862 

27 

1,201,916 

22 

139,310 

769,672 

1,737.342 

5,246,102 

1900 

726,984 

22 

511,518 

16 

142,784 

250,436 

1,714,219 

3,345,941 

1906 

854,610 

24 

648,715 

18 

170,584 

202,285 

1.164.7U 

3.640.907 

^  For  a  statement  of  the  package  freight  business  on  the  Lakes,  aee  Pre» 
liminary  Report  of  the  National  Waterways  Commission,  pp.  48-52. 
•  Report  of  the  Iiiland  Waterways  Commission,  p.  224. 


76         WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

This  table  indicates  a  considerable  falling-off  in  the  per- 
centage of  products  of  the  farm  and  the  forest  in  recent 
years,  but  shows  these  two  sources  still  to  furnish  over  42 
per  cent  of  the  entire  tonnage. 

In  the  year  1908, "  Manufactures  "  included  the  following 
commodities:  — 

Commodity  Tons 

Domestic  spirits 93 

Furniture 50 

Pig  Iron 19,171 

Bloom  and  bar  iron 944 

Castings  and  ironware 230 

Domestic  woolens ,  68 

Salt 85,812 

Under  the  heading  "Merchandise"  were  included  the 
following:  — 

Commodity  Tons 

Sugar 40,056 

Molasses 1,116 

Coflfee 2,114 

Iron  and  steel 829 

Flint,  enamel,  crockery,  and  glassware 58 

Ice 122,675 

All  other  merchandise 121,833 

"Other  articles"  included  the  following  kinds  of  freight: 

Commodity  Tons 

Stone,  lime,  and  clay 1,053,759 

Phosphate 20,414 

Anthracite  coal 358,572 

Bituminous  coal 140,209 

Iron  ore 29,114 

Petroleum 123 

Sundries  39,223 

These  tables  show  that  practically  all  the  traflSc  on  the 
canals  of  New  York  is  of  low  grade.  "Furniture,"  "Do- 
mestic spirits,"  "Domestic  woolens,"  "Coffee,"  and  "All 
other  mechandise"  may  alone  fairly  be  considered  as  of 
high  grade,  and  in  1908  these  constituted  only  about  four 
per  cent  of  the  total  tonnage. 


WATER  TRAFFIC  IN  UNITED  STATES      77 

The  same  general  situation  exists  on  the  Mississippi 
River  system.  Without  giving  a  detailed  statement  of  the 
tonnage  of  different  commodities,  it  should  be  stated  that 
"of  the  total  freight  movement,  exclusive  of  harbor  traffic 
and  car  ferries,  .  .  .  more  than  56  per  cent  was  coal  and  20 
per  cent  stone  and  sand.  This  was  an  increase  of  coal  traffic 
since  1889  of  29.4  per  cent,  and  in  stone  and  sand  of  1147 
per  cent."  ^  On  the  Lower  Mississippi,  from  Memphis 
southward,  considerable  quantities  of  general  merchandise 
jind  plantation  supplies  are  still  shipped,  but  they  now  con- 
stitute only  a  small  proportion  of  the  total  traffic.^ 

Between  the  years  1886  and  1902,  75  per  cent  of  the 
entire  traffic  on  the  Ohio  River  was  coal,  and  at  the 
present  time  it  is  nearly  all  coal.'  On  the  Monongahela 
River  84  per  cent  of  the  traffic  is  coal  and  15  per  cent  sand 
and  gravel,  and  on  the  Allegheny  almost  the  entire  tonnage 
is  made  up  of  lumber,  coal,  gravel,  sand,  and  stone,*  On 
the  Kanawha,  coal  constitutes  90  per  cent  of  the  total,  and 
timber  and  ties  most  of  the  remainder,  while  on  the  Big 
Sandy,  timber  and  ties  make  up  94  per  cent  of  the  total 
traffic.  On  the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Canal,  in  1906,  coal 
constituted  88  per  cent  of  the  entire  tonnage.^ 

4.  Having  considered  the  character  of  present  water- 
borne  freight  in  the  United  States,  and  the  decline  in  traffic 
that  has  taken  place  on  the  majority  of  American  rivers 
and  canals  during  the  last  thirty  or  forty  years,  we  may  now 
inquire  into  the  causes  of  this  condition.  The  tendency  has 
been  to  assign  the  practical  failure  of  water  transportation 
in  recent  years  to  two  main  reasons :  first,  to  physical  defects 
in  the  waterways,  and  second,  to  the  unfair  competition  of 
the  railroads.    Let  us,  therefore,  inquire  in  what  degree' 

*  Dixon,  Traffic  History  of  the  Mississippi  River  System,  p.  64  {National 
Waterways  Commission,  Doc.  10). 

*  Ibid.,  p.  60.  3  Ibid.,  p.  44.  *  Ibid.,  p.  47. 

*  Report  of  Inland  Waterways  Commission,  p.  1157. 


78  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

these  causes  have  been  operative,  and  at  the  same  time 
endeavor  to  ascertain  whether  there  may  not  also  have  been 
other  causes  contributing  to  produce  the  decline  in  water- 
borne  freight  which  has  been  observed. 

a.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  one  of  the  reasons  for  the 
failure  of  water  traffic  to  increase  in  the  United  States  of 
late  has  been  the  inadequate  development  of  water  lines. 
Many  of  the  old  canals  are  of  insufficient  depth  to  be  of  any 
importance  in  modern  transportation.  Other  canals  have 
been  neglected  and  allowed  to  fill  up  with  silt,  while  the 
wharves  have  rotted  away  for  want  of  repair.  Again,  some 
of  our  canals  are  poorly  located,  "  beginning  nowhere  and 
ending  nowhere,"  as  has  been  well  said.  These  cannot  play 
an  important  part  as  carriers  of  traffic.  It  is  an  absolute 
essential  that  water  lines  should  connect  with  the  important 
routes  of  traffic. 

Many  of  our  rivers  are  ill  adapted  to  navigation  on  ac- 
count of  the  existence  of  snags,  sandbars,  shifting  channels, 
and  alternating  high  and  low  water.  The  nonuniformity 
of  depth,  and  the  absence  of  connecting  links  between  im- 
portant water  routes,  have  likewise  been  serious  handicaps 
to  the  development  of  water  traffic. 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  stated  that  even  where 
there  are  no  barriers  of  the  kind  mentioned,  the  condition 
of  water  traffic  in  this  country  is  little  better.  The  Hudson 
River,  for  instance,  is  capable  of  carrying  a  most  extensive 
traffic,  yet  statistics  show  the  tonnage  movement  to  be 
insignificant  in  quantity.  The  Erie  Canal,  which  connects 
the  Hudson  with  the  Great  Lakes,  has  a  present  depth  of 
seven  feet,  as  much  as  any  of  Germany's  great  inland  water 
ways,  except  the  Rhine  River.  On  the  Mississippi  River 
below  Cairo  there  is  a  channel  nine  feet  in  depth  which  is 
seldom  obstructed  by  either  ice  or  low  water,  and  as  far  up 
as  St.  Louis  there  has  been  for  many  years  a  depth  of  eight 
feet  during  the  greater  part  of  each  season.  The  extensive 


WATER  TRAFFIC  IN  UNITED  STATES      79 

water  traffic  of  Europe  is  carried  on  waterways  which,  with 
few  exceptions,  have  depths  less  than  this.  We  must,  then, 
look  to  other  causes  than  the  inadequacy  of  present  water 
routes  for  a  complete  explanation  of  the  decline  of  water 
traffic. 

b.  In  considering  the  part  played  by  the  railways  in  the 
decline  of  water-borne  freight,  it  may  be  said  at  once  that 
the  waterways  are  unable  to  compete  for  freight  which  is 
of  considerable  value  or  which  requires  a  speedy  delivery. 
The  superiority  of  the  railways  in  handling  high-class  freight 
is  universally  admitted.  As  it  was  not  until  after  the  Civil 
War  that  the  railways  of  the  United  States  really  came 
into  their  own,  this  diversion  of  high-class  freight  from  the 
waterways  is  to  a  considerable  extent  reflected  in  the  charts 
shown  above.  This  obviously  accounts,  however,  for  only  a 
small  part  of  the  decline  which  has  taken  place. 

c.  When  we  take  up  the  case  of  the  diversion  of  the  low- 
class  freight  from  its  supposedly  natural  avenue,  the  water- 
way, it  becomes  necessary  to  inquire  more  closely  into  the 
situation.  It  is  not  sufficient  to  say  that  superior  advan- 
tages offered  by  the  railways  for  the  carrying  of  low-grade 
commodities  accounts  for  the  wholesale  diversion  of  such 
freight  that  has  occurred.  In  order  to  get  at  the  causes 
we  must  give  careful  attention  to  the  history  of  this  de- 
cline. 

First,  let  us  consider  the  competitive  methods  employed 
by  the  railways.  The  most  obvious  method  at  the  com- 
mand of  the  railroads  for  attracting  traffic  away  from  the 
waterways  is  by  the  cutting  of  rates  on  competitive  freight. 
That  the  railways  have  lowered  their  rates  in  order  to  meet 
the  competition  of  water  lines  is  admitted  even  by  railway 
men.  Case  after  case  has  come  before  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  involving  this  point.  This  cutting  of 
rates  is  oftentimes  not  so  great  as  to  eliminate  all  profit 


80  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

from  the  handling  of  the  traflSc;  that  is,  something  is  still 
obtained  above  the  direct  cost  of  carrying  the  goods  in 
question.  It  is  undoubtedly  true,  however,  that  the  rail- 
roads have  not  infrequently  cut  rates  to  a  point  so  low  that 
the  returns  were  insufficient  to  cover  the  mere  haulage  costs, 
to  say  nothing  of  affording  anything  to  apply  in  the  pay- 
ment of  fixed  charges.  They  have  done  this  in  the  know- 
ledge that,  after  the  competing  boat  lines  had  been  driven 
from  the  waterways,  the  rates  by  rail  could  be  substantially 
increased.  This  latter  practice  maybe  regarded  as  an  unfair 
means  of  competition,  but  the  former  not  necessarily  so. 
For  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  operators  of  boat 
lines  do  not  have  to  fix  rates  which  cover  the  cost  of  the 
highway  itself.  Fixed  charges  do  not  concern  them,  for  the 
waterways  are  constructed  and  maintained  by  the  state. 
Consequently,  when  the  railways  lower  their  rates  to  a 
point  where  the  returns  yield  little  if  anything  to  be  ap- 
plied in  payment  of  fixed  charges,  where  they  only  cover 
the  haulage  cost  proper,  they  are  simply  competing  with 
waterways  on  even  terms.  That  the  railways  resort  to  this 
practice  is  no  indication,  then,  that  the  waterways  are  in- 
herently the  cheaper  means  of  transport.  To  settle  that 
point,  as  we  have  elsewhere  pointed  out,  the  charges  on 
fixed  capital,  as  well  as  the  haulage  costs  proper,  must  be 
included.  But  when  the  railways  cut  rates  below  the  actual 
haulage  charges  for  a  time,  in  order  to  crush  out  competi- 
tion, the  case  is  somewhat  different.  We  generally  regard 
such  practices,  when  employed  by  a  railway  or  an  indus- 
trial corporation,  as  unfair,  and  legislation  attempts  to 
prevent  such  means  of  destroying  competition. 

d.  It  is  by  other  means,  however,  that  the  railways  have 
most  seriously  damaged  the  waterways.  A  much  more 
eflFective  method  of  competition  than  the  cutting  of  rates 
has  been  the  refusal  to  cooperate  with  water  lines  in  the 
handling  of  through  freight.  Inasmuch  as  a  great  proper- 


WATER  TRAFFIC  IN  UNITED  STATES      81 

tion  of  traffic  does  not  originate  or  find  its  destination  im- 
mediately along  water  routes,  it  is  imperative  that  they 
should  have  the  cooperation  of  the  railroads.  The  railways 
have  possessed  here  a  controlling  advantage. 

Testimony  before  the  CuUom  Committee  of  1885  brought 
out  the  fact  that  the  New  York  Central  Railway  practically 
forbade  roads  connecting  with  itself  to  accept  any  traffic 
that  might  come  to  them  from  the  Erie  Canal,  by  the  threat 
of  severing  their  own  connections  with  such  roads  as  re- 
fused to  obey.i  Further  testimony  stated  that  "the  rail- 
roads west  of  the  Mississippi  River,  running  to  the  river 
and  crossing  the  river,  —  unless  they  could  be  compelled 
to  do  so  by  law,  —  will  not  discharge  their  cargoes  on  the 
west  bank  of  the  river,  but  will  carry  them  through  to  the 
Lake  ports. "2  It  is  obviously  to  the  advantage  of  the  rail- 
ways to  carry  this  traffic  through  to  Chicago,  on  account 
of  the  larger  return  from  the  longer  haul.  And  so  long  as 
the  total  rate  to  final  destination  is  not  greater  than  it 
would  be  by  a  broken  route,  the  shippers  will  seldom  raise 
any  serious  complaint. 

Wherever  goods  must  travel  a  part  of  the  distance  by 
rail,  the  railway  is  in  a  position  to  adjust  rates  in  such  a 
way  that  the  traffic  will  prefer  to  make  the  entire  journey 
by  rail  instead  of  using  the  water  route  for  a  part  of  the 
distance.  It  can  do  this  by  refusing  to  prorate  with  the 
waterways  on  terms  which  will  allow  a  broken  route, 
the  railway  rate  for  the  short  haul  to  the  waterway  being 
placed  so  high  that  the  combination  rail  and  water  charge 
is  in  excess  of  the  all-rail  charge.  The  railways  thus  hold 
the  whip  hand  and  the  waterways  must  forego  the  traffic. 

e.  It  is  through  the  control  of  terminal  and  transfer  facili- 
ties, however,  that  the  railways  have  perhaps  intrenched 

'  Report  of  Cullom  Committee  on  an  Investigation  of  Interstate  Commerce, 
1885,  p.  367. 
»  Ibid.,  p.  1297. 


Si  WATERWAYS  ^'ERSUS  RAILWAYS 

themselves  most  strongly.  In  nearly  all  the  cities  having 
important  waterway  terminals,  the  railroads  control  the 
situation  in  no  small  tlogrec.  In  Philadelphia  "the  attitude 
of  the  railroads  as  to  tlioir  frontage  hoklings  has  been  highly 
exclusive  and  adverse  to  general  water  tratlic.  Railroads, 
a-s  a  rule,  refuse  any  use  of  their  piers  for  freight  not  going 
over  their  particular  lines  and  oppose  independent  lighter- 
age. Thus  lighters  cannot  come  to  a  pier  to  get  freight  for 
independent  water  or  rail  lines."  *  In  Chicago  the  situa- 
tion is,  however,  somewhat  better.  Although  on  the  south 
branch  of  tlie  Chicago  River  the  city  owns  only  street  ends 
and  about  twenty-five  hundred  feet  of  wharves,  the  rest 
being  owned  by  railroads  and  industrial  concerns,  nearly 
all  of  the  Sanitary  Canal  is  under  public  control.  About 
seventy  miles  of  frontage  is  reserved  here,  with  a  view  to 
providing  industrial  sites.-  The  city  of  Milwaukee,  on  the 
other  hand,  owns  no  frontage  of  commercial  importance. 
The  larger  portion  is  held  by  the  railways,  with  some  under 
the  control  of  industrial  companies.'  In  Bufl'alo  "about 
half  of  the  active  river  frontage  is  owned  by  the  railroads, 
with  some  small  holdings  by  water  lines.  Of  the  five  miles 
on  the  two  sides  of  the  City  Ship  Canal,  four  miles  are  owned 
by  railroads.  On  the  Lake  front  the  total  frontage  pro- 
tected by  breakwaters  is  about  four  miles,  of  which  rail- 
roads own  about  three,  subject  to  some  dispute  as  to  title. 
The  city  owns  about  three  fourths  of  a  mile,  but,  with  the 
exception  of  two  blocks,  practically  none  of  its  frontage 
can  be  reached  without  crossing  railroad  property.  The 
city  owns  and  controls  nine  small  docks  at  street  ends."* 
Again,  the  railroads  at  Buffalo  control  much  of  the  trans- 
shipping equipment,  and  the  so-called  "Elevator  Pool'* 
has  often  prevented  the  shipment  of  grain  by  canal.' 
"At  the  terminals  on  the  Mississippi  system  there  is  a 

•  Report  of  Commissioner  of  Corporations,  vol.  I,  p.  10. 
«  Ibid.,  p.  23.  «  Ibid. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  26.  s  Ibid.,  p.  S3, 


WATER  TRAFFIC  IN  UNITED  STATES      83 

conspicuous  lack  of  coordination  between  railroads  and 
water  lines,  which  has  undoubtedly  contributed  with  other 
causes  to  reduce  the  volume  of  Mississippi  River  traffic."  ^ 
"In  many  cases  all  satisfactory  terminal  property  has  been 
acquired  by  the  railways.  For  example,  portions  of  the 
river  front  at  Pittsburg,  New  Orleans,  St.  Louis,  and 
Vicksburg  are  owned  by  railway  corporations.  The  primary 
purpose  of  the  railways  is  not  to  check  the  development 
of  water  transportation,  but  to  secure  desirable  land  for 
switch  tracks  and  yards,  yet  its  effect  on  the  development 
of  steamboat  traffic  is  disastrous."^ 

/.  Again,  the  railways  have  in  many  cases  eliminated 
water  competition  by  the  outright  purchase  of  canals,  or 
by  the  control  of  boat  lines.  The  cases  of  direct  purchase 
of  canals  by  railway  companies  are  not  numerous.  The 
Ohio  and  Pennsylvania  Canal  of  Ohio  was  purchased 
many  years  ago  by  the  Mahoning  Railroad  Company, 
which  raised  the  tolls  so  high  that  boating  was  not  profit- 
able.^ The  James  River  and  Kanawha  Canal  in  Virginia 
was  purchased  in  1880  by  the  Richmond  and  Alleghany 
Railroad,  which  assumed,  also,  outstanding  obligations  to 
the  amount  of  $1,546,020.'*  In  1871  the  Delaware  and 
Raritan  Canal  was  leased  by  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad 
Company  for  999  years,  and  since  that  date  it  has  been 
operated  by  that  road.  The  Pennsylvania  Railroad  Com- 
pany engages  to  pay  ten  per  cent  per  annum  on  the  total 
stock.  Since  1894  there  has  been  a  considerable  annual 
deficit  from  operation.^ 

The  railways  have  more  effectively  eliminated  water 
competition,  however,  through  gaining  control  of  boat 
lines  on  the  waterways.  Attention  has  been  called,  in  an- 
other place,  to  the  fact  that  as  early  as  1881  competition 

'  Report  of  Commissioner  of  Corporations,  p.  33. 

'  Report  of  National  Waterways  Commission,  Doc.  11,  p.  68. 

»  United  States  Census,  1880,  vol.  iv,  p.  30. 

*  Whitford,  History  of  New  York  Canals,  vol.  Il,  p.  1376. 

»  United  States  Census,  1880,  vol.  ly.  p.  31. 


84  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

between  the  Ohio  River  boats  and  the  railroads  was  al- 
most nil.  "The  understanding  between  the  railroads  and 
the  steamboat  lines  has  not  amounted  to  a  pooling  arrange- 
ment or  a  mutual  participation  in  profits,  but  has  sought 
to  effect  a  certain  distribution  of  freight,  and  has  virtually 
removed  competition  as  to  rates  between  the  two  methods 
of  transportation."  ^  The  Cullom  Committee  of  1885  found 
that  *'all  of  the  canals  of  the  United  States,  except  the 
Erie,  are  now  controlled  by  the  railroads."  ^  The  majority 
of  the  boat  lines  on  the  Great  Lakes  are  owned  by  the 
railways,'  and  even  on  the  Erie  Canal  the  railways  exer- 
cise no  little  control  over  Canal  rates  on  certain  kinds  of 
freight.  The  through  Canal  and  Lake  service  for  pack- 
age freight  is  supplied  by  Lake  lines,  which  charter  boats 
and  make  rates  for  the  through  service.  Since  the  rail- 
ways own  the  Lake  lines,  and  these  in  turn  control  the 
Canal  shipments,  the  railways  may  be  said  to  determine 
the  rates  that  Canal  boats  may  charge  on  this  package 
freight.  This  does  not  apply,  however,  to  the  grain  trade, 
and  other  Canal  traffic* 

In  various  ways,  then,  the  railroads  have  succeeded  in 
restricting  the  growth  of  water  traffic.  By  the  cutting  of 
rates  on  competitive  freight  to  a  point  below  the  actual 
haulage  costs  until  the  boats  are  forced  to  suspend  opera- 
tions; by  refusal  to  cooperate  with  the  waterways  in  the 
carriage  of  through  freight;  by  control  of  terminal  sites  and 
equipment;  and  by  ownership  or  control  of  canals  and  boat 
lines,  the  railroads  have  come  to  dominate  the  situation 
almost  completely.  The  knowledge  that  the  railways  have 
adopted  such  methods  as  these  to  defeat  the  waterways 

'  Report  on  Internal  Commerce,  1881,  Appendix,  p.  56. 

*  Report  of  Cullom  Committee,  p.  507.  "Control"  is  here  meant  in 
■the  sense  that  the  boat  lines  are  in  the  hands  of  the  railways. 

»  For  a  complete  list  of  the  boat  lines  on  the  Great  Lakes  which  are 
controlled  by  the  railways,  see  United  States  Census  Publication  on  Trant' 
.fortation  by  Water,  1906,  p.  149. 

*  Report  of  the  Chicago  Harbor  Commission,  1909,  p.  188. 


WATER  TRAFFIC  IN  UNITED  STATES      85 

has  raised  a  storm  of  protest,  and  developed  the  conten- 
tion that,  if  the  waterways  were  afforded  protection  from 
such  crushing  competition,  they  would  speedily  regain  their 
former  position  in  the  transportation  of  the  country.  Such, 
indeed,  might  prove  the  case  were  there  no  other  causes 
for  the  decline  of  water  traffic  than  the  unfair  competition 
of  the  railways.  We  shall  find,  however,  that  the  com- 
petitive methods  in  question  by  no  means  tell  the  whole 
story. 

g.  Until  the  time  of  the  Civil  War  the  Mississippi 
River  enjoyed  a  large  traffic,  especially  in  grain  for  export 
by  way  of  New  Orleans.  Directly  after  the  war,  how- 
ever, this  traffic  began  to  go  to  New  York  as  the  port  of 
shipment.  "In  1872  the  railways  carried  to  market  83  per 
cent  of  the  grain  and  provisions  of  the  West."  ^  It  would 
seem  that  this  extensive  diversion  of  traffic  to  the  Atlantic 
seaboard  may  be  partially  accounted  for  without  reference 
to  the  unfair  methods  of  competition  discussed  above. 

Until  the  development  of  the  through  railway  lines  to 
the  Mississippi  in  the  sixties,  the  only  outlet  for  the  pro- 
duce of  the  Mississippi  Valley  was  by  way  of  the  river 
through  New  Orleans.  The  railway  lines  to  the  east  gave 
a  new,  a  much  shorter,  and  at  the  same  time  a  much  safer 
route  to  the  markets  of  the  world.  The  advantage  from  the 
standpoint  of  distance  is  especially  marked  in  the  Upper 
Mississippi  Valley,  and  it  is  here  that  the  diversion  to  the 
east-and-west  route  was  most  rapid  and  complete.  "The 
building  of  railroads  west  of  the  Mississippi  River  brought 
that  vast  territory  almost  completely  into  subjection  to  rail 
transportation.  By  1879,  seven  eighths  of  the  surplus  pro- 
ducts of  the  trans-Mississippi  States  north  of  Arkansas 
crossed  the  Mississippi  River  on  railways  at  St.  Louis,  or 
between  that  city  and  St.  Paul,  and  were  transported  east 
to  local  or  foreign  markets.  Only  608,555  tons  were  carried 

*  Report  of  National  Waterways  Commission,  Doc.  11,  p.  38. 


86  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

south  by  river  in  1878,  as  compared  with  4,583,844  tons 
moved  east  by  rail  by  way  of  St.  Louis  and  points  north, 
from  the  territory  west  of  the  Mississippi."  ^ 

Again,  the  development  of  Chicago  as  the  great  primary 
grain  market  of  the  country  would  doubtless  have  resulted 
in  sending  grain  eastward  rather  than  to  the  south,  even 
had  the  railways  offered  no  differential  rate  advantage  over 
the  water  route  by  way  of  New  Orleans.  And  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  although  at  times  the  through  charge  from  St.  Louis 
to  Liverpool  by  way  of  New  York  has  been  greater  than 
that  by  way  of  New  Orleans  (when  the  railways  to  the  At- 
lantic seaboard  have  been  in  agreement  to  maintain  rates), 
much  the  greater  portion  of  this  grain  has  nevertheless 
gone  by  way  of  Chicago  and  New  York.^  The  development 
of  these  east-and-west  railroad  facilities,  and  of  primary 
markets  like  Chicago,  obviously  do  not  entirely  account 
for  the  diversion  of  traffic  from  the  Mississippi.  The  rail- 
way practices  referred  to  above  played  no  small  part,  as 
did  also  other  causes  soon  to  be  discussed.  No  one  influ- 
ence alone  can  be  said  to  have  been  decisive,  and  we  must 
give  each  its  due  credit.  With  this  in  mind  we  may  now 
consider  another  factor  instrumental  in  the  defeat  of  the 
waterways. 

h.  In  striking  contrast  to  the  lack  of  organization  every- 
where present  on  the  water  lines,  the  railways  of  the  coun- 
try have  developed  very  systematic  methods,  both  in  the 
carrying  of  traffic  and  in  the  attracting  of  it  to  their  lines. 
"The  freight  lines  have  their  agents  in  nearly  all  the  local 
markets  of  the  West  who  solicit  traffic  for  them.  The  Erie 
Canal  has  no  such  agencies.  It  receives  only  such  traffic 
as  seeks  it  in  consequence  of  lower  rates."  '  The  Cullom 
Committee  in  1885  reported  that  "the  last  twenty  years 

*  Report  of  National  Waterways  Commission,  Doc.  11,  p.  48. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  56. 

'  Report  of  the  Cullom  Cownittee  on  Investigation  of  Interstate  Commerce, 
1885-86.  p.  59. 


WATER  TRAFFIC  IN  UNITED  STATES      87 

have  constituted  a  period  of  railway  improvements  in 
which  the  inventive  genius  and  business  talent  of  the  coun- 
try have  been  devoted  to  the  newer  and  more  rapid  means 
of  transport,  while  the  artificial  waterways  have  been  com- 
paratively neglected.  But  by  far  the  most  eflScient  cause 
of  the  relative  increase  of  railway  tonnage  is  to  be  found  in 
the  administrative  organization  of  the  railway  compan- 
ies." 1 

The  contention  is  frequently  made,  however,  that  while 
it  is  true  that  the  railways  are  far  better  organized  than 
the  neglected  waterways  at  present,  if  the  latter  were  now 
systematically  developed  and  given  an  eflScient  adminis- 
tration, they  would  be  able  to  more  than  hold  their  own 
against  the  railways.  It  is  pertinent  to  inquire  at  this 
point,  therefore.  Why  is  it  that  the  possibilities  of  water 
transportation  have  been  neglected,  if  they  are  so  full  of 
promise?  Why  is  it  that  we  are  confronted  with  the  sorry 
spectacle  of  broken-down  gang-planks,  of  deserted  wharves, 
and  boatless  rivers  and  canals?  Why  has  not  private  capi- 
tal been  lured  into  this  unusually  profitable  field  of  invest- 
ment? If  a  great  waterway  from  the  Great  Lakes  to  the 
Atlantic  Ocean  or  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  could  drive  com- 
peting railways  from  the  field,  as  is  said,  why  have  not  our 
great  business  men  seized  the  golden  opportunity?  Why 
did  such  men  as  Daniel  Drew,  Commodore  Vanderbilt, 
and  James  J.  Hill  forsake  the  waterway  business,  in  which 
they  had  been  engaged,  for  the  railway?  The  reason  that 
practically  everywhere  in  this  country  private  capital 
shuns  investments  in  waterways  can  hardly  be  because 
they  are  exceedingly  profitable.  In  spite  of  the  hundreds 
of  millions  of  dollars  that  have  been  donated  by  our  State 
and  National  Governments  to  the  cause  of  water  transport- 
ation, the  water  traffic  of  the  country  has  steadily  de- 
clined for  many  years.  Private  capital  has  not  been  willing 

*  Report  of  the  Cullom  Committee  on  Investigation  of  Interstate  Commerce, 
1885-86,  p.  59. 


88  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

even  to  build  the  boats  and  other  equipment  to  make  use 
of  waterways,  even  where  they  are  broad  and  deep  enough 
to  carry  vast  quantities  of  freight.  If  it  be  answered,  per- 
chance, that  the  reason  private  capital  has  been  chary  of 
investment  in  waterways  is  because  of  the  cut-throat  com- 
petition to  which  the  railways  subject  them,  it  may  still  be 
asked  why  the  railway  men  themselves  have  not  exten- 
sively used  the  waterways  as  aids  to  the  railroads  if  they 
offer  great  economies  in  the  carriage  of  freight. 

Even  were  private  capital  induced  to  develop  water 
transportation,  and  were  the  inventive  genius  of  the  coun- 
try now  directed  to  that  field  of  activity,  it  would  seem  still 
that  it  would  be  impossible  to  develop  a  waterway  sys- 
tem comparable  with  that  which  exists  on  the  railways, 
for  the  reason  that  waterways  are  inherently  not  so  well 
adapted  to  efficient  systematization  as  are  the  railroads. 
It  is  admittedly  impossible  to  secure  a  uniform  depth  of 
waterways  throughout  the  country;  and  even  if  we  could 
secure  a  standard  gauge  on  all  our  rivers  and  canals,  there 
would  still  remain  comparative  disadvantages  which  the 
water  routes  could  not  overcome.  The  ability  of  the  rail- 
ways to  extend  their  lines  to  every  point  of  the  compass, 
to  develop  a  very  network  of  branch  and  spur  lines  which 
can  carry  traflSc  from  the  most  out-of-the-way  source  to 
any  destination  whatsoever,  cannot  be  matched  by  any 
system  of  waterways  that  could  be  developed.  Consider- 
able attention  will  be  devoted  to  these  considerations 
elsewhere;  hence  they  may  be  dismissed  at  present  with- 
out further  comment.  It  is  sufficient  to  note  at  this  place 
that  the  lack  of  systematization  must  always  remain  a 
handicap  to  successful  competition  with  the  railroads. 
Waterways  are  inherently  not  adapted  to  efficient  organiza- 
tion. In  the  United  States,  moreover,  the  play  of  sectional 
interests  and  the  influence  of  politics  tend  greatly  to  increase 
the  disadvantages  suffered  by  the  water  routes  in  this  re- 
gard. While  our  railways  are  privately  owned  and  have 


WATER  TRAFFIC  IN  UNITED  STATES      89 

been  developed  on  truly  national  lines,  our  waterway  de- 
velopment has  been  spasmodic,  in  pursuance  of  no  plan, 
and  dependent  upon  the  ability  of  sectional  interests  to 
secure  appropriations  for  waterway  construction  in  their 
particular  districts. 

i.  Still  other  reasons  for  the  diversion  of  traffic  from 
the  waterways  are  to  be  found  in  certain  advantages  of- 
fered by  the  railroads  in  the  way  of  speed  and  protection 
of  the  cargo  from  injury  during  transit.  Grain  is  at  times 
required  to  be  delivered  at  New  York,  in  order  to  meet  con- 
tracts for  ocean  shipments,  sooner  than  it  can  be  trans- 
ported there  by  way  of  the  Great  Lakes  and  the  Erie  Ca- 
nal.^ Again,  "railway  transportation  is  preferred  for  grain 
in  bad  condition,  since  it  sustains  less  injury  when  shipped 
in  that  way  than  by  canal."  ^  Unless  the  grain  is  perfectly 
dry,  it  is  always  liable  to  heat  when  carried  for  long  dis- 
tances in  so  large  mass  as  is  necessary  when  it  is  loaded  into 
the  holds  of  ships  or  barges.  The  same  consideration  pre- 
vents the  extensive  shipping  of  grain  by  boat  in  France, 
even  though  the  distances  there  are  much  shorter  than  in 
the  United  States.' 

In  the  case  of  flour,  these  considerations  are  still  more 
important.  Expeditious  delivery  of  flour  is  a  very  fre- 
quent demand  of  shippers;  and  barrels  of  flour  are  often 
broken  open  if  rough  weather  is  encountered  on  the  Lakes. 
It  is  worthy  of  attention,  while  we  are  considering  this 
question  of  damage  to  cargoes  in  transit,  that  when  a  cargo 
is  delivered  to  a  railway  company,  the  company  assumes 
the  responsibility  and  guarantees  a  safe  and  reasonably 
speedy  delivery.  It  issues  the  shipper  a  bill  of  lading, 
which  is  a  merchantable  and  bankable  paper,  and  almost 
absolutely  protects  him  against  loss  of  any  kind.  On  the 

*  Report  of  Windom  Select  Committee,  p.  69. 
«  Ibid.,  p.  59. 

*  Bulletin  de  V Associaiion  du  Congrea  International  des  Chemina  de  f  er, 
1910,  xxui,  p.  1425. 


90  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

contrary,  if  he  ships  by  water  he  receives  a  mere  receipt 
for  his  goods,  and  must  go  to  the  expense  and  trouble  of 
having  his  cargo  insured.  This  point  of  itself  is  very  often 
sufficient  to  lead  the  shipper  to  choose  the  rail  route  with- 
out further  consideration. 

j.  Inquiring  still  further,  we  find  that  another  cause  of 
the  falling-off  in  water  traffic  in  recent  years  has  been  the 
exhaustion  of  the  supply  of  certain  commodities  which 
formerly  traveled  extensively  by  water.  For  instance, 
great  quantities  of  timber  were  once  found  along  the  Wis- 
consin, St.  Croix,  and  Chippewa  Rivers,  which  in  the  form 
of  logs  was  floated  down  these  streams  every  spring.  Every 
town  of  any  size  on  the  Mississippi  between  St.  Louis  and 
St.  Paul  was  either  a  lumbering,  manufacturing,  or  dis- 
tributing point  for  logs,  or  a  mere  distributing  centre  for 
the  rafts  of  laths,  shingles,  and  various  forms  of  manufac- 
tured lumber  brought  down  from  the  upper  river  and  trib- 
utaries. "The  most  important  cause  of  decline  in  this 
lumber  traffic  has  been  the  exhaustion  of  the  lumber  sup- 
ply along  the  water  courses,  making  it  more  feasible  either 
to  ship  logs  by  rail  to  the  mills,  or  to  move  the  mills  into 
the  forest  and  ship  out  by  rail  the  manufactured  lumber."^ 
"The  New  York  forests  have  long  since  been  denuded;  and 
in  recent  years  the  Michigan  supply  has  fallen  off,  and 
with  it  the  Lake  lumber  business."^  The  results  of  this 
are  seen  in  the  decreased  tonnage  of  forest  products  both 
on  the  Lakes  and  on  the  Erie  Canal,  as  shown  by  the  traffic 
statistics  given  above.  In  fact,  all  over  the  great  North- 
west the  supply  of  lumber  has  been  rapidly  decreasing,  and 
with  its  exhaustion  has  come  an  inevitable  decline  in  water 
traffic. 

Iron  ore  was  once  an  important  traffic  on  New  York  ca- 
nals, but  the  relatively  small  output  of  the  Lake  Cham- 

*  Report  of  National  Waterways  Commission,  Doc.  11,  p.  51. 
»  Fairlie.  "New  York  Canals,"  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economies,  1900, 
pp.  219-20. 


WATER  TRAFFIC  IN  UNITED  STATES      91 

plain  mines  since  the  development  of  the  vast  deposits  of 
ore  along  Lake  Superior  has  resulted  in  a  great  falling-oflf 
in  such  traffic  on  the  canals  of  New  York.^  There  are  many 
such  cases  as  this.  Some  canals  were  early  built  for  the 
exploitation  of  some  particular  source  of  traffic,  but  the 
subsequent  shifting  of  industrial  centres  has  completely 
changed  conditions,  and  necessitated  the  abandonment 
of  canals,  or  at  least  has  destroyed  their  prosperity. 

k.  A  final  and  very  important  cause  of  the  decline  in 
water  traffic  in  recent  years  has  been  the  decrease  of  traf- 
fic which  originates  near  enough  to  water  lines  to  avoid 
the  necessity  of  transshipment.  So  long  as  industry  was 
confined  almost  entirely  to  the  river  valleys,  the  problem 
of  transshipment  did  not  present  itself.  But  with  the 
extension  of  business  to  points  off  the  river  courses,  the 
situation  was  greatly  changed.  When  it  became  necessary 
to  carry  the  produce  a  part  of  the  way  to  destination  by 
rail,  whether  it  would  go  the  remaining  distance  by  water 
depended  upon  whether  the  cost  of  transshipping  to  the 
water  route  were  greater  or  less  than  the  saving  in  haulage 
by  water  for  the  remainder  of  the  journey.  And  it  seems 
to  have  been  often  true,  even  at  an  early  day,  that  the  cost 
of  transshipment  was  prohibitive.  The  National  Water- 
ways Commission  states  that  grain  shipments  on  the  Upper 
Mississippi  River  have  now  ceased  almost  entirely. ^  "  When 
grain  began  to  be  produced  away  from  the  waterways,  it 
had  to  be  loaded  first  into  railroad  cars,  and  once  in  the  cars 
it  remained  there  until  it  reached  its  market.  The  move- 
ment of  the  wheat  area  northwestward  to  a  region  west  of 
Lake  Superior,  and  the  advance  of  the  corn  area  westward, 
enhanced  this  tendency."  '    This  same  tendency  of  the 

*  Fairlie,  "New  York  Canals,"  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics,  1900, 
p.  220. 

^  Report  of  National  Waterways  Commission,  Doc.  11,  p.  39.  \Miat 
little  grain  is  still  produced  near  the  rivers  is  almost  wholly  consumed  by 
local  mills.  »  Ibid.,  p.  68. 


92         WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

grain  trade  to  make  use  of  the  railroads  for  the  entire  dis- 
tance to  market,  inasmuch  as  it  must  in  any  case  make  use 
of  them  for  a  part  of  the  distance,  is  true  also  in  Germany. 
It  is  there  recognized  that  agricultural  produce,  except  that 
which  is  imported  to  be  consumed  in  cities  on  the  banks 
of  water  routes,  cannot  advantageously  travel  by  water  on 
account  of  the  cost  of  transshipment.^ 

In  the  United  States,  on  account  of  the  very  long  haul 
afforded  by  the  water  route  from  Chicago  or  Duluth  to  the 
Atlantic  by  way  of  the  Great  Lakes  and  the  Erie  Canal  or 
the  St.  Lawrence  River,  it  has  been  often  possible  to  make 
the  transshipment  from  the  railways  at  these  primary 
grain  markets.  The  saving  in  the  long  water  haul  is  here 
sufficient  to  outweigh  the  cost  of  the  transshipment.  The 
considerations  noted  above,  however,  relative  to  grain  in 
bad  condition,  and  the  frequent  demand  for  speedy  delivery 
in  New  York  in  order  to  meet  foreign  contracts,  should  not 
be  forgotten.  Grain  in  good  condition,  where  speed  is  not 
demanded,  can,  however,  usually  travel  by  the  Great  Lakes 
and  the  Erie  Canal,  so  long  as  tolls  are  not  charged  on  the 
latter,  at  an  advantage  sufficient  to  offset  the  cost  of  trans- 
shipment at  Western  markets. 

But  in  the  case  of  grain  which  is  not  destined  for  export, 
the  advantage  is  wholly  in  favor  of  the  railroads.  In  this 
case  there  is  an  extra  transshipment  to  be  reckoned.  In 
addition  to  that  from  rail  to  water  at  the  Western  markets, 
it  must  again  be  transshipped  from  water  to  rail  in  order  to 
reach  all  those  towns  which  are  not  located  immediately 
upon  the  banks  of  waterways.  "The  increase  in  the  trans- 
portation of  wheat  and  corn  by  rail  is  due  chiefly  to  the 
organization  of  through  freight  lines  from  all  the  principal 
points  in  the  West  to  the  interior  points  in  the  New  England 
States,  and  the  states  of  the  Atlantic  seaboard,  such  trans- 
port being  practicable,  notwithstanding  the  greater  cost  of 
movement  per  mile  by  rail,  from  the  fact  that  grain  thus 
^  See  chapter  ix,  pp.  212-13. 


WATER  TRAFFIC  IN  UNITED  STATES      93 

carried  is  distributed  directly  to  the  consumers,  and  also 
because  it  thus  avoids  the  terminal  charges  at  Buffalo 
and  at  New  York,  formerly  the  chief  distributing  point  of 
Western  wheat  and  corn  consumed  in  New  England."  ^ 
Even  though  the  waterv\'ays  are  maintained  entirely  at 
Government  expense,  they  have  no  chance  to  compete  for 
the  domestic  grain  trade. 

In  the  case  of  the  cotton  traffic  in  the  Southwest,  we  find 
the  same  transshipping  considerations  playing  a  decisive 
r61e  in  the  fate  of  water  transportation.  "With  the  devel- 
opment of  railways  in  the  South  after  1865,  with  the  estab- 
lishment of  cotton  manufacturing  plants  at  various  points 
in  the  South,  the  extension  of  cotton  culture  westward 
beyond  the  Mississippi  into  territory  not  served  by  water- 
ways, and  the  change  in  method  of  purchasing,  compressing, 
and  shipping  cotton,  the  waterways  became  of  decreasing 
importance.  The  immense  cotton  territory  extending  up  the 
Mississippi  and  along  the  Red,  Ouachita,  Arkansas,  and 
White  Rivers,  which  had  sent  its  cotton  to  New  Orleans 
wholly  by  water,  began  to  ship  its  products  by  rail.  .  .  . 
By  1880  shipments  of  cotton  from  the  Arkansas  and 
White  Rivers  had  practically  ceased."  ^  So  long  as  the 
agricultural  and  industrial  development  of  the  South  was 
confined  to  the  very  banks  of  rivers,  water  transportation 
was  profitable.  But  as  soon  as  the  development  of  railways 
made  it  possible  to  extend  the  culture  and  manufacture  of 
cotton  to  outlying  districts,  the  waterways  were  unable  to 
hold  their  own.  When  the  transshipping  charges  are  in- 
cluded, the  cost  by  rail  is  less  than  that  by  river. 

There  has  been  a  great  falling-off  in  the  amount  of  coal 
handled  by  the  canals  of  the  State  of  New  York.  "The 
construction  of  railroads  from  the  mines  in  eastern  Penn- 
sylvania to  Lake  Erie,  which  provided  a  shorter  and  more 
direct  route  than  that  via  the  Hudson  River  and  the  canals^ 

*  Report  of  the  Windom  Select  Committee,  p.  54. 

'  Report  of  NcUional  Waterways  Commission,  Doc.  11,  p.  58. 


94  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

and  without  transfer  en  route,  and  the  extensive  use  of 
bituminous  coal,  which  is  mined  in  regions  not  directly- 
accessible  for  a  canal  movement,  either  east  or  west,"^  have 
been  set  down  as  the  causes  of  this  decline.  "The  develop- 
ment of  coal  traflBc  has  been  one  of  the  most  important  items 
in  the  expansion  of  railroad  traffic;  and  the  geographic  situa- 
tion of  mines  and  markets  explains  why  the  canals,  in  their 
present  condition,  have  not  shared  in  this  development."  ^ 

In  the  case  of  the  Ohio  River,  "with  the  exception  of 
coal,  and  to  a  slight  extent  lumber,  commerce  is  now  con- 
fined to  short-distance  movements  between  local  points. 
In  spite  of  the  fact  that  along  the  Ohio  River  between  Pitts- 
burg and  Cairo  there  are  forty  railway  crossings,  or  termi- 
nals, this  traffic  reaches  but  a  few  miles  from  the  river  bank. 
Traffic  requiring  transfer  and  a  rail  haul  for  any  consider- 
able distance  no  longer  makes  any  use  of  the  river,  but  is 
handled  the  entire  distance  by  rail."^ 

The  only  waterway  in  this  country  that  has  had  a  re- 
spectable increase  in  business  in  recent  years,  aside  from  the 
Great  Lakes,  is  the  Ohio  River.  And  as  we  have  seen,  this 
increase  has  been  due  entirely  to  the  movement  of  coal  from 
western  Pennsylvania  to  points  on  the  Ohio  and  the  Mis- 
isissippi.  It  is  a  fact  to  be  particularly  noted,  however,  that 
this  coal  traffic  requires  no  transshipment  whatever.  "Coal 
•can  be  loaded  direct  from  the  mines  into  the  barges  and 
can  then  be  transported  without  any  rehandling  to  its 
destination,  which  is  the  river  steamboat,  the  ocean-going 
steamship,  the  sugar  plantation  on  the  bay,  or  the  railway 
coal  yards  on  the  river  bank.  In  other  words,  theMississippi 
system  can  at  present  handle  traffic  successfully  which  be- 
gins and  ends  within  its  banks,  but  traffic  requiring  transfer 
to  the  railways  at  any  point  on  its  course  will  have  a  tend- 
jency  to  resort  to  the  railways  for  the  entire  distance."* 

'  Fairlie,  "  New  York  Canals,"  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics,  1900, 
VP-  220.  2  Ibid. 

*  Report  of  National  Waterways  Commission,  Doc.  11,  p.  48. 

■*  Ibid.,  p.  69. 


WATER  TRAFFIC  IN  UNITED  STATES      95 

In  the  light  of  these  considerations,  it  is  evident  that  the 
failure  of  through  traffic  to  develop  on  our  waterways  is  to 
be  attributed,  in  the  main,  to  the  inability  of  waterways  to 
carry  traffic  the  entire  distance  from  source  to  destination. 
In  other  words,  there  is  a  real  question  as  to  whether  it  is 
possible  for  a  broken  rail  and  water  route  to  carry  traffic, 
even  when  the  waterway  is  supported  at  public  expense,  as 
cheaply  as  a  railroad  can  move  the  traffic  for  the  entire  dis- 
tance. We  shall  have  much  more  to  say  on  this  point  in 
following  chapters;  and  it  may  be  dismissed  for  the  present 
with  the  mere  recognition  of  the  fact  that  the  various  Gov- 
ernment investigating  commissions  on  water  transporta- 
tion, and  independent  students  of  the  question,  unite  in 
attributing  a  considerable  part  of  the  failure  of  water  trans- 
portation to  expand  in  this  country  to  the  prohibitive  costs 
of  transshipments  from  rail  to  water,  and  vice  versa. 

It  should  be  added  that  it  is  not  alone  in  the  case  of  a 
broken  rail  and  water  route  that  transshipment  is  a  serious 
problem.  Transshipment  must  often  be  made  from  small  to 
large  boats,  and  vice  versa,  on  account  of  different  depths  of 
channel;  and  where  this  is  necessary,  the  railways  possess 
the  usual  advantage.  For  instance,  it  is  said  that  "the  di- 
version of  commerce  from  the  river  to  rail  at  St.  Louis  was 
aided  by  the  fact  that  in  river  traffic  transfers  at  this  point 
were  necessary.  Because  of  the  shallowness  of  the  upper 
river,  vessels  of  much  less  draft  operate  above  the  city  than 
below.  Because  of  this  break  in  shipment,  the  railways 
found  their  opportunity  to  step  in  and  take  the  business."^ 
When  to  the  river  rate  proper  was  added  the  cost  of  this 
transshipment  from  the  smaller  to  the  larger  barges,  the 
balance  of  advantage  passed  from  the  waterway  to  the 
railroads.  Too  much  weight  cannot  be  given  to  this  point. 
Here  was  a  case  where  the  necessity  of  transshipment  from 
one  section  of  the  river  to  another  spelled  the  fate  of  water 
traffic.  The  Lower  Mississippi  was  not  dependent  in  this 
*  Report  of  National  Waterways  Commission,  p.  39. 


96         WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

connection  on  cooperation  with  the  railways.  There  were 
no  unfair  practices  of  any  sort  present.  The  necessity  of 
transshipment  simply  prevented  through  traflSc  on  the 
river. 

5.  The  results  of  the  above  inquiry  have  indicated  that 
the  decline  of  transportation  by  water  in  the  United  States 
has  been  due  to  a  large  number  of  factors.  In  addition  to 
the  physical  imperfections  of  the  waterways,  and  what  have 
been  defined  as  unfair  competitive  methods  of  the  rail- 
roads, we  have  found  that  many  other  influences  have  been 
equally  important  in  producing  the  decline  of  water  tonnage 
that  has  taken  place.  The  development  of  the  primary 
grain  markets  and  the  great  trunk-line  railroads  from  the 
Middle  West  to  the  Atlantic  seaboard ;  the  inherently  ineflS- 
cient  organization  of  the  waterways  in  contrast  to  the  ex- 
cellent systematization  of  the  railroads ;  the  considerations 
of  speed,  and  of  damage  to  grain  in  bad  condition  wheiji 
carried  by  water;  and,  finally,  the  cost  of  breaking  bulk,  of 
transshipping  en  route,  —  these  various  factors  have  been 
of  at  least  equal  importance  with  the  physical  handicaps 
of  the  waterways  and  the  unfair  practices  of  the  railroads 
in  causing  the  decadence  of  water  transportation.  It  can- 
not fairly  be  said,  therefore,  that,  if  the  waterways  of  the 
country  were  improved  and  guaranteed  protection  from  the 
railroads,  their  successful  future  would  be  assured.  The 
other  considerations  mentioned  above  might  still  be  found 
to  be  of  suflScient  weight  in  themselves  to  prevent  any  ex- 
tensive development  of  water  traffic.  Before  deciding  to 
expend  millions  in  the  development  of  water  routes,  we 
should  give  careful  attention,  not  only  to  the  unfair  prac- 
tices of  the  railways,  but  to  the  many  other  factors  that 
have  been  operative  in  the  defeat  of  our  present  waterways. 

Thus  far  our  discussion  has  brought  us  to  a  twofold 
conclusion:  first,  that  a  large  number  of  causes  have  con- 
spired to  produce  the  decline  in  water  traffic  that   has 


WATER  TRAFFIC   IN   UNITED   STATES    97 

taken  place  in  the  United  States,  that  no  one  alone  can 
be  regarded  as  of  determining  importance;  and,  second, 
that  the  question  of  the  feasibility  of  further  waterway 
development  can  be  decided  only  on  the  basis  of  a  thor- 
ough-going scientific  study  of  particular  projects.  It  seems 
advisable,  however,  to  postpone  the  consideration  of  such 
projects  until  we  have  taken  up  the  study  of  water  trans- 
portation in  foreign  countries.  This  will  be  found  to  clear 
up  so  many  points  of  importance  to  our  investigation 
that  the  subsequent  discussion  of  specific  projects  will 
be  greatly  facilitated. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  BARGE  CANALS  OP  GREAT  BRITAIN 

1.  When  discussing  the  causes  of  the  movement  for  the 
rehabilitation  of  the  waterways  of  the  United  States,  men- 
tion was  made  of  the  part  played  by  the  apparent  success 
of  foreign  canal  and  river  transportation.  Attention  was 
also  called  to  the  current  popular  argument  that  if  water- 
ways are  successful  in  Europe,  then  assuredly  they  can  be 
made  successful  in  the  United  States,  with  its  unrivaled 
system  of  naturally  navigable  rivers.  A  second  contention 
is  also  frequently  made,  to  the  effect  that,  if  the  United 
States  would  keep  pace  with  other  nations  in  the  great 
struggle  for  industrial  supremacy  which  is  going  on,  she 
has  no  alternative  other  than  to  develop  her  waterways  as 
European  nations  are  doing. 

Now,  while  it  is  unquestionably  true  that  nations  have 
in  general  much  to  learn  from  one  another  and  that  foreign 
example  is  frequently  instructive,  it  is  equally  true,  on  the 
other  hand,  that  where  conditions  are  not  substantially 
similar,  it  may  be  the  worst  of  folly  for  a  nation  to  follow  in 
the  footsteps  of  other  countries.  It  has  already  been  seen  ^ 
that  a  large  number  of  influences  may  condition  the  trans- 
portation development  of  any  country,  and  it  should  be 
apparent  that  conclusions  concerning  the  feasibility  of 
waterways,  when  drawn  from  a  foreign  experience,  are  of 
little  if  any  value,  unless  they  are  formed  after  a  care- 
ful weighing  of  all  the  considerations  which  may  affect 
the  situation.  It  has  seemed  necessary,  therefore,  to  de- 
vote considerable  attention  to  a  careful  study  of  transport- 
*  Chapter  iv. 


BARGE  CANALS  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN      99 

ation  in  the  principal  countries  of  Europe.  In  so  doing, 
two  main  questions  have  been  kept  constantly  in  mind: 
First,  to  what  extent  have  the  waterways  of  the  different 
European  countries  been  successful  under  the  conditions 
there  existing?  And  second,  what  conclusions,  if  any,  may 
be  drawn  therefrom  relative  to  the  feasibility  of  waterway 
development  in  the  United  States?  The  first  country  to  be 
considered  is  Great  Britain. 

No  other  country  furnishes  so  favorable  an  opportunity 
for  a  comparative  study  of  rail  and  water  transportation 
as  England,  because  there  alone  have  both  railways  and 
waterways  been  from  the  beginning  privately  owned  and 
privately  operated.  In  contrast  to  the  Continental  method 
of  strict  governmental  supervision  or  ownership  of  the 
agencies  of  transportation,  England  has  consistently  left 
the  development  of  her  transportation  system  in  the 
hands  of  private  companies.  Rather  than  arbitrarily 
establishing  freight  rates  which  force  certain  classes  of 
commodities  to  travel  on  the  waterways,  as  has  France; 
rather  than  building  up  a  national  system  of  canals  and 
railways  to  serve  national  purposes,  —  commercial,  mili- 
tary, and  political,  —  as  has  Germany;  rather  than  grant- 
ing subsidies,  —  money  for  the  building  of  canals;  land,  for 
the  most  part,  for  the  construction  of  railways, —  as  has  the 
United  States,  England  has  chosen  to  permit  entire  free- 
dom of  competition,  and  has  aided  neither  canals  nor  rail- 
ways, directly  or  indirectly.  In  this  unhindered  struggle 
for  supremacy,  the  relative  merits  of  the  two  systems  of 
transport  were  put  to  the  test  of  eflSciency.  The  history  of 
English  canals  and  railways  is  consequently  full  of  interest 
and  suggestion  to  the  student  of  transportation. 

2.  Similarly  to  the  United  States,  England  passed 
through  an  early  mania  for  canal  building,  a  period  of 
great  canal  prosperity,  followed  by  a  gradual  decadence, 
and,  finally,  a  great  wave  of  agitation  for  the  resuscitation 


100        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

of  the  languishing  waterways.  The  chief  steps  in  this 
history  may  be  briefly  traced. 

The  impetus  to  canal  building  in  England  was  given  by 
the  Duke  of  Bridgewater  about  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth 
century.  In  order  to  secure  an  outlet  for  his  valuable  coal 
mines  at  Worsley,  in  Lancashire,  in  the  northern  part  of 
England,  he  undertook  the  then  tremendous  task  of  build- 
ing a  canal  from  his  mines  to  the  city  of  Manchester.  The 
waterway  was  opened  in  1761.  Encouraged  by  the  rewards 
of  the  enterprise,  the  route  was  soon  extended  and  by 
1772  was  opened  for  traffic  all  the  way  to  Liverpool.^  So 
great  an  improvement  was  this  canal  upon  the  previous 
means  of  transportation,  and  so  large  were  the  profits, 
that  it  brought  canals  into  great  favor  and  led  to  a  verit- 
able mania  for  canal  building.  In  the  year  1792  no  less 
than  eighteen  canal  schemes  were  promoted,  and  in  the 
four  years  ending  in  1794  as  many  as  eighty-one  canal  acts 
were  passed  by  Parliament.  Many  of  the  schemes  were 
wholly  speculative,  and  thousands  of  innocent  investors 
suffered  the  losses  which  usually  occur  on  date  of  settle- 
ment. 

But  such  of  the  projects  as  were  carefully  considered 
and  favorably  located,  proved  unusually  remunerative. 
They  soon  obtained  a  monopoly  of  all  the  traffic  that  had 
to  travel  any  considerable  distance.  The  ancient  method 
of  trucking  was  altogether  unable  to  compete  with  the 
barges,  and  consequently  all,  except  the  speculative  water- 
ways, earned  handsome  dividends  for  their  owners.^  A 
vast  system  of  canals  was  thus  developed,  connecting  all 
the  principal  cities  of  England.  By  1830  there  were  as 
many  as  sixty-nine  canals  and  seventy-one  canalized  rivers 
in  England  and  Wales,  with  a  total  length  of  3669  miles.^ 

*  Report  of  the  Royal  Commission  on  Canals  and  Inland  Navigations, 
1906,  vol.  VII,  p.  3. 

*  Pratt,  British  Canals;  Is  their  Resuscitation  Practicable,  1906,  pp.  16- 
17. 

*  Forbes  and  Ashford,  Our  Waterways,  p.  295. 


BARGE  CANALS  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN     101 

From  Liverpool,  Manchester,  Birmingham,  and  London 
they  radiated  in  all  directions;  while  through  connections 
enabled  goods  to  travel  the  entire  length  of  the  country  by 
boat.^  As  it  was  another  twenty  years  before  the  railways 
were  fairly  established,  the  canals  enjoyed  practically  a 
half-century  of  undisturbed  prosperity. 

3.  But  since  about  1850,  as  in  the  United  States,  the 
water-borne  traffic  has  steadily  declined,  coincidently  with 
the  development  of  railways.  Many  formerly  prosperous 
canals  have  been  entirely  abandoned,  others  have  been 
converted  into  railways,  and  a  still  larger  number  have 
been  purchased  by  railway  companies  and  are  now  used 
by  them  in  conjunction  with  the  railroads.  "On  a  few 
waterways  or  sections  of  waterways,  favored  by  special 
conditions,  combined  in  two  or  three  places  with  enterpris- 
ing management,  traffic  has  been  maintained  and  even 
increased.  On  other  waterways  it  has  declined;  on  some 
it  has  virtually  disappeared.  Everywhere  the  proportion 
of  long-distance  traffic  to  local  traffic  has  become  small. 
Considered  as  a  whole,  the  waterways  have  had  no  share 
in  the  enormous  increase  of  internal  transport  business 
which  has  taken  place  between  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth 
century  and  the  present  time."  ^ 

4.  An  agitation  for  the  revival  of  canal  transportation 
in  Great  Britain  began  about  a  decade  ago,  and  culminated 
in  1906.  Scores  of  resolutions  appeared  from  boards  of 
trade  and  chambers  of  commerce.  Government  select 
committees  investigated  the  question,  canal  bills  were 
presented  in  Parliament,  and  the  public  press  was  prolific 

'  "  The  largest  part  of  the  existing  canal  system  had  been  completed  by 
the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century,  and  the  whole  of  it,  with  the  exception 
of  the  Manchester  Ship  Canal  and  a  few  short  cuts  or  arras,  was  com- 
pleted before  1830,  the  year  of  the  opening  of  the  Manchester  and  Liver' 
pool  Railway."   {Report  of  Royal  Commission,  p.  3.) 

*  RepoH  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vii,  p.  5. 


102        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

in  articles  showing  the  imperative  necessity  of  rebuilding 
the  waterways  of  the  country.  Literally  dozens  of  projects 
were  advocated  and  widely  discussed,  including  a  ship 
canal  from  Birmingham  to  Liverpool,  and  even  a  large 
steam  barge  canal  from  Liverpool  to  London.  It  was 
urged  that  the  waterways  should  be  nationalized,  that  the 
Imperial  Government  should  purchase  the  present  canals, 
deepen  and  widen  them,  and  systematize  the  waterways 
of  the  entire  kingdom.^ 

As  in  the  United  States,  again,  there  were  a  number  of 
causes  leading  to  this  agitation  for  waterway  reconstruc- 
tion. It  was  generally  believed  that  the  railways,  having 
strangled  the  competition  of  the  barge  canals  by  purchase 
and  control,  and  by  unfair  methods  of  competition,  such 
as  the  wholesale  cutting  of  rates  at  competitive  points,  had 
monopolized  the  transportation  of  the  country  and  were 
charging  exorbitant  rates,  to  the  injury  of  British  industry. 
The  magazines,  feeling  the  public  pulse,  took  up  the  cry, 
and  article  after  article  was  published,  showing  how  the 
railway  companies  were  destroying  the  canals  of  the  coun- 
try. The  conviction  grew  that  it  was  absolutely  imperative 
to  subject  the  railways  to  competition,  thereby  forcing 
them  to  lower  their  extortionate  tariffs;  and  it  was  believed 
that  an  efficient  waterway  system  would  achieve  the  de- 
sired result. 

Then,  second,  there  was  a  class  of  people,  directly  inter- 
ested in  canals,  who  hoped  to  benefit  by  their  rehabilita- 
tion. If  constructed  at  the  expense  of  the  state,  the  cost 
being  distributed  among  all  the  taxpayers  of  the  country, 
those  shippers,  favorably  located  and  dealing  in  commodi- 
ties adapted  to  canal  transportation,  would  doubtless  be 
benefited,  though  at  the  expense  of  the  many  taxpayers 
not  directly  interested  in  water  transportation. 

'  Forbes  and  Ashford,  op.  cit.  Chapter  xii  gives  a  very  good  descrip- 
tion of  the  agitation.  For  an  article  indicating  the  character  of  the  pop- 
ular arguments,  see  Lee,  "British  Canal  Problems,"  Journalof  Society  of 
Aria,  December,  1904. 


BARGE  CANALS  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN     103 

Then,  too,  the  fact  that  vast  sums  of  money  were  being 
expended  upon  canals  and  rivers  on  the  Continent  led 
many  persons  to  believe  that  canals  would  be  advantage- 
ous to  England  in  its  industrial  competition  with  other 
countries,  and  that  they  should,  therefore,  by  all  means  be 
reconstructed. 

Finally,  the  movement  was  apparently  given  much  sup- 
port by  the  opinions  of  engineers.  When  once  the  agita- 
tion for  a  systematic  development  of  the  waterways  of  the 
country  was  aroused,  the  question  of  engineering  practic- 
ability necessarily  had  to  be  decided;  and  constructing 
engineers  soon  pronounced  the  rehabilitation  of  the  water- 
ways as  fraught  with  no  insurmountable  engineering  diffi- 
culties. Immediately,  thereupon,  many  people  regarded 
the  question  as  settled,  failing  to  reflect  that  the  proof  of 
practicability  from  an  engineering  standpoint  is  not  a 
demonstration  of  commercial  feasibility.^ 

The  contention  was  not  advanced  in  England,  as  it  is 
in  the  United  States,  that  the  railways  were  in  need  of  relief 
from  superabundant  traffic.  In  other  respects,  however, 
the  agitation  for  waterways  in  England  rests  upon  the 
same  general  grounds  as  the  waterways  movement  in  this 
country. 

5.  The  agitation  resulted  in  the  appointment,  on  March 
5,  1906,  of  a  royal  commission  on  waterways.  This  com- 
mission was  instructed  to  — 

inquire  into  the  canals  and   inland  navigations  of  the  United 
Kingdom  and  to  report  on :  — 

(1)  Their  present  condition  and  financial  position. 

(2)  The  causes  which  have  operated  to  prevent  the  carrying- 
out  of  improvements  by  private  enterprise,  and  whether 
such  causes  are  removable  by  legislation. 

*  For  a  good  analysis  of  the  causes  of  the  British  canal  movement,  see 
Pratt,  British  Canals,  introductory  chapter. 


104        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILW^AYS 

(3)  Facilities,  improvements,  and  extensions  desirable  in  order 
to  complete  a  great  system  of  water  communication. 

(•1)  The  prospect  of  benefit  to  the  trade  of  the  country  com- 
patible with  a  reasonable  return  upon  the  probable  cost. 

(5)  The  expediency  of  canals  being  made  or  acquired  by  public 
bodies  or  trusts  and  the  methods  by  which  funds  for  the 
purpose  could  be  obtained  and  secured;  and  what  should 
be  the  system  of  control  and  management  of  such  bodies 
and  trusts.^ 

The  commission  collected  evidence  from  representatives 
of  canal  companies,  of  railway  companies  owning  or  con- 
trolling waterways,  from  traders,  merchants,  manufac- 
turers, mine-owners,  agriculturalists,  waterway  carriers, 
chambers  of  commerce,  and  county  and  city  councils.  Two 
hundred  and  sixty-six  witnesses  submitted  testimony. ^ 
The  report  fills  eleven  large  English  Blue  Books,  and  is  of 
great  importance  because  it  furnishes  us  with  practically 
the  only  reliable  data  on  British  waterways.  The  conclu- 
sions set  forth  below  are  consequently  based  largely  upon 
a  study  of  the  evidence  collected  by  the  Royal  Commis- 
sion. 

If  the  conclusions  reached  in  the  following  pages  be  found 
to  differ  in  some  respects  from  those  set  forth  in  the 
"Majority  Report"  of  the  Royal  Commission,^  the  reasons 
therefor  will  be  stated  in  every  case,  and  where  data  are 
necessary  for  the  support  of  conclusions  presented  here, 
they  will  be  drawn  from  those  furnished  by  the  commission 
itself.  But  before  entering  upon  an  analysis  of  the  recom- 

*  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  i,  p.  11. 
'  Ibid.,  vol.  VII,  p.  1. 

*  The  Royal  Commission  was  composed  of  nineteen  members,  only  six- 
teen of  whom  signed  the  Majority  Report.  Five  of  these  aflSxed  their  sig- 
natures, not  because  they  agreed  with  the  recommendations,  but  on  ac- 
count of  the  historical  and  other  useful  data  that  the  report  contained. 
Four  of  these  6ve  members  submitted  a  series  of  twenty-eight  reserva- 
tions, stating  wherein  they  disagreed  with  the  Majority  Report.  Each  of 
the  three  members  who  refused  to  sign  submitted  a  Minority  Report, 
stating  the  grounds  of  dissent. 


BARGE  CANALS  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN      105 

mendations   of  the  commission,  it  will   be  necessary  to 
describe  the  present  status  of  English  waterways. 

6.  The  condition  of  canals  in  England  is  almost  as  hope- 
less as  in  the  United  States.  Unfortunately  no  early  sta- 
tistics of  English  canal  traffic  were  ever  kept,  and  it  is 
accordingly  impossible  to  show  the  precise  extent  of  the 
decline  of  water-borne  traffic  which  every  one  is  aware  has 
taken  place.  The  only  statistics  that  exist  for  the  period 
before  1888  are  those  collected  by  the  Select  Committee 
on  Canals  (1881-83);  and  these  are  woefully  incomplete 
and  unreliable.  But  Sir  James  Allport  submitted  evidence 
to  this  committee,  showing  that  the  amount  of  coal  brought 
into  London  from  the  Midlands  and  North  of  England  by 
canals  and  railways  respectively  in  the  years  1852  and  1882 
was  as  follows:^  — 

1852  1882 

Carried  by  canals    ....     33,000  toas  7,900  tons. 

Carried  by  railways     .     .     .  317,000  6,546,000 

Since  coal  has  always  comprised  a  large  percentage  of 
all  the  canal  traffic  of  the  country,  this  decline  may  be 
regarded  as  unusually  significant.  It  should  be  observed 
that  there  was  an  absolute  falling-off  in  canal  tonnage, 
during  these  thirty  years,  of  more  than  seventy-five  per 
cent;  and  that,  on  the  other  hand,  the  tonnage  carried  by 
the  railways  increased  more  than  twenty  fold.  Doubtless 
not  all  the  canals  of  the  country  would  show  so  large  a 
diminished  tonnage  during  this  period,  but  unquestionably 
all  of  them  would  reveal  a  very  heavy  relative  decline, 
even  in  coal,  the  commodity  generally  regarded  as  best 
adapted  to  water  transport.  The  reasons  for  the  decline 
of  coal  traffic  on  canals  will  be  given  presently. 

While  there  are  no  statistics  of  the  traffic  in  manufac- 
tures and  general  merchandise  for  this  period  up  to  1882, 
it  is  a  matter  of  common  knowledge  that  such  traffic  has 
»  Pratt,  p.  81. 


lOG        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

now  almost  wholly  disappeared  from  the  waterways.  The 
commission  finds  that  by  far  the  larger  part  of  the  total 
traffic  at  present  consists  of  coal,  iron  ore,  and  pig  iron; 
building-materials,  —  such  as  stone,  brick,  timber,  cement, 
tile,  and  slate;  road  materials,  — sand,  gravel,  and  clay; 
manures  and  refuse;  and  some  grain  and  food  stuff;  while 
in  Lancashire  and  Yorkshire  a  considerable  amount  of  wool 
and  cotton  still  travels  by  water.  ^ 

For  the  past  twenty  years  statistics  of  total  tonnage  for 
the  principal  waterways  of  England  and  Wales  are  some- 
what more  accurate.  The  commission  has  formulated  a 
table,  giving  the  tonnage  t.nd  revenue  for  all  the  water- 
ways of  England  and  Wales  on  which  full  returns  were 
obtainable,  as  follows:  ^  — 


England 

Miles 

Year 

Total 
tonnage 

Total  gross 
revenue 

Total 
expenditures 

ToUl  net 
revenue 

and 
Wales 

2416 

1888 
1893 
1906 

33,123,666 
34,022,493 
32,340,264 

89,122,965 
9,275,530 
9,553,560 

$5,840,925 
6,845,950 
7,237,975 

$3,282,040 
2,429.580 
2,315,585 

This  table  shows  a  slight  reduction  in  the  amount  of 
freight  carried  by  water,  even  since  1888,  when  already  the 
railways  had  become  the  dominant  agent  of  transporta- 
tion. In  contrast  with  this  continuing  decline  in  water- 
borne  traffic  during  this  period,  we  find  that  the  tonnage 
carried  by  the  railways  of  the  entire  United  Kingdom  has 
increased  by  sixty-four  per  cent;  from  281,747,439  tons 
in  1888  to  461,139,023  tons  in  1905.'  The  total  waterway 
tonnage  for  the  entire  United  Kingdom  in  1905  was 
43,161,927  tons;^  or  a  little  more  than  one  eleventh  of  the 
total  freight  tonnage  of  Great  Britain.  Were  the  ton-miles 
of  traffic  computed,  the  proportion  carried  by  rail  would  be 

*  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vir,  p.  61. 

»  Ibid.,  p.  49.  For  the  years  1888  and  1898  statistics  for  all  the  canals 
could  not  be  secured.  The  above  table  comprises  about  three  fifths  of  the 
total.  In  this  table  the  year  1905  includes  only  those  canals  on  which 
data  for  the  previous  years  were  available. 

»  Ibid.,  p.  52.  4  7Ji^.,  vol.  IV,  p.  3. 


BARGE  CANALS  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN    107 

found  to  be  even  very  much  greater  still,  since  by  far  the 
larger  part  of  the  water  tonnage  is,  according  to  the  com- 
mission, local  traffic.  Whereas,  once  boats  commonly 
traveled  all  the  way  from  Lancashire  and  Yorkshire  to 
London,  to-day  practically  all  of  the  through  traffic  goes 
either  by  rail,  or  around  by  sea. 

As  regards  revenue,  it  is  to  be  seen  from  the  above  table 
that  the  total  net  revenue  on  these  canals  has  decreased 
from  $3,282,040  to  $2,315,585,  a  falling-off  of  twenty-nine 
per  cent. 

The  commission  has  also  compiled  a  table  for  all  the 
waterways  of  the  United  Kingdom,  which  gives  some  addi- 
tional items  of  interest.  The  statistics  for  1905  are  reliable, 
but  those  for  the  earlier  dates  are  incomplete  as  before. 
The  table  includes  all  of  the  canals  and  canalized  rivers  of 
the  British  Isles,  whether  independent,  railway  owned,  or 
railway  controlled:^  — 


■wo 

Rbvbnue 

EXPENDmjRES 

g'3 

u 

bc 

S 

£« 

a 

Tear 

i 

!  = 

s 

s 

ID      a 

s 

c 

« 

2^ 

3§a 

h  <3 

5S 

l£ 

2*3 

cs      a 

5  ►< 

5  £ 

3tt 

■1^ 

a. 

H 

H 

b 

o 

H 

s    a 

H 

o 

H 

» 

K 

$ 

s 

$ 

s 

s 

s 

8 

$ 

$ 

$ 

000 

000 

000 

000 

000 

000 

000 

000 

000 

000 

000 

1888 

155,030 

182,305 

4,485 

2,180 

1,500 

10,145 

4,135 

235 

5  6.515 

3,630 

1898 

220,255 

208,000 

5,675 

3,975 

2,180 

11,930  3,625 

3,210 

1,865  8,710.  3,220 

1905 

237,750 

215,805 

6,595 

4,140 

2,665 

13,400j  4,000 

3,305 

2,145  9,455|  3,945 

$845 

From  this  table  it  would  seem  that  for  the  entire  United 
Kingdom,  the  net  revenue  from  waterway  investments  is 
increasing.  This  is  not  actually  the  fact,  however,  because 
the  amounts  for  1888  and  1898  are  far  too  low,  due  to 
incomplete  returns.  An  important  fact  brought  out  by 
the  table  is  that  about  one  fourth  of  the  total  revenue 
comes  from  "Other  sources."  Most  of  this  increased  reve- 
nue is  derived  from  the  increase  in  rents  of  property  be- 
*  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  iv,  p.  3. 


108        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

longing  to  the  canal  companies,  and  from  the  supply  of 
water,  cranage,  haulage,  etc.*  Since  the  expenses  con- 
nected with  these  other  sources  are  practically  nil,  the  net 
income  from  "Other  sources"  is  by  far  the  largest  item  of 
profit.  In  fact,  the  total  net  profits  are  but  little  more  than 
the  amount  of  this  outside  revenue. 

The  amount  of  the  annual  revenue  in  comparison  with 
the  total  paid-up  capital  is  interesting.  In  1905  the  paid- 
up  capitalization  was  $237,753,840,  or  $50,880  per  mile. 
While  these  figures  include  the  Manchester  Ship  Canal, 
which  considerably  swells  the  average  capitalization  per 
mile,  they  include,  also,  812  m^les  of  open  river,  needing  no 
improvement  whatever,  and  1312  miles  of  rivers  requiring 
only  a  small  amount  of  canalization  to  make  them  navi- 
gable.- This  is  more  than  suflScient  to  counterbalance  the 
effect  of  the  Manchester  Ship  Canal  on  the  average  con- 
struction cost  per  mile.  Taking  the  average  cost  given 
above,  therefore,  as  approximately  that  of  the  small 
canals,  we  find  that  there  has  been  expended  upon  the 
narrow  barge  canals,  with  an  average  depth  of  only  four 
or  five  feet  on  the  sills  at  the  locks,  over  $50,000  a  mile, 
giving  a  capitalization  about  one  fifth  that  of  the  great 
railway  system  of  England,  and  almost  as  great  per  mile 
as  that  of  the  railways  of  the  United  States.  The  total  net 
revenue  per  mile  on  these  waterw^ays  in  1905  was  $845.  If 
the  entire  amount  were  applied  in  the  payment  of  divi- 
dends, the  rate  on  the  total  capitalization  would  equal  .0166. 
The  fact  is  that  only  in  rare  instances  are  earnings  dis- 
tributed to  shareholders;  the  scanty  profits  being  usually 
devoted  to  improvements.  This  net  revenue,  it  should  be 
recalled,  includes  the  revenue  from  "Other  sources,"  with- 
out which  the  net  earnings  would  be  practically  negligible. 
It  has  thus  been  seen  that  the  traflfic  on  the  waterways 
of  Great  Britain  has  steadily  declined  since  about  the  mid- 
dle of  the  last  century;  that  practically  the  only  traflSc 
'  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vii,  p.  52.  *  Ibid.,  p.  20. 


BARGE  CANALS  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN    109 

now  carried  by  the  waterways  is  of  a  bulky  nature  and  of 
small  value;  and  that  this  sort  of  traffic  is  on  the  wane 
and  altogether  insufficient  in  amount  to  make  canal  trans- 
portation profitable.  It  will  be  of  interest  now  to  ascertain 
the  causes  responsible  for  this  condition. 

7.  Since  the  palmy  days  of  canal  transportation,  before 
the  railways  had  appeared  as  competitive  carriers,  there 
has  taken  place  a  complete  transformation  in  the  methods 
employed  in  practically  every  branch  of  industry.  The  in- 
troduction of  the  telegraph,  the  telephone,  and,  be  it  said, 
the  railway  itself,  has  completely  revolutionized  commer- 
cial conditions,  rendering  almost  the  entire  internal  trade 
of  such  a  country  as  England  retail  in  character.  The  pri- 
mary demand  on  the  part  of  shippers  is  for  speedy  and  cer- 
tain delivery.  It  has  come  to  be  recognized,  in  these  days 
of  small  margins  of  profit,  that  the  most  successful  busi- 
ness man  is  he  who  allows  the  least  portion  of  his  capital 
to  lie  idle.  The  frequency  of  the  turn-over  of  the  stock  of 
goods  is  the  test  of  efficiency.  Capital  tied  up  in  stock 
which  lies  idle  for  a  considerable  period  of  time  is  capital 
wasted.  Hence,  business  men  have  now  taken  to  ordering 
in  smaller  quantities,  but  at  more  frequent  intervals,  than 
they  formerly  did.  In  order,  however,  to  keep  but  a  small 
stock  on  hand,  and  yet  never  fail  their  customers,  they  re- 
quire a  rapid  and  certain  means  of  transportation.  For, 
quick  and  dependable  service,  the  railways  are  much  supe- 
rior to  any  inland  waterways  which  could  be  constructed. 
Some  of  their  chief  advantages  were  well  stated  before  the 
commission  by  Mr.  Fay,  the  general  manager  of  the  Great 
Western  Railway  Company.  Asked  why  he  thought  the 
railways  were  able  to  divert  traffic  from  the  waterways, 
he  replied,  "Firstly,  the  canals  only  carry  from  one  point  to 
another,  from  A  to  B  or  C,  as  a  rule,  whereas  railways  can 
carry  from  A  to  the  rest  of  the  alphabet,  and  vice  versa,. 
Traders  naturally  prefer  to  deal  with  the  carrier  which  can 


110        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

take  their  traffic  to  all  points,  and  can  accept  from  all 
places.  Secondly,  a  manufacturer  who  has  a  siding  to  his 
works  can  himself  run  railway  wagons  to  any  part  of 
his  manufactory,  and  has  neither  to  lay  out  nor  build  his 
works  to  suit  a  fixed  spot  for  the  receipt  and  dispatch  of 
goods,  as  in  the  case  of  a  canal.  Thirdly,  there  are  more 
privately  owned  railway  wagons  in  the  country  than  there 
are  railway-owned,  and  it  is  to  the  interest  of  owners  to 
keep  their  wagons  continuously  moving.  That  is  more 
particularly  the  case  in  connection  with  the  colliery  busi- 
ness, and  tells  very  much  against  the  canals."  ^  In  regard 
to  this  statement  the  commission,  says  that  "there  is  a 
considerable  degree  of  truth  in  the  argument  for  certain 
classes  of  goods,"  but  adds  that  "  it  does  not  follow  that 
waterways,  if  they  are  given  a  stronger  administration  and 
an  improved  carrying  capacity,  will  not,  as  in  other  coun- 
tries, be  extensively  used  for  that  class  of  traffic  which  is, 
by  its  nature,  most  suitable  for  water  carriage."^  The 
commission  thus  acknowledges,  and,  in  fact,  it  is  now  al- 
most universally  recognized,  that  canals  are  adapted  only  to 
slow-moving,  bulky  traffic  of  small  value.  It  will  be  our  pur- 
pose accordingly  to  devote  all  of  our  attention  henceforth 
to  the  question  of  bulkj^  freight.  It  will  be  advisable  to 
•consider  first  the  present  condition  of  such  traffic,  for  it  will 
be  found  that  this  study  will  throw  much  light  upon  the 
possibility  of  an  increased  tonnage  in  case  the  waterways 
were  enlarged  and  systematized. 

8.  By  far  the  most  important  waterway  traffic,  wher- 
ever waterways  exist,  is  coal.  In  fact,  so  important  is  the 
coal  traffic  in  water  transportation  that  it  can  almost,  if 
not  quite,  be  said  that  the  deciding  factor  in  the  canal 
question  is  whether  coal  will  travel  extensively  by  water. 
In  the  year  1905,  on  the  fifteen  most  important  waterways 
of  the  United  Kingdom,  the  coal  tonnage  was  9,727,972, 

*  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vii,  p.  80,  footnote.    *  Ibid.,  p.  82. 


BARGE  CANALS  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN    111 

out  of  a  total  waterway  traffic  of  21,494,631  tons;  or  forty- 
five  per  cent  of  the  entire  amount.^ 

By  far  the  most  important  coal  traffic  in  the  Kingdom 
is  that  between  the  Yorkshire  and  Midland  region  and 
the  metropolis  of  London.  The  commission  has  collected 
much  valuable  data  as  to  the  present  state  of  this  traffic, 
and  has  summarized  in  the  following  table  the  amount  of 
coal  coming  to  London  by  rail,  by  sea,  and  by  canal:  ^  — 


Tear 

By  rail 

Per  cent 

By  sea 

Per  cent 

By  canal 

Per  cent 

Total 

1880 

6,200,780 

62.5 

3,714,708 

37.4 

4,079 

0.045 

9,919,567 

1888 

7.619,223 

60.9 

4,887,583 

39.0 

12,541 

0.098 

12,519,347 

1898 

6,954,206 

48.6 

7,337,062 

51.3 

13,808 

0.097 

14,305,076 

1900 

7,742,269 

49.2 

7,988,250 

50.7 

15.484 

0.098 

15,746,003 

1901 

7,399,908 

49.1 

7.652,137 

50.8 

13.489 

0.000 

15,065,534 

1902 

7,360,890 

47.7 

8,069,898 

52.2 

16,686 

0.108 

15,447,474 

1903 

7,101,903 

47.1 

7,969,903 

52.8 

15,981 

0.106 

15,087,787 

1901 

7,141,567 

46.3 

8,285.409 

53.6 

18.870 

0.122 

15,445,846 

1905 

7,137,473 

45.6 

8,494,234 

54.3 

18,681 

0.119 

15,650,388 

Totals 

64,658,219 

50.1 

64,399,184 

49.8 

120,619 

0.100 

129,187,022 

It  should  be  recalled  that  in  1852  the  amount  of  coal 
traffic  carried  to  London  by  canal  was  33,000  tons.^  It  is 
at  present  but  little  more  than  half  that  amount,  though  it 
has  been  increasing  slightly  during  the  past  few  years.  The 
totals  in  the  tables  show  that  since  1880  only  one  tenth  of 
one  per  cent  of  this  very  important  traffic  traveled  on  the 
canals,  even  though  they  connect  directly  with  all  the 
great  colliery  districts.  On  the  other  hand,  49.8  per  cent 
of  the  coal  coming  to  London  is  brought  by  sea.  It  is  to  be 
noted  also  that  the  percentage  of  that  carried  by  sea  has 
steadily  increased.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  it  can  be 
brought  in  large  boats  in  tremendous  quantities  and  un- 
loaded directly  to  the  holds  of  ships  bunkering  for  long 
ocean  voyages.  It  can  also  be  unloaded  conveniently  at 
the  great  wharves  along  the  Thames,  whence  it  can  be 
carted  directly,  or  carried  in  railway  cars,  to  its  destina- 
tion. 

Between  1852  and  1880  the  amount  carried  by  the  rail- 

*  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vii,  p.  61.    ^  Ibid.,  p.  66.    *  See  p.  105. 


112        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

ways  increased  from  317,000  to  6,546,000  tons,  since  which 
time  it  has  averaged  50.1  per  cent  of  the  total.  ^  This  is  five 
hundred  times  the  amount  brought  by  canals  during  the 
same  period  of  time.  Is  this  surprising  condition  due  to  the 
insufficient  size  of  the  present  waterways  and  to  the  lack 
of  organization,  or  is  it  because  the  railways  are  inherently 
better  adapted  to  the  needs  of  coal  shippers? 

Coal  is  shipped  to  London  for  three  chief  purposes:  for 
fuel  in  ocean-going  vessels,  for  fuel  in  manufacturing  and 
industrial  establishments,  and  for  household  consumption. 
It  has  already  been  seen  that  in  supplying  the  ships  there 
is  every  advantage  in  bringing  it  by  sea  to  London  and  un- 
loading directly  to  the  ocean  vessels.  Neither  the  canals 
nor  the  railways  can  hope  to  secure  this  traffic  in  face  of 
the  open-sea  competition.  Hence  we  may  omit  this  from 
consideration,  and  direct  attention  to  the  coal  needed  by 
factories  and  manufacturing  concerns  of  whatever  kind. 

It  comes  somewhat  as  a  surprise  at  first  to  learn  that  the 
railways  have  a  tremendous  advantage  over  the  canals  in 
supplying  factories  with  fuel.  It  would  seem  that  coal 
might  be  sent  down  to  London  by  canal  in  large  quantities 
and  unloaded  to  suit  the  needs  of  the  various  plants  in  a 
very  satisfactory  and  economical  manner.  The  fact  is, 
however,  that  it  can  be  much  more  economically  and  more 
satisfactorily  carried  by  the  railroads.  A  prominent  rail- 
road man,  Mr.  A.  C.  Briggs,  testified  before  the  commis- 
sion that,  in  the  case  of  coal  for  large  establishments,  "  the 
railway  can  very  often  take  it  in  the  sidings  actually  to  his 
boilers,  if  he  be  a  manufacturer;  if  not,  it  takes  it  to  a  wharf 
where  carts  can  be  actually  backed  against  the  truck;  the 
coal  is  at  a  higher  level  and  it  takes  very  much  less  labor  to 
lift  the  coal,  or  shovel  the  coal  into  the  consumer's  cart  out 
of  the  truck,  than  it  would  out  of  the  barge."^  Or,  the 
trucks  may  be  emptied  by  tipping  directly  into  carts,  ef- 
fecting a  very  great  saving. 

^  See  p.  105.  *  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vii,  p.  224. 


BARGE  CANALS  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN     113 

Still  another  consideration,  of  the  first  importance  in 
counting  the  cost,  is  that  of  loading  at  the  colliery.  If  it 
is  to  be  shipped  by  canal,  the  coal  has  either  to  be  carted 
or  carried  by  rail  for  a  considerable  distance  from  the  mine 
to  the  banks  of  the  waterway;  for  it  is  of  course  utterly  out 
of  the  question  to  be  continually  extending  lateral  canals 
as  the  source  of  the  coal  moves  from  place  to  place.  On  the 
other  hand,  a  railway  side-track  can  with  little  difficulty  be 
run  almost  anywhere  to  the  very  mouth  of  a  mine.  The 
cars  can  accordingly  be  loaded  directly  at  the  colliery  and 
sent  to  any  destination,  without  delay,  and  without  the 
extra  costs  of  transshipments.  When  once  it  is  loaded  on 
the  cars,  it  becomes  a  sheer  waste  of  money  to  haul  it  a 
short  distance,  then  transfer  it  to  a  waterway,  from  which 
again  it  must  be  laboriously  unloaded,  and  more  than  likely 
carried  to  its  final  destination  in  railway  cars.  This  ques- 
tion of  transshipment  is  ever  protruding  itself.  We  have 
seen  how  the  same  consideration  was  fundamentally  im- 
portant in  our  own  country.  Everywhere  it  is  one  of  the 
most  important  aspects  of  the  problem.  It  is  in  the  stand- 
ard gauge  and  inexpensive  siding,  making  it  possible  to 
send  a  railway  car  to  any  point  of  the  compass,  that  one 
of  the  greatest  advantages  of  the  railway  lies. 

Finally,  in  London  there  is  the  very  important  traffic  in 
house  coal.  Here,  again,  the  railways  possess  a  great  ad- 
vantage, and  for  various  reasons.  It  is  of  course  immed- 
iately apparent  that  the  cost  of  transshipment  from  rail- 
way to  canal  and  back  again  is  to  the  disadvantage  of  the 
waterways  as  before.  That  argument  need  not  be  reiter- 
ated. In  the  second  place,  much  the  greater  part  of  this 
coal  is  handled  in  London  by  small  dealers.  With  these 
men,  as  with  retailers  generally,  a  small  stock  and  a  rapid 
turn-over  is  essential  if  the  business  is  to  be  made  profit- 
able. Consequently  their  orders  are  for  small  quantities 
at  a  time,  and  for  prompt  delivery.  Mr.  Bury  stated  be- 
fore the  commission  that  the  Great  Northern  Railway 


114        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

Company,  with  which  he  is  connected,  built  some  large 
railway  cars  which  were  able  to  carry  from  thirty  to  thirty- 
five  tons  of  coal  each,  but  the  traders,  to  use  his  own  words, 
"would  not  look  at  them.  The  ordinary  order  for  house 
coal  is  from  a  householder  whose  cellar  does  not  hold  more 
than  eight  or  ten  or  twelve  tons  and  he  wishes  it  in  these 
amounts."^  Consequently,  the  small  railway  truck  is  of 
very  convenient  size  to  meet  the  needs  of  these  shippers. 
On  the  contrary,  the  capacity  of  the  barges  on  the  present 
waterways  is  as  a  rule  from  thirty  to  fifty  tons.  The  same 
objection  evidently  applies  to  their  use  as  to  the  large  rail- 
way cars.  The  reason  for  the  predominance  of  small  ship- 
ments is  to  be  found  in  the  prohibitive  cost  to  small  deal- 
ers of  providing  warehouses  or  storage  place  in  London. 
Without  attempting  to  push  the  point  too  far,  it  must  be 
considered  as  a  strong  argument  against  the  use  of  canal 
barges. 

A  more  important  point  for  the  coal  dealer  to  consider, 
however,  is  that  if  he  orders  by  boat,  he  must  accept  de- 
livery at  the  boat's  side,  transfer  the  cargo  to  carts,  and 
haul  it  perhaps  for  miles  across  the  city  to  customers; 
whereas,  if  he  orders  by  rail,  the  cargo  will  be  delivered  on 
the  siding  in  whatever  part  of  the  city  he  desires.  The  ad- 
vantage of  the  railways  in  this  connection  is  decisive. 

Finally,  breakage  of  coal  is  much  more  serious  in  barges 
than  in  small  railway  cars.  Mr.  A.  C.  Briggs,  before 
quoted,  stated  before  the  commission  that  there  is  not  half 
the  breakage  by  rail  that  there  is  by  canal  barges.^  He  ex- 
plained that  while  the  broken  fragments  can  be  disposed 
of  for  various  purposes,  it  must  be  at  a  price  reduction  of 
from  $.40  to  $1.80  a  ton. 

9.  Turning  now  to  building-materials,  it  appears  again 
that  certain  railway  advantages  have  combined  to  divert 
from  the  waterways  a  large  share  of  their  "natural"  traffic. 

*  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vii,  p.  223.  *  Ibid.,  p.  224. 


BARGE  CANALS  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN    115 

Such  commodities  as  brick,  stone,  timber,  tiles,  drain- 
pipes, and  road  materials  are  frequently  handled  more  ex- 
peditiously and  more  conveniently  by  rail  than  by  canal, 
considerations  which  more  than  counterbalance  the  less 
cost  of  actual  haulage  on  the  canal.  For  instance,  a  Lon- 
don builder  in  the  heart  of  the  city,  who  secures  his  mate- 
rials from  Yorkshire,  must,  if  they  are  shipped  by  canal, 
have  them  carted  several  miles  across  the  city  from  the 
terminus  of  the  Grand  Junction  Canal  at  Limehouse, 
where  they  are  unloaded,  to  the  site  of  the  building  opera- 
tions. Since,  on  the  other  hand,  he  can  secure  them 
quicker  by  rail  and  have  them  delivered  near  at  hand,  he 
is  practically  never  disposed  to  make  use  of  the  water- 
ways.^ 

Again,  as  in  the  case  of  coal,  the  size  of  the  shipment 
of  building-materials  is  often  an  important  factor.  An  in- 
stance of  this  in  the  brick  traffic  between  Peterborough 
and  London  was  cited  to  the  commission  by  Mr.  Bury. 
"The  traffic  amounted  to  about  1,000,000  tons  a  year,  and 
formed  a  suitable  material  for  large  [railway]  wagons;  but 
the  consignees  would  not  accept  large  consignments  on  the 
site  where  the  bricks  were  required,  and  neither  would 
they  agree  to  the  bricks  being  unloaded  and  stacked  at  the 
station,  inasmuch  as  double  handling  would  be  necessary, 
the  cost  of  which  the  consignees  were  not  prepared  to 
bear."  2  It  is  apparent,  therefore,  that  the  barge-load  of 
thirty  or  forty  tons  is  not  adapted  to  the  needs  of  these 
shippers.  A  small  carload  of  eight  or  ten  tons  is  convenient, 
hence  the  railways  secure  the  traffic. 

10.  The  northern  counties  of  England  constitute  the 
greatest  cotton  manufacturing  district  in  the  world.  The 
raw  cotton  which  supplies  the  mills  is  imported  from 
abroad.    One  might  naturally  expect  that,  since  practic- 

'  Pratt,  Railways  and  their  Rates,  p.  343. 

*  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vii,  p.  225.  (Minority  Report.) 


116        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

ally  all  of  the  inland  manufacturing  towns  have  waterway 
communication  with  the  great  entrepot  of  Liverpool,  the 
bulky  raw  cotton  would  be  distributed  to  the  manufactur- 
ing districts  by  means  of  canal  barges.  The  fact  is,  how- 
ever, that  nearly  all  of  the  cotton  is  carried  inland  by  rail. 
Again,  the  size  of  the  cargo  preferred  by  the  shippers  seems 
to  be  a  determining  factor.  The  spinners  do  their  business 
on  a  comparatively  small  scale,  and  they  prefer  to  tele- 
graph or  telephone  to  Liverpool  for  the  amount  of  raw 
cotton  required  from  time  to  time.  If  it  were  brought  in 
barges,  warehousing  space  would  be  required  for  the  sur- 
plus which  could  not  be  immediately  used.  Rather  than 
incur  this  expenditure,  and  at  the  same  time  tie  up  capital 
in  stored  cotton,  the  cotton  men  naturally  prefer  to  use 
the  small  railway  car,  which  can  promptly  deliver  the 
goods  in  the  quantities  desired. 

11.  Agricultural  commodities  are  among  those  com- 
monly regarded  as  adapted  to  water  transportation.  The 
commission,  however,  reports  that  the  agricultural  pro- 
duce carried  by  English  canals  is  insignificant  in  quantity. 
"The  Grand  Junction  Canal,  for  instance,  passes  across 
nearly  one  hundred  miles  of  farm  lands  in  order  to  reach 
London.  In  1905,  it  carried  but  5812  tons  of  agricultural 
produce,  out  of  a  total  canal  traffic  of  1,794,233  tons."' 
The  reasons  presented  by  the  commission  in  explanation 
of  this  condition  are  as  follows:  First,  the  farmers  buy 
and  sell  their  commodities  in  small  quantities,  and  they 
find  the  railways  more  convenient.  Second,  the  farm 
roads  lead  to  the  railway  stations  and  loading-places,  and 
do  not  connect  with  the  canals.  Third,  canal  transport- 
ation is  too  slow  for  the  daily  deliveries  of  the  products 
of  the  dairy,  in  which  there  is  a  large  traffic  in  England. 
Finally,  the  warehousing  facilities  along  the  canals  are 
hopelessly  inadequate  to  meet  the  farmers'  needs.^ 
*  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vii,  p.  62.  *  IbicU 


BARGE  CANALS  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN     117 

12.  Small  as  is  the  traffic  on  British  inland  waterways  at 
present  it  would  be  even  less  than  it  is,  in  the  absence  of 
certain  exceptional  conditions.  It  is,  of  course,  true  that 
the  general  conditions  governing  the  transportation  of 
bulky  commodities  which  we  have  been  discussing  are  not 
applicable  to  every  ton  of  such  traffic.  Under  especially 
favoring  circumstances  some  coal  and  building-materials 
may  still  advantageously  travel  to  London  by  canals,  and 
some  cotton  and  agricultural  produce  may  continue  to  be 
economically  shipped  on  the  waterways.  But  this  can 
account  for  but  a  small  part  of  the  canal  traffic  that 
still  remains. 

A  large  amount  of  the  existing  tonnage  is  to  be  explained 
by  the  fact  that  factories  were  constructed  on  the  banks 
of  canals  long  before  the  days  of  railways,  and  that  an 
industrial  inertia  operates  to  prevent  their  removal,  or 
the  giving-up  of  the  accustomed  means  of  transport.  In 
some  cases,  it  must  be  said  that  there  would,  indeed,  be 
little  advantage  in  a  change.  For  example,  in  the  north  of 
England  many  flour  mills  are  located  along  canals.  Barges 
bring  the  wheat  to  these  mills  directly  from  unloading 
vessels  in  Liverpool.  They  can  tie  up  alongside  the  large 
boats  at  the  dock,  be  loaded  directly,  and  again  unloaded 
readily  from  the  barges  to  the  mills  on  the  banks  of  the 
canals.  The  conditions  are  here  rather  favorable  for  water 
transport.  The  cost  of  transshipment  is  small,  the  size  of 
the  barge  cargo  convenient  for  the  millers,  and  the  ques- 
tion of  speed  not  important.  Hence  the  traffic  is  not  in- 
considerable. 

Again,  we  find  that  London  is  decentralizing.  Many 
factories  are  moving  out  from  the  heart  of  the  city  because 
of  the  high  rents  which  must  be  paid  in  the  metropolitan 
district.  They  locate  on  the  banks  of  the  canals,  but  con- 
veniently also  to  railways.  When  they  have  large  orders  of 
certain  classes  of  freight,  —  biscuits,  for  example,  on  which 
the  London  cost  of  cartage  is  not  heavy,  —  they  often 


118        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

make  use  of  the  waterways.  Since  the  distance  is  short, 
the  question  of  speed  hardly  enters.  Nevertheless,  practic- 
ally all  of  the  smaller  orders  are  sent  by  train,  and  the  total 
of  such  waterway  tonnage  is  by  no  means  great.  It  should 
be  borne  in  mind,  also,  that  in  all  these  cases,  if  the  canals 
were  not  already  constructed,  no  private  capital  could  be 
found  to  build  them  for  the  sake  of  the  small  traflSc  which 
the  present  waterways  still  retain. 

There  is  still  another  important  reason  for  the  continued 
use  of  these  old  canals.  The  commission  reports  that  "the 
survival  of  the  existing  traffic  in  England  is  probably  due, 
to  a  considerable  extent,  to  the  character  of  the  labor 
employed.  Just  as  in  many  parts  of  the  country,  farming 
is  most  successfully  carried  on  by  a  small  farmer  and  his 
family,  so  inland  navigation  is  mainly  worked  by  families  of 
small  means  living  day  and  night  in  the  barges."  ^  The 
motive  power  is  generally  a  horse,  which  the  husband,  with 
usually  a  lad  to  spell  him  when  he  becomes  weary,  leads 
along  the  towpath  on  the  banks  of  the  canal.  The  wife, 
meanwhile,  rides  on  the  barge  and  holds  the  tiller.  There 
has  been  practically  no  improvement  in  this  primitive 
method  in  generations.  The  bargemen  are  of  course  op- 
posed to  any  innovation  which  might  imperil  their  means  of 
livelihood.  When  recently  a  Londoner  traveled  over  many 
of  the  canals  of  England  in  a  motor  boat,  with  the  view  to 
the  introduction  of  electric  traction  on  the  waterways,  he 
was  rudely  received  by  the  canal  bargemen.  Learning  his 
purpose,  they  assailed  him  from  the  banks  and  bridges 
with  all  manner  of  missiles.  Were  it  not  for  the  character 
of  this  labor,  for  inertia,  and  for  the  few  special  conditions 
enumerated,  practically  all  of  what  little  waterway  traffic 
remains  would  be  diverted  to  the  railways. 

13.  In  the  foregoing  paragraphs  the  present  status  of 
British  canals  and  inland  navigation,  as  detailed  in  the 
^  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vii,  p.  57. 


BARGE  CANALS  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN    119 

report^  of  the  commission,  has  been  described;  and  reasons 
have  been  presented  which  it  is  believed  account  for  the 
failure  of  the  waterways  to  retain  their  former  position 
in  the  transportation  business  of  the  country.  The  com- 
mission, however,  designates  three  main  causes  for  the 
decline  of  waterway  traffic  in  Great  Britain,  as  follows :  the 
lack  of  warehousing  and  terminal  facilities;  the  lack  of 
organization  and  systematization;  and  the  control  of  a  con- 
siderable portion  of  the  waterways  by  railway  companies.^ 
As  regards  the  first  two  of  these  causes,  the  commission 
states  that  the  canal  owners  have  failed  to  provide  loading 
facilities,  terminals,  and  storage  accommodations  for  the 
convenience  of  shippers,  and  that  the  canals  are  controlled 
by  a  large  number  of  small  owners,  which  has  militated 
against  their  systematization.  Accordingly  they  are  of 
varying  width  and  depth;  thus  preventing  the  use  of  large 
boats  for  through  traffic,  —  this,  because  the  capacity  of 
the  smallest  link  in  the  chain  of  waterways  determines 
the  size  of  the  barge  that  can  travel  over  the  entire  route. 
Contrasting  this  lack  of  system  and  equipment  with  the 
excellent  terminals  and  commodious  warehousing  facilities 
of  the  great  railways,  with  their  standard  gauge,  and  rapid 
through  service,  the  commission  thinks  it  is  easy  to  under- 
stand why  the  canal  owners  have  become  doubtful  of  the 
future  of  waterways.  Let  us  see  if  these  causes  are  not 
more  apparent  than  real. 

It  has  been  seen  that  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  nineteenth 
century  canals  had  a  virtual  monopoly  of  the  transport- 
ation business  of  England.  They  possessed,  therefore,  the 
tremendous  competitive  advantage  of  a  well-established 
trade.  On  the  other  hand,  the  railways,  new  and  experi- 
mental, possessed  nothing  except  inherent  possibilities. 
Overcoming  the  tremendous  handicap  of  the  long  lead 

'  When  the  report  of  the  commission  is  referred  to,  the  majority  report 
is  always  meant.  Whenever  a  minority  report  is  referred  to,  it  will  be 
specifically  named. 

*  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vii,  p.  82. 


120        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

obtained  by  the  canals  during  the  half-century  of  their 
uninterrupted  prosperity,  the  railroads  succeeded,  in  a 
surprisingly  short  space  of  time,  in  diverting  from  the 
canals  the  greater  part  of  their  traffic  and  in  gaining  a  com- 
plete ascendancy.  Since  English  canals  were  privately 
owned,  there  was  unquestionably  every  incentive  to  keep 
them  in  a  condition  to  compete  successfully  with  the  rail- 
ways. The  canal  owners,  facing  the  possibility  of  a  destruc- 
tion of  their  vested  interests,  cannot  reasonably  be  con- 
sidered as  having  been  apathetic  in  regard  to  the  future  of 
the  waterways.  The  canal  companies  lacked  a  systematic 
organization,  it  is  true,  but  it  must  be  remembered  that 
in  1850  the  railways  were  equally  unorganized.  The  rail- 
way men  had  to  build  the  great  systems  which  to-day 
exist.  They  had  to  provide  themselves  with  expensive 
warehousing  facilities  and  costly  terminals.  With  the  same 
incentive  and  the  same  free  opportunity,  why  did  not  the 
canal  men  at  least  keep  pace  with  the  railway  men  in  these 
improvements? 

We  may  now  consider  the  third  factor  to  which  the 
commission  assigns  the  decline  of  water  transportation, 
namely,  that  the  railways  have  purchased  many  of  the 
canals  of  the  country  and  have  contrived  to  strangle  com- 
petition. Mr.  Inglis,  in  his  minority  report,  contributed 
some  interesting  information  as  to  the  reasons  for  the  pur- 
chase of  canals  by  the  railway  companies.  He  says,  "The 
scared  canal  companies  themselves  thought  to  safeguard 
their  own  interests,  as  far  as  they  could,  at  the  expense  of 
the  railways.  In  some  cases  such  pressure  was  brought  to 
bear  on  the  railway  companies  that  they  were  compelled 
to  take  over  certain  canals  as  a  condition  of  getting  author- 
ity to  construct  their  proposed  lines.  In  other  cases  the 
canal  companies  obtained  Parliamentary  powers  to  build 
railways,  with  the  express  design  of  compelling  the  railway 
companies  to  buy  them  out.  In  still  other  cases  the  rail- 
ways deemed  it  prudent  to  purchase,  to  take  over,  or  to 


BARGE  CANALS  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN    121 

guarantee  the  interests  of  canal  companies  without  being 
actually  forced  so  to  do.  But  whatever  the  precise  reason, 
the  canals  were  not,  in  the  great  majority  of  cases,  volun- 
tarily acquired  by  the  railway  companies."  * 

Even  if  it  could  be  shown  that  the  railways  dealt  un- 
fairly with  the  canals,  this  fact  would  furnish  no  argument 
that  the  canals  should  be  reconstructed.  In  the  case  of 
neglected  governmental  waterways  there  might  possibly 
be  some  occasion  for  contending  that  the  fight  for  suprem- 
acy had  not  been  won  by  the  naturally  most  efficient  agent 
of  transportation.  Where,  however,  perfect  freedom  of 
competition  has  existed,  as  in  England,  such  a  contention 
cannot  fairly  be  made.  One  would  rather  have  expected 
to  see  the  canals  purchase  and  cripple  the  newly  develop- 
ing railways  than  the  reverse.  It  is  usually  the  industry 
that  is  strongly  intrenched  that  buys  up  and  destroys 
struggling  would-be  competitors,  instead  of  potential  com- 
petitors purchasing  the  old  established  interests.  That  the 
railways  were  able  to  enter  an  already  appropriated  field, 
and  in  a  few  short  years  entirely  dominate  the  transport- 
ation business,  would  seem  to  be  strong  circumstantial 
evidence  of  their  superiority  over  canals,  rather  than  the 
reverse.  At  any  rate,  the  burden  of  proof  would  seem  to 
lie  with  those  who  contend  that  it  is  the  superior  agent 
that  has  succumbed  in  the  struggle  for  supremacy. 

14.  Now,  as  to  the  specific  recommendations  of  the  com- 
mission.  The  report  states  that  if  the  waterways  of  Eng- 

^  Report  of  Royal  Commission  (Minority  Report  of  Mr.  J.  C.  Inglis),p. 
207.  Mr.  E.  A.  Pratt,  in  his  book  on  British  Canals,  has  made  the  same 
contention,  and  he  quotes  from  the  general  manager  of  the  Great  West- 
ern Railway,  which  owns  more  canals  than  any  other  railway  company, 
to  the  effect  that  "  his  company  owned  about  216  miles  of  canal,  not  a 
mile  of  which  had  been  acquired  voluntarily.  Many  of  these  canals  had 
been  forced  upon  the  railway  as  the  price  of  securing  acts,  and  some  had 
been  obtained  by  negotiation  with  the  canal  companies.  The  others 
had  been  acquired  in  incidental  ways,  arising  from  the  fact  that  the 
traffic  had  absolutely  disappeared."    (Pratt,  British  Canals,  p.  38.) 


122        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

land  were  improved  and  systematized,  as  they  are  on  the 
continent  of  Europe,  a  large  traffic  would  undoubtedly 
develop,  and  that  the  trade  of  the  country  would  undergo 
a  decided  stimulus.  To  use  the  words  of  the  report,  "There 
can  be  no  question  that  trade  would  be  largely  increased 
upon  waterways,  or  at  any  rate  certain  main  routes  of 
waterway,  if  they  were  placed  under  a  uniform  adminis- 
tration; if  they  were  so  far  improved  as  to  enable  horse 
traction  to  be  more  largely  replaced  by  steam  or  electric 
traction,  to  allow  of  economies  of  time  and  labor  in  the 
transport  of  goods;  if  arrangements  existed  for  the  running 
of  regular  services  and  for  the  supply  of  ordinary  facilities 
for  loading,  unloading,  and  protecting  goods,  and  for  col- 
lection and  delivery;  and  if  transit  upon  them  were  cheaper 
to  a  substantial  degree  than  transport  by  railway."  ^ 
Accordingly,  the  commission  has  recommended  the  im- 
provement of  four  main  waterway  routes  as  a  start  in 
the  programme  of  reconstruction.  From  the  present  radi- 
ating canal  centres  of  Birmingham,  in  the  Midlands  of 
England,  it  is  proposed  to  construct,  as  trunk  lines  in  the 
new  system,  four  chief  routes  leading  to  the  four  corners 
of  the  country,  as  it  were,  and  connecting  with  the  estua- 
ries of  the  Thames,  Mersey,  Severn,  and  Humber  Rivers.^ 
(See  the  map  on  the  opposite  page.) 

Route  I  is  the  present  principal  water  route  between 
London  and  Birmingham,  via  Norton  Junction  and  War- 
wick. 

Route  II  extends  from  Hull  via  Trent  Junction  and 
Leicester,  to  Route  I  at  Norton  Junction. 

Route  III  is  the  principal  route  from  the  Mersey  River 
and  the  Manchester  Ship  Canal  to  Birmingham,  via  the 
Haywood  and  Fradley  Junctions. 

Route  IV  connects  Birmingham  with  the  estuary  of  the 
Severn  River  via  Worcester. 

It  is  the  opinion  of  the  commission  that  these  four  routes 

*  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vii,  p.  84.        *  Ibid.,  pp.  93-94. 


124 


WATERWAYS   VERSUS   RAILWAYS 


might  be  so  improved  as  to  permit  the  cheap  transport  of 
minerals  and  goods  which  do  not  require  the  highest  speed, 
such  as  import  raw  materials,  and  coal,  building-materials, 
hardware,  explosives,  and  other  commodities  of  large 
bulk.^  These  water  routes  would  unite  practically  all  of 
the  great  coal  and  mineral  regions  of  England,  and  at  the 
same  time  connect  directly  with  the  four  great  seaports  of 
London,  Liverpool,  Bristol,  and  Hull,  and  with  the  Man- 
chester Ship  Canal,  extending  from  Liverpool  to  the  great 
inland  port  of  Manchester.  There  can  be  no  question  that 
these  routes  are  well  chosen,  and  that  these,  if  any,  are  the 
ones  which  should  be  reconstructed. 


15.  The  commission  was  instructed  to  ascertain  "the 
prospective  benefit  to  the  trade  of  the  country,  compatible 
with  a  reasonable  return  on  the  probable  cost."  Conse- 
quently, an  attempt  was  made  to  secure  an  approximate 
estimate  of  the  cost  of  carrying  out  the  improvements 
recommended  above.  The  following  table  gives  the  derived 
estimates  for  a  100-ton  and  a  300-ton  barge  capacity:^  — 

TOTAL  COST  OF  THE  ROUTES 


100-ToN  Scheme 

300-ToN  Scheme 

ROUTB 

Dis- 
tance 

Miles 

Cost  per  mile 

Dis- 
tance 

Cost  per  mile 

$ 

$ 

Miles 

$ 

$ 

Route  I,  and  Branch  I    .    . 

Route  II 

Route  III,  and  branches  from 
Wolverhampton  to  Trent 
Junction 

Route  IV,  and  branch  to 
Wolverhampton       .    .    . 

150+ 
144-f- 

141+ 
108+ 

26,385,770 
11,171,650 

18,554,320 
10,855,675 

175,085 
77,340 

131,145 
100,460 

150+ 
142+ 

141+ 
108+ 

49,794,185 
18,795,830 

35,297,185 
18,681,915 

330,550 
132,170 

249,485 
172,965 

Total 

544+ 

66,967,415 

122,945 

542+ 

122,569,115 

225,975 

While  the  commission  did  not  definitely  commit  itself  as 
to  which  barge  capacity  it  deemed  preferable,  the  300-ton 
boat  was  evidently  favored,  all  the  estimates  of  traffic 

*  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vii,  p.  94.  *  Ibid.,  p.  145. 


BARGE  CANALS  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN     125 

being  based  on  the  300-ton  scheme.  Indeed,  if  water  trans- 
portation is  to  be  "cheaper  to  a  substantial  degree  than 
transport  by  railway,"  and  this  is  absolutely  essential  to 
the  success  of  the  enterprise,  at  least  a  300-ton  capacity 
must  necessarily  be  provided.  Almost  the  whole  assump- 
tion of  the  inherent  cheapness  of  water  transportation  is 
dependent  upon  a  large  cargo.  It  is  generally  considered, 
in  the  United  States,  that  nothing  less  than  barges  of 
1000  tons'  capacity  can  reclaim  the  traflSc  from  the  railways. 
On  the  waterways  of  Germany  there  are  few  barges  with  a 
capacity  of  less  than  600  tons,  and  in  France  the  300-ton 
"peniche  flamande"  is  the  prevailing  boat  now  in  use.  In 
view  of  these  facts,  we  may  dismiss  the  100-ton  scheme  from 
consideration. 

16.  In  attempting  "to  ascertain  the  prospective  bene- 
fit to  the  trade  of  the  country  compatible  with  a  reason- 
able return  upon  the  probable  cost,"  the  commission 
undertook  an  investigation  of  the  traffic  possibilities  upon 
the  proposed  routes,  and  the  savings  that  might  be 
effected  as  compared  with  present  transportation  in  Eng- 
land. On  the  basis  of  a  total  cost  of  $122,569,115  for  the 
four  routes  of  waterway,  it  was  computed  that  when  the 
canals  were  in  operation  the  annual  Government  expenses, 
on  account  of  maintenance,  administrative  charges,  and 
loss  of  interest,  would  amount  to  $4,825,000.  The  next  step 
was  to  ascertain  the  amount  of  traffic  necessary  to  yield  a 
net  revenue  equal  to  this  sum;  and  it  was  found  that  "at 
0.2  pence  (4  mills)  per  ton-mile,  the  total  ton-mileage  of 
traffic  required  will  amount  to  1,158,000,000."^  Since  the 
existing  traffic  may  fairly  be  regarded  as  certain  to  con- 
tinue on  the  improved  waterways,  in  order  to  find  the  in- 
creased tonnage  necessary,  we  may  subtract  the  present 
tonnage  from  the  above  estimated  totals.   "The  existing 

^  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vii,  p.  157.  This  rate  of  4  mills 
is  the  government  toll.  To  ascertain  the  total  cost  to  the  shipper,  the 
haulage  charge  must  be  added  to  this  amount. 


126        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

tonnage  on  these  waterways  amounts  to  about  16,600,000 
tons.  If  it  is  assumed  that  the  average  travel  is  twelve 
miles,  the  present  traffic  amounts  to  199,200,000  ton- 
miles.  Additional  traffic  would  therefore  be  required, 
amounting  to  958,800,000  ton-miles,  to  meet  the  total  ex- 
penditure when  in  the  course  of  years  the  whole  scheme 
of  improvements  had  been  completed."^  What  are  the 
probabilities  of  so  heavy  a  traffic  being  developed? 

17.  In  an  effort  to  ascertain  how  great  an  increase  of 
traffic  might  be  expected,  questions  were  sent  out  by  the 
commission  to  manufacturers,  mine-owners,  and  other 
traders  along  the  main  routes,  asking  how  large  an  amount 
of  traffic  they  would  likely  ship  over  improved  waterways : 

(1)  At  present  rates  of  transport. 

(2)  If  these  were  reduced  by  twenty-five  per  cent. 

(3)  If  these  were  reduced  by  fifty  per  cent. 

The  replies  returned  in  response  to  these  queries  were 
far  from  encouraging.  The  commission  reports  that  "it 
cannot  be  said  that  these  inquiries  elicited  very  numerous 
or  exact  assurances  of  traffic.  The  most  important  results 
of  these  inquiries  were  the  replies  sent  by  the  Erewash 
Valley  coal-owners  in  the  Nottingham  District,  and  by 
the  coal-owners  in  the  South  Staffordshire  and  Warwick- 
shire Districts.  These  replies  indicate  a  probability  that 
if  there  were  a  reduction  of  fifty  per  cent  in  the  total  cost 
of  transport  per  ton  per  mile,  3,000,000  tons  of  coal  per 
annum  might  be  sent  to  London  by  the  inland  water  route 
from  these  two  districts  alone.  If  to  the  statements  from 
the  two  colliery  districts  which  we  have  mentioned  are 
added  other  definite  statements  which  were  made  by  manu- 
facturers in  reply  to  our  written  questions,  the  total  amount 
of  traffic  predicted  on  Route  I  amounts,  in  case  of  a  fifty 
per  cent  reduction  in  rate,  to  4,220,912  tons;  in  case  of  a 
twenty-five  per  cent,  to  1,550,178  tons."^ 

*  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vii,  p.  157.  *    Ibid.,  p.  160. 


BARGE  CANALS  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN     127 

Since  these  estimates  of  traffic  are  based  upon  an  assump- 
tion of  greatly  reduced  freight  rates,  before  we  may  draw 
conclusions  it  is  pertinent  to  inquire  into  the  probability  of 
so  large  a  reduction  in  freight  charges.  On  this  point  the 
commission  states:  "We  do  not  believe  that  any  very  exact 
estimate  of  the  cost  of  transport  on  improved  waterways 
can  be  arrived  at.  But  upon  the  figures  which  have  been 
placed  before  us,  based  in  one  case  upon  experiments  which 
have  been  made,  regard  being  had  to  figures  furnished  by 
foreign  waterways,  there  is  much  reason  to  believe  that,  if 
on  improved  canals  trainloads  of  260  tons  could  be  conveyed 
in  shorter  time  than  loads  of  50  to  60  tons  on  the  present 
canals,  tolls  remaining  at  their  existing  level,  there  would 
be  a  large  reduction  in  the  cost  per  ton-mile  of  convey- 
ance." ^    This  is  obviously  merely  a  profession  of  faith. 

The  only  attempt  to  show  concretely  the  extent  of  rate 
reduction  that  might  be  made  was  in  a  computation  of  the 
cost  of  carrying  coal.  The  report  states  that  "the  total  rate, 
including  toll  and  haulage,  at  which  coal  can  at  present  be 
conveyed  by  waterways  from  a  colliery  in  Leicestershire  to 
Paddington  [a  London  station]  is  about  $1.60  per  ton,^  al- 
most the  same  as  its  conveyance  by  rail.  Of  this  cost,  60 
cents  is  due  to  the  tolls  charged  at  the  locks  and  $1  is  for 
haulage.  It  has  been  calculated  that  on  an  improved  water 
route,  allowing  the  passage  of  boat  trains  conveying  220  tons 
of  coal  at  a  time,  the  toll  being  reduced  to  56  cents,  by  a 
reduction  of  the  actual  mileage,  the  total  cost  of  transport 
could  be  reduced  from  $1.60  to  92  cents  per  ton."^  This 
is  a  reduction  of  42.5  per  cent  from  the  present  water,  and 
from  the  present  railway  rates,  on  such  traffic.  These,  how- 
ever, are  merely  haulage  and  toll  charges.  To  obtain  the 
total  cost  by  water  there  must  be  added  the  costs  of  trans- 
shipment, extra  cartage,  deterioration  by  breakage,  etc.   If 

1  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vii,  p.  159. 

*  For  clearness  the  English  shillings  and  pence  are  here  stated  in  terms 
of  American  coinage. 
»  Ibid.,  p.  159. 


128        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

these  incidental  charges  be  included,  it  is  doubtful  if  there 
would  be  any  advantage  in  shipping  by  water. ^  In  any 
event  it  cannot  be  expected  that  more  than  a  twenty-five 
per  cent  reduction  could  be  effected  by  the  proposed  im- 
provements. With  such  a  reduction  the  commission  re- 
ceived assurance  that  there  might  result  an  increased  traffic 
on  Route  I,  amounting  to  1,550,178  tons  per  year.^  There 
was  no  assurance  of  an  increase  on  the  other  routes.  Since 
Route  I  leads  from  the  great  mining  and  manufacturing 
region  of  central  England  to  the  metropolis,  it  offers  far  the 
best  possibility  of  any  of  the  routes  for  a  heavy  canal  traffic. 
But  to  be  very  liberal,  suppose  we  assume  that  the  other 
routes  might  enjoy  practically  as  great  an  increase  as  Route 
I  and  concede  6,000,000  tons  per  year  for  the  four  canals. 
At  present  the  average  distance  traveled  by  each  ton  is 
something  like  twelve  miles;  but  since  a  larger  proportion  of 
through  traffic  might  be  expected  on  the  larger  waterways, 
let  us  here  extravagantly  estimate  that  the  average  haul 
will  become  fifty  miles.  Multiplying  6,000,000  by  fifty, 
gives  a  ton-mileage  of  300,000,000.  This  is  the  maximum 
tonnage  that  could  be  expected,  granting  that  freight  rates 
were  reduced  by  twenty-five  per  cent.  It  should  be  ob- 
served now  that  this  is  less  than  one  third  of  the  958,800,000 
ton-miles  computed  by  the  commission  as  necessary  to 
meet  the  annual  cbargesonthecostestimateof  $122,000,000. 
The  commission  reports,  however,  that  "on  the  whole, 

1  Mr.  Inglis,  in  his  minority  report  (Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vii, 
p.  224),  adds  to  the  above  figures  several  items  of  importance,  as  follows: 
Conveyance  from  pit  to  canal,  and  toll  or  haulage  on  Thames 

or  Regent's  Canal  in  London  (not  included  above) 24  cents 

Deterioration  by  breakage 12 

Extra  cost  of  unloading   12 

Extra  cost  of  cartage  in  London  (average)   38 

Total 84  cents 

Adding  84  cents  to  the  commission's  estimate  of  92  cents  for  haulage  and 
toll  gives  a  total  transportation  charge  from  mine  to  market  of  $1.76,  or 
more  than  the  present  inclusive  cost  by  rail. 

*  See  page  126. 


BARGE  CAN.\LS  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN     129 

it  is  necessary  to  base  expectations  of  future  traffic,  not 
upon  any  promises  which  may  be  made,  but  upon  the  in- 
trinsic probabilities  of  the  case."  ^  Thereupon,  the  report 
proceeds  to  show  how  many  millions  of  tons  of  coal  still 
await  transportation  from  the  great  Midland  coal-fields  of 
England.  It  is  true  that  the  coal  is  there,  but  it  is  equally 
true,  according  to  testimony  submitted  to  the  commission, 
that  the  shippers  prefer  to  send  it  to  market  by  rail  or  by 
sea.  The  commission  thus  repudiated  its  own  evidence, 
collected  from  shippers,  from  whose  verdict  there  could 
well  be  no  reasonable  appeal.  The  "intrinsic  probabili- 
ties" would  seem  to  be  that  the  shippers  along  Route  I 
had  good  reason  for  saying  that  with  a  twenty-five  per 
cent  reduction  in  freight  charges  they  would  ship  not 
more  than  1,500,000  tons  of  freight  each  year  by  water. 

18.  In  the  above  analysis  of  the  commission's  report  on 
the  feasibility  of  the  routes  in  question,  the  cost  estimates 
presented  were  accepted  without  criticism.  It  should  be 
mentioned  now,  however,  that  some  English  writers  con- 
tend that  the  ultimate  cost  of  the  system  would  in  all 
probability  reach  several  times  the  amount  estimated 
by  the  commission.^  There  seem,  in  fact,  to  be  the  best  of 
reasons  for  such  a  belief. 

It  should  be  recollected  that  public  works  of  this  kind, 
for  some  reason,  almost  universally  cost  far  more  than  is 
predicted  in  the  carefully  prepared  preliminary  estimates. 
The  Chicago  Drainage  Canal,  the  Panama  Canal,  and  the 
Manchester  Ship  Canal,  for  examples,  eventually  cost  two 
or  three  times  the  amount  originally  expected.  It  is 
doubtful  if  any  canal,  outside  of  some  of  the  continental 
countries,  for  which  public  money  was  appropriated,  was 
ever  carried  to  completion  within  the  limits  of  the  first 
estimates  of  minimum  cost. 

^  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vii,  p.  160. 

^  For  example,  see  J.  B.  Firth,  Fortnightly  Review,  April,  1910,  who 
estimates  that  the  total  cost  would  probably  reach  $500,000,000. 


130        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

The  above  estimates,  moreover,  are  far  from  being  in- 
clusive of  all  the  items  of  cost.  For  instance,  they  do  not 
include  the  cost  of  maintaining  an  adequate  water  supply, 
of  providing  wharves,  warehouses,  and  terminal  arrange- 
ments, nor  any  of  the  incidental  Parliamentary,  legal,  and 
engineering  expenses.^  While  it  is  of  course  impossible  to 
ascertain  how  great  a  total  outlay  these  items  would  event- 
ually necessitate,  a  rough  idea  of  the  amount  may  never- 
theless be  obtained. 

The  commission  has  furnished  some  estimates  of  the 
probable  cost  of  securing  and  maintaining  at  all  times  an 
adequate  and  reliable  supply  of  water  for  the  proposed 
canals.   For  the  separate  routes  they  are  as  follows:  ^  — 

Route  I $1,061,940 

Route  II 16,875 

Route  III 743,400 

Route  IV 587,715 

Total $2,409,930 

The  commission  states  that  "these  estimates  include 
only  the  cost  of  providing  the  mechanical  arrangements 
for  raising  water  to  points  along  the  routes  and  of  the  re- 
pair of  the  existing  reservoirs  and  feeders;  but  they  do  not 
include  the  cost  of  obtaining  powers  to  take  from  the 
sources  recommended  the  quantities  of  water  required  for 
the  schemes,  nor  do  they  include  any  amounts  for  Parlia- 
mentary, legal,  or  engineering  expenses."  ^  The  cost  of  se- 
curing the  right  to  sources  of  water  in  the  heart  of  a  great 
manufacturing  region  would  unquestionably  be  very  great, 
and  the  incidental  expenditures  named  are  by  no  means 
inconsiderable.* 

*  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vn,  p.  143. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  155.  »  IMd.,  p.  150. 

*  It  seems  probable  that  if  to  the  commission's  estimate  of  $2,409,980, 
for  the  mere  physical  and  mechanical  costs  connected  with  the  securing  of 
the  water,  be  added  the  cost  of  the  water  itself,  and  of  the  engineering, 
legal,  and  Parliamentary  proceedings  incidental  to  the  schemes,  the  total 
outlay  for  a  water  supply  would  reach  in  the  neighborhood  of  $4,000,000. 


BARGE  CANALS  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN     131 

It  is  necessary,  also,  to  consider  the  question  of  shipping 
facilities  for  the  improved  waterways.  The  commission  has 
asserted  many  times  that  a  chief  cause  of  the  failure  of  the 
waterways  has  been  the  lack  of  warehouses,  wharves,  and 
terminal  arrangements.  Unquestionably  the  need  of  ade- 
quate equipment  is  imperative  if  the  canals  are  to  be 
placed  on  equal  footing  with  the  railways.  To  make  the 
necessary  provision  for  the  needs  of  shipping  involves 
the  purchase  of  large  amounts  of  land,  which  is  every- 
where costly  in  England,  and  tremendously  so  in  the 
large  cities.^  Again,  there  would  be  required  along  the 
entire  system  of  canals  extensive  docks  and  warehouses; 
and  at  every  important  shipping  point  expensive  terminal 
equipment  would  have  to  be  constructed.^ 

Finally,  the  estimate  of  the  commission  does  not  in- 
clude the  necessary  branches  and  feeders  of  the  four  main 
lines  of  waterway.  The  report  states  on  this  point,  that 
"we  have  not  been  able  to  arrive  at  more  than  an  approx- 
imate estimate  of  what  the  eventual  cost  will  be  if  we  in- 
clude the  cost  of  improving  the  minor  canals  or  'feeders* 
of  the  main  routes,  a  procedure  essential  to  the  success  of 
the  enterprise."^  In  order  to  compete  successfully  with 
the  railways,  whose  side-tracks  extend  to  almost  every 
nook  and  cranny  of  the  country,  a  vast  system  of  branch 
waterways  would   have  to  be  constructed.    At  present, 

'  It  cost  the  Manchester  Ship  Canal  Company,  for  the  land  it  required, 
$7,514,250,  or  $211,000  a  mile  {PoH  of  Manchester  Official  Sailing  and 
Shipping  Guide,  April  1910,  p.  97).  Since  this  scheme  involves  the  secur- 
ing of  land  in  a  large  number  of  the  big  cities  of  England,  it  is  evident 
that  the  total  cost  on  this  account  would  be  many  millions  of  dollars. 

*  No  statistics  for  comparative  purposes  are  available  in  this  connec- 
tion, since  the  Manchester  Ship  Canal  Company  does  not  separate  the 
equipment  from  the  other  construction  costs,  and  since  the  old  canals 
have  furnished  no  statistics  relative  to  what  little  equipment  they  possess. 
There  cannot  be  the  slightest  question,  however,  that  the  erection  of  these 
indispensable  facilities  —  wharves,  storehouses,  and  terminals  —  would 
entail  an  outlay  of  many  additional  millions. 

'  Report  of  the  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vii,  p.  155. 


132        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

for  instance,  there  is  a  veritable  network  of  small  barge 
canals  about  the  city  of  Birmingham,  all  of  which  would 
require  rehabilitation.  And  unless  these  lateral  canals  were 
constructed  on  the  same  scale  as  the  main  lines,  their  utility 
would  be  but  slight.  If  they  were  smaller  than  the  main 
waterways,  one  or  the  other  of  two  consequences,  either  of 
which  would  be  disastrous,  would  result:  Either  transship- 
ments would  be  necessary  for  all  freight  not  originating  on 
main  lines,  involving  expenditures  which  would  dissipate 
any  savings  in  the  cost  of  carrying  which  the  canals  might 
otherwise  effect;  or  else  the  size  of  all  the  barges  on  the 
main  canals  would  have  to  be  restricted  to  the  capacity  of 
the  branches,  which  would  destroy  the  advantages  of  en- 
larging these  same  main  routes.  The  commission  has  re- 
cognized that  adequate  branch  canals  are  "essential  to  the 
success  of  the  enterprise,"  and  has  estimated  that  574 
miles  of  branches  would  be  required.  Since  the  necessary 
laterals  should  be  of  the  same  size  as  the  main  routes,  since 
they  would  require  very  extensive  docks,  warehouses,  etc. 
(practically  all  of  them  would  necessitate  terminals),  it 
cannot  but  follow  that  the  cost  per  mile  would  be  almost, 
if  not  quite,  as  great  for  the  laterals  as  for  the  main  lines. 
The  length  of  the  main  lines  was  542  miles  as  against  a 
minimum  of  574  miles  for  the  lateral.  We  may  conclude, 
therefore,  that  the  estimate  of  $122,000,000  would  have  to 
be  practically  doubled  on  this  account  alone.  ^ 

It  is  evident  from  the  above  discussion  that  it  is,  indeed, 
not  improbable  that  the  ultimate  cost  of  the  proposed 
improvements  would  be  three  or  four  times  the  admittedly 
partial  and  tentative  estimate  of  the  commission.  This 
being  true,  it  follows  that  three  or  four  times  as  much  traf- 
'fic  would  be  required  to  cover  the  cost  as  was  estimated 

^  It  does  not  appear  from  the  commission's  report  to  what  extent  the 
promised  increase  of  traffic  is  contingent  upon  the  existence  of  adequate 
branch  lines.  It  is  possible  (though  by  no  means  probable)  that  the  de- 
velopment of  branch  lines  might  secure  a  considerably  larger  traffic  than 
"was  estimated. 


BARGE  CANALS  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN     133 

above.  Instead  of  958,800,000  ton-miles  of  traffic,  it  would 
take  some  three  or  four  billion  ton-miles  of  traffic  to  meet 
the  annual  outlays.  This  raises  a  question  as  to  the  ca- 
pacity of  the  proposed  canals. 

On  this  point  the  commission  has  stated  that  if  so  large 
an  increase  of  traffic  should  result  as  the  3,000,000  tons  of 
coal  from  the  Erewash  mines  (which  was  promised  contin- 
gently upon  a  fifty  per  cent  reduction  in  charges),  it  would 
involve  additional  construction  expenditures  upon  the  ca- 
nals, in  the  duplication  of  locks,  etc.  It  has  been  seen  in 
a  preceding  paragraph  that  1,500,000  tons  of  freight  for 
each  route  (the  amount  contingent  upon  a  twenty -five 
per  cent  reduction  in  rates)  would  give  a  total  ton-mileage 
of  300,000,000.  This  was  less  than  a  third  of  the  amount 
necessary  to  cover  the  cost,  on  the  basis  of  the  partial  esti- 
mate of  the  commission;  3,000,000  tons  would  be  only  two 
thirds  enough.  And  if  the  system  is  to  cost  three  or  four 
times  as  much  as  estimated  by  the  commission,  it  is  evident 
that  the  capacity  of  the  canals  will  be  only  one  fourth  or 
one  fifth  large  enough  to  permit  them  to  be  profitable.  If 
they  were  to  be  enlarged,  moreover,  it  is  obvious  that  con- 
struction expenses  would  then  greatly  exceed  the  estimates 
given  above;  and  this  in  turn  would  necessitate  a  corre- 
sponding increase  in  the  traffic  over  the  above  estimates, 
if  again  the  project  be  made  to  pay. 

19.  It  would  have  passed  comprehension  if  the  commis- 
sion, in  the  face  of  all  the  contrary  data  which  it  collected, 
had  still  held  out  the  hope  of  a  direct  return  upon  the  capi- 
tal invested.  The  report  states  that  "we  do  not  think  it 
right  to  make  a  confident  statement  that  there  will  be  an 
adequate  direct  return  on  the  probable  cost."  ^  The  indi- 
rect results  were,  however,  regarded  as  sufficiently  import- 
ant to  more  than  counterbalance  any  direct  loss  which 
might  be  sustained.  "There  would  be  the  reward  which 
^  Report  of  the  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vn,  p.  164. 


134        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS. 

we  anticipate  of  an  indirect  return  in  the  shape  of  benefit 
to  the  trade  of  the  country."  ^  Hence  it  would  follow  that 
the  improvements  should  be  made.  Now  there  would 
seem  to  be  only  one  way  in  which  the  trade  of  the  country 
could  be  benefited  by  the  waterways,  namely,  through  re- 
duced transportation  charges.  We  have  seen  that  it  is  very 
doubtful  whether,  even  on  the  basis  of  the  partial  cost  esti- 
mate given  by  the  commission,  there  would  be  any  reduc- 
tion in  the  cost  of  transport  as  compared  with  existing  rail- 
ways, when  all  the  transportation  expenditures  from  place 
of  origin  to  place  of  destination  are  included.  And  when  it  is 
recognized  that  the  total  cost  would  be,  in  all  probability, 
several  times  the  tentative  estimate  of  the  commission,  it 
becomes  a  certainty  that  rates  could  not  be  reduced  at  all. 
On  the  other  hand,  we  have  found  that  the  shippers  of 
bulky  commodities  declare  that  even  if  there  were  a 
twenty-five  or  fifty  per  cent  reduction  from  the  present 
level  of  canal  rates,  they  would  nevertheless  make  little 
use  of  the  waterways.  In  the  face  of  these  facts,  one  hesi- 
tates to  accept  without  question  the  commission's  state- 
ment that  the  general  trade  of  the  country  would  experi- 
ence a  revival,  and  is  prompted  to  raise  the  query,  —  to 
what  branches  of  industry  are  these  promised  indirect  bene- 
fits to  accrue,  and  in  what  guise  may  they  be  expected  to 
appear?  But  one  searches  the  report  of  the  commission 
in  vain  for  an  answer  to  the  question.  There  is  to  be  found 
merely  the  comforting  anticipation  that  improved  water- 
ways would  confer  indirect  benefits  upon  the  trade  of  the 
country. 

20.  One  need  not  look  far  to  find  the  reasons  why  the 
shippers  should  refuse  to  make  extensive  use  of  enlarged 
waterways,  even  though  they  should  efiFect  so  large  a  re- 
duction in  rates  as  twenty-five  or  fifty  per  cent.  To  un- 
derstand their  attitude,  it  is  only  necessary  to  recall  the 
^  Report  oj  the  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vii,  p.  164. 


BARGE  CANALS  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN    135 

reasons  why  the  present  waterways  are  unused.  In  the 
case  of  coal,  the  canals  would  obviously  still  be  unable  to 
compete  for  that  which  now  travels  from  the  Northern 
coal-fields  to  London  by  sea.  And  as  against  the  railways, 
the  canals  would  continue  under  the  handicap  imposed  by 
the  necessity  of  transshipments;  while  barges  of  300  tons' 
capacity  would  be  much  less  adapted  to  the  needs  of  small 
shippers  than  those  of  30  tons'.  Finally,  the  loss  from 
breakage  in  the  larger  barges  would  be  much  increased. 

In  the  case  of  building-materials,  the  cartage  charges 
from  canal  to  place  of  destination  in  the  city  were  found  to 
be  frequently  prohibitive,  and  the  demand  was  often  for 
small  allotments  in  order  to  save  space  on  the  site  where 
the  materials  were  to  be  used,  or  the  cost  of  double  hand- 
ling if  stacked  along  the  canal  awaiting  delivery.  Three- 
hundred-ton  barges  would  only  aggravate  the  latter  dis- 
advantage, and  they  would  not  lessen  the  prohibitive 
cartage  costs. 

Cotton  is  ordered,  as  we  have  seen,  in  small  amounts 
and  shipped  by  rail  from  Liverpool  to  place  of  destination. 
It  is  not  carried  extensively  either  upon  the  small  canals 
or  upon  the  Manchester  Ship  Canal;  no  more  would  it  be 
shipped  on  canals  of  300  tons'  capacity. 

In  the  case  of  agricultural  produce  the  dearth  of  storage 
facilities  along  the  present  routes  might  be  removed,  but 
the  macadamized  roads  of  England  cannot  be  expected  to 
change  their  present  location,  and  300-ton  boats  would  be 
less  adapted  to  the  farmers'  requirements  than  the  present 
small  barges. 

21.  In  the  light  of  the  above  investigation,  how  are  we 
to  account  for  the  recommendations  of  the  Royal  Com- 
mission in  favor  of  the  extensive  improvement  of  the  in- 
land waterways  of  Great  Britain?  One  should  doubtless 
show  some  degree  of  hesitancy  in  undertaking  to  criticize 
the  work  of  a  governmental  commission.  But  after  all,  a 


136        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

commission  is  nothing  more  nor  less  than  a  public  servant, 
and  its  work  is  therefore  freely  open  to  the  criticism  of 
those  it  purports  to  serve.  Accordingly,  no  apology  is  con- 
sidered necessary  for  subjecting  both  the  Royal  Commis- 
sion and  its  findings  to  a  careful  examination  before  in- 
dorsing without  qualification  the  recommendations  found 
in  its  report. 

It  cannot  fail  to  become  apparent  to  any  one  who  reads 
the  report  of  the  commission  that  the  majority  of  its  mem- 
bers came  to  their  task  with  an  almost  unalterable  preju- 
dice against  the  railways.  Now,  whatever  may  have  been 
the  misdeeds  of  the  railways  in  the  past,  however  deserv- 
ing they  may  be  of  the  opprobrium  which  is  heaped  upon 
them,  a  study  of  the  question  of  transportation,  for  the 
purpose  of  ascertaining  whether  it  would  at  present  be 
wise  economic  policy  for  the  nation  to  provide  for  the  re- 
habilitation of  its  defunct  waterways,  can  count  for  little 
if  it  is  not  undertaken  with  a  mind  open  to  conviction.^ 

Again,  the  commission  appears  to  have  been  unduly  in- 
fluenced by  the  apparent  success  of  Continental  waterways. 
The  report  teems  with  references  to  the  amount  of  public 
money  that  has  been  expended  upon  the  waterways  of  Ger- 
many, France,  Belgium,  and  the  Netherlands,  and  to  the 
increase  of  traffic  that  has  resulted.  But  unfortunately 
the  mere  fact  that  money  was  spent  in  these  countries  and 
that  water-borne  traffic  thereafter  increased  does  not  es- 
tablish the  economic  feasibility  of  the  systematic  develop- 
ment of  British  waterways  at  Government  expense.  The 
commission's  treatment  of  Continental  transportation  was 
woefully  inadequate.  Absolutely  no  effort  was  made  to  as- 
certain whether  the  increase  of  water  traffic  in  these  coun- 
tries was  sufficient  to  yield  a  reasonable  return  upon  the 
expenditures  involved;  no  attempt  was  made  to  discover  if 

*  Dissenting  members  of  the  commission  called  attention  to  the  pre- 
disposition of  the  majority  to  favor  the  development  of  the  waterways, 
regardless  of  evidence.  (^Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vii,  p.  206.) 


BARGE  CANALS  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN    137 

a  like  investment  in  railways  would  not  have  proved  eco- 
nomically more  profitable;  no  recognition  was  given  to  the 
fact  that  on  the  Continent  most  of  the  railways,  as  well  as 
the  waterways,  are  governmentally  owned  or  controlled;  no 
attention  was  given  to  the  question  of  whether  it  would  be 
advisable  for  England  to  follow  the  French  method  of  pre- 
venting competition  between  railways  and  waterways  by 
arbitrarily  establishing  rates  which  forced  commodities  to 
travel  by  the  one  or  the  other,  according  to  the  desire  of 
the  government;  no  mention  was  made  of  the  military, 
naval,  and  political  considerations  which  have  shaped  the 
transportation  policy  of  Germany;  and  no  consideration 
was  given  to  the  necessity  of  canals  in  the  Low  Countries 
for  drainage  purposes,  and  to  the  exceptional  situation  of 
those  countries  as  gateways  to  the  inland  waterways  of 
France  and  Germany,  a  situation  affording  a  tremendous 
traffic  in  the  transshipping  of  ocean  commerce  to  the  in- 
terior of  Europe.  The  only  question  asked  was.  Has  traffic 
developed?  In  the  mind  of  the  commission  that  consider- 
ation alone  appeared  to  decide  the  entire  question.  An 
attempt  was,  indeed,  made  to  show  that  topographic  con- 
ditions, density  of  population,  and  the  character  of  traffic 
were  sufficiently  alike  to  indicate  that  similar  results  to 
those  on  the  Continent  might  be  expected  from  corres- 
ponding expenditures  upon  a  systematic  development  of 
the  waterways  of  England;  but  this  afforded  absolutely 
no  information  concerning  either  the  need  of  improving 
the  waterways  of  England  or  the  economic  feasibility  of 
their  reconstruction.  The  study  of  Continental  waterways 
was  thus  utterly  wanting  in  discrimination.  Whether  the 
commission  purposely  avoided  a  discussion  of  the  vital 
considerations  which  we  have  mentioned,  or  whether  the 
members  lacked  sufficient  penetration  to  discover  their 
existence,  matters  little.  In  either  case  the  value  of  their 
conclusions  must  be  heavily  discounted. 


138        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

22.  The  future  of  British  inland  waterways  appears, 
therefore,  utterly  devoid  of  promise.  In  all  probability 
the  proposed  improvements  would  not  be  able  to  effect 
any  reduction  in  freight  charges,  and  in  almost  equal  like- 
lihood, even  were  the  present  water  rates  substantially 
lowered,  the  railways  would  continue  to  dominate  the 
transportation  business  of  the  country  as  before.  Even  the 
commission  can  see  no  prospect  of  a  direct  return  upon 
the  probable  cost  of  the  improvements;  and  the  hoped- 
for  indirect  benefits  appear  to  be  as  visionary  as  the  indi- 
viduals who  have  expressed  their  anticipation  thereof.  It 
should  be  added  that  there  is  small  chance  that  the 
improvements  which  have  been  recommended  will  ever 
be  undertaken.  To  use  the  words  of  a  writer  in  the 
"Fortnightly  Review,"  "Another  Royal  Commission  has 
expended  time  and  labor  on  a  forlorn  hope,  and  has  only 
succeeded  in  recommending  —  and  that  in  a  half-hearted 
way  —  to  the  public,  a  project  for  the  expenditure  of  mil- 
lions which  no  responsible  Government  would  ever  dare  to 
lay  before  the  House  of  Commons."  ^ 

The  grave  political  problems  the  nation  is  facing,  to- 
gether with  the  tremendous  naval  expenditures  consequent 
upon  the  mad  race  with  Germany  for  maritime  supremacy, 
preclude  the  possibility  of  any  immediate  development  of 
a  comprehensive  scheme  of  internal  transportation  facili- 
ties. Indications  are  rather  that  the  discussion  of  water- 
ways will  gradually  diminish  until  it  altogether  ceases  to 
agitate  the  British  public;  but,  like  financial  crises  and 
comets,  its  periodical  return  to  the  foreground  of  public  in- 
terest may,  with  no  little  degree  of  confidence,  be  predicted. 

23.  It  only  remains  to  inquire  what  conclusions,  if  any, 
may  be  adduced,  from  this  study  of  the  barge  canals  of 

»  J.  B.  Firth,  Fortnightly  Review,  April,  1910,  p.  755.  It  was  not  until 
after  the  present  study  was  completed  that  the  writer  learned  of  Mr. 
Firth's  article.  His  conclusions  confirm  those  here  presented  in  practi- 
cally every  particular. 


BARGE  CANALS  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN    139 

Great  Britain,  as  to  the  advisability  of  developing  through 
governmental  aid  a  great  system  of  internal  waterways  in 
the  United  States.  It  is  always  necessary  to  exercise  the 
greatest  caution  before  making  conclusions,  drawn  from  a 
particular  set  of  circumstances  and  conditions,  the  basis  of 
action  in  a  foreign  environment,  where  perhaps  consider- 
ations of  a  vastly  different  order  may  serve  materially  to 
complicate  or  alter  the  nature  of  the  problem.  American 
advocates  of  waterway  development,  for  instance,  almost 
invariably  point  to  the  apparent  success  of  the  waterways 
of  continental  Europe  as  sufficient  evidence  of  the  practi- 
cability of  water  transportation  in  the  United  States,  ut- 
terly ignoring  the  while  the  numerous  points  of  incompar- 
ability  between  European  and  American  conditions.  The 
folly  of  accepting  such  evidence  at  face  value  will  be  fully 
laid  bare  in  the  succeeding  chapters  on  the  waterways  of 
continental  Europe.  In  the  meanwhile,  we  should  not  fall 
into  an  error  equally  bad,  and  equally  inexcusable,  by  as- 
suming that  the  evident  failure  of  British  canals  proves  the 
case  against  similar  undertakings  on  this  side  of  the  Atlan- 
tic. Before  attempting  any  conclusions,  we  should  first 
direct  attention  to  certain  conditions  which  may  be  re- 
garded as  fairly  comparable  in  the  countries  in  question, 
and  then  to  various  points  of  obvious  dissimilarity.  Not 
until  such  an  analysis  has  been  made  shall  we  be  in  a  posi- 
tion to  decide  what  inferences  of  value  to  the  United  States 
are  to  be  drawn  from  the  history  of  British  inland  water- 
ways. 

In  point  of  railway  efficiency,  England  and  the  United 
States  are  far  in  advance  of  all  other  nations.  Their  rail- 
ways have  been  systematically  developed  and  welded  into 
a  few  great  systems  universally  regarded  as  among  the 
greatest  achievements  of  man.  Moreover,  in  contrast  with 
the  countries  of  continental  Europe,  a  distinctive  feature 
in  the  railway  history  of  English-speaking  nations  has  been 
the  development  of  facilities  for  the  economical  carriage 


140        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

of  freight,  no  less  than  passenger  traflBc.  The  enterprise 
in  this  direction  has  resulted  in  the  provision  of  every  facil- 
ity for  the  convenience  of  railway  shippers.  The  water- 
ways of  both  countries  have,  therefore,  been  subjected  to 
a  competition  of  a  marvelously  well-equipped  transporta- 
tion agent. 

Again,  the  question  of  speed  has  come  to  be  a  decisive 
factor  in  transportation  in  England,  as  well  as  in  our  own 
country.  The  imperative  demand  of  shippers  is  for  dis- 
patch and  promptness  of  delivery.  The  state  of  canals  in 
both  countries  has  been  in  no  small  degree  determined  by 
this  consideration. 

In  the  third  place,  the  influence  of  water  competition 
(other  than  canal)  has  been  of  the  greatest  force  in  both 
these  nations  in  the  adjustment  of  freight  tariffs.  England 
has  an  abundance  of  good  harbors,  and  the  open  sea  is  no- 
where far  distant  from  the  most  inland  centre.  Accord- 
ingly, a  tremendous  traffic  travels  from  port  to  port  in 
ocean  vessels,  and  the  railways  have  been  forced  to  meet 
these  rates.  Similarly,  in  the  United  States,  despite  our 
great  area,  the  competition  of  natural  waterways  has  been 
a  determining  factor  in  the  adjustment  of  freight  rates. 
From  New  York  and  New  England  to  the  Southern  States, 
the  railways  had  to  compete  with  the  open  Atlantic;  and 
the  rates  finally  established  in  that  region  affected  indi- 
rectly all  of  the  north-and-south  tariff  schedules  of  the  east- 
ern half  of  the  country.  In  the  Middle  West,  moreover,  the 
navigable  Mississippi  River  system  formerly  exerted  a  great 
influence  in  the  adjustment  of  north-and-south  rates.  The 
transcontinental  railways  have  been  compelled  to  adjust 
their  schedules  to  meet  the  ocean  competition  around 
South  America,  or  by  way  of  the  Panama  Railway  across 
the  Isthmus.  And,  finally,  the  east-and-west  water  route 
afforded  by  the  Great  Lakes  has  largely  determined  the 
level  of  freight  rates  on  all  points  from  the  Northwest  to 
the  Atlantic  seaboard.  The  existence  of  this  natural  water 


BARGE  CANALS  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN    141 

competition  in  England  and  the  United  States  has  forced 
both  a  lower  level  of  rates  and  a  more  eflScient  transporta- 
tion service  than  would  have  otherwise  developed. 

Two  methods  were  open  to  the  railroads  in  order  to 
neet  the  competition  of  natural  waterways,  —  to  effect 
economies  in  construction  of  the  roads  and  in  moving 
of  traflSc,  or  to  offer  shippers  facilities  superior  to  those 
furnished  by  the  waterways.  The  railway  men  adopted 
both  plans,  to  the  great  advantage  of  transportation  every- 
where. Now,  it  is  evident  that  the  more  ample  the  trans- 
portation facilities  and  the  lower  the  transportation 
charges  of  a  country,  both  on  the  natural  water  routes,  and 
on  the  railways,  the  less  need  is  there  for,  and  at  the  same 
time  the  less  profitable  becomes,  the  development  of  arti- 
ficial waterways.  Here  and  in  England,  in  fairly  equal  de- 
gree, natural  waterways  have  been  a  conditioning  factor. 

Finally,  in  the  two  countries  under  consideration  free- 
dom of  competition  between  waterways  and  railways  has 
been  the  general  policy  adopted  by  the  respective  Govern- 
ments. While  the  United  States  has  not  followed  an  iden- 
tical policy  with  that  of  England  in  this  respect,  having  ex- 
tensively subsidized  some  of  its  railways  by  means  of  land 
grants,  and  to  a  less  extent  through  direct  financial  aid, 
and  having  expended  hundreds  of  millions  of  dollars  on  ca- 
nals and  river  improvements,  whereas  England  has  left  all 
to  private  enterprise,  still,  the  fact  that  the  United  States, 
though  contributing  freely  to  the  development  of  trans- 
portation systems,  has  interfered  comparatively  little  with 
their  use  and  management,  serves  to  maintain  the  analogy 
with  English  conditions.  Private  companies  have  been  as 
free  to  exploit  the  possibilities  of  water  as  of  rail  transport- 
ation. Indeed,  there  has  been  much  greater  freedom  of 
enterprise  in  connection  with  the  waterways  from  the  fact 
that  the  railways  have  been  subjected  to  no  little  restrict- 
ive legislation;  and  the  same  thing  has  been  true  in  Eng- 
land. 


142        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

We  now  have  to  present,  on  the  other  hand,  certain 
phases  of  the  transportation  question  which  are  far  from 
being  similar  in  the  countries  under  discussion.  In  certain 
respects  canal  transportation  in  England  has  enjoyed  ad- 
vantages unknown  to  water  transport  on  this  side  of  the 
Atlantic;  and  the  reverse  is  equally  true. 

The  advantages  possessed  by  English  waterways  arise 
from  the  topographic  and  climatic  conditions  and  from  the 
density  of  population.  England  is  a  small  island  attaining 
nowhere  a  great  elevation  above  sea  level.  The  construc- 
tion of  canals  has,  therefore,  involved  comparatively  no 
great  engineering  obstacles.  The  problem  of  river  control 
presents  not  a  tenth  part  of  the  difficulty  that  it  does  in  the 
United  States,  the  streams  of  Great  Britain  being  mere 
brooks  as  compared  with  the  mighty  rivers  of  North 
America.  Moreover,  the  warm  climate  of  the  island  does 
not  permit,  as  in  the  United  States,  the  accumulation  of 
great  quantities  of  winter  snow,  the  sudden  melting  of 
which  produces  torrential  spring  floods  and  works  havoc 
with  river  navigation  for  weeks  every  year.  Equally  im- 
portant is  the  fact  that  ice  is  seldom  a  barrier  to  English 
water  transportation,  whereas  our  Northern  rivers  and 
lakes  are  totally  closed  by  it  from  three  to  five  months  each 
season.  Again,  the  verj''  short  distances  in  England  have 
been  decidedly  advantageous  to  canal  building.  England 
and  Wales  together  are  not  quite  so  large  as  the  State  of 
Indiana,  and  the  two  great  ports  of  London  and  Liverpool, 
almost  at  opposite  corners  of  the  country,  are  only  about 
two  hundred  miles  apart.  It  is  a  quite  different  undertak- 
ing to  construct  canals  across  an  intervening  territory  of 
several  hundred  or  a  thousand  miles  in  order  to  join  import- 
ant trade  centres,  as  would  be  necessary  in  the  United  States, 
to  that  of  building  them  for  short  distances  of  from  twenty 
to  perhaps  a  maximum  of  two  hundred  miles,  as  in  Eng- 
land. That,  early  in  the  nineteenth  century,  England  was 
able  to  boast  that  no  place  in  the  country  was  more  than 


BARGE  CANALS  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN    143 

twenty  miles  from  a  navigable  waterway  would  seem  to  be 
circumstantial  evidence  of  the  comparative  ease  of  water- 
way construction  there.  It  would  be  hardly  possible,  even 
to-day,  to  develop  in  the  United  States  so  ramifying  a  sys- 
tem of  internal  waterways  as  is  found  in  these  old  canals 
of  Great  Britain. 

The  population  inhabiting  England's  small  territorial 
expanse  was,  in  1901,  more  than  32,000,000,  equal  to  that 
of  the  entire  United  States  so  recently  as  1880.  At  the 
beginning  of  the  railroad  era,  England  had  a  dense  popu- 
lation and  a  traffic  correspondingly  great,  being  in  the 
enjoyment,  even  at  that  time,  of  a  high  state  of  industrial 
development.  It  is  readily  apparent  that  the  greater  the 
amount  of  traffic  there  is  to  be  handled  within  a  given  area, 
the  more  need  there  is  for  extensive  transportation  accom- 
modation; and  as  a  consequence  of  this,  it  follows  that  the 
probability  that  the  waterways  would  be  able  to  secure  a 
share  of  the  traffic,  and  hence  prove  remunerative,  is  pro- 
portionally increased.  English  canals,  in  this  respect,  pos- 
sessed a  tremendous  advantage  over  those  of  the  United 
States,  especially  during  the  period  of  active  competition 
between  the  canals  and  railways  in  the  third  quarter  of 
the  last  century. 

Turning  our  attention  now  more  directly  to  the  United 
States,  we  find  certain  peculiarly  favoring  conditions  for 
water  transport  which  tend  to  offset  the  foregoing  handi- 
caps. While  canals  are  less  easily  constructed  in  this  country 
than  in  England,  there  is  at  the  same  time  comparatively 
less  need  for  their  extensive  development,  owing  to  the 
existence  of  a  wonderful  system  of  great  navigable  rivers 
and  inland  lakes.  Canals  are  consequently  required,  pri- 
marily not  as  independent  routes  but  as  connecting  links 
in  a  great  chain  of  natural  waterways.  It  is  usually  stated 
that  America,  on  account  of  her  immense  rivers  and  lakes, 
possesses  greater  possibilities  for  inland  water  traffic  than 
any  other  country.    While  this  may  be  the  case  so  far 


144        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

as  traffic  on  the  lakes  and  rivers  themselves  is  concerned, 
it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  the  same  is  true  to  a 
like  extent  on  canals.  Nevertheless,  we  may  regard  the 
existence  of  these  natural  waterways  as  a  distinct  Amer- 
ican advantage  and  one  serving  in  large  measure  to  offset 
the  disadvantages  as  compared  with  England,  to  which 
attention  has  been  called.  Indeed,  were  there  no  other 
considerations  than  these  thus  far  enumerated,  one  might 
possibly  hold  that,  on  the  whole,  the  transportation  con- 
ditions] of  England  and  the  United  States  are  sufficiently 
similar  to  warrant  the  drawing  of  conclusions  from  one  for 
the  other.  Unfortunately,  however,  there  remains  to  be 
discussed  a  very  important  consideration,  which  will  be 
seen  to  destroy  whatever  balance  of  conditions  may  other- 
wise exist. 

Attention  has  many  times  been  called  to  the  determining 
force  of  the  size  of  the  cargo  in  the  question  of  water  trans- 
portation. We  have  seen  that  in  England  the  growing  de- 
mand for  rapid  service  and  prompt  delivery  has  been  accom- 
panied by  a  demand  for  smaller  shipments.  Now,  while 
speed  is  of  even  greater  importance  in  the  United  States 
than  in  England,  the  demand  for  quick  deliveries  on  this 
side  of  the  Atlantic  has  not  carried  with  it  a  desire  for  con- 
signments of  smaller  size.  To  a  surprising  degree  England 
has  remained  a  country  of  small  producers  and  small 
dealers.  We  have  seen,  for  instance,  how  factories  have 
continued  to  stand  on  old  canal  sites  for  generations.  But 
in  America  there  has  been  much  less  industrial  inertia. 
Tradition  has  been  wanting,  and  regardless  of  apparent 
waste,  we  have  torn  down  the  old  as  fast  as  it  has  become 
antiquated,  and  built  anew  on  a  larger  and  more  extensive 
plan.  The  tremendous  scale  on  which  American  enter- 
prises are  conducted  is  proverbial.  The  result  of  all  this  is 
that  the  demand  of  the  American  shipper  is  usually  for  large 
consignments,  in  striking  contrast  to  that  of  his  British 
cousin.  One  of  the  first  things  to  excite  the  curiosity  of  an 


BARGE  CANALS  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN    145 

American  traveling  in  England  is  the  tiny  English  railway 
freight  car.  Compared  with  the  huge  American  freight 
cars,  it  appears  a  mere  toy  or  dummy.  One  at  first  has 
difficulty  in  believing  that  the  cars  he  sees  are  not  designed 
for  some  unique  purpose,  and  he  remains  for  some  time 
incredulous,  expecting  momently  to  discover  the  box  or 
gondola  car  of  "regulation  size."  He  learns,  however,  that 
they  are  all  small,  and  adapted  to  meet  the  almost  universal 
demand  of  English  shippers  for  small  consignments. 

In  our  analysis  of  the  causes  of  the  decline  of  water-borne 
traffic  in  England,  we  found  one  of  the  chief  reasons  to  be 
that  barge-loads  of  thirty  or  forty  tons  were  inconveniently 
large;  and  we  concluded  therefrom  that  the  proposed  300- 
ton  barges  would  only  aggravate  this  disadvantage.  But 
in  the  United  States  cargoes  of  many  times  this  size  are 
by  no  means  exceptional.  Now,  while  we  found  that  there 
was  grave  doubt  that  the  waterways  of  England  having  a 
capacity  for  barges  of  300  tons  could  move  traffic,  all 
things  considered,  more  economically  than  the  railways,  it 
does  not  necessarily  follow  that  the  same  would  hold  true 
on  canals  capable  of  floating  600  or  1000-ton  barge-loads. 
Conceivably  such  cargoes  might  be  sufficient  to  overcome 
the  margin  of  difference  and  tip  the  balance  in  favor  of 
canal  transportation.  It  is  considerations  such  as  this  that 
usually  prove  the  determining  factors  in  industrial  pro- 
blems; and  yet,  strangely  enough,  it  is,  at  the  same  time, 
considerations  such  as  this  that  are  so  often  overlooked  or 
disregarded  in  the  making  of  comparisons  and  in  the  draw- 
ing of  conclusions.  For  our  part,  we  w^ould  refrain  from 
determining  the  future  of  American  waterways  by  the  fate 
of  the  canals  of  Great  Britain. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  MANCHESTER   SHIP  CANAL 

1.  The  Manchester  Ship  Canal,  connecting  the  city  of 
Manchester  with  the  sea  at  Liverpool,  on  the  northwest 
coast  of  England,  has  attracted  much  attention  in  the 
United  States  during  the  last  few  years  of  canal  agitation. 
Though  much  has  been  written  about  it  in  this  country 
in  a  descriptive  way,  there  has  been  no  careful  study  with 
a  view  to  ascertaining  whether  it  has  been  economically 
successful,  and  whether  it  affords  a  reliable  basis  for  con- 
clusions as  to  the  feasibility  of  similar  enterprises  in  the 
United  States.  In  the  present  treatment  a  brief  history  and 
description  of  the  project  is  given  because  of  the  light 
it  throws  upon  English  methods,  and  upon  subsequent 
developments  along  the  canal ;  but  the  body  of  the  discus- 
sion is  devoted  to  the  economic  aspects  of  the  waterway. 
As  in  the  decade  following  1820  the  monopolistic  rates 
charged  by  canal  between  Manchester  and  Liverpool 
started  an  agitation  which  led  directly  to  the  construction 
of  a  railway  between  the  two  cities,  so,  in  turn,  in  the  eight- 
ies the  high  railway  tariffs  between  the  same  points  devel- 
oped an  agitation  which  resulted  in  the  Manchester  Ship 
Canal.  There  had  been  occasional  proposals  as  early  as 
1840,  but  no  definite  steps  were  taken  until  1882,  when  a 
provisional  committee  indorsed  the  project,  and  raised  a 
fund  for  the  purpose  of  defraying  the  necessary  expenses 
incident  to  the  securing  of  a  charter  from  Parliament. 
Three  years  of  persistent  effort  on  the  part  of  the  pro- 
moters of  the  project  were  required  before  Parliamentary 
sanction  could  be  secured.  England,  in  contrast  to  the 
United  States,  has  never  adopted  the  policy  of  passing 
general  incorporation  laws  for  public  service  corporations. 


MANCHESTER  SHIP  CANAL  147 

Her  railways  have  one  by  one  been  required  to  secure  from 
Parliament  a  special,  distinct  charter.  Instead  of  having 
merely  to  conform  to  certain  specifications  laid  down  in  a 
general  law,  each  company  has  been  rigidly  required  to 
prove  the  necessity  for  its  existence,  before  a  charter  would 
be  granted.  To  prove  the  necessity  of  a  ship  canal,  ade- 
quate for  ocean-going  vessels,  from  Manchester  to  the  sea, 
was  no  easy  matter.  Determined  opposition  developed  on 
the  part  of  the  railways,  the  Mersey  Docks  and  Harbor 
Board,  the  Liverpool  corporation,  and  the  owners  of  great 
estates.  The  case  for  the  canal  was  submitted  w'ith  a  full- 
ness of  detail  seldom  equaled,  and  in  startling  contrast  to 
the  slipshod  method  prevalent  in  the  United  States.  In  the 
Parliamentary  sessions  of  1883-85  no  less  than  175  days 
were  consumed  in  the  discussion  of  the  project.^  Witnesses 
were  cross-questioned  as  in  a  criminal  trial,  and  their 
statements  and  statistics  were  subjected  to  the  most 
searching  criticism.  As  many  as  326  petitions  in  favor  of 
the  project  were  presented  by  cities,  chambers  of  com- 
merce, and  trading  and  manufacturing  companies  of  the 
district  interested.^  The  authorizing  act  was  finally  passed 
in  1885.  The  estimated  necessary  funds  were  secured  in 
the  following  two  years,  the  stock  being  subscribed  for  by 
the  business  people  of  Manchester  and  neighboring  cities. 
Construction  work  was  begun  in  November,  1887,  and  the 
waterway  was  opened  for  trafiic  on  January  1,  1894. 

The  building  of  the  waterw'ay  was  a  magnificent  engi- 
neering feat.  The  length  of  the  canal  is  35.5  miles,  and  it 
has  a  depth  for  the  entire  distance  of  28  feet,  and  a  bottom 
width  of  120  feet.^   There  are  five  sets  of  gigantic  locks, 

1  Tracy,  "The  Manchester  Ship  Canal.  The  Story  in  Brief,"  Journal 
of  Manchester  Geographical  Society,  July,  1907. 

2  Ibid. 

'  A  comparison  of  the  Manchester  Canal  with  other  noted  canals  follows : 

Depth  Bottom  width 

Suez 26  feet  72  feet 

Amsterdam 23  89 

Manchester 2S  120 


148        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

necessitated  by  the  70  feet  elevation  of  Manchester  above 
the  sea  level.  Among  the  engineering  features  are  a  num- 
ber of  tremendous  swing-bridges,  a  huge  sea  wall,  rising 
in  places  from  a  depth  of  40  feet,  and  averaging  12  feet  in 
thickness,  and  the  Barton  aqueduct,  by  means  of  which 
the  Bridgewater  Canal  is  carried  over  the  Ship  Canal  and 
its  course  stopped  and  swung  at  right  angles  during  the 
passage  of  large  ships. 

The  cost  of  the  waterway,^  to  January  1, 1894,  the  dateof 
opening,  was  £14,860,000;  while  a  deepening  of  two  feet, 
together  with  the  construction  of  docks,  sheds,  and  other 
necessary  equipment,  had  raised  the  total  expenditure  on 
capital  account  by  December  31,  1909,  to  £16,790,491,  or 
nearly  $84,000,000.^ 

At  Manchester  magnificent  docks,  nine  in  number,  have 
been  constructed  on  a  commodious  scale,  with  an  eye  to 
future  needs.  There  is  a  solid  concrete  and  steel  shed,  half 
a  mile  long  and  three  stories  in  height,  and  a  huge  grain 
elevator  with  a  capacity  of  1,500,000  bushels,  equipped 
with  the  most  modern  improvements.  The  dock  equip- 
ment includes  53  hydraulic,  61  steam,  and  9  electric  cranes, 
capable  of  lifting  from  1  to  10  tons  to  a  height  of  from 
13  to  59  feet;  a  30-ton  steam  crane;  47  locomotives;  6 
floating  pontoons  of  a  dead-weight  capacity  of  800  tons 
each;  and  all  modern  appliances  for  giving  vessels  quick 
dispatch.  There  is  also  a  pontoon  sheers  capable  of  dealing 
with  weights  up  to  250  tons,  with  a  lift  of  21  feet.^  In  fact, 
no  money  has  been  spared  to  make  the  canal,  harbor,  and 
docks  thoroughly  modern  and  eflScient. 

Ocean  vessels  from  all  parts  of  the  world  now  load  and 
unload  their  cargoes  of  every  description  at  this  inland 
seaport,  already  fourth  in  importance  in  the  United  King- 

*  Tracy,  op.  cit. 

^  Port  of  Manchester  Official  Sailing  List  and  Shipping  Guide,  April, 
1909,  p.  97. 
»  Ibid.,  p.  94. 


MANCHESTER  SHIP  CANAL  149 

dom.  The  ships  are  towed  up  the  canal  by  large  tugs. 
Competition  has  lowered,  to  some  extent,  the  rates 
charged  by  the  railways,  while  the  canal-borne  traffic 
travels  at  a  still  lower  charge.  Distributing  business  hat 
been  built  up  in  Manchester,  and  the  relative  decline  of 
the  city  has  been  checked  in  no  small  degree.  The  trans- 
shipping business  alone  furnishes  a  large  amount  of  em- 
ployment, and,  in  addition,  new  industries  have  developed 
along  the  canal.  All  this  means  more  business  and  larger 
opportunity  for  the  people  of  Manchester,  whose  splendid 
enterprise  has  brought  the  sea  inland  to  the  very  centre  of 
their  business  activities. 

Such,  in  brief,  is  the  story  of  the  Manchester  Ship  Canal 
as  it  is  customarily  told.  The  conclusion  commonly  drawn 
from  such  cursory  sketches  is  that  this  deep  waterway  is 
an  unqualified  success,  —  that  here  is  substantial  proof  of 
the  beneficent  results  of  ship  canals.  A  careful,  first- 
hand investigation  of  the  entire  project  has,  however,  led 
the  writer  to  the  conclusion  that  the  Manchester  Ship 
Canal  has  fallen  far  short  of  fulfilling  the  expectations  of 
its  builders,  and  that,  splendid  engineering  achievement 
as  it  is,  its  economic  advantages  are  of  very  questionable 
importance. 

2.  In  the  first  place,  the  canal  cost  more  than  twice  the 
amount  of  the  original  estimate.  The  very  carefully  pre- 
pared report  of  the  committee  formed  to  consider  the 
Manchester  Ship  Canal,  which  was  submitted  in  1886, 
estimated  "that  the  Ship  Canal  and  works  can  be  com- 
pleted ready  for  traffic  at  a  cost  within  the  estimate  of 
£5,750,000,  and  that  the  sum  of  £802,936  set  down  for  the 
purchase  of  the  necessary  land  is  a  safe  estimate."  ^  In 
addition  to  this,  it  was  estimated  that  the  Bridgewater 
Canal  property,  to  be  purchased,  would  cost  £1,710,000,^ 

*  Report  of  the  Committee  formed  to  consider  the  Manchester  Ship  Canal, 
p.  4. 

»  Ibid. 


150        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

making  a  total  of  £8,262,936.  The  contract  was  let  for  the 
construction  of  the  canal  at  the  above  figure,  but  the  chief 
engineer,  finding  himself  utterly  unable  to  complete  the 
work  under  double  the  amount  of  his  bid,  gave  up  in  des- 
pair,^ and  the  work  had  to  be  finished  by  others.  Expendi- 
tures kept  mounting  higher  and  higher,  and  it  became 
necessary  for  the  company  to  borrow  an  extra  £5,000,000 
from  the  city  of  Manchester  in  order  to  finish  the  work. 
By  December  31, 1909,  the  expenditure  on  capital  account 
stood  as  follows :  ^  — 

Construction  of  works  (including  plant  and  equip- 
ment)  £10,956,792 

Bridgewater  Canal _ 1,268,286 

Land  (purchase  and  compensation) 1,502,850 

Engineering  and  surveying 194,210 

Interest  on  share  and  loan  capital 1,170,734 

Parliamentary  expenses 195,022 

General  expenses 448,357 

Interest  on  debentures  discharged  by  the  issue  of  a 
like  amount  of  preference  stock  to  the  corporation 

of  Manchester 1,054,240 

£16,790,491 

There  is  no  question  that  had  it  been  known  in  advance 
that  the  cost  of  the  canal  would  approximate  a  total  of 
nearly  $75,000,000  on  opening  day  in  1894,  and  nearly 
$9,000,000  more  in  the  next  sixteen  years,  the  project 
would  never  have  been  undertaken. 

In  the  second  place,  the  anticipated  earnings  have  not 
been  realized.  The  committee  above  mentioned  estimated 
the  net  revenue  for  the  second  year  of  operation  at  £479,- 
430.  "This  sum,  which  we  consider  a  safe  estimate,  would 
be  sufficient  to  pay  a  five  per  cent  dividend  upon  the  whole 
share  capital  of  the  company  [£8,000,000],  and  to  leave  a 
surplus  of  £79,430. "3  How  has  this  prophecy,  made  after 

*  This  engineer,  Mr.  Walker,  died,  before  the  completion  of  the  work, 
it  is  said  of  a  broken  heart  over  his  failure. 

*  Port  of  Manchester  Official  Sailing  List  and  Shipping  Guide,  April, 
1910,  p.  97. 

*  Report  of  the  Committee,  p.  15. 


MANCHESTER  SHIP  CANAL  151 

a  very  careful  investigation,  been  fulfilled?  In  the  second 
year  of  canal  operation  the  gross  revenue  was  only  £137,- 
474,^  but  little  more  than  one  fourth  the  estimated  net 
revenue.  Sixteen  years  have  now  elapsed,  and  never  has 
the  company  been  able  to  make  ends  meet.  Never  yet 
has  it  been  possible  to  pay  in  full  the  interest  on  the 
£5,000,000  borrowed  from  the  city  of  Manchester.  At  the 
close  of  the  year  1909,  a  balance  of  £6990  of  interest  re- 
mained unpaid. 2  There  is  a  perennial  hope  that  the  interest 
payments  may  be  met  in  the  near  future,  but  shareholders 
have  almost  ceased  even  to  dream  of  dividends. 

3.  There  appear  to  be  two  reasons  for  this  failure  to  pay 
dividends  —  excessive  expenditures,  and  small  traffic.  Since 
the  experience  of  the  Manchester  Ship  Canal  is  typical 
of  practically  all  similar  enterprises,  it  seems  advisable  to 
set  forth  in  some  detail  the  situation  as  it  developed. 
The  expenditures  will  be  considered  first. 

It  had  been  assumed,  as  is  usually  the  case  in  quasi- 
public  undertakings  of  this  kind,  that  once  the  canal  was 
open  for  traffic,  thereafter  all  would  be,  literally,  smooth 
sailing.  Three  years  after  the  date  of  completion,  how- 
ever, a  special  report  on  the  physical  and  engineering 
features  of  the  waterway  was  submitted,  which  showed 
how  numerous  were  the  points  of  weakness  in  the  canal, 
and  indicated  how  heavy  might  be  the  expense  connected 
therewith.  Some  of  the  difficulties  to  be  encountered 
were :  ^  — 

1.  A  crowded  entrance  at  Liverpool. 

2.  A  poor  entrance  at  Eastham. 

3.  Only  one  entrance  to  the  canal,  which  might  cause  a  blockade 
from  mishaps,  such  as  the  grounding  or  wrecking  of   boats, 

*  Port  of  Manchester  Official  Sailing  List  and  Shipping  Guide,  supra, 
p.  97. 

*  Statement  of  accounts,  general  balance  sheet,  December  31,  1909. 

'  Manchester  Ship  Canal :  Physical  and  Engineering  Features,  Special 
Report  by  an  Expert,  1897,  p.  8. 


152        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

disablement  of  lock  gates,  or  of  swing-bridges,  landslips  in  the 
cuttings,  floods  and  storms,  or  loss  of  water. 

4.  The  silting-up  of  the  tidal  portion  of  the  canal. 

5.  The  failure  of  sea  embankments  at  Ellesmere  Port. 

6.  Dangers  of  the  Weaver  River. 

7.  Dangers  from  cross  traffic  at  Runcorn. 

8.  Dangers  in  the  deep  cuttings  at  Norton. 

9.  Encroachments  by  estuary  floods  and  storms. 

10.  Dangers  at  swing-bridges. 

11.  The  liability  of  the  caving-in  of  rock  cuttings. 

12.  Dangers  from  defects  in  locks  and  sluice  gates. 

13.  The  instability  of  lock  walls. 

14.  Deficient  dock  and  trade  arrangements. 

Obviously,  not  all,  nor  even  many  of  the  above  difficul- 
ties would  have  to  be  met  at  once,  but  at  any  time  large 
unexpected  expenses  were  likely  to  arise.  Some  of  the  diffi- 
culties, however,  such  as  the  incessant  dredging  necessary 
to  keep  the  channel  free  from  silt  and  the  maintenance 
of  adequate  dockage  and  trading  facilities,  were  constant 
problems. 

One  of  the  most  serious  problems  in  inland  water  trans- 
portation, everywhere,  is  the  filling-up  of  the  channel  with 
silt.  "It  is  manifest  that  the  difficulties  of  dredging  in  the 
docks  and  in  the  restricted  channel  of  the  [Manchester] 
Canal,  simultaneously  with  continuous  use  by  shipping, 
will  be  almost  insuperable."  ^  For  the  half-year  ending 
December  31,  1909,  the  cost  of  dredging  was  £20,282,^ 
or  almost  equal  to  the  total  outlay  for  salaries  of  managers 
and  wages  of  all  the  employees  of  the  canal  company,  which 
amounted  to  £24,535.^  This  half-year  may  be  regarded 
as  typical.  Hence,  approximately  $200,000  a  year  is  the 
cost  of  dredging  alone,  in  a  canal  only  35.5  miles  in  length, 
—  nearly  $6000  per  mile  annually  to  keep  the  channel 
freely  navigable. 

*  Manchester  Ship  Canal,  etc.,  ibid.,  p.  9. 

*  Statement  of  account,  December  31,  1909.  '  Ibid. 


MANCHESTER  SHIP  CANAL  153 

It  is  to  the  credit  of  the  company  that  no  expense  has 
been  spared  in  attempting  to  make  the  physical  equipment 
of  the  best.  Untiring  effort  and  great  expense  have  like- 
wise been  undergone  in  trying  to  better  the  facilities  of 
trade.  A  list  of  questions  was  sent  out  in  1897  to  shippers, 
asking  whether  they  were  using  the  canal;  if  so,  with  what 
success;  if  not,  why  not.  Suggestions  were  also  asked  in 
every  case.  The  answers  returned  showed  that  in  many 
instances  the  canal  was  not  used  because  of  poor  service 
in  handling,  etc.;  very  frequently  it  was  stated  that  foreign 
shippers  were  averse  to  risking  their  goods  upon  the  canal; 
and  shipowners  hesitated  to  send  their  ships  thirty-five 
miles  inland  to  Manchester.  Such  problems  as  these  were 
not  to  be  overcome  without  the  expenditure  of  a  deal  of 
effort  and  a  tremendous  amount  of  money.  Even  then,  as 
will  be  seen,  they  were  by  no  means  wholly  removed. 

The  anticipated  tremendous  traffic  has  not  yet  been 
realized.  There  has  been  an  earnest  desire  on  the  part  of 
Manchester  business  men  to  see  the  canal  prosperous. 
Having  expended  many  millions  of  pounds  sterling  in 
bringing  the  sea  to  their  midst  they  were  naturally  anxious 
to  cooperate  in  making  the  canal  a  success.  Answers  to 
the  queries  which  the  company  sent  out  in  1897  showed, 
as  a  rule,  that  the  shippers  were  making  use  of  the  canal 
wherever  possible,  sometimes  even  at  a  loss,  in  the  hope 
that  service  would  improve  and  the  enterprise  be  ulti- 
mately successful.  Yet,  with  this  unusually  favorable  dis- 
position on  the  part  of  the  shipping  public,  traffic  failed  to 
expand  rapidly.  There  are  many  reasons. 

We  have  already  noted  the  hesitation  of  shipowners  to 
risk  their  vessels  on  inland  waters;  the  objections  of  foreign 
shippers  to  the  transit  of  their  goods  on  the  canal,  because 
of  delays,  ungrounded  fears,  or  what-not;  and  the  slow  and 
often  inefficient  service  rendered  on  the  canal.  Moreover, 
it  was  soon  realized  that  the  savings  on  freight  were  far 
from  being  as  great  as  had  been  estimated,  if  they  were 


154        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

not  indeed  altogether  negligible.  It  had  been  contended 
that  enormous  savings  would  accrue,  not  alone  to  all 
places  on  the  canal  and  to  points  directly  east  of  Man- 
chester, but  to  the  entire  surrounding  country,  north  and 
south  of  the  canal  as  well.  But  it  usually  did  not  work 
out  that  the  rate  from  Liverpool  to  Manchester  by  canal, 
plus  the  railway  charge  from  Manchester  to  some  city,  X, 
Y,  or  Z,  was  less  than  from  Liverpool  to  this  point  direct 
by  rail,  especially  when  the  delays  and  inconveniences  of 
the  canal  route  were  considered.  In  consequence  of  these 
conditions,  traffic  did  not  expand  with  the  rapidity  pre- 
dicted. Below  is  a  statement  of  the  annual  tonnage  during 
the  sixteen  years  of  the  canal's  existence.^ 


Year 

Sea-borne  traffic, 
tons 

Barge  traffic,  tons 

Total  tons 

1894 

1895 

1896 

1897 

1898 

1899 

1900 

1901 

1902 

1903 

1904 

1905.  .     .     .     . 

1906.  .     .          , 

1907 

1908 

1909 

686,158 
1,087,443 
1.509,658 
1.700,479 
2,218,005 
2,429,168 
2,784,843 
2,684,833 
3.137,348 
3,554,636 
3,618.004 
3,993,110 
4,441.241 
4,927.784 
4,317,965 
4,290,765 

239,501 
271,432 
316.579 
365,336 
377,580 
348.940 
275.673 
257,560 
280,711 
292,259 
299,574 
260.244 
259,683 
282,975 
264.531 
272,636 

925,659 
1,358,875 
1,826,237 
2,065,815 
2,595,585 
2,778,108 
3,060,516 
2,942,393 
3,418,059 
3,846,895 
3,917,578 
4,253,354 
4,700,924 
5,210,759 
4  582,496 
4,563,401 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  from  the  beginning  the  increase 
was  very  slow,  indeed,  and  that  1909  showed  a  lower  total 
than  1906.  Nor  is  the  outlook  for  the  future  encouraging. 
The  semiannual  shareholders'  report  for  February  12, 
1910,  is  decidedly  gloomy.  Where,  if  in  any  place,  one 
would  expect  to  find  an  expression  of  optimism  for  the 
future,  we  read  in  the  secretary's  words:  — 

»  Report  of  Directors,  December  31,  1909. 


MANCHESTER  SHIP  CANAL  155 

I  do  not  see  any  present  prospect  of  going  ahead  with  really 
rapid  strides.* 

And  again :  — 

I  do  not  know  that  the  repetition  or  frequent  reiteration  of  our 
pressing  need  is  likely  to  do  much  good,  yet  I  cannot  refrain  from 
saying  that  if  more  patriotism  could  somehow  or  other  be  infused 
into  the  mercantile  and  manufacturing  community  of  this  district 
we  should  soon  have  a  large  expansion  of  traffic* 

In  the  light  of  such  statements  the  case  seems  clear  to 
an  unbiased  observer.  The  people  who  went  deep  into 
their  pockets  to  build  a  canal  for  the  salvation  of  their  city 
now,  from  lack  of  patriotism,  it  is  said,  do  not  make  use 
of  their  own  waterway.  Manufacturers  and  traders  are 
usually  business  men  more  than  patriots,  and  the  only 
reasonable  explanation  for  their  not  using  the  canal  would 
seem  to  be  that  it  is  more  profitable  not  to  use  it.  The 
report  referred  to  is  almost  naive  in  some  of  its  state- 
ments :  — 

For  some  reason  or  other  they  [the  manufacturers  and  mer- 
chants] still  quote  the  same  price  for  delivery  at  various  ports  and 
take  the  chance  of  having  to  deliver  the  goods  and  pay  the  carriage 
to  such  ports,  as  even  London  and  Glasgow,  although  they  them- 
selves are  near  to  Manchester.  It  is  difficult  to  get  at  the  bottom 
of  it.  When  you  hear  that  works  are  leaving  inland  towns  to  get 
on  the  sea,  it  seems  to  me  a  very  curious  thing  that  when  the  sea 
is  brought  to  the  manufacturers,  they  are  not  eager  to  make  use 
of  it.3 

May  it  not  be  that  the  constant  deterrent  is  a  something 
inherent  in  an  inland  ship  canal  itself,  as  a  means  of  trans- 
portation? When  it  would  seem  to  be  to  the  direct  interest 
of  these  shippers  to  use  the  waterway  as  much  as  possible, 
in  the  hope  of  receiving  dividends  on  their  share  invest- 
ments, and  in  order  to  build  up  Manchester  and  the  sur- 

^  Report  of  the  Half-yearly  Meeting  of  Shareholders,  February  17, 1910^ 
p.  9. 
« Ibid.,  p.  8.  »  Ibid,,  p.  8. 


156        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

rounding  territory,  thereby  enlarging  their  businesses  and 
increasing  their  opportunities,  the  fact  that  they  employ 
other  means  of  transportation  seems,  indeed,  strong  evi- 
dence against  the  earning  capacity  of  this  ship  canal. 

The  amount  of  traffic  carried  in  barges,  as  shown  by  the 
above  table,  is  likewise  very  instructive.  It  is  particularly 
interesting,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  in  the  United  States 
barge  canals  are  looked  upon  with  much  favor  as  a  solution 
of  our  transportation  problem.  It  should  be  observed  that 
the  tonnage  of  barge  traffic  on  the  Manchester  Canal  has 
remained  almost  a  constant  quantity  for  sixteen  years, 
and  comprises  only  about  one  seventeenth  of  the  total 
canal  traffic;  and  this,  in  face  of  the  fact  that  the  Ship 
Canal  has  direct  communication  with  fourteen  barge 
canals,  tapping  the  central  manufacturing  region  of  Eng- 
land, the  Lancashire,  Yorkshire,  and  Birmingham  districts. 

4.  In  another,  though  indirect,  manner  it  was  hoped 
that  the  great  canal  would  reward  the  expenditures  of  its 
builders.  It  was  believed  that  in  addition  to  building  up  a 
huge  traffic  by  water,  and  securing  for  all  time  low  trans- 
portation charges,  the  Manchester  Ship  Canal  would 
attract  many  new  industries  to  the  region.  The  Report  of 
the  Committee  of  1886'  expressed  the  conviction  that  along 
the  entire  length  of  the  canal  great  manufacturing  estab- 
lishments would  be  erected,  that  shipbuilding  would  be- 
come a  great  industry  on  the  banks  of  the  waterway,  and 
that  Warrington,  Runcorn,  and  other  intermediate  cities 
between  Manchester  and  Liverpool  would  quickly  become 
thriving  commercial  ports.  Traveling  the  length  of  the 
canal  sixteen  years  after  its  opening,  one  sees  scant  evi- 
dence of  the  fulfillment  of  this  brilliant  promise.  There  is 
some  shipping  at  intermediate  points,  to  be  sure;  naturally 
some  new  industries  have  been  established  along  the  canal ; 
but  shipbuilding  there  is  none,  and  remarkable  industrial 

»  Op.  cit. 


MANCHESTER  SHIP  CANAL 


157 


development  has  not  been  present,  as  witness  only  too 
plainly  the  tonnage  and  revenue  statistics  already  given. 

Many  Manchester  business  men,  owners  of  stock  in  the 
canal  company,  are  frank  to  admit  that  the  canal  has  been 
a  great  disappointment.  "We  got  excited  over  the  alluring 
picture  of  Manchester  as  an  ocean  port"  is  a  common 
expression.  And  it  is  now  generally  believed  that  the  chief 
benefits  from  the  canal  have  come  through  the  growth  of 
population  and  the  general  expansion  of  business  —  bene- 
fits unascertainable  in  amount,  but  none  the  less  existent, 
and  none  the  less  important.  Attempts  have  been  made 
by  supporters  of  the  waterway  to  claim  a  prodigious 
growth  in  Manchester  since  the  canal  was  built.  But 
population  statistics  do  not  bear  them  out.  The  census 
returns  show  the  following  statistics  for  a  number  of  rival 
cities  in  northern  England:  — 


Hull    .    .    . 
Leeds  .    .    . 
Birmingham 
Liverpool 
Manchester  . 


1891 


200,472 
367,505 
478,113 
629,548 
505,368 


1901 


240,618 
428,953 
522,182 
684,947 
543,969 


Iq crease,  per  cent 


20 
16.6 
9.3 

8.7 
7.5 


Later  statistics  would  be  better  evidence,  but  they  are 
not  available.  In  1901,  however,  the  canal  had  been  open 
eight  years,  and  the  anticipation  of  its  beneficent  results 
should  have  stimulated  industry  and  business  before  the 
waterway  was  actually  ready  for  traffic.  Consequently, 
the  above  figures  furnish  good  evidence  as  to  the  benefits 
of  the  canal.  They  show  a  less  rapid  growth  in  Manchester 
than  in  any  of  the  other  large  cities  in  northern  England. 
Perhaps  without  the  canal,  Manchester  would  have  gained 
even  less  rapidly,  but  at  all  events,  it  can  hardly  be  con- 
tended that  a  remarkable  growth  of  the  city  has  resulted 
from  its  water  connection  with  the  sea. 

Again,  it  was  hoped  that  the  entire  surrounding  territory 


158        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

would  receive  a  reviving  impetus,  that  unemployment 
would  cease,  that  unalloyed  contentment  would  reign  in  all 
the  district.  Alas,  however,  we  find  to-day  more  unemploy- 
ment than  ever  before.  In  fact,  Lancashire  and  Yorkshire 
form  the  centre  of  English  discontent,  and  a  desperate 
effort  is  being  made  by  the  anti-socialist  union  to  quell  the 
rising  tide  of  socialism,  which  is  the  outgrowth  of  low  wages 
and  unemployment.  Large  and  increasing  numbers  of 
emigrants  are  leaving  the  country  for  English  dominions 
overseas.  The  canal  in  this,  as  in  other  respects,  appears 
to  have  been  a  failure. 

But  what  of  the  potential  competition  which  the  water- 
way has  offered?  Has  it  not  paid  for  itself  indirectly  by 
forcing  the  railways  to  lower  their  rate  schedules?  It  is 
impossible  to  say  precisely  what  effect,  if  any,  the  canal 
has  had  upon  railway  rates.  In  the  Report  of  the  Chicago 
Harbor  Commission,^  Professor  Goode  quotes  rates  on 
certain  classes  of  freight  which  show  rate  reductions,  as  a 
rule,  of  from  five  to  ten  per  cent.^  These  are  slight  reduc- 
tions at  best,  and  but  little  more  than  has  been  the  case 
elsewhere  in  England  during  the  same  period.  As  against 
the  contention  that  the  canal  has  substantially  lowered  rail 
rates,  W,  M.  Acworth,  the  well-known  English  authority 
on  transportation,  states  that  the  canal  has  had  virtually' 
no  effect  on  the  rates  charged  by  the  railways  of  that  sec- 
tion of  England.^  The  relatively  slow  growth  of  popula- 
tion and  the  rather  stagnant  condition  of  industry  seem 
also  to  indicate  that  these  indirect  benefits  have  not  beet 
very  great  in  comparison  with  the  outlay.  In  any  event,  it 
would  require  an  enormous  saving  in  freights,  indeed,  to 
yield  interest  to  the  people  of  Manchester  on  an  expendi- 
ture of  $84,000,000.  A  waterway,  the  benefits  of  which 
depend  mainly  upon  the  potential  competition  secured,  is 
always  of  exceedingly  doubtful  feasibility. 

If  it  be  found  necessary  to  resort  to  potential  compe- 
^  Published  in  1909.         «  Page  8G.         »  Personal  letter  to  the  writer. 


MANCHESTER  SHIP  CANAL  159 

tition  as  a  means  of  reducing  freight  rates,  the  result  can 
be  attained  in  a  more  economical  manner  than  by  means 
of  a  ship  canal.  The  canal  had  cost,  up  to  the  beginning 
of  1910,  about  $2,400,000  per  mile  of  length.  The  capital- 
ization of  English  railways,  on  the  other  hand,  is  only 
about  $385,000  per  mile,  and  a  cheaper  means  of  secur- 
ing potential  competition  would  be  through  the  build- 
ing of  Government  railroads.' 

5.  Having  seen  what  were  the  hopes  for  the  Manchester 
Ship  Canal,  and  having  discovered  in  how  small  degree 
these  have  been  subsequently  realized,  it  remains  to 
inquire  what  conclusions  are  to  be  drawn  as  to  the  feasi- 
bility of  similar  undertakings  in  the  United  States.  Were 
not,  perchance,  the  engineering  problems  of  this  project 
particularly  difficult,  and  may  not  the  commercial  condi- 
tions have  been  peculiarly  adverse?  And,  therefore,  de- 
spite this  failure,  may  not  ship  canals  in  our  own  country 
prove  successful .f*  Let  us  consider  the  conditions  existing 
at  Manchester. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  Manchester 
lies  only  35.5  miles  from  the  open  sea,  and  the  elevation  is 
only  70  feet  above  tide  water.  The  slight  elevation  mini- 
mizes the  number  of  locks  needed  to  control  the  waters, 
thereby  greatly  lessening  the  cost  of  construction  and 
maintenance. 

In  the  second  place,  the  builders  of  the  canal  were  excep- 
tionally fortunate  in  the  matter  of  construction  materials. 
Suitable  filling-in  material  was  plentiful  along  the  entire 
route,  while  rock,  clay,  and  sand  for  the  making  of  the 
sea-wall  embankments  were  found  in  abundance.  For  a 
long  period  of  time  over  450,000  bricks  per  week  were  pro- 
duced, as  needed,  right  along  the  works.^  Unusually  favor- 

*  A  fuller  consideration  of  this  question  will  be  found  in  chapters  xix 
and  XX. 

*  Tracy,  op.  cit.,  p.  9. 


160        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

able  were  these  very  important  phases  of  the  engineering 
work;  and  there  is  no  record  of  any  exceptional  difficulties 
encountered.  The  excessive  expenditures  have  never  been 
ascribed  to  unexpected  engineering  difficulties.  They  are 
rather  due  to  the  usual  underestimates  of  the  cost  of 
deep  waterways.  It  is  doubtful  if  anywhere  in  the  United 
States  can  be  found  conditions  as  favorable  to  cheap  con- 
struction as  were  present  at  Manchester. 

Furthermore,  in  the  building  of  a  ship  canal  which  costs 
more  than  $2,000,000  per  mile,  the  question  of  distance 
is  of  paramount  importance.  The  amount  of  traffic  on  a 
canal  seventy  miles  in  length  will,  as  a  general  rule,  be  not 
much  greater  than  on  one  thirty -five  miles  in  length,  pro- 
vided both  reach  important  industrial  centres;  but  the 
cost  of  construction  will  be  nearly  double  for  the  longer 
distance.  Now,  in  the  United  States,  we  have  no  inland 
city  of  half  a  million  people  which  is  not  many  hundreds  of 
miles  inland.  The  Erie  Canal  route  from  Buffalo  to  New 
York  is  over  340  miles  in  length.  From  Chicago  to  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico  by  way  of  the  Mississippi  River  the  dis- 
tance is,  roughly,  1600  miles.  Canals  of  sufficient  depth 
for  ocean  vessels,  as  is  sometimes  advocated,  between  these 
points  would  involve  an  expenditure  of  fabulous  sums  of 
money.  From  the  standpoint  of  distance  every  advantage 
lies  with  the  Manchester  Canal. 

Again,  the  geographical  situation  of  Manchester  could 
hardly  be  improved  upon  as  a  ship-canal  port.  It  is  the 
centre  of  the  greatest  manufacturing  region  in  the  United 
Kingdom  and  a  distributing-point  for  more  than  one 
hundred  and  seventy  industrial  towns.  Within  a  radius  of 
twenty-five  miles  lives  a  population  of  3,778,765,  and 
within  fifty  miles  are  8,726,267  people.^  Bolton,  the  centre 
of  the  cotton-spinning  district,  a  city  of  170,000,  is  but  nine 
miles  away;  Oldham,  another  great  cotton  centre,  with 
140,000  people,  is  but  eight  miles  from  Manchester;  while 
^  Manchester  Journal  of  Commerce,  October  15,  1909,  p.  3. 


MANCHESTER  SHIP  CANAL  161 

Stockport  (79,000),  Bury  (60,000),  Ashton  (44,000), 
Eccles  (35,000),  and  Stalybridge  (28,000),  are  other  im- 
portant industrial  cities  near  by.  Manchester  is  at  once  a 
natural  terminus  and  a  starting-point  —  a  centre  of  great 
activity.  The  enormous  manufacturing  of  the  district 
necessitates  the  importation  of  vast  quantities  of  raw  ma- 
terials, while  the  dense  population  has  to  be  fed  on  food- 
stuffs sent  in  from  abroad.  Cotton,  wool,  flax,  iron  ore, 
timber,  oils,  dyewoods,  paper,  paper-making  materials, 
and  all  kinds  of  foodstuffs,  grain,  flour,  meat,  fruit,  etc., 
are  commodities  of  constant  importation.  For  the  back- 
haul, the  export  trade,  we  find  tremendous  quantities  of 
cotton  and  other  skilled  manufactures,  all  kinds  of  hard- 
ware and  machinery,  and  an  abundance  of  coal  from  the 
Yorkshire  fields.  This  traffic  was  already  existent,  appar- 
ently waiting  for  the  canal  to  carry  it.  It  did  not  require 
an  influx  of  population  and  a  slow  growth  of  industries  to 
develop  it.   It  was  ready  at  hand. 

Especially  important  is  the  cotton  trade  which  centres 
about  Manchester.  The  city  had  control  of  all  the  cotton- 
distributing  business,  even  before  the  canal  was  opened. 
Testimony  before  the  House  of  Lords  in  1885  showed  that 

the  business  is  done  through  Manchester  and  for  many  very  im- 
portant reasons.  One  above  all  others  is  that  the  goods  require 
inspection,  and  the  man  who  buys  the  goods  to  ship  requires  to 
know  that  he  is  getting  the  quality  he  has  bought;  and  the  goods 
are  marketed  in  Manchester,  and  inspected  in  Manchester.  Then 
a  great  portion  of  the  goods  require  to  be  finished,  some  of  them 
dyed,  some  of  them  bleached,  some  of  them  printed;  and  all  those 
subsidiary  trades  are  grouped  around  Manchester.  Hence,  Man- 
chester practically  directs  the  whole  of  the  cotton  trade,  and  many 
other  trades  in  the  district;  and  the  buyers  are  all  congregated 
there,  and  they  have  their  agents  abroad  who  are  acquainted  with 
all  the  requirements  of  every  market.* 

^  Manchester  Ship  Canal  Enquiry  before  the  House  of  Lords  (J.  C. 
Fielden),  1885,  p.  7. 


162        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

It  seemed  certain  that  all  of  this  traflBc  would  go  by  the 
waterway.  In  fact,  traflSc  conditions  were  little  short  of 
ideal.  There  was  an  abundance  of  traffic  in  commodities 
well  adapted  to  water  transport;  there  was  an  established 
trade  in  both  directions,  an  all-important  consideration; 
and  finally,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  canal  was  in  the 
direct  line  of  established  routes,  not  crosswise  to  the  main 
line  of  trade  as  are  some  of  the  proposed  canals  of  the 
United  States.  It  is  not  surprising  in  view  of  these  facts, 
that  M.  Fleury,  the  French  expert,  visiting  Manchester 
in  1885,  asked,  "In  what  other  part  of  the  globe  are  con- 
ditions so  favorably  combined?"^ 

From  practically  every  standpoint,  then,  this  English 
canal  project  was  subject  to  unusually  favoring  conditions : 
there  was  comparatively  easy  construction,  abundance  of 
traffic  in  both  directions  in  the  region,  and  the  cooper- 
ation of  shippers  financially  interested  in  the  success  of 
the  scheme.  Conditions  are  far  less  favorable  in  the  United 
States,  where  greater  distances  have  to  be  traversed, 
higher  elevations  to  be  overcome,  swifter  streams  to  be 
controlled;  and  where  the  population  is  less  dense,  and  the 
traffic  correspondingly  lighter  and  more  uncertain. 

*  Tracy,  op.  cit.,  p.  11. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE   FORTH   AND    CLYDE   SHIP   CANAL 

1.  There  has  been  considerable  discussion  in  Great 
Britain  at  various  times,  and  especially  since  the  begin- 
ning of  the  canal  revival,  about  the  year  1900,  of  a  ship 
canal  across  the  narrow  isthmus-like  piece  of  land  between 
the  estuaries  of  the  Forth  and  the  Clyde  Rivers  in  Scot- 
land. Resolutions  in  favor  of  the  project  have  been  passed 
by  the  town  councils  of  the  particularly  interested  cities 
of  Glasgow,  Stirling,  and  Greenock;  and  Parliamentary 
commissions  have  investigated  the  scheme,  both  from  the 
commercial  and  from  the  naval  points  of  view.  Since  the 
project  is  of  tremendous  size,  and  since  it  has  attracted 
no  little  attention  in  the  United  States,  it  perhaps  merits 
a  brief  discussion  at  this  place. 

There  has  long  been  a  small  barge  canal  connecting  the 
opposite  coasts  of  Scotland  via  the  Forth  and  the  Clyde; 
but  it  is  urged  that  a  deep  channel,  permitting  the  passage 
of  large  ocean  steamers  and  of  Dreadnought  battleships, 
has  become  essential  to  meet  the  needs  of  both  modern 
commerce  and  modern  warfare. 

On  the  commercial  side,  advocates  of  the  scheme  call 
attention,  in  the  first  place,  to  the  fact  that  the  canal  would 
save,  for  vessels  traveling  between  the  Irish  and  North 
Seas,  the  long  journey  of  over  four  hundred  miles  around 
the  northern  end  of  Scotland;  and  similarly,  it  would  elimi- 
nate a  somewhat  less  distance  for  vessels  bound  from  Ger- 
many to  the  ports  of  North  America. 

In  the  second  place,  it  would  permit  a  much  readier 
assembling  of  a  full  cargo.  The  once  numerous  small 
"tramp"   steamers  are   rapidly  disappearing   from  the 


164        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

sea,  giving  way  before  the  demand  for  large  vessels  and 
through  cargoes.  At  the  present  time  it  is  diflBcult  for  a 
large  boat  to  secure  a  full  load  on  either  Scottish  coast, 
alone;  but  if  the  proposed  ship  canal  were  opened,  it  would 
become  possible  for  them  to  load  in  part  on  the  east 
coast  and  then  complete  their  cargoes  in  the  port  of 
Glasgow.  The  present  trouble  and  expense  of  having  to 
travel  all  around  the  Scottish  coast  in  order  to  collect  a 
respectable  cargo  is  a  serious  handicap  to  shipping  inter- 
ests. It  is  thought,  also,  that  Continental  vessels  might 
easily  be  induced  to  stop  at  Glasgow  or  Grangemouth  and 
pick  up  traffic,  while  en  route  for  the  United  States.  Much 
encouragement  for  this  belief  is  found  in  the  fact  that  there 
is  an  abundance  of  cheap  bunker  coal  along  the  proposed 
canal  routes,  which  it  is  thought  should  prove  attractive 
to  foreign  shipowners. 

The  strategical  importance  of  the  scheme  would  arise 
from  the  possibility  it  would  insure  of  a  rapid  mobiliza- 
tion in  time  of  emergency,  of  naval  vessels  on  either  the 
North  or  the  Irish  Sea.  The  exigencies  of  war,  moreover, 
often  require  the  quick  repair  of  damaged  ships,  and  this 
canal  would  open  up  the  great  shipyards  on  the  Clyde  to 
the  use  of  his  Majesty's  Navy  in  time  of  need.  On  the 
strength  of  these  naval  advantages,  aid  in  the  carrying-out 
of  the  project  has  been  asked  of  the  Imperial  Government. 

2.  Two  different  routes  have  been  proposed.  Since  the 
iate  of  the  scheme  has  hinged  largely  upon  a  choice  of 
routes,  it  seems  advisable  to  present  here  a  brief  state- 
ment of  the  alternate  projects :  ^  — 

a.  The  first  route  would  follow  the  course  of  the  present 
Forth  and  Clyde  barge  canal  from  Grangemouth  on  the 
east  coast  (Firth  of  Forth)  to  Yoker  on  the  Clyde,  below 
Glasgow.  The  total  length  would  be  30  miles  and  the  ele- 

*  Report  of  Royed  Commission  on  Canals  and  Inland  Navigations,  vol. 
vn,  pp.  180-81. 


FORTH  AND  CLYDE  SHIP  CANAL       165 

vation  to  be  overcome  35  feet.  Various  estimates  of  the 
probable  cost  of  this  plan  have  been  submitted,  but  none 
can  be  regarded  as  other  than  tentative.  Mr.  Hogg,  an 
engineer,  estimates  that  for  a  depth  of  26  feet  with  a  bot- 
tom width  of  110  feet  the  cost  would  be  $35,000,000;  while 
for  a  depth  of  30  feet  the  amount  would  probably  reach 
$50,000,000.  Other  estimates  have  placed  the  cost  as  high 
as  $100,000,000,  and  D.  &  C.  Stevenson  regard  the  amount 
needed  as  $135,000,000  in  case  deep  cuttings,  which  seem 
advisable,  were  substituted  for  all  of  the  locks  except  those 
at  either  entrance. 

b.  The  second  route  would  start  at  a  point  one  and  one 
fourth  miles  above  Grangemouth  and  proceed  past  Ban- 
nockburn  and  Stirling  to  Loch  Lomond,  a  distance  of  35.5 
miles;  thence  15.5  miles  to  Tarbet;  thence  1.75  miles  to 
Loch  Long,  an  arm  of  the  sea,  some  15  miles  distant  from 
the  Firth  of  Clyde. 

The  advantage  of  this  route  is  that  it  is  nearly  level,  and 
would  require  but  two  locks.  It  is  estimated  that  the  cost 
would  approximate  $100,000,000  for  a  depth  of  36  feet  with 
a  bottom  width  of  100  feet. 

The  Committee  of  Imperial  Defense  recently  investi- 
gated the  strategical  side  of  the  question,  submitting  a 
report  thereon  in  June,  1909,  in  which  it  is  stated  that  the 
minimum  dimensions  required  by  the  Admiralty  are  as 
follows :  ^  — 

Depth 36  feet 

Width  of  floor 148 

Length  of  lock 850 

Width  of  entrance 110 

Depth  of  locks 36 

It  was  further  reported  that  only  the  second,  or  Loch 

Lomond  route,  would  satisfy  the  naval  requirements.  For 

this  route  the  estimated  cost  given  above  was  $100,000,000 

for  a  bottom  width  of  100  feet;  since  nothing  short  of  a 

*  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  iMd.,  p.  183. 


166        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

floor  width  of  148  feet,  almost  a  half  greater,  will  satisfy 
the  Admiralty,  we  must  conclude  that  the  total  cost  of 
the  project  would  much  exceed  $100,000,000,  granting  that 
the  estimate  for  the  size  named  is  in  reality  adequate. 

3.  The  Royal  Commission  endeavored  to  ascertain  how 
much  financial  support  for  the  project  could  be  relied  upon 
from  the  inhabitants  of  the  interested  districts,  and  they 
found  that  the  citizens  were  not  prepared  to  make  the  canal 
themselves,  and  that  "it  seems  doubtful  whether  they 
would  contribute  to  the  cost,  if,  for  strategic  reasons,  .  .  . 
the  Loch  Lomond  route  were  adopted  in  preference  to  the 
direct  route,  which  has  hitherto  been  favored  by  Glasgow 
opinion."  •  Since  this  second  route  alone  is  adapted  to 
naval  requirements  it  is  apparent  that  the  fate  of  the  pro- 
ject rests  in  the  hands  of  the  Imperial  Government.  It 
is  accordingly  significant  to  note  that  the  aforementioned 
Committee  on  Imperial  Defense  reported  that  while  the 
canal  would  unquestionably  possess  some  strategical  value, 
"this  value  alone  would,  however,  not  be  suflBcient  to 
warrant  any  considerable  Government  expenditure."  ^  It 
would  seem,  therefore,  that  the  project  is  indefinitely  sus- 
pended. The  Government  is  disposed  to  give  no  aid  for  the 
first-named  route,  because  it  is  strategically  valueless;  the 
inhabitants  of  Glasgow  and  other  cities  are  averse  to  con- 
tributing to  the  building  of  the  second  route,  because  it 
promises  no  substantial  direct  commercial  returns  to 
themselves;  and  neither  party  is  willing  to  undertake  its 
favored  scheme  without  the  cooperation  of  the  other. 

4.  While  the  prospect  that  the  project  will  ever  be  car- 
ried to  completion  is  exceedingly  remote,  we  may  never- 
theless profitably  give  some  attention  to  the  alleged  com- 
mercial advantages.  For  vessels  engaged  in  the  coasting 
trade  the  distance  saved  would  be  some  four  hundred 

*  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  ibid.,  p.  182.  *  Ibid.,  p.  183 


FORTH  AND  CLYDE  SHIP  CANAL   167 

miles.  Were  there  no  counterbalancing  extra  costs  the 
reductions  effected  here  might  be  regarded  as  of  some 
importance;  but  the  fact  is  that  such  savings  in  fuel  as 
might  result  from  the  shorter  distance  would  be  largely, 
if  not  wholly,  dissipated  by  additional  expenditures  for 
towage  and  for  extra  labor,  such  as  tugmen,  lock-keepers, 
and  pilots,  on  the  canal.  Furthermore,  since  the  risks 
incurred  by  large  ocean  vessels  in  navigating  the  re- 
stricted channel  of  an  inland  waterway  are  greatly  in- 
creased, the  insurance  charges  are  always  proportionally 
higher.  Again,  the  saving  in  time  would  be  largely  lost 
on  account  of  the  slow  pace  necessitated  on  the  canal  and 
the  numerous  delays,  including  half-hour  stops  at  each 
lock. 

In  the  case  of  German  vessels  bound  for  American  ports 
the  distance  saved  would  be  much  less,  and  it  requires  an 
unusually  elastic  imagination  to  conceive  that  these  ships 
could  be  induced  to  encounter  the  dangers  and  delays  and 
extra  costs  of  an  inland  waterway  for  the  sake  of  a  saving 
of  some  200  or  300  miles'  distance  in  the  open  ocean. 

Nor  can  it  be  considered  plausible  that  these  ocean  ves- 
sels would  find  it  to  their  advantage  to  enter  the  canal  for 
the  sake  of  picking  up  freight  at  Grangemouth  or  Glasgow. 
Tramp  steamers  of  the  old  type  might  possibly  do  so;  but, 
as  the  advocates  of  this  canal  themselves  say,  these  wan- 
dering vessels  are  becoming  scarcer  year  by  year  as  the 
demand  grows  for  through  cargoes  on  large  steamers.  To 
contend  in  the  next  sentence  that  German  vessels  would  be 
likely  to  load  partly  at  home,  then  cross  the  North  Sea  and 
encounter  all  the  uncertainties  of  an  inland  waterway  in 
order  to  finish  out  their  cargoes,  is,  to  say  the  least,  incon- 
sistent; and  it  is  as  improbable  as  it  is  lacking  in  consistency. 

Still  another  inducement,  however,  was  held  out  to  these 
Continental  vessels,  namely,  that  of  cheap  bunker  coal  in 
Scotland.  No  evidence  was  submitted  to  show  that  Scotch 
coal  is,  in  fact,  any  cheaper  than  German  coal;  but,  granting 


168        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

that  it  may  be  slightly  cheaper,  there  nevertheless  appears 
scant  inducement  to  German  ships.  No  difficulty  is  experi- 
enced by  these  vessels  in  carrying  sufficient  coal  for  the 
entire  journey  to  the  United  States;  and  Scotland  is,  at  any 
rate,  only  one  day's  journey  from  the  North  German  ports. 
Again,  the  coal  which  would  still  have  to  be  bought  in 
Germany  for  a  part  of  the  trip  would  doubtless  cost  more 
per  ton  than  when  larger  amounts  were  purchased;  and, 
moreover,  the  incidental  loading  expenses  w  ould  not  be 
decreased  proportionally  with  the  reduced  amount  of  fuel 
purchased  in  Germany.  But  if  a  considerable  portion  of 
the  coal  were  secured  in  Scotland,  the  loading  equipment 
and  incidental  expenses  would  have  to  be  duplicated,  and, 
in  addition,  many  hours,  or  days,  of  valuable  time  would 
perhaps  be  wasted  during  the  process  of  loading.  Vessels 
can  be  fully  bunkered  in  the  home  port  at  the  same  time 
that  the  cargo  is  being  loaded.  These  considerations  far 
more  than  offset  any  slight  advantages  that  might  arise 
from  a  possibly  lower  cost  of  fuel  in  Scotland.  Hence  it  is 
unnecessary  to  enumerate  again  the  further  disadvantages 
in  the  way  of  risks,  extra  canal  costs,  etc. 

There  is  some  point  to  the  argument  that  ships  experi- 
ence difficulty  at  present  in  securing  a  full  cargo  on  either 
Scottish  coast,  alone.  Undoubtedly,  the  coasting  trade 
would  find  the  canal  a  convenient  short  cut.  One  may 
grant  all  the  benefits  that  the  most  optimistic  could  look 
for  in  this  respect,  and  yet  regard  the  scheme  as  wholly 
impracticable.  A  minimum  estimate  of  the  cost  is  $100,- 
000,000,  or  over  $3,000,000  per  mile.  To  secure  adequate 
returns  on  so  great  an  outlay  as  this,  in  incidental  ways, 
would  require  an  enormous  length  of  time.  If  the  coasting- 
vessels  cannot  profitably  carry  the  traffic  around  the  island, 
and  if  it  becomes  necessary  to  collect  all  of  the  shipping 
upon  one  or  the  other  coast,  this  can  obviously  be  done 
much  more  expeditiously  and  much  more  economically, 
even  allowing  for  the  extra  cost  of  transshipment,  by  a 


FORTH  AND  CLYDE  SHIP  CANAL   169 

railway,  costing  at  most  perhaps  $200,000  a  mile,  —  one 
fifteenth  the  amount  of  the  proposed  water  route. 

Thus,  from  whatever  point  of  view  one  regards  this 
much-discussed  ship-canal  project,  it  appears  hopelessly 
visionary.  It  is  well  that  the  citizens  of  Glasgow  have 
come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  commercial  benefits  of 
such  a  canal  would  not  be  suflBcient  to  warrant  their 
undertaking  its  construction  unaided;  they  will  not  under- 
take the  project  unaided.  And  it  is  fortunate  for  the 
present  state  of  the  imperial  exchequer  that  the  Govern- 
ment has  not  been  made  to  believe  that  the  strategical 
importance  of  the  project  is  of  suflScient  value  to  warrant 
the  necessary  appropriations  for  carrying  out  the  scheme. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE    WATERWAYS    OF    GERMANY.      COST,    TRAFFIC 
DEVELOPMENT,    AND    FINANCIAL    SUCCESS 

1.  The  rivers  of  the  German  states  have  been  used  from 
time  immemorial  as  agents  of  transport,  and  the  construc- 
tion of  canals  dates  back  for  centuries.  As  early  as  the 
year  791,  Charlemagne  is  said  to  have  caused  surveys  to  be 
made  for  a  canal  to  connect  the  Danube  and  Main  Rivers, 
but  the  work  was  not  carried  out.  The  Finow  Canal,  near 
Berlin,  however,  was  opened  to  traffic  in  1609,  and  the 
Friedrich  Wilhelm  Canal  was  completed  in  1668.^  During 
the  next  two  centuries  waterways  continued  to  be  the 
chief  means  of  transport  in  Germany;  and  it  was  not  until 
about  1850  that  railways  began  to  play  an  important  role 
in  the  carrying  of  freight  and  passengers.  The  develop- 
ment of  railways  in  Germany,  however,  was  accompanied, 
as  in  other  countries,  by  a  decline  in  water  transport,  which 
remained  unchecked  until  the  inauguration  of  govern- 
mental supervision  of  water  transportation  in  the  seventies. 
Between  1875  and  1900  the  waterway  system  of  the  country 
was  completely  reorganized.  Existing  waterways  were  im- 
proved and  a  number  of  new  canals  were  constructed,  and 
the  whole  administration  thereof  was  placed  under  the  con- 
trol of  a  Waterways  Department  in  the  Ministry  of  Public 
Works.  The  principal  new  projects  completed  during 
these  years  were  as  follows :  ^  — 

Canalization  of  the  Main  from  Mayence  to  Offenbach. 

Canalization  of  the  Lower  Spree. 

Canalization  of  the  Fulda  from  Cassel  to  Munden. 

1  Gerhardt,  Die  Woche,  June  18,  1910,  p.  1027. 

^  Sympher,  London  Daily  Chronicle,  April  7,  1906. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  GERMANY       171 

Canalization  of  the  Upper  Oder. 
Construction  of  the  Dortmund-Ems  Canal. 
Construction  of  the  Elbe-Trave  Canal. 

In  addition  to  these  the  lower  Weser  was  canalized,  and 
the  Kaiser  Wilhelm  and  Konigsberger  Canals  were  con- 
structed; but  as  these  projects  are  for  the  benefit  of  sea- 
going vessels,  they  may  not  properly  be  classed  with  inland 
waterways. 

Following  the  inauguration  of  the  new  policy,  traflSc 
rapidly  developed,  from  2,900,000,000  ton-kilometers  in 
1875  to  11,500,000,000  ton-kilometers  in  1900.  ^  Encour- 
aged by  this  increase  of  water  tonnage,  the  Administra- 
tion passed  two  important  laws  in  1904  and  1905  for  a 
still  further  extension  of  the  waterway  net  of  the  country. 
These  laws  provide  for  an  outlay  of  $1 16,430,200  ^  upon 
rivers  and  canals,  an  amount  almost  equal  to  Prussia's 
entire  expenditures  upon  waterways  up  to  1904.  It  is 
expected  that  all  the  new  projects  will  be  completed  by 
the  year  1917. 

From  the  remarkable  development  of  traffic  upon  the 
waterways  of  Germany  immediately  following  their  re- 
habilitation, and  from  the  fact  that  the  Prussian  Govern- 
ment has  deemed  it  advisable  to  appropriate  an  enormous 
amount  of  money  for  a  still  further  development  of  inland 
navigation,  it  would  seem  perhaps  that  we  might  at  once 
consider  the  question,  whether  the  waterways  of  Germany 
have  been  successful  under  the  conditions  there  existing, 
as  answered  in  the  affirmative.  A  careful  analysis  of  the 
character  and  the  extent  of  the  development  of  water- 
borne  freight,  and  of  the  accompanying  costs  of  such 
development,  will  show,  however,  that  German  waterways 
have  not  uniformly  enjoyed  the  success  with  which  they 
are  usually  credited. 

'  Sympher,  Die  neuen  vxisserwirtachajtlichen  Gesetze  in  Preussen,  1905w 
p.  17. 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  50-51. 


172        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

2.  In  the  first  place,  the  great  increase  in  German  water- 
borne  tonnage,  when  taken  merely  by  itself,  is  almost  sure 
to  be  misleading.  It  should  be  borne  in  mind  in  this 
connection  that  during  the  period  in  question  Germany 
has  grown  with  astonishing  rapidity.  Beginning  shortly 
after  the  formation  of  the  Empire  in  1871,  the  country 
underwent  a  transformation  that  has  hardly  been  paral- 
leled anywhere  in  the  Old  World.  Between  1871  and  1905 
the  population  increased  from  41,000,000  to  60,641,298, 
or  47,7  per  cent.^  Far  more  significant,  however,  than  the 
mere  increase  in  numbers,  is  the  increase  of  business  done 
within  the  country.  This  is  reflected  in  the  amount  of 
traffic  handled  on  the  railways  and  waterways  combined. 
The  development  of  traffic  between  1875  and  1905  is 
shown  in  the  following  table:  ^  — 


Waterwats 

Railways 

Year 

Length 
(miles) 

Ton- 
mileage 
(000,000) 

Increase 
per  cent 

Length 
(miles) 

Ton- 
mileage 
(000,000) 

Increase 
per  cent 

Tear 

1875 
1885 
1895 
1900 
1905 

6200* 

1798 
2976 
4650 
7130 
9300 

66 
56 
53 
30 

16,430 
22,940 
27,780 
30,750 
33,730 

6,758 
10,292 
16,430 
22,878 
27,652 

52 
60 
39 
21 

1875 
1885 
1895 
1900 
1905 

•  The  number  of  miles  of  waterway  actually  increased  by  185  during  these  years.  Some 
new  canals  were  built,  and  some  old  ones  abandoned.  The  general  result,  however,  is  not 
materially  affected  by  the  slight  inaccuracy  of  the  table. 

The  total  traffic  moved  by  water  and  by  rail  was  8,556,- 
000,000  ton-miles  in  1875;  in  thirty  years  it  more  than 
quadrupled,  reaching  the  enormous  total  in  1905  of  36,- 
952,000,000  ton-miles.  In  the  light  of  such  an  industrial 
expansion,  it  is  apparent  that  the  important  point  to  be 
considered  is  not  so  much  the  absolute  increase  of  water- 
borne  freight  as  the  relative  increase,  as  compared  with 

1  Statistisches  Jahrbuch,  1909,  p.  1. 

2  Report  of  Royal  Commission  on  Canals  and  Inland  Navigations  of  Great 
Britain,  vol.  vi,  p.  211. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  GERMANY        173 

that  on  the  railways.    The  above  table  gives  the  oppor- 
tunity for  such  a  comparison. 

The  percentages  show  that  Germany's  waterway  traflSc 
has  increased  in  about  the  same  proportion  as  that  of 
her  railways.  While  the  total  ton-mileage  for  the  period 
increased  by  323  per  cent  on  the  railways,  that  by 
water  shows  a  growth  of  only  239  per  cent.  On  the  other 
hand,  however,  the  waterway  increase  took  place  with  but 
a  slight  increase  in  mileage,  while  the  railway  mileage  a 
little  more  than  doubled  during  the  period;  the  increase  in 
the  number  of  ton-miles  per  mile  is  therefore  more  signifi- 
cant than  the  mere  ton-mileage.  The  increase  of  tonnage 
per  mile  on  the  waterways  was  417  per  cent,  as  against 
an  increase  of  100  per  cent  on  the  railways.^  Since,  how- 
ever, the  base  figures  are  in  both  cases  much  larger  for 
the  railways,  a  corresponding  allowance  must  be  made  in 
the  percentage  columns  in  favor  of  the  railways.  On  the 
whole,  therefore,  the  waterways  and  railways  may  be  said 
to  have  enjoyed  fairly  equal  development.  In  no  sense 
can  the  expansion  of  waterway  traflSc  be  considered  ex- 
ceptional. It  has  merely  kept  good  pace  with  the  general 
industrial  growth  of  the  country. 

3.  There  is  another  consideration  to  be  regarded  in  con- 
nection with  the  development  of  water  traffic  in  Germany 
which  is  of  the  greatest  importance  for  the  purpose  of  our 
study.  The  differences  between  transportation  on  arti- 
ficial and  on  natural  waterways  have  been  discussed  in  a 
previous  chapter;  and  it  has  also  been  shown  that,  on  ac- 
count of  differences  of  industrial  and  geographic  conditions, 
some  naturally  navigable  rivers  may  be  of  little  use,  while 
others,  even  within  the  same  country,  may  carry  enormous 
quantities  of  freight.  It  will  therefore  prove  instructive  to 
ascertain  whether  the  development  of  waterway  traffic  in, 
Germany  has  been  evenly  distributed. 

*  Report  of  Royal  Commisaion,  vol.  vi,  p.  211. 


174        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

In  1902  the  total  number  of  ton-kilometers  of  traffic  car- 
ried on  all  the  waterways  of  Germany  was  11,500,000,000; 
and  of  this  amount  the  seven  great  canalized  rivers,  the 
Memel,  Vistula,  Oder,  Elbe,  Weser,  Rhine,  and  Danube,  car- 
ried 9,350,000,000  ton-kilometers,  or  81  per  cent  of  the  total. ' 
The  increase,  likewise,  has  been  greatest  upon  these  large 
rivers.  "The  great  increase  in  water-borne  traffic  in  Germany 
...  is  mainly  upon  her  important  rivers.  In  1875  the  seven 
main  rivers  carried  60  per  cent  of  the  total  traffic,  and  in 
1905,  80  per  cent.  On  the  Rhine,  alone,  between  Kehl  and 
the  Dutch  frontier,  43  per  cent  of  the  total  traffic  of  the 
country,  and  on  the  Elbe,  between  Hamburg  and  the  Aus- 
trian frontier,  24  per  cent  was  carried."^  The  latter  part 
of  the  above  quotation  deserves  especial  notice.  On  the 
two  rivers,  the  Elbe  and  the  Rhine,  there  was  carried  in 
1905,  67  per  cent  of  all  the  traffic  on  German  waterways. 
The  length  of  the  Rhine  within  German  territory  is  about 
S55  miles  and  of  the  Elbe  386  miles,  making  a  total  of  741 
'miles.^  The  total  length  of  all  the  waterways  of  the  coun- 
ttry  is  7582  miles,  and  of  the  actually  important  ones  6155.^ 
These  two  rivers  comprise,  therefore,  only  12  per  cent  of 
the  important  waterway  mileage  of  the  country;  yet  they 
carry  67  per  cent  of  the  entire  water-borne  traffic.  The 
Rhine,  alone,  handles  43  per  cent  of  the  entire  amount,  and 
has  a  mileage  of  less  than  6  per  cent  of  the  total  of  the  im- 
portant waterways.  In  fact,  the  tremendous  development 
of  the  Rhine  traffic  is  chiefly  responsible  for  the  apparently 
good  showing  indicated  by  the  above  statistics.  "In  1875 
the  average  tonnage  per  mile  upon  the  river  for  the  355 
miles  above  the  frontier  of  Holland  was  1560;  by  1905  it 
had  mounted  to  11,400,  an  increase  of  631  per  cent."^ 

1  Sympher,  London  Daily  Chronicle,  May  10,  1906. 
'  Preliminary  Report  of  the  {United  States)  National  Waterwayt  Coin- 
mission,  1910,  p.  28. 

'  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  p.  182. 

*  Sympher,  London  Daily  Chronicle,  April  7,  1906. 

•  Preliminary  Report  of  National  Waterways  Commission,  p.  29. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  GERMANY         175 

Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  development  of  Ger- 
man waterway  traffic  has  thus  been  confined  mainly  to  two 
great  rivers,  the  above  statistics  of  total  traffic  are  custom- 
arily presented  as  evidence  of  the  success  of  all  German 
waterways,  whether  natural  or  artificial,  whether  in  an  in- 
dustrial or  agricultural  region.  That  such  statistics,  when 
unanalyzed,  are  sure  to  be  misleading,  is  clearly  obvious. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  proceed  further  in  this  direction  at 
present.  Enough  statistical  data  have  been  presented  to 
make  it  apparent  that  if  we  are  to  ascertain  whether  Ger- 
man waterways,  both  natural  and  artificial,  are  successful 
in  all  sections  of  the  country,  we  must  leave  the  general  and 
take  up  the  particular,  that  is,  make  a  separate  investiga- 
tion of  the  development  that  has  occurred  on  each  of  the 
important  waterways  of  the  country.  In  this  study  we 
shall  inquire  at  what  cost  the  various  water  routes  have 
been  developed,  the  extent  of  traffic  development  that  has 
taken  place,  and  the  financial  results  of  each  project.  We 
shall  further  give  attention  to  the  various  geographic  and 
industrial  conditions  that  have  affected,  either  favorably 
or  unfavorably,  each  particular  waterway.  These  are  the 
points  which  may  serve  to  illuminate  our  own  waterway 
question.  It  is  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  in  this  treatment 
we  shall  be  applying  American  tests  to  German  conditions. 
In  the  following  chapter,  however,  we  shall  discuss  the  gen- 
eral transportation  policy  of  Germany  from  the  German 
point  of  view. 

4.  Statistics  of  water  traffic  are  collected  at  each  of  the 
important  ports  on  the  various  waterways  of  the  country. 
Were  we  to  combine  the  totals  for  each  port  on  a  given 
route,  a  large  portion  of  the  tonnage  would  have  been 
counted  twice.  In  the  absence  of  data  as  to  the  total 
amount  of  freight  movement  on  particular  waterways,  we 
shall  in  each  case  present  the  statistics  for  the  port  of  larg- 
est traffic.  For  the  purposes  of  our  discussion  these  will 
be  found  to  be  sufficiently  accurate* 


176        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 


The  most  important  inland  waterway  of  Germany  is  the 
Rhine  River.  The  extent  and  character  of  its  traflSc  de- 
velopment may  best  be  shown  by  the  statistics  of  export 
and  import  for  a  period  of  years  at  Emmerich,  on  the  bor- 
der of  Holland.  They  are  as  follows:^  — 


Year 
(annual 

Imports 

Exports 

Total 

Floating 
timber 

average) 

i873-75 

818,000 

1,554,000 

2,372,000 

76-80 

1,108 

2,020 

3,128 

13,000 

81-85 

1,726 

2,594 

4,320 

18 

86-90 

2.482 

2,760 

5,242 

31 

91-95 

4,004 

3,021 

7.025 

29 

9(1-00 

7,703 

3,728 

11,431 

29 

1901-05 

9,934 

6,373 

16,307 

22 

06 

13,402 

7,678 

21,080 

14 

07 

16,000 

7,189 

23,189 

21 

08 

14,193 

7,625 

21,818 

17 

The  character  of  the  traflBc  for  the  year  1908  was  as 

follows :  ^  — 


Imports 

EXPOBTS 

Commodity 

Tonnage 

Per  cent 

Commodity 

Tonnage 

Per  cent 

Iron  ores    .     . 

5,798,121 

40.8 

Coal      .     .     . 

4,559,149 

59.7 

Grain    .     .     . 

2,696,940 

19.0 

Iron  (worked) 

804,009 

10.5 

Wood  .     .     . 

1,409,975 

9.9 

Earths  .     .     . 

693,928 

Ores  (other)    . 

894,935 

6.3 

Stone    .     .    . 

468,452 

Coal      .     .     . 

527,636 

3.7 

Cement     .     . 

238,016 

Petroleum 

436,324 

Fertilizers 

121,355 

Rape  seed 

292,800 

Cement      .     . 

271,397 

Fat  oils     .     . 

127,081 

Stone    .     .     . 

114,400 

Metal    .     .     . 

112,382 

Flour    .     .     . 

111,636 

Sugar   .     .    . 

107,517 

Total    .    .     . 

12,701,144 

89.5 

90.3 

1  Statistik  des  deutscken  Reichs,  1909,  Binnenschiffabrt,  p.  14.  Through- 
out this  chapter  the  tonnage  statistics  are  in  metric  tons.  A  metric  ton  is 
equal  to  2105  English  pounds;  the  difference  is  slight,  and  so  long  as  mere 
increases  are  being  shown,  there  is  nothing  gained  by  a  change  to  English 
tonnage. 

»  Ibid.,  p.  37. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  GERMANY        177 

This  table  shows  that  a  comparatively  small  number  of 
bulky  commodities  comprise  nearly  the  whole  traffic,  while 
two  or  three  commodities  alone  make  up  over  half  the  en- 
tire tonnage.  We  shall  find  it  instructive  to  inquire  into  the 
industrial  conditions  which  have  produced  so  large  a  traffic 
in  these  few  particular  commodities. 

The  first  and  by  far  the  most  important  point  to  be  noted 
is  that  the  Rhine  passes  through  the  great  Westphalian  coal 
region,  the  most  productive  on  the  continent  of  Europe.  This 
one  fact  alone  accounts  for  70.2  per  cent  of  all  the  exports 
over  the  Dutch  border.  Partly  manufactured  iron  is  added 
to  the  coal  in  obtaining  this  figure,  its  existence  being  en- 
tirely due  to  the  presence  of  coal.  Of  the  imports,  the  ores 
brought  in  to  be  manufactured  in  the  coal  regions  may  be 
directly  set  down  as  a  result  of  the  location  of  the  river  near 
the  coal-fields.  These  comprised  41.7  per  cent  of  the  total 
upstream  traffic  passing  through  Emmerich  in  1908.  The 
existence  of  these  rich  coal-fields  along  the  Rhine,  more- 
over, has  obviously  given  rise  indirectly  to  much  of  the 
remaining  traffic. 

The  second  point  to  be  observed  is  that  the  connections 
and  tributaries  of  the  Rhine  are  exceptionally  favorable  to 
traffic  development.  The  canalized  Main  River,  together 
with  the  Main-Danube  Canal,  form  a  connection  with  the 
great  Danube  River  flowing  through  the  centre  of  Austria 
to  the  Black  Sea.  The  Neckar,  joining  the  Rhine  at  the 
large  inland  port  of  Mannheim,  reaches  the  rich  rock-salt 
region  near  Heilbronn.  This  salt  finds  a  natural  market  in 
the  Ruhrort  industrial  region,  where  it  is  used  in  the  pro- 
cess of  iron  and  steel  manufacture.  At  Strassburg,  the  head 
of  navigation  on  the  Rhine,  the  river  is  joined  by  the  Rhine- 
Rhone  and  Rhine-Marne  Canals,  which  lead  across  the 
border  to  the  waterways  of  France. 

The  utility  of  these  excellent  tributary  sources,  and  of 
the  Rhine  itself,  however,  could  not  be  fully  developed 
were  there  but  a  scanty  population.  Under  however  favor- 


178        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

ing  natural  conditions,  the  density  of  traflBc,  by  rail  or  by 
water,  very  closely  corresponds  with  the  density  of  popula- 
tion. Within  Germany  on  the  banks  of  the  Rhine  are  ten 
cities  of  more  than  fifty  thousand  people,  six  of  them  with 
more  than  a  hundred  thousand.  Frankfort-on-the-Main, 
only  twenty-three  miles  from  the  Rhine,  may  be  added  to 
the  list.^  All  of  these  cities  are  great  consuming  centres, 
especially  for  imported  grain,  a  commodity  constituting 
in  1908  nineteen  per  cent  of  the  total  upstream  traflBc. 

The  interior  coal  traflac  is  also  very  important  by  reason 
of  this  large  population  along  the  river.  The  great  indus- 
trial cities  of  Mannheim  and  Frankfort,  on  the  upper 
Rhine  and  the  Main  respectively,  secure  their  coal  from 
the  Ruhr  district,  near  the  lower  Rhine.  At  Mannheim 
coal  and  grain  together  comprised  in  1906  nearly  two 
thirds  of  the  total  traffic  received,^  and  at  Frankfort  in 
1908  coal  alone  made  up  44.7  per  cent  of  the  total  up- 
stream traflBc' 

Another  factor  to  be  noted  is,  that  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Rhine  in  the  Netherlands  is  the  great  world  port  of  Rotter- 
dam. The  construction  of  what  is  called  the  Rotterdam 
Waterway  removed  practically  the  only  impediment  to 
navigation  on  the  entire  river.  Ever-moving  sandbanks 
near  the  old  outlet  of  the  river  rendered  navigation  so  dan- 
gerous that  in  1866  the  Government  of  Holland  undertook 
the  construction  of  a  canal  outlet  to  the  sea.^  As  a  result  all 
of  the  German  hinterland  has  participated  in  the  benefits 
of  an  excellent  harbor  and  outlet  without  having  to  share 
their  cost. 

Having  now  found  how  exceptionally  favorable  are  the 

*  Chisholm,  Annual  Report  of  Smithsonian  Institution,  1907,  p.  354. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  356. 

*  Statistik  des  deutschen  Reichs,  supra,  p.  9.  This  trafiSc,  for  the  most 
part,  does  not  pass  through  Emmerich  and  hence  the  tonnage  is  not  in- 
cluded in  the  above  table.  It  is  set  forth  here  in  explanation  of  traflBc 
development  on  the  upper  Rhine. 

*  See  chapter  xiv. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  GERMANY        179 

commercial  conditions  of  the  Rhine  territory,  we  may  pass 
to  a  consideration  of  the  character  of  the  river  itself. 

In  the  first  place,  the  Rhine  is  remarkably  straight,  the 
river  distance  between  Strassburg  and  the  Dutch  frontier 
being  only  41  miles,  or  about  13  per  cent  greater  than  that 
by  rail. 

Second,  with  the  exception  mentioned  above,  near  its 
mouth,  in  Holland,  the  river  has  required  comparatively 
little  regulative  work.  The  only  section  of  dangerous  waters 
has  been  that  between  Bingen  and  St.  Goar,  a  distance  of 
about  18  miles,  and  an  expenditure  of  $1,712,500  was  suflB- 
cient  to  perfect  this  part  of  the  stream.^  In  all,  for  the  355 
miles  of  navigable  river  within  Germany,  the  canalization 
costs  between  1866  and  1898  amounted  to  $4,250,000.2  As 
compared  with  the  enormous  outlays  necessary  to  control 
the  majority  of  American  rivers,  this  sum  is  almost  insig- 
nificant in  amount. 

Third,  the  current  of  the  Rhine  is  not  strong,  the  aver- 
age descent  being  only  1.14  feet  per  mile.^  This  condition 
alleviates  the  dangers  of  downstream  navigation  and  at 
the  same  time  lessens  the  cost  of  propulsion  or  towage  up- 
stream. No  locks  are  required  on  any  portion  of  the  river. 

Fourth,  there  are  very  few  interruptions  to  traffic  on  ac- 
count of  floods,  drought,  or  winter's  ice.  The  river  is  fed 
by  the  melting  of  the  glacial  ice  of  the  Alps  Mountains, 
and  hence  the  supply  of  water  is  comparatively  uniform 
throughout  the  year.  There  are  very  few  destructive  spring 
floods,  the  average  interruptions  to  traffic  from  that  cause 
being  but  two  days  a  year.^  No  costly  bank  protections, 
levees,  or  huge  impounding  reservoirs  are  required.  The 
climate  of  the  region  is  such  that  ice  closes  navigation  on 
the  average  but  seventeen  days  each  year.^ 

*  International  Ausstellung,  Mailand,  1906,  Wasserbau,  p.  135. 

'  Kommissionsbericht  Uber  die  Wasserstrasaen  Vorlage  des  Jahres  1904, 
p.  286. 

*  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vi,  p.  182. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  68.  »  Ibid. 


180        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

Finally,  the  capacity  of  the  river  is  amply  sufficient. 
Barges  with  a  carrying  capacity  of  two  thousand  tons  can 
travel  as  far  up  the  river  as  Mannheim,  351  miles  above 
Rotterdam,  while  800-ton  barges  can  reach  Strassburg,  the 
present  head  of  navigation.  Thus  both  the  commercial 
and  the  geographic  conditions  promote  to  an  unusual  de- 
gree the  successful  navigation  of  the  Rhine. 

In  still  another  manner,  however,  has  shipping  on  the 
Rhine  been  favored,  namely,  by  the  administrative  policy 
of  both  Germany  and  the  Netherlands  in  maintaining  the 
river  free  of  tolls.  Including  Holland's  expenditure  upon 
the  Rotterdam  Waterway,  the  present  outlet  to  the  sea, 
about  $40,000,000^  has  been  spent  by  the  two  countries 
in  regulative  works.  It  is  not  attempted,  however,  by  the 
Governments  of  these  countries  to  recoup  themselves  at 
the  expense  of  shippers.  In  Germany  in  the  year  1905, 
there  was  a  total  net  outlay  on  the  part  of  the  State,  for 
maintenance  and  operation,  including  interest  and  sinking 
fund  at  3.5  per  cent,  of  $750,215.2  This  may  be  taken  as 
approximately  the  average  yearly  outlay.  Shippers  are 
thus  given  outright  by  the  State  each  year  a  sum  equal  to 
about  $2000  per  mile  of  river  length. 

The  shipping  is  carried  on  by  independent  shipping 
companies,  and  it  is  obvious  that  the  rates  they  charge 
need  be  sufficient  merely  to  cover  the  cost  of  the  boats  and 
the  haulage  charges,  together  with  a  reasonable  profit  on 
this  investment.  Even  the  harbor  facilities  are  furnished 
them  by  the  various  cities  (Ruhrort  by  the  State),  and  the 
rates  charged  for  their  use  are  very  low;  usually  much  less 
than  would  be  necessary  to  cover  the  cost  of  mainten- 
ance plus  interest  on  the  investment.' 

It  is  interesting  to  note,  in  passing,  that,  between  Frank- 

*  Chisholm,  supra,  p.  359.    ^  Peters,  Schiffahrtsabgaben,  part  in,  p.  260. 

'  It  would  seem  to  have  a  bearing  upon  the  question  of  competition 
with  the  dividend-paying  railways  that  "  in  1902,  eight  out  of  nineteen 
shipping  companies  paid  no  di\'idends;  and  in  1903,  four  paid  none." 
(Chisholm,  supra,  p.  359.)  The  facts  as  to  later  years  are  unknown  to 
the  writer. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  GERMANY        181 


fort-on-the-Main^  and  the  Westphalian  region,  railways 
parallel  the  Main  and  the  Rhine  for  the  entire  distance, 
and  that  in  1907  the  amount  of  coal  carried  by  rail  was 
128,799  tons,  as  against  450,788  tons  by  river.^  At  all 
times  of  the  year  the  railways  were  able  to  maintain  com- 
petition in  spite  of  the  natural  advantages  of  these  par- 
ticular rivers,  and  the  artificial  advantages  in  the  way  of 
Government  subsidy  to  the  waterways. 

These  various  commercial,  geographic,  and  administra- 
tive advantages  have  combined  in  an  exceptional  manner 
to  further  the  transport  of  goods  on  the  Rhine.  Probably 
on  no  other  river  in  the  world  are  conditions  so  conducive 
to  the  development  of  water  traffic.  The  result  has  been 
that  in  a  limited  number  of  commodities,  chiefly  coal,  ores, 
and  imported  grain,  there  has  been  a  very  great  increase 
of  tonnage  during  the  past  thirty  years. 

5.  We  have  next  to  consider  the  canalized  river  Main,  a 
branch  of  the  Rhine  in  south  central  Germany.  The  work 
of  thorough  canalization  from  Mayence  to  Frankfort  was 
carried  out  by  the  Prussian  Government  between  1883  and 
1886.^  The  traffic  development  is  shown  in  this  table:* — 


Tear 
(annual  average) 

Received 

Dispatched 

Total 

1873-75 

76-80 

81-85 

86-90 

91-95 

96-00 

1901-05 

06 

07 

08 

28,000 

10 

10 

290 

524 

811 
1,018 
1,180 
1,079 

963 

2,000 

1 

2 
47 
96 
155 
224 
284 
265 
211 

30,000 
11 

12 

3.37 

620 

966 
1,242 
1,464 
1,344 
1,174 

^  Frankfort  is  only  twenty-three  miles  up  the  Main,  and  that  river  has 
been  canalized  to  permit  the  passage  of  the  large  Rhine  boats,  as  far  as 
Frankfort. 

*  McPherson,  Transportation  in  Europe,  1910,  p.  176. 

*  Die  Wasser  und  Hajenhauten  in  Frank Jurt-a.-M.  Statistischen  Tief- 
hauamt,  pp.  7-S. 

*  Statistik  des  deutschen  Reichs,  supra,  p.  15. 


182        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 


It  is  to  be  noted  that  a  rapid  development  began  imme- 
diately after  the  completion  of  the  canalization  works  in 
1886,  and  continued  to  increase  uninterruptedly  for  about 
twenty  years.  The  last  two  years  indicate  a  considerable 
falling  off  in  tonnage,  and  the  total  in  1908  was  appreci- 
ably less  than  the  average  during  the  earlier  years  from 
1901  to  1905.  The  years  1907  and  1908  were,  however, 
not  good  traffic  years  in  general;  consequently  too  much 
importance  should  not  be  attached  to  the  decline. 

It  is  hoped  that  the  completion  of  the  fine  new  harbor 
at  Frankfort  in  1911  will  serve  to  stimulate  traffic,  as  did 
the  canalization  works  in  the  eighties.  An  analysis  of  the 
character  of  the  present  traffic,  however,  indicates  that  a 
rapid  further  extension  is  doubtful.  In  1908  the  chief  com- 
modities received  and  dispatched  were  as  shown  in  the 
table  below :  ^  — 


Received 

DlSPATOBED 

Commodity 

Tonnage 

Per  cent 

Commodity 

Tonnage 

Per  cent 

Coal   .... 

430,469 

44.7 

Wood .     .     . 

29,486 

18.7 

Earths    . 

166.400 

17.3 

Ores    . 

37,045 

17.5 

Grain 

72,525 

Grain  . 

18,741 

Wood      . 

47.144 

Earths 

15,847 

Flour      . 

43,459 

Casks  . 

15,729 

Coke  .     . 

41,436 

Stone  . 

15,581 

Petroleum 

19,988 

Cement 

9,984 

Building-Stone 

15,571 

- 

Stone      .     .     . 

10,545 

- 

Total     . 

847,717 

88 

150,213 

71 

As  is  shown  by  the  table,  coal  makes  up  nearly  one  half  the 
total  tonnage  received.  This  coal  comes  from  the  Ruhrort 
region  along  the  lower  Rhine,  and  is  for  the  domestic  sup- 
ply of  Frankfort  and  the  surrounding  territory.  The  coal 
harbor  and  wharves  are  complete,  and  the  forwarding  busi- 
ness is  already  well  developed,  about  one  third  of  the  total 
amount  received  being  now  transshipped  to  rail  and  dis- 
'  Statistik  des  deutschen  Reichs,  ibid.,  p.  9. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  GERMANY       183 


tributed  to  near-by  towns.  ^  It  is  evident  that  the  fur- 
ther development  of  this  coal  traflBc  cannot  go  beyond 
the  general  industrial  development  of  Frankfort  and  its 
environs.  And  the  same  thing  is  obviously  true  of  most 
of  the  other  commodities  in  the  list.  The  demand  for  such 
materials  is  necessarily  limited  to  the  growth  of  the  region 
they  supply.  The  very  rapid  development  following  1886 
seems  to  have  been  due  not  so  much  to  the  growth  of 
Frankfort  as  to  the  diversion  of  this  traffic  from  the  rail- 
ways; and  the  failure  to  continue  to  expand  rapidly  in  the 
last  two  years  is  unquestionably  due  to  the  fact  that  diver- 
sion of  traflBc  from  the  railroads  has  ceased,  and  that  now 
the  development  must  be  merely  a  normal  one.  It  is  not 
expected  that  the  opening  of  the  new  harbor  will  attract 
manufactured  commodities  to  the  waterway.  Manufac- 
tured goods  do  not  travel  extensively  by  water  anywhere 
in  Germany.  But  even  though  it  be  granted,  then,  that 
the  development  of  traffic  on  the  Main  must  be  less  rapid 
in  the  future  than  it  was  in  the  years  immediately  follow- 
ing its  canalization  in  1886,  still,  has  not  the  net  result 
amply  rewarded  the  outlays  made  upon  the  river?  This 
question  will  be  considered  in  the  following  paragraphs. 

The  table  below  shows  the  expenditures  that  have  been 
made  in  order  to  perfect  the  navigation  of  the  river  :^  — 


Items 

Totals 

Per  mile 

Original  works,  1883-86 
Extensions,  1891-95  .     . 

$1,375,000 
745,000 

§3,120,000 
22,250,000 

$90,987 

City  harbor  and  facilities, 

1883-87      

Extensions,  1890-1900    . 
New  Harbor  * 

Land 

Construction  .     .     . 

Interest  loss    .     .     . 

1.625.000 
625,000 

8,000,000 

10,000,000 

2,000,000 

954,935 

Totals.     .     .     . 

$24,370,000 

§1,045,923 

*  These  statistics  were  furnished  by  Hermann  Uhlfelder. 
Statement  of  Hermann  Uhlfelder,  building  constructor  of  the  new  harbor. 
Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vi,  p.  197. 


184        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

It  will  be  observed  that  there  is  included  in  this  table  the 
cost  of  the  harbor  as  well  as  the  cost  of  canalization  of  the 
river.  In  counting  the  cost  of  waterways  in  the  United 
States,  it  is  common  to  include  only  the  cost  of  construct- 
ing the  canal,  or  of  canalizing  the  river.  But  a  waterway 
without  harbors  and  wharves  is  as  handicapped  as  a  rail- 
way without  terminals.  Well-equipped  railway  terminals 
attract  traffic  in  the  same  way  that  an  extensive  industrial 
or  commercial  harbor  tends  to  build  up  trade,  and  if  we  in- 
clude the  cost  of  railway  terminals,  we  must  obviously  in- 
clude also  the  cost  of  waterway  terminals,  when  making  a 
comparison  of  the  relative  cost  of  developing  the  two 
agents  of  transport.  The  table,  then,  shows  that  the  total 
cost  of  improving  this  river  for  a  distance  of  23.3  miles 
from  Frankfort  to  the  Rhine  was  $24,370,000,  or  $1,045,- 
923  per  mile. 

As  a  return  for  its  share  of  the  outlay,  the  Prussian  Gov- 
ernment levies  small  tolls  upon  vessels  passing  through  the 
locks.  These  are,  however,  insufficient  to  meet  the  annual 
charges  for  operation  and  maintenance,  and  for  interest 
on  the  capital  invested,  the  deficit  in  1905  being  $82,598.^ 
The  city  of  Frankfort,  on  its  side,  levies  a  few  nominal  har- 
bor dues,  and  charges  something  for  the  use  of  equipment, 
but  it  is  not  expected  that  after  the  new  harbor  is  com- 
pleted, the  direct  revenue  therefrom  will  equal  even  one  per 
cent  of  the  investment.^  This  leaves,  therefore,  a  yearly 
deficit  of  at  least  2.5  per  cent  on  the  capital  invested  in  the 
harbor.  (Interest  and  sinking  fund  Is  commonly  computed 
in  Germany  at  3.5  per  cent.^)   This  means  that  Frank- 

^  Statistics  of  operation  of  Prussian  waterways  are  not  officially  pub- 
lished yearly.  For  the  above  figures,  and  for  those  of  all  the  waterways 
subsequently  to  be  given,  we  are  indebted  to  Max  Peters,  who,  under 
government  appointment,  has  prepared  careful  tables  of  the  cost  and  ex- 
penditures on  all  the  waterways  of  Prussia.  His  tables  are  complete  to 
the  close  of  the  year  1905  only.   Peters,  Schiffartsabgaben,  p.  262. 

'  Statement  of  Hermann  Uhlfelder. 

*  The  interest  is  computed  at  3  per  cent  and  the  sinking  fund  at  .5  per 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  GERMANY        185 

fort  must  meet  each  year  a  deficit  of  at  least  $500,000. 
It  will  probably  greatly  exceed  that  amount.  Adding 
this  sum  to  the  annual  deficit  incurred  by  the  Prus- 
sian Government,  as  it  stood  in  1905,  gives  a  total  of 
$582,598.  This  represents  somewhere  near  the  amount 
of  the  annual  donation  of  the  people  of  Frankfort  and  of 
Prussia  in  general  for  the  benefit  of  shipping  on  the  Main. 

Viewed  from  the  standpoint  of  national  economy,  it 
should  be  considered  whether  these  millions  have  been 
profitably  expended.  In  1907  the  average  capitalization 
per  mile  of  the  railways  of  Prussia  was  111,687.^  This  in- 
cludes terminal  facilities  and  full  equipment  even  to  the 
rolling-stock,  whereas,  in  the  above  waterway  cost  com- 
putation, the  boats,  tugs,  etc.,  were  not  included,  they  be- 
ing constructed  and  owned  by  private  companies.  These 
figures  signify  that  nine  or  ten  fully  equipped  railways 
could  have  been  constructed  for  the  cost  of  the  canaliza- 
tion and  harbor  works  of  the  water  route,  leaving  the  boats 
still  to  be  supplied.  Were  a  railroad  constructed  for  the  sole 
purpose  of  carrying  bulky  freight,  it  is  obvious  that  the  cost 
per  mile  would  be  much  less,  probably  not  more  than  half 
that  of  a  road  designed  for  both  passengers  and  freight. 
As  we  shall  have  occasion  later  to  develop  this  point  in 
some  detail,  it  may  be  passed  by  here  as  a  mere  sug- 
gestion. 

Suppose,  now,  one  railway  were  constructed , — as  a  matter 
of  fact,  none  would  yet  be  needed,  even  were  the  water- 
way not  used,  the  existing  railways  still  being  adequate, 
—  but  suppose  one  railway  had  to  be  built  for  the  purpose 
of  handling  the  bulky  traffic  of  the  region.  At  the  full 

cent.  The  sinking  fund  is  regarded  as  a  deficit  on  account  of  water  trans- 
portation by  Mr.  Peters;  and  this  is  quite  proper,  so  long  as  in  making 
comparisons  with  railway  figures  a  similar  allowance  is  made. 

*  Statistisches  Jahrbuch  fur  das  deutsche  Reich,  1909,  p.  114.  It  is  said 
that  the  railways  of  Germany  have  been  greatly  overcapitalized  for  the 
purpose  of  making  the  dividends  appear  moderate  in  amount,  thus  pre- 
venting a  clamor  for  a  reduction  of  rates. 


186        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

average  rate  of  railway  construction  in  Prussia,  for  roads 
whose  greatest  use  is  for  passenger  traffic,  and  hence  are 
much  more  costly  than  they  would  needs  be  did  they  handle 
only  freight,  a  railway  between  Frankfort  and  Mayence 
would  cost  $2,602,317.  The  balance  against  the  waterway, 
which  costs  $24,370,000,  is  $21,767,683.  Suppose,  more- 
over, that  the  rates  on  this  railway  were  not  to  be  fixed 
high  enough  to  yield  a  profit;  suppose,  on  the  other  hand, 
that  it  were  even  run  at  a  loss ;  suppose,  if  you  please,  that 
the  $582,598  which  is  annually  donated  to  the  waterway 
were  presented  each  year  to  the  railway  in  question.  If  a 
freight  railway  should  thus  receive  an  annual  gift  equal  to 
about  23  per  cent  of  its  capitalization,  it  is  obvious  that  the 
freight  rates  might  be  enormously  reduced.  Were  the  same 
amount  given  to  the  existing  railways,  they  could  doubt- 
less carry  this  low-class  freight  for  nothing;  relying  upon 
fast  freight  and  passenger  traffic  for  dividends. 

Viewed,  however,  from  the  local  standpoint  of  Frank- 
fort alone,  the  odds  against  the  waterway  appear  not 
quite  so  overwhelming.  Were  it  not  for  the  waterway,  the 
city  of  Mayence,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Main,  or  Mannheim, 
a  little  above  Mayence  on  the  Rhine,  would  become  the 
point  of  transshipment  to  the  railways.  The  result  would 
be  that  Frankfort  would  lose  the  transshipping  business 
she  now  enjoys,  together  with  the  consequent  general 
stimulus  to  trade  such  transshipment  carries  with  it.  It  is 
impossible  to  compute  accurately  the  extent  and  import- 
ance of  this  business;  but  we  have  seen  that  one  third  of 
the  coal  received,  and  some  of  the  grain  and  other  mate- 
rials, is  annually  transshipped  at  Frankfort  and  forwarded 
to  near-by  cities  and  towns.  The  amount  of  coal  that  was 
transshipped  in  1908  was  in  the  neighborhood  of  150,000 
tons.  The  German  Government  estimates  the  cost  of 
transshipping  coal  from  ship  to  railway  at  ten  cents  per  ton.^ 

*  Frachtvergleichungen  fiir  gewisse  giiter  auf  dem  Bahn,See  und  Binnen- 
wasserwege,  p.  62. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  GERMANY         187 

We  shall  later  see,  however,  that  this  Government  rate 
is  merely  nominal  and  that  the  actual  cost  is  probably 
twice  the  scheduled  rate.  Thirty  thousand  dollars  a  year, 
then,  is  a  rough  computation  of  the  amount  of  money 
expended  each  year  in  Frankfort  in  consequence  of  the 
forwarding  of  coal. 

Of  the  other  56  per  cent  of  the  traflSc  received,  compara- 
tively small  amounts  were  transshipped.  The  earths,  such 
as  clay,  sand,  and  gravel,  as  well  as  the  stone,  cement,  and 
other  building-materials  were  doubtless  practically  all 
destined  for  local  consumption.  The  same  thing  is  largely 
true  of  the  grain  received,  for  the  surrounding  country 
raises  more  than  suflBcient  grain  to  supply  its  own  needs. 

If  we  should  consider  that  all  of  the  traffic  dispatched 
by  water  were  transshipped  from  the  railways,  the  total 
value  would  not  be  great,  as  only  211,000  tons  were  sent 
out  from  Frankfort  by  water  in  that  year.  Forty  thousand 
dollars  a  year  may,  therefore,  be  set  down  as  the  very 
maximum  value  of  this  transshipping  business  at  pre- 
sent. Adding  this  to  the  $30,000  above  makes  a  total  of 
$70,000  a  year.^  It  will  take,  therefore,  more  than  seven 
times  the  present  transshipped  traffic  to  repay  Frankfort 
directly  for  the  annual  outlay  of  approximately  $500,000 
a  year.  Many  generations  will  elapse  before  that  region 
will  afford  seven  times  its  present  traffic. 

It  may  be  argued,  however,  that  there  are  indirect 
benefits  which  accrue  from  the  mere  fact  of  a  city's  being 
a  shipping  centre.  Industries  are  naturally  attracted  to  a 
place  that  is  possessed  of  good  shipping  facilities,  and  a 
general  stimulus  to  the  prosperity  of  the  city  is  the  natural 
result.  It  is  not  to  be  questioned  that  such  benefits  are  of 
much  importance,  though  they  do  not  lend  themselves  to 
computation.  It  should  be  borne  in  mind,  however,  that 
something  like  a  sevenfold  development  is  necessary  to 

*  1908  was  not  quite  a  normal  year,  but  the  general  result  is  neverthe- 
less not  materially  affected. 


188 


WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 


overcome  the  present  margin  of  loss.  And,  again,  atten- 
tion should  be  directed  to  the  consideration  that  if  the 
city  of  Frankfort  should  donate  more  than  $500,000  to  a 
railway  each  year,  the  very  low  freight  rates  that  would 
doubtless  result  would  be  likely  to  attract  far  more  busi- 
ness to  the  city  than  does  the  waterway. 

6.  The  Saar  River,  in  southwestern  Germany,  is  another 
waterway  which  is  sometimes  regarded  as  fulfilling  its 
mission.  Tapping,  as  it  does,  the  rich  Saar  coal-fields,  it 
apparently  should  have  enjoyed  an  extensive  development 
of  traflSc.  The  table  below  shows  the  growth  that  has 
occurred  since  1873.  The  statistics  are  for  the  traffic 
passing  through  the  principal  locks,  at  Gudingen:^  — 


Year 
(annual  average) 

Upstream 

Downstream 

Total 

1873-75     .     .     . 

520,000 

95,000 

615,000 

76-80 

583 

59 

641 

81-85 

637 

91 

728 

86-90 

609 

193 

801 

91-95 

503 

245 

748 

96-00 

566 

275 

841 

1901-05 

560 

254 

814 

06 

571 

334 

905 

07 

480 

329 

809 

08 

417 

319 

736 

Of  the  traffic  upstream,  coal  comprised  98.7  per  cent  of  the 
total  for  1908;  and  of  that  downstream  the  three  commod- 
ities, iron  ore,  stone,  and  earth,  made  up  70  per  cent  of 
the  entire  amount. ^ 

It  is  seen  from  the  table  that  the  tonnage  has  but 
slightly  increased  since  1873,  and  that  in  1908  it  was  less 
than  it  was  twenty  years  earlier.  The  amount  of  coal 
handled  now  is  less  than  it  was  even  thirty-five  years  ago. 

The  total  expenditures  by  the  State  on  the  Saar  up  to 
April  1,  1906,  amounted  to  $2,060,429;  and  the  net  deficit 


*  Statistik  des  deutschen  Reichs,  tupra,  p.  15. 


«  lUd.,  p.  9. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  GERMANY 


189 


in  1905  was  $101,649.^  Notwithstanding  the  favorable 
location  and  the  heavy  Government  subsidies,  the  above 
statistics  indicate  that  the  waterway  has  failed  to  develop 
the  resources  of  the  territory  it  serves. 

7.  The  Rhine-Marne  Canal  extends  across  the  French 
border  and  connects  the  Marne  River  of  France  with  the 
Rhine  at  Strassburg,  the  head  of  navigation  on  that  river. 
Traffic  movement  since  1872  has  been  as  follows:'^  — 


Year 
(annual  average) 

Imports 

Exports 

Total 

1872-75     .     .     . 

124,000 

284.000 

408,000 

76-80     .     .     . 

91 

409 

500 

81-85     .     .     . 

124 

442 

566 

86-90     .     .     . 

246 

349 

595 

91-95     .     .     . 

307 

253 

560 

96-00     .     .     . 

348 

317 

665 

1901-05     .     .     . 

356 

345 

701 

06     .     .     . 

431 

425 

956 

07     .     .     . 

503 

354 

857 

08     .     .     . 

442 

303 

744 

The  traffic  is  seen  to  have  about  doubled  in  thirty-six  years, 
by  no  means  keeping  pace  with  the  general  development  of 
the  country  as  a  whole.  Of  the  tonnage  from  France  in 
1908,  61  per  cent  was  coal,  iron  ore,  and  coke,  and  of  the 
exports,  82.7  per  cent  was  coal  alone.^  The  presence  of 
minerals,  again,  is  seen  to  be  the  chief  cause  of  the  water- 
way traffic  that  exists. 

8.  Another  famous  waterway  of  southern  Germany  is 
the  Ludwigs,  or  Main-Danube  Canal,  connecting  the  Main 
and  the  Danube  Rivers.  Here  the  decline  in  water  traffic 
presents  a  striking  parallel  with  that  on  the  Erie  Canal  in 
the  United  States.  The  statistics  of  traffic  between  1852 
and  1892  are  as  follows  :*  — 

'  Peters,  supra,  pp.  260-62. 

*  Statistik  des  deutschen  Reichs,  supra,  p.  16.  *  Ibid,,  p.  9. 

*  Schranz,  Main-Donau  Kanal,  seine  Schicksale,  p.  68. 


190        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 


Year 

Ton-kilometers 

Tear 

Ton-kilometere 

1852 
57 
62 
67 
72 

463,780 
703.758 
934,690 
651,803 
475,591 

1877 

83 
87 
93 

358,370 
265,935 
254,733 
183,583 

Complete  statistics  later  than  1892  are  not  available  to 
the  writer,  but  in  1905  the  traffic  at  Nuremberg,  the  chief 
centre,  was  much  under  50,000  tons  both  ways.^  The 
average  haul  in  1892  was  only  2.2  kilometres.  The  length 
of  the  haul  had  formerly  been  much  greater;  at  present 
much  the  greater  portion  of  the  traffic  is  local. ^ 

This  rapid  decline  in  tonnage  took  place  in  spite  of  the 
fact  that  a  series  of  legislative  acts  after  1843  continually 
reduced  the  rates  of  toll  until  1876.'  The  combined  effect 
of  a  concurrent  decline  in  traffic  and  a  reduction  of  tolls 
upon  the  financial  status  of  the  canal  is  set  forth  in  the 
subjoined  table :  *  — 


Year 

Receipts 

Expenaes 

Surplus 

Deficit 

1847     .     .     . 

$43,911 

$  54.489 

$10,578 

53 

70,154 

43.433 

$36,732 

57 

84,353 

43.715 

41.538 

63 

71.338 

58,731 

12,507 

67 

49,198 

109,446 

60,348 

73 

36.389 

81,311 

44,923 

77 

33.002 

78,544 

45,543 

82 

24,534 

73,827 

48,293 

87 

28,342 

64,754 

36,414 

92 

23.010 

53,357 

29,157 

As  the  number  of  tons  moved  on  the  canal  in  1892  wa& 
83,447,  the  average  deficit  amounted  to  twenty -eight  cents 
per  ton.  This  was  for  moving  low-class  freight,  mainly 
sand  and  gravel,  an  average  distance  of  2.2  kilometres,  or 
1.36  miles.  To  this  must  of  course  be  added  the  small  tolls. 


'  Chisholm,  supra,  p.  359. 
»  Ibid.,  p.  107. 


*  Schranz,  supra,  p.  68. 
«  Ibid.,  pp.  111-12. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  GERMANY        191 

and  the  actual  freight  charges  made  by  the  owners  of  the 
boats,  as  well,  if  one  is  to  ascertain  the  complete  cost  of 
handling  this  traffic.  Were  one  so  disposed,  it  would  be 
interesting  to  compute  whether  the  value  of  the  freight 
was  equal  to  its  cost  of  transportation. 

9.  The  Danube  River,  before  reaching  the  Austrian 
border,  is  navigable  for  many  miles  in  Bavaria,  and,  as 
we  have  seen,  is  connected  with  the  Main  and  the  Rhine 
by  means  of  the  Ludwigs  Canal.  The  traffic  movement 
at  Passau,  near  the  Austrian  frontier,  has  been  as  fol- 
lows:^ — 


Tear 
(annual  average) 

Imports 

Exports 

Total 

1883-85      .     .     . 

80,000 

47,000 

127,000 

86-90 

194 

37 

231 

91-95 

170 

44 

214 

96-00 

208 

39 

247 

1901-05 

244 

55 

299 

06 

279 

69 

348 

07 

356 

92 

448 

08 

176 

105 

281 

These  statistics  indicate  only  a  very  slight  increase  as 
compared  with  that  on  the  Rhine  and  the  Main;  but  it  is 
of  more  importance  to  observe  that  the  total  quantity 
carried  is  insignificant  in  amount,  only  281,000  tons  in 
1908,  as  compared  with  1,174,000  at  Frankfort-on-the- 
Main  the  same  year.  This  cannot  be  due  to  the  lack  of 
capacity  of  the  river,  as  the  mean  depth  of  the  Danube 
above  Vienna  in  Austria  is  7.5  feet,  while  the  shallowest 
portion  of  the  entire  river  is  6.5  feet  deep.^  The  depth  of 
the  Main  below  Frankfort  is  only  7.2  feet,  while  above  that 
port  it  averages  only  about  4  feet.'  The  small  traffic  is 
doubtless  due  to  the  absence  of  a  large  supply  of  coal  along 
the  Danube. 

*  Statistik  des  deutschen  Reichs,  supra,  p.  16. 

*  Schranz,  supra,  p.  62.  '  Ibid. 


192 


WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 


10.  After  the  Rhine  River  system,  the  most  important 
inland  waterways  of  Germany  are  those  centring  about 
Berlin,  commonly  known  as  the  "Mark  Waterways."  The 
diagram  below  shows  Berlin  to  have  several  waterway 
connections  with  the  sea.  The  more  important  are  the 
routes  by  way  of  the  Havel  and  Elbe  Rivers  to  Hamburg, 
a  North  Sea  port;  or  to  Liibeck  on  the  Baltic,  by  way  of 


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the  Elbe  River  and  the  Elbe-Trave  Canal.  The  lines  are 
navigable  for  vessels  of  600  tons'  capacity.  The  alternative 
routes  are  by  way  of  the  Havel,  the  Finow  Canal,  and 
the  Oder  River  to  the  Baltic  port  of  Stettin;  or  by  way 
of  the  Oder-Spree  Canal  and  the  Oder  River  to  the  same 
port;  these  are  navigable  for  vessels  of  400  tons'  capacity.^ 
In  the  opposite  direction  the  Elbe  and  the  Oder  extend 
across  the  Austrian  border,  the  Oder  opening  up  the  great 
Silesian  coal-fields  of  southeastern  Germany.  Directly  east 
from  the  Oder,  a  short  distance  from  the  point  of  junction 
with  the  Oder-Spree  Canal,  extends  the  Warthe,  which,  with 
Sympher,  Die  neuen  wasserwirtschajilichen  Gesetze,  p.  6. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  GERM.VNY 


193 


the  Netze  River  and  the  Bromberger  Canal,  forms  a  direct 
connection  with  the  great  Vistula  (Weichsel),  in  eastern 
Germany.  Now,  the  "Mark  Waterways"  proper  are  those 
of  the  inner  circle  about  Berlin,  the  Havel  and  Spree,  to- 
gether with  the  canals  connecting  these  with  the  Elbe  and 
Oder.  But  since  all  of  the  rivers  mentioned  above  are  so 
closely  centred  about  the  metropolis,  it  will  prove  ad- 
vantageous to  consider  them  as  one  system. 

The  only  statistics  showing  the  traflBc  development  over 
a  considerable  period  of  years  are  those  of  the  tonnage 
received  at  Berlin  by  the  Spree  and  by  canals.  These  do 
not  represent  the  total  water  traffic  of  Berlin,  as  will  be 
later  seen;  but  for  purposes  of  comparison,  for  showing  the 
growth  of  traffic  that  has  occurred,  they  are  serviceable:^ — • 


Tear 
(annual  average) 

From  downstream 

From  upstream 

Total 

1873-75    .     .     . 

2,008,000 

742,000 

2,750,000 

76-80    .     .     . 

2,215 

733 

2,948 

81-85    .    .     . 

1,916 

1,043 

2,959 

86-90    .     .    . 

2,594 

1,556 

4,150 

91-95    .     .     . 

2,618 

1,914 

4,532 

96-00    .     .     . 

2,887 

2,004 

4,891 

1901-05    .    .     . 

3,531 

2,619 

6,150 

06    .     .     . 

3,890 

3,551 

7,441 

07    .    .     . 

3,058 

2,827 

5,985 

08    .     .     . 

2,769 

2,210 

4,979 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  traffic  in  recent  years  has  been  only 
about  double  what  it  was  from  1873  to  1875;  while  for  the 
same  period  on  the  Rhine,  the  increase  was  more  than  a 
thousand  per  cent.  It  is  to  be  observed  further  that  the 
amount  of  traffic  received  in  1908  was  but  slightly  greater 
than  was  the  tonnage  ten  years  earlier,  while  the  totals 
for  both  1J>07  and  1908  are  considerably  less  than  those 
for  1905.  The  decline  in  1907  and  1908  is,  however,  partly 
due  to  a  general  lethargy  of  industry. 

During  this  period,  when  the  water-borne  traffic  shows 
*  Statistik  des  deutschen  Reichs,  supra,  p.  12. 


194 


WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 


an  increase  of  about  100  per  cent,  the  population  of 
Berlin  increased  by  about  200  per  cent,  —  from  825,000 
in  1871  to  about  2,500,000  in  1908. 

The  character  of  the  traffic  is  equally  interesting.    Ir 
1908  it  was  as  follows  :^  — 


From  Downstream 

From  Upstream 

Commodity 

Tonnage 

Per  cent 

Commodity 

Tonnage 

Per  cent 

Coal      .     .     . 
Building- 
stones    .     . 
Timber     .     . 

Grain    .     .     . 

Earths  .     .     . 
Meal     .     .     . 
Oils.     .     ,     . 
Sugar   .     .     . 
Raw  iron  .     . 
Coke     .     .    . 
Stone  and 

stoneware  * 
Cement     .     . 

783,191 

769,158 
200,996 

179,349 
141,981 
82,204 
72,001 
70,295 
55,104 
52,378 

45,053 
40,490 

29 

28 

Earths    .     . 

Coal  .    .    . 
Building 

stones .     . 
Grain      .     . 
Cement  .     . 
Flour .     .    . 
Timber  ,     . 
Sugar      ,     . 
Metals    .     . 

1,117,895 

403,624 

302,408 
110,906 
110,039 
46,002 
24,632 
20,399 
11,037 

50 
18 
14 

Total .    . 

2,492,230 

90 

2,146,942 

97 

Again  we  find  that  a  comparatively  few  commodities  make 
up  nearly  the  whole  of  the  waterway  traffic.  A  very  import- 
ant point  to  be  considered  here,  also,  is  that  a  large  pro- 
portion of  this  traffic  is  of  local  origin,  and  hence  that  its 
carriage  by  water,  granting  it  to  be  cheaper,  can  be  of  no 
widespread  economic  importance  to  the  country,  savings 
for  short  distances  obviously  being  relatively  much  less 
important  than  those  across  long  stretches  of  territory. 
The  fact  is  that  85  per  cent  of  this  traffic  is  of  local  origin,'' 
traveling  a  distance  of  only  a  few  miles  to  its  destination. 
The  grain  traffic  amounted  to  179,349  tons  upstream, 
and  110,906  tons  downstream,  together  less  than  six  per 
cent  of  the  total  waterway  tonnage  received  at  the  metro- 

*  Statistik  des  deutachen  Reichs,  ibid.,  p.  5. 

*  Weltauastellung  in  Briissel,  1910,  p.  94. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  GERIMANY       195 

polis.  In  contrast  with  this,  2,696,940  tons  of  grain  passed 
through  Emmerich  on  the  Rhine  in  1908,  or  more  than 
nine  times  the  amount  received  by  water  at  Berlin. 

Some  tables  are  now  presented  which  are  of  the  first 
importance  as  showing  the  amount  of  traffic  carried  by 
rail  and  by  water  respectively  to  and  from  the  metropo- 
lis:»— 


Building  materials    .    . 

Coal 

Foodstuffs  (inc.  grain)  . 

Other    raw   and    partly 

manufactured  stutfs  . 

Timber 

Industrial  manufactures 
Sundry  wares   .... 


Total 


Per  cent 


1906 


RaU 


2,147,707 
3,252,893 
1,542,933 

1,167,156 
742,477 
632,232 
M8,332 


10,034,730 


Water 


6,502,790 

1,952,576 

735,977 

407,569 

439,133, 

12,342 

99,782 


9,650,175 


Total 


8,650,503 
4,705,469 
2,279,910 

1,574,725 

1,181,610 

644,574 

648,114 


DISPATCHED 


RaU 


157,194 
307,152 

288,147 

568,975 

90,634 

185,682 

1,031  ,'279 


19,684,905  ,2,629,063 


Water       Total 


745,839 


365,234 
344,110 
390,947 

689,306 

111,565 

201,555 

1,272,186 


3,374,902 


1907 


Building  materials    .    . 

Coal 

Foodstuffs  (inc.  grain)  . 

Other    raw  and    partly 

manufactured  stuffs  . 

Timber 

Industrial  manufactures 
Sundry  wares  .... 

Total 

Per  cent 


1,827,812 
3,632,990 
1,655,403 

1,173,393 
624,208 
609,945 
502,238 


10,025,989 


56.8 


4,617,286 

1,522,975 

698,749 

325,708 

343,120 

12,626 

98,772 


7,619,236 


43.2 


6,445,098 
5,155,965 
2,354,152 

1,499,101 
967,.328 
622,571 
601,010 


17,645,225 


211,084 
247,.507 
312,833 

627,.508 

91,628 

207,441 

1,104,814 


2,802,815 


78.6 


303,628 
19,984 
83,998 

86,363 

14,4.55 

16,528 

237,018 


761,974 


21.4 


517,712 
267,491 
396,831 

713,871 

106,083 

223,969 

1,341,832 


3,564,789 


1908 


Building  materials    .     . 

Coal 

Foodstuffs  (inc.  grain)  . 

Other    raw  and    partly 

manufactured  stuffs  . 

Timber 

Industrial  manufactures 
Sundry  wares  .... 

Total 

Per  cent 


1,573,801 
3,640,393 
1,718,259 

961,614 
516,580 
555,561 
503,867 

4,003,850 

1,616,629 

649,251 

307,841 

311,589 

10,495 

107,630 

5,577,6,51 
5,257,022 
2,367,510 

1,269,455 
828,169 
566,056 
611,497 

192,368 
259,719 
314,514 

527,805 

70,728 

213,005 

1,177,073 

294,314 

18,283 
105,782 

91,751 

11,107 

15,675 

164,152 

9,470,075 

7,007,285 

16,477,360 

2,755,302 

701,064 

57.5 

42.5 

79.7 

20.3 

486,682 

278,002 
420,296 

619,646 

81,835 

228,680 

1,341,225 

3,456,366 


1  Statiatische  Mitteilungen,  1909,  p.  262. 


196        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

Having  regard  first  to  the  totals,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the 
decline  in  tonnage  from  1906  to  1908  was  much  greater  on 
the  waterways  than  on  the  railroads.  That  dispatched  by 
the  railways  even  shows  a  substantial  increase.  It  should 
be  observed,  also,  that  the  railways  are  handling  much 
more  than  half  the  traffic  of  the  metropolitan  region,  and 
that  they  are  constantly  increasing  their  share  of  the  total. 
Of  the  traffic  received,  the  railways'  share  increased  from 
51  per  cent  in  1906  to  57.5  per  cent  in  1908,  and  of  that 
dispatched,  the  increase  was  from  77.9  to  79.7  per  cent  in 
the  same  years.  It  is  a  point  well  worth  considering,  also, 
that  in  1908  the  dispatched  traffic  of  the  waterways  was 
equal  to  only  10  per  cent  of  that  received,  while  on  the 
railways  the  proportion  was  28  per  cent.  This  appears  the 
more  significant  when  one  reflects  that  there  is  every  in- 
ducement for  the  private  canal  companies  to  offer  very  low 
rates  for  return  cargoes  of  some  sort,  rather  than  send 
their  boats  back  empty.  The  railroads,  on  the  other 
hand,  have  the  alternative  of  return  cargoes  made  up  of 
manufactured  goods.  Yet  only  20.3  per  cent  of  the  total 
traffic  sent  out  from  Berlin  in  1908  was  shipped  by 
water. 

In  building-materials,  alone,  which  include  sand,  gravel, 
bricks,  cement,  stone,  etc.,  did  the  waterways  carry  a 
greater  tonnage  than  was  handled  by  rail,  and  although 
all  of  this  is  of  local  origin  and  especially  adapted  to  water 
transit,  the  waterway  percentage  of  the  total  none  the  less 
decreased  from  74.3  per  cent  in  1906  to  70.8  per  cent  in 
1908. 

Foodstuffs,  generally  regarded  as  certain  water  traffic, 
except  where  perishability  is  a  factor,  do  not  appear  to 
advantage  on  the  Berlin  waterways.  In  1906  as  much  as 
67  per  cent  of  that  received  came  into  the  city  by  rail, 
and  73  per  cent  was  sent  out  over  the  railways.  In  1908 
these  proportions  had  increased  to  75  and  75  per  cent  re- 
spectively. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  GERMANY        197 

But  the  commodity  deserving  the  most  attention,  be- 
cause it  is  the  most  distinctively  a  waterway  commodity, 
is  coal.  The  above  table  shows  that  there  was  not  a  fall  in  g- 
off  in  the  coal  traffic  during  these  years,  the  total  quantity 
received  increasing  from  4,705,469  tons  in  1906  to  5,257,022 
tons  in  1908,  and  the  amount  dispatched  falling  off  merely 
from  344,110  tons  to  278,000  tons.  Of  that  received,  the 
railways  carried  67  per  cent  in  1906,  and  in  1908  they  had 
increased  their  proportion  to  69  per  cent,  while  of  the  coal 
sent  out  from  Berlin,  the  railways  increased  their  share 
from  89.2  per  cent  to  93.4  per  cent  during  the  years  in 
question. 

Reference  to  the  above  table  will  show  that  the  falling- 
off  in  traffic  on  both  railways  and  waterways  in  1907  was 
chiefly  in  building-materials.  Now,  since  the  waterways 
suffered  most  here,  on  account  of  their  larger  tonnage  in 
such  traffic,  it  would  have  seemed  that  they  should  have 
redoubled  their  efforts  to  supplement  their  heavy  losses 
by  capturing  a  larger  portion  of  other  commodities.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  railways  suffered  less  from  the  easing- 
up  of  building  activities  both  directly  and  relatively, 
since  building-materials  constituted  a  much  smaller  share 
of  their  total  tonnage  than  was  the  case  on  the  waterways. 
Nevertheless,  as  we  have  seen,  the  waterways  have  lost 
in  their  percentages  of  both  foodstuffs  and  coal,  the  two 
most  fruitful  fields  of  waterway  enterprise  after  building- 
materials. 

In  order  to  appreciate  the  better  how  the  waterways 
are  failing  to  fulfill  their  mission  in  the  carrying  of  coal,  it 
is  necessary  to  consider  the  sources  of  the  coal  which  is 
shipped  to  Berlin.  The  following  table  indicates  the  total 
quantities  brought  from  the  various  coal  districts  in  1907 
and  1908,  and  the  proportion  which  is  shipped  by  water 
and  by  rail  respectively:'  — 

*  Statistiache  Mitteilungen,  ibid.,  p.  105. 


198        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 


Cannel  Coal,  Coeb,  and  Bbikettb 


1907 

1908 

Soarce 

Total 

By  water 

Per 
cent 
water 

Per 
cent 
rail 

Total 

By  water 

Per 
cent 
water 

Per 
cent 
rail 

English  .... 
Weetphalian    .     . 
Saxon     .... 
Upper  Silesian 
Lower  Silesian     . 

1,164,511 

483,()30 

15,527 

2,101,904 
303,241 

967,920 
144,897 

709,423 
249,590 

83.1 
29.9 

33.7 
82.3 

16.9 
70.1 
100. 
66.3 
17.7 

1,439,890 

408,940 

14,887 

1,968,546 

39,127 

1,134,208 
105,503 

801,668 
36,775 

78.8 
25.7 

40.7 
94.0 

21.2 
74.3 
100. 
59.3 
6.0 

Grand  total*    . 

4,068,813 

2,071,830     46.7 

54.3 

3,871,390 

2,078,154 

50  9 

49.1 

•  These  totals  do  not  agree  with  those  in  the  above  table,  for  the  reason  that  they  do 
not  include  the  so-called  "  Braunkohlen." 


It  is  to  be  noted,  first,  that  about  four  fifths  of  the  English 
coal  arriving  at  Berlin  comes  by  water.  This  would  be 
expected  from  the  fact  that  it  must  cross  the  North  Sea 
to  the  port  of  Hamburg,  and  that  there  excellent  harbor 
facilities  are  afforded  for  transshipment  to  barges.  The 
water  route  thence  to  Berlin  is  capacious  enough  for  boats 
of  600  tons.  There  would  be  no  elimination  of  transship- 
ment here  if  this  coal  were  brought  to  Berlin  by  rail. 

Of  the  Westphalian  coal,  only  25.7  per  cent  travels  to 
Berlin  by  water.  The  route  here  is  by  way  of  the  Dort- 
mund-Ems Canal,  and  the  North  Sea  to  Hamburg,  and 
thence  to  the  metropolis.  The  much  greater  distance  of 
the  water  route  as  compared  with  that  by  rail  doubtless 
has  some  effect  upon  the  proportion  in  this  case. 

The  largest  part  of  the  coal  used  in  Berlin,  however,  is 
brought  from  the  Upper  Silesian  coal-fields  near  the  port 
of  Kosel,  on  the  Oder.  Though  this  river  is  navigable  for 
vessels  of  400  tons,  as  far  as  Kosel, ^  only  40.7  per  cent  of 
the  near-by  coal  is  shipped  to  Berlin  by  water.  It  is  a  point 
well  worth  noticing,  also,  that  about  three  fourths  as  much 
coal  is  imported  from  England  as  is  brought  from  the 
Silesian  district,  only  a  short  distance  away.  The  canaliza- 
tion of  the  Oder  has  not  yet  fulfilled  its  mission  in  develop- 
^  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vi,  p.  69. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  GERMANY 


199 


ing  the  domestic  coal  mines  of  the  "Fatherland."  In  1908 
there  was  an  increase  over  the  previous  year  of  23.6  per 
cent  in  the  coal  imported  to  Berlin  from  England,  and  a 
decrease  of  .6  per  cent  in  the  quantity  drawn  from  the 
Silesian  fields.  "Exceptional"  railway  tariffs  have  been 
established  for  this  Silesian  coal;  the  government  realizing 
that  the  water  route  cannot  be  depended  upon,  at  least 
in  its  present  condition. 

Other  coal  received  at  Berlin  in  large  quantities  is  that 
classed  as  Braunkohlen  and  Briketts.  The  amounts  re- 
ceived in  1907  and  1908  were  as  follows:  ^  — 


Year 

Total 

By  water 

Per  cent  by  water 

1907  .... 

1908  .... 

1,823,293 
1,961,106 

13,485 
6,325 

.008 
.003 

Practically  all  of  this  comes  from  the  Silesian  district,  and, 
as  is  shown  by  the  table,  the  amount  traveling  by  water  is 
almost  negligible. 

Briketts  are  extensively  used  for  household  purposes, 
and  the  reason  for  their  preferable  shipment  by  rail,  as 
well  as  all  coal  that  is  for  household  use,  is  that  the  break- 
age, when  brought  in  large  barges,  causes  a  serious  loss. 
"  The  best  coal  will  not  stand  the  rough  handling  it  receives 
at  the  hands  of  coal  tips  and  ponderous  self-loading  buck- 
ets. Coal  resifted  on  coming  out  of  the  barges  at  Mannheim 
after  its  second  transshipment,  —  the  first  being  from  rail 
to  water  in  Duisburg-Ruhrort,  —  shows  a  loss  in  value  of 
1.40  marks  per  ton  (33  cents)." ^  We  have  earlier  seen  how 
this,  with  other  causes,  prevented  the  shipment  of  coal, 
destined  for  household  purposes,  to  London  by  water.^ 

Having  seen  the  extent  of  traflBc  development  on  the 
waterways  surrounding  Berlin,  we  may  now  turn  our 


*  Statisiische  Mitteilungen,  svpra,  p.  105. 
'  Clapp,  The  Navigable  Rhine,  p.  105. 


'  See  pages  112-14. 


200        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

attention  to  a  consideration  of  the  cost  of  developing  such 
traffic.  It  is  quite  impossible  to  compute  the  cost  with 
any  considerable  accuracy.  Some  of  the  waterways  over 
which  the  Berlin  traffic  passes  are  also  used  in  more  or 
less  degree  for  other  traffic,  and  it  would  be  quite  unfair 
to  charge  off  their  total  cost  against  the  Berlin  com- 
merce alone.  Such  is  particularly  the  case  with  the  riv- 
ers which  form  the  tributaries,  so  to  speak,  of  the  "  Mark 
Waterways,"  immediately  surrounding  the  metropolis.  In 
the  case  of  the  Oder,  the  local  traffic  is  insignificant.  Of 
the  traffic  downstream  in  1908  from  the  upcountry  port 
of  Kosel,  for  instance,  94  per  cent  was  coal,  practically 
all  of  which  was  bound  for  Berlin.^  This  river  would  not 
have  been  canalized  in  its  upper  course  had  it  not  been 
for  the  possibility  of  furnishing  Berlin  with  coal  from  the 
Silesian  district.  We  may,  therefore,  consider  that  approx- 
imately three  fourths  of  the  expense  of  improving  the  Oder 
is  fairly  chargeable  to  the  Berlin  trade.  The  Elbe,  how- 
ever, enjoys  a  larger  degree  of  independence  from  Berlin, 
the  total  traffic  handled  at  Hamburg  in  1908  being 
8,778,000  tons,^  or  more  than  the  total  traffic  at  Berlin. 
The  greater  part  of  this,  however,  was  Berlin-Hamburg 
traffic.  Making  allowance  for  such  of  this  traffic  as  is 
independent  of  Berlin,  and  also  for  the  upstream  local 
traffic  on  the  Elbe,  we  may  yet  safely  conclude  that  at 
least  half  the  expenditures  on  this  river  have  been  for 
the  benefit  of  the  Berlin  trade.  On  the  Warthe,  the 
Netze,  and  the  Bromberger  Canal,  which  form  the  con- 
nection of  the  Oder  with  the  Vistula,  there  is  also  a 
considerable  local  traffic,  and  one  half  the  cost  of  this 
route  may  hence  be  charged  to  that  account.  The  "Mark 
Waterways,"  proper,  evidently  serve  mainly  the  Berlin 
trade.  On  the  basis  of  the  above  allowances,  we  may, 
then,  present  a  table  which  shows,  roughly,  the  total 
cost  of  developing  the  Berlin  waterway  system.  For  pur- 
*  Stalistik  ies  deutschen  Reichs,  supra,  p.  3.  *  Ihid.,  p.  4. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  GERMANY        201 


poses  of  reference  verification,  the  complete  statistics  are 
given  first,  and  the  necessary  deductions  are  made  in  a 
lump  sum  from  the  total  :^  — 


Length 

Capital  in- 
vested to 
April  1, 
1906 

Operation 

Deficit,   includ- 
ing'interest  and 
sinking  fund  at 
3.5  per  cent. 
1905 

Deficit 

Surplus 

Mark  Waterways  .     .    . 

Elbe 

Baale  and  Unstrub  (Elbe 

brauches) 

Oder 

Warthe 

Netze   ....... 

Bromberger    Canal    and 

Lower  Netze  .... 

715 
253 

140 

430 

215 

65 

25 

$22,564,491 
10,239,300 

2,048,515 

12,207,032 

2,009,204 

992,082 

636,867 

$419,002 

30,188 
542,395 
109,361 

1,996 

$507,667 
16,521 

$282,090 
777,378 

122,494 
969,641 

197,183 
51,244 

24,286 

Total 

2,(M3 

$50,697,491 

$2,424,316 

To  April  1, 
1905 

Ofbsation 

Habbob 

Deficit 

Surplus 

"(Mark)" 

$551,975 

73,509 

16,975 

177.577 

13,067 

1,988,923 
10,120 
7,500 

16,500 

67,700 

779 

117,338 

1,804,375 

755,000 

464,250 

120,550 

651 
2,565 

$3,256 

7,186 

800 

1,054 

21 

18,942 
341 
94 

843 
843 

8,064 
3,227 

$16,063 

6,162 
436 

60,615 

64 

Brandenburg 

(21be) 

Halle 

381 

(Oder) 

Frankfort-a.-Oder 

1,526 
28 

4,739 

65,708 

Kosel* 

10,006 

7,447 

Total 

$6,186,038 

$172,175 

.     .    . 

Grand  total .... 

$56,883,529 

$2,596,481 

Less  deductions    .    . 

$45,867,988 

$1,767,778 

*  Internal ionalaitastellung,  Mailand,  1906,  p.  108. 

No  deductions  are  made  in  the  statistics  of  harbors,  Magde- 
burg being  the  only  costly  one  not  very  closely  connected 
with  the  Berlin  traffic.  This  over-allowance  is  more  than 

*  These  statistics  have  been  assembled  from  Peters,  Schiffahrtsabgaben, 
pp.  260-74. 


202        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

offset  by  omissions.  Kiistrin,  an  important  harbor  on  the 
Oder  at  the  junction  with  the  Warthe,  is  not  included,  the 
statistics  not  being  available.  Mr.  Peters  tells  us,  more- 
over, that  the  statistics,  both  of  the  waterways  and  the 
harbors,  are  in  many  cases  incomplete,  records  having 
either  been  lost  or  never  kept.  Still  further,  the  harbor 
facilities  for  inland  shipping,  in  the  great  ports  of  Ham- 
burg, Liibeck,  and  Stettin,  are  not  included.  All  in  all, 
therefore,  we  may  conclude  that  the  amount  shown  in  the 
column  headed  "Less  deductions"  fairly  represents  the 
approximate  cost  of  perfecting  these  waterways  for  the 
purpose  of  carrying  the  Berlin  traflSc.  It  may  be  added 
that  even  in  case  this  table  should  be  considered  by  some 
as  charging  off  too  much  against  the  Berlin  traffic  the 
general  conclusion  to  be  reached  would  not  be  materially 
affected.  It  is  believed,  however,  that  the  table  is  duly 
conservative. 

It  appears,  then,  that  in  round  numbers  $45,000,000 
has  been  expended  in  Prussia  in  order  to  develop  the  Berlin 
waterways,  which  now  carry  considerably  less  than  half  of 
the  bulky  traffic  of  the  metropolitan  district.  Reference  to 
the  right-hand  column  of  the  above  table  shows,  more- 
over, that  water  transportation  is  heavily  subsidized  each 
year.  Of  the  waterways  proper,  only  those  of  the  Mark 
show  a  surplus  from  operation,  and  even  they  are  not 
able  to  cover  the  annual  interest  and  sinking  fund.  On 
the  Netze,  the  W^arthe,  and  the  Oder,  as  far  up  as 
Breslau,  there  are  no  tolls  whatever ;  ^  consequently  the 
deficits  from  operation  alone  are  here  very  heavy.  A 
few  of  the  harbors  are  able  to  make  ends  meet,  but,  as 
a  rule,  they  too  have  failed  to  earn  enough  to  pay  in- 
terest and  provide  a  sinking  fund.  In  all,  the  deficit  in 
1905,  an  excellent  traffic  year,  was  $1,767,778.  Since  the 
total  tonnage  received  at  and  shipped  from  Berlin  in  1908 
was  7,708,349,  the  year's  donation,  assuming  a  like  de- 
*  Sympher,  Die  neuen  wasserwinschafllichen  Gesetze,  p.  24. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  GERMANY        203 

ficit  in  1908  (it  was  undoubtedly  larger  ^  on  account  of 
the  heavy  decline  of  traflSc),  amounted  to  23  cents  a  ton. 
Recall  now  that  85  per  cent  of  the  Berlin  traffic  was  local, 
nearly  all  of  it  low-class  freight  of  small  value,  and  more 
than  half  of  it  sand,  clay,  gravel,  brick,  and  stone.  A 
cost  of  23  cents  a  ton  for  carrying  such  traffic  an  aver- 
age distance  of  15  or  20  miles  is  tremendously  heavy 
in  itself.  The  water  freight  rate  on  rock  salt  and  iron 
ore  from  Mannheim  to  Ruhrort  on  the  Rhine,  a  dis- 
tance of  202  miles,  is  only  29  cents  a  ton;^  while  in  the 
United  States  the  Illinois  Central  Railroad  hauls  coal  from 
southern  Illinois  to  Chicago,  a  distance  of  200  miles, 
for  62  cents  a  ton.'  This  rate,  moreover,  covers  the 
full  cost  of  the  transportation.  But  to  the  23  cents  a  ton 
above  is  still  to  be  added  both  the  tolls  which  the  Govern- 
ment levies  on  Government  waterways  and  the  actual 
charge  of  transporting  the  goods,  which  is  done  by  private 
companies  owning  their  own  boats  and  working  at  a  profit. 
With  an  outright  annual  gift  of  some  23  cents  a  ton,  the 
waterways  are  handling  much  less  than  half  and  an  ever- 
decreasing  portion  of  the  Berlin  traffic.  Of  the  traffic 
"naturally  belonging  to  the  waterways,"  the  proportion 
against  them  is  almost  as  surprising. 

11.  It  seems  in  place  to  consider  here,  before  passing 
to  a  discussion  of  other  German  waterways  which  are  in 
operation,  the  new  "Mark  Waterway,"  the  Berlin-Stettin 
Canal,  which  is  to  be  opened  in  1912.  This  canal,  which 
is  also  known  by  the  name  of  the  Berlin-HohensaatheD 
Waterway,  is  to  connect  Berlin  with  Stettin,  following  the 
route  of  the  Havel,  the  Finow  Canal,  and  the  Oder.  (See 
diagram  on  page  192.)    It  is  not  an  enlargement  of  the 

^  The  Government  publishes  no  annual  statistics  of  specific  expendi- 
tures for  w.aterway  operation;  hence  1905  has  to  be  used  as  a  basis. 
*  Sympher,  London  Daily  Chronicle,  June  2,  1906. 
'  Report  of  Chicago  Harbor  Commission,  1909,  p.  234. 


204        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

Finow  Canal;  a  new  canal  is  being  cut  and  the  present 
Finow  will  not  be  materially  altered. 

Rather  than  being  national  in  its  aim,  the  chief  pur- 
pose of  this  project  is  to  benefit  the  Baltic  port  of  Stettin. 
"It  is  hoped  to  restore  the  competitive  capacity  of  Stettin 
as  against  Hamburg  and  Liibeck.  Hamburg  is  benefited 
by  the  Kaiser- Wilhelm  Canal,  and  Liibeck  by  the  Elbe- 
Trave  Canal.  Also  the  newly  built  Oder-Spree  Canal, 
which  is  navigable  for  ships  of  400  tons'  capacity  has 
not  only  afforded  a  good  connection  between  Silesia  and 
Berlin,  but  also  greatly  improved  the  connection  of  Silesia 
with  Hamburg."^  This  quotation  is  from  an  official  state- 
ment, and  it  has  appeared  in  various  places.^  The  argu- 
ment is  that  since  Hamburg  and  Liibeck  possess  good 
waterway  connections  with  the  metropolis,  the  rival  port 
of  Stettin  must  be  favored  in  a  similar  manner.  The  needs 
of  traffic  and  the  cost  seem  to  be  secondary  considerations. 

The  canal  is  a  joint  project  between  the  Government,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  the  cities  of  Stettin  and  Berlin  on  the 
other.  The  Government  has  agreed  to  construct  the  water- 
way proper,  at  a  cost  of  $10,750,000,^  on  condition  that  the 
two  cities  interested  should,  after  the  opening  of  the  canal, 
annually  contribute  a  third  of  the  three  per  cent  interest 
deficit,  pay  a  yearly  sum  of  $108,750,  and  after  sixteen 
years  a  still  further  annual  amount  of  $18,000,  to  be  used 
as  a  sinking  fund  for  the  amortization  of  the  capital;  and 
in  addition  still,  they  are  to  advance  $163,750  each  year 
to  help  defray  maintenance  and  operation  expenditures, 
remaining  uncovered  from  the  receipts.'*  It  is  thus  appar- 
ent that,  at  least  for  many  years  to  come,  it  is  not  expected 
that  the  traffic  on  the  waterway  will  yield  a  revenue  even 

»  Gerhardt,  Die  Woche,  June  18,  1910,  p.  1028. 

*  Weltausstellung,  p.  165;  and  Sympher,  hondon  Daily  Chronicle,  Juae 
6.  1906. 

*  Gerhardt,  supra. 

*  Sympher,  Die  neuen  wassermrtschaftlickeu  Geaetze,  p.  51. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  GERMANY        205 

suflBcient  to  pay  running  expenses,  to  say  nothing  of  meet- 
ing interest  or  providing  an  amortization  fund. 

The  mere  cost  of  the  canal,  however,  constitutes  but  a 
fraction  of  the  total  outlays  connected  with  the  scheme. 
Under  the  waterway  law  of  1904.,  the  State  and  the  city 
of  Stettin  together  are  expending  $11,744,200  on  the  im- 
provement of  the  Lower  Oder.^  While  there  are  allied 
benefits  from  this  improvement,  in  the  way  of  protection 
from  spring  overflows  and  the  consequent  damage  to  agri- 
culture, the  larger  part  of  it  may  be  regarded  as  a  donation 
to  transportation.  In  addition,  the  city  of  Stettin  has  con- 
structed a  magnificent  harbor  at  a  cost  of  $5,337,945,  in 
anticipation  of  an  enlarged  waterway  to  Berlin.  The  total 
deficit  thereon  in  1905  amounted  to  $113, 394. ^  Prussia  has 
expended  upon  the  Stettin-Swinemunde  Harbor  $6,677,- 
002,^  but  as  this  is  of  great  naval  importance,  its  cost  may 
be  omitted  from  our  present  computation.  The  existence 
of  this  excellent  harbor  entrance  to  the  Oder  is,  however, 
of  much  commercial  value  to  the  port  of  Stettin,  some 
distance  upstream.  To  make  Stettin  a  seaport  and  give  it 
a  waterway  connection  with  Berlin  for  vessels  of  600  tons* 
capacity  is  costing,  then,  about  $27,832,145.  In  this 
amount  previous  expenditures  on  the  Oder  and  on  the  old 
Finow  Canal  are  not  included.  It  represents  merely  the 
approximate  total  cost  of  enlarging  the  competitive  capac- 
ity of  Stettin  as  against  Hamburg  and  Liibeck.  From  a 
national  standpoint,  now,  —  that  is,  disregarding  Stettin's 
gain  at  the  expense  of  her  rivals,  —  it  will  be  worth  our 
while  to  inquire  what  are  the  prospects  of  remuneration 
from  the  expenditure. 

The  old  Finow  Canal  has  a  capacity  sufficient  for  vessels 
of  only  170  tons'  burden,  while  that  of  the  new  waterway 
will  be  large  enough  for  vessels  carrying  600  tons.  The 
expected  result  of  this  enlargement  upon  freight  rates  is 

*  Sympher,  Die  neuen  wasserwirtschaftlichen  Geseize,  p.  50. 

*  Peters,  Schifahrtsahgahen,  pp.  268,  274.  »  Ibid. 


206        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

set  forth  in  the  following  official  statement:  "Through 
the  more  rapid  transport  of  commodities,  and  the  3.5  times 
enlargement  of  boats,  the  freight  costs  become  immensely 
cheaper.  It  is  hoped  that  between  Stettin  and  Berlin  there 
will  be  a  freight  moderation  of  from  17  to  19  cents  a  ton."^ 
A  saving  of  this  amount,  applied  to  the  entire  quantity 
of  freight  passing  through  the  Liebenwalde  locks  on  the 
Finow  Canal  to  and  from  Berlin  in  1908,  that  is,  3,369,000 
tons,2  shows  a  total  saving  of  $606,420. 

The  savings  on  new  traffic  must  be  computed,  not  as 
against  the  old  Finow  Canal,  but  as  against  the  Elbe  River 
to  Hamburg  or  Lubeck,  that  being  the  route  from  which 
traffic  is  to  be  diverted  for  the  benefit  of  Stettin.  It  is 
difficult  to  see  how  a  canal  with  nineteen  locks,  and  a 
longer  distance  than  the  Elbe,  affords  superior  advantages 
to  the  naturally  navigable  river.  It  would  seem  that  the 
only  way  in  which  the  new  route  can  take  traffic  away  from 
the  Elbe  is  by  more  heavily  subsidizing  that  traffic;  and  this 
is  obviously  a  national  loss.  Consequently,  we  may  leave 
such  additional  traffic  as  would  have  to  be  taken  from  the 
Elbe,  if  secured,  out  of  the  reckoning.  The  savings  must 
be  confined  to  the  existing  Finow  Canal  traffic,  and  to  that 
naturally  developing  along  the  route. 

Now,  the  annual  interest  on  the  $10,750,000,  the  cost  of 
the  waterway,  and  on  the  $11,744,200,  the  expenditure 
for  improving  the  Oder,  amounts  to  $674,826.  The  yearly 
contributions  of  Berlin  and  Stettin  for  maintenance  and 
operation  are  to  be  $163,750;  and  it  remains  to  be  seen  how 
much  in  addition  will  be  left  for  the  State  to  contribute 
for  this  purpose.  The  annual  deficit  on  the  Stettin  Harbor, 
using  1905  as  a  basis,  is  $113,394.  Taken  together,  these 
make  a  total  of  $951,970.'  It  follows  from  this  that,  even 
if  the  hoped-for  reductions  in  charges  of  from  17  to  19 
cents  a  ton  eventuate,  there  will  still  be  a  loss,  equal  to  the 

*  Weltausntellung,  supra,  p.  164.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  163. 

'  This  does  not  include  a  sinking  fund. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  GERMANY        207 

difference  between  the  $951,970  of  added  outlay  and  the 
$606,420  of  saving,  or  $345,550  each  year.  It  is  not  ex- 
pected, moreover,  that  there  will  be  any  consideraV)le 
increase  in  local  traffic  along  the  route  as  a  result  of  the 
new  canal.  The  success  of  the  project  admittedly  depends 
upon  the  Berlin-Stettin  through  traffic. 

It  is,  perhaps,  well  to  add  that  if  the  traffic  is  to  be 
diverted  from  the  Finow  Canal  in  order  to  secure  these 
savings,  all  the  outlays  that  have  been  made  on  the  Finow 
must  be  transferred  as  items  of  cost  to  the  new  project, 
and  be  included  in  its  capitalization.  If  this  be  done,  the 
above  figures  of  loss  will  be  proportionately  increased.  The 
cost  of  the  boats  for  the  600-ton  routes  have  also  to  be 
included. 

From  a  national  standpoint,  however,  the  question  is 
not  so  much  how  greatly  freight  charges  are  reduced  over 
the  Berlin-Stettin  route  by  means  of  the  deeper  canal,  as 
whether  it  is  good  economy  to  support  a  second  water 
route  when  one  alone  is  sufficient.  The  Elbe  route  is  far 
from  being  taxed  to  its  full  capacity,  and  the  existing  rail- 
ways have  not  been  overworked.  Dividing  the  traffic  over 
several  routes  involves  a  heavy  loss,  not  only  on  account 
of  the  unnecessary  construction  cost  entailed,  but  in  the 
actual  carrying  of  traffic  as  well.  The  larger  the  traffic 
on  a  given  route,  the  less  is  the  haulage  cost  per  unit  of 
commodity.  It  takes  nearly  double  the  labor  force  and  the 
general  equipment,  aside  from  the  boats  or  rolling-stock, 
to  operate  two  waterways  or  two  railways,  than  it  does  to 
operate  one  alone.  ^ 

There  is,  however,  another  side  of  this  question  to  be 
considered.  If  it  be  determined  that  the  ambitious  port 
of  Stettin  must  share  in  the  traffic  now  going  to  Liibeck 
and  Hamburg,  it  is  submitted  that  there  is  an  alternative 
method  by  which  this  result  may  be  secured.  Suppose  the 
total  estimated  annual  outlay  of  $540,000  for  interest  and 

'  For  an  enlargement  upon  this  point,  see  chapter  x,  pages  282-84. 


208        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

operating  deficit  were  to  be  devoted  to  reducing  the  railway 
freight  rates  between  Berlin  and  Stettin.  (This  figure  does 
not  include  the  cost  of  the  harbor,  because  that  would  still 
be  necessary  for  the  loading  of  the  ocean  vessels  from  the 
railways.)  No  new  railways  would  be  required  to  carry  the 
traflBc  that  maybe  expected  to  develop  beyond  the  capacity 
of  the  present  Finow  Canal.  For  some  years  to  come, 
at  least,  if  a  little  systematic  extension  of  railway  freight 
facilities  on  existing  railways  were  made,  they  could  easily 
handle  all  the  traffic  between  Berlin  and  Stettin,  including 
that  now  traveling  by  water.  The  length  of  the  waterway 
is  61.7  miles  ;^  and  the  annual  net  outlay  amounts, therefore, 
to  about  $8750  per  mile.  Give  this  amount  each  year  to 
a  railway  between  the  two  cities,  and  freight  rates  could 
be  reduced  to  such  an  extent  that  even  the  great  Elbe  itself 
would  find  difficulty  in  successfully  competing  therewith. 
The  case  is  analogous  to  that  of  Frankfort-on-the-Main. 
From  the  commercial  point  of  view,  therefore,  it  is  impos- 
sible to  discover  the  advantages  of  this  "  Grosschiff ahrts- 
weg"  even  to  the  enterprising  port  of  Stettin.  The  same 
expenditure  upon  railways  would  yield  much  larger  re- 
turns. 

12.  Another  of  the  seven  great  rivers  of  Germany  is  the 
Vistula,  or  Weichsel,  as  it  is  called  in  Germany.  It  rises 
in  Russia  and  crosses  the  eastern  part  of  Germany  for  a 
distance  of  153  miles  before  reaching  the  Baltic  Sea  at 
Danzig.  The  fall  is  but  .83  feet  per  mile,  even  less  than  that 
of  the  Rhine,  and  the  interruptions  on  account  of  floods 
average  but  three  days  each  year.^  It  has  required  almost 
no  canalization,  and  is  free  of  tolls.  The  statistics  of 
tonnage  at  Thorn,  near  the  Russian  border,  are  as  fol- 
lows :  ^  — 

*  Sympher,  supra,  p.  51. 

*  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  VI,  p.  183. 

*  Statistik  des  deutschen  Reichs,  1909,  p.  10. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  GERMANY 


209 


Year 
(annual  average) 

Export 

Import 

Total 

Floating  timber 

1873-75    .      . 

37,000 

124,000 

161,000 

1,101 

76-80   .     . 

58 

154 

212 

757 

81-85    .     . 

53 

89 

141 

869 

86-90    .     . 

29 

78 

107 

783 

91-95    .     . 

82 

65 

97 

681 

96-00    .     . 

43 

47 

90 

818 

1901-05    .     . 

56 

63 

119 

699 

06   .     . 

63 

66 

129 

1,013 

07  .     . 

58 

54 

112 

893 

08  .     . 

71 

64 

135 

546 

Despite  its  apparently  excellent  possibilities,  the  traffic  is 
seen  to  be  less  to-day  than  it  was  thirty-five  years  ago. 
The  timber  trade  is  naturally  falling  off  with  the  gradual 
exhaustion  of  the  adjacent  forest  supplies.  The  total 
amount  of  traffic,  aside  from  the  timber,  is  insignificant 
as  compared  with  that  on  the  Rhine,  or  even  the  waterways 
of  the  "Mark."  The  reasons  for  the  failure  of  traffic  to 
develop  on  the  Vistula  are  deferred  until  the  statistics  of 
traffic  for  the  other  waterways  of  eastern  Germany  have 
been  presented.  As  the  same  reasoning  applies  to  all,  they 
can  best  be  treated  together. 

The  situation  on  the  Warthe  and  the  Netze,  in  east 
central  Prussia,  is  little  better  than  that  on  the  Vistula. 
Their  location  in  relation  to  other  German  waterways 
could  hardly  be  improved  upon.  Running  due  east  and 
west,  together  with  the  short  Bromberger  Canal,  they  join 
the  Vistula  and  its  basin  with  the  Oder  at  Kiistrin,  and 
thereby  with  Stettin,  Berlin,  and  Hamburg.  (See  map 
on  page  223.)  There  would  seem  to  be  a  most  excellent 
opportunity  for  an  extensive  development  of  waterway 
traffic  between  the  agricultural  east  and  the  industrial 
west.  The  following  table  shows  the  extent  of  the  expan- 
sion of  traffic.  The  statistics  are  for  Kiistrin  at  the  junction 
with  the  Oder:^  — 

^  Statistik  des  deutschen  Reichs,  ibid.,  p.  11. 


210        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 


Tear 
(annual  average) 

Upstream 

Downstream 

Total 

Floating  timber 

1873-75    .     . 

52,000 

157,000 

209,000 

63,000 

76-80    .     . 

61 

192 

253 

73 

81-85    .     . 

71 

205 

276 

81 

86-90    .     . 

77 

235 

312 

94 

91-95    .     . 

98 

255 

353 

111 

96-00    .     . 

140 

400 

540 

126 

1901-05    .     . 

138 

429 

567 

131 

06    .     . 

145 

507 

652 

114 

07    .     . 

153 

405 

558 

141 

08    .     . 

178 

376 

554 

126 

While  the  total  has  a  little  more  than  doubled  since  1873, 
it  has  been  practically  stationary  for  the  last  ten  years; 
and  the  entire  amount  is  only  about  one  third  as  much  as 
the  coal  traffic  alone  at  Kosel  on  the  Oder. 

Near  the  eastern  end  of  this  route,  at  Bromberg,  on  the 
Bromberger  Canal,  the  movement  of  traffic  has  been  as 
follows:^  — 


Tear 

Toward  the 

Toward  the 

Total 

Floating  timber 

(annual  average) 

Vistula 

Netze 

1873-75    .     . 

21,000 

72,000 

93,000 

454.000 

76-80    .     . 

27 

58 

85 

351 

81-85    .     . 

35 

60 

95 

404 

86-90    .     . 

30 

42 

73 

480 

91-95    .     . 

14 

51 

65 

343 

96-00    .     . 

46 

86 

133 

405 

1901-05    .     . 

90 

127 

317 

383 

06    .     . 

91 

201 

293 

504 

07    .     . 

83 

193 

275 

458 

08    .     . 

109 

164 

273 

201 

While  the  barge  tonnage  has  here  appreciably  increased, 
it  is  only  half  as  large  as  that  at  Kustrin,  at  the  opposite 
end  of  the  route.  If  one  includes  the  timber  traffic,  the 
total  tonnage  is  now  little  more  than  it  was  in  1873. 

There  has  been  expended  upon  these  waterways,  exclu- 
sive of  harbor  construction,  $3,638,153.2  The  Warthe  and 
the  Netze  are  entirely  free  of  dues,  and  hence  the  annual 
deficit  is  very  large,  amounting,  together  with  that  on  the 

'  Statistik  des  deutschen  Reichs,  ibid. 

*  Peters,  Schifahrtnabgaben,  pp.  260-64. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  GERMANY        211 

Bromberger  Canal,  to  $272,713.^  The  policy  of  heavy 
subsidy  has,  however,  thus  far  failed  to  produce  gratifying 
results.  The  law  of  1905  provides  for  further  improvements 
calculated  to  increase  the  capacity  of  the  route  to  permit 
the  use  of  400-ton  vessels.^  The  story  of  the  ample  Vis- 
tula, however,  would  seem  to  indicate  no  great  quickening 
of  traffic  from  this  enlargement  of  the  Warthe  and  Netze. 
As  will  presently  be  seen,  the  character  of  the  country  is 
unfavorable  to  a  development  of  water  traffic. 

In  the  extreme  northeastern  part  of  Prussia,  flowing 
into  the  Baltic  Sea,  is  the  Memel  River,  with  a  length  of 
69  miles  in  German  territory.  The  river  is  of  ample  capac- 
ity and  has  a  fall  of  only  .48  feet  per  mile.'  The  traffic 
development  at  Schmalleningken,  near  the  Russian  border, 
has  been  as  follows :  *  — 


Year 

Exports 

Imports 

Total 

Floating  timber 

1876-80    .     . 

18,000 

140.000 

158,000 

480,000 

81-85    .     . 

16 

104 

120 

522 

86-90    .     . 

5 

88 

93 

725 

91-95    .     . 

6 

84 

90 

609 

96-00    .     . 

8 

81 

99 

718 

1901-05    .     . 

8 

147 

155 

610 

06   .     . 

11 

247 

258 

919 

07    .     . 

18 

184 

202 

984 

08    .     . 

17 

249 

266 

555 

Floating  timber  has  comprised  about  three  fourths  of  the 
entire  amount.  The  supply  of  that  cannot  continue  indefi- 
nitely. The  barge  traffic  has  increased  only  62  per  cent  in 
thirty  years,  and  is  inconsiderable  in  amount.  In  short,  the 
Memel  tells  the  same  story  as  do  all  the  waterways  of  east- 
ern Germany. 

It  remains  to  inquire  what  are  the  reasons  for  the  evi- 
dent failure  of  the  waterways  of  eastern  Prussia.  This  en- 

*  Peters,  ibid. 

*  Sympher,  Die  neuen  wassermrtschaftlichen  Gesetze,  supra,  p.  51. 
»  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vi,  p.  183. 

*  Statistik  des  deutachen  Reichs,  supra,  p.  10. 


212        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

tire  section  affords  an  excellent  illustration  of  several  points 
which  were  brought  out  in  chapter  iv,  in  connection  with 
the  various  influences  affecting  the  possibilities  of  success- 
ful water  transportation.  In  the  first  place,  the  waterways 
of  eastern  Germany  are  closed  by  ice  from  90  to  135  days 
each  year.^  This  is  as  against  an  interruption  of  17  days 
on  the  Rhine.  The  result  of  this  ice  is  probably  manifested 
not  only  during  the  season  of  closed  navigation,  but  through- 
out the  year;  for  much  traffic  which  might  employ  the 
waterways,  were  they  serviceable  at  all  times,  doubtless 
goes  to  the  railways,  where  there  are  no  interruptions. 

In  the  second  place,  along  none  of  the  rivers  of  eastern 
Germany  are  there  extensive  deposits  of  coal  or  other  min- 
erals. Subtracting  the  coal  and  ore  tonnage  from  the  to- 
tals of  the  Rhine  traffic,  as  was  seen,  would  more  than  cut 
it  in  twain.  It  was  brought  out,  also,  that  the  extensive  in- 
dustrial development,  consequent  upon  the  existence  of  the 
coal,  was  responsible  for  most  of  the  remainder  of  the 
Rhine  traffic.  It  is  easy  to  understand,  then,  how  the  ab- 
sence of  coal  near  the  rivers  of  the  east  may  alone  have 
caused  their  failure.  It  is  unfortunate  that  in  the  discus- 
sion of  waterway  development  in  our  own  country  more 
attention  has  not  been  given  to  this  crucial  consideration 
■of  the  location  of  the  deposits  of  coal  in  relation  to  the 
j)roposed  water  routes. 

Eastern  Germany  is,  however,  a  great  agricultural  re- 
gion, and  the  question  naturally  arises,  Why  does  not  agri- 
cultural produce  travel  extensively  by  water?  The  answer 
is  that  the  conditions  of  an  agrarian  region  are  such  that 
farm  produce  can  much  more  advantageously  travel  by 
rail,  and  the  Germans  generally  recognize  that  this  is  true. 
"The  raising  of  agricultural  produce  always  presupposes 
a  relatively  extensive  area  of  production,  and  is  thus  a  de- 
centralized industry,  on  which  account,  in  the  great  ma- 
jority of  cases,  it  is  only  the  railways  that  come  into  con- 
^  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  supra,  p.  57. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  GERMANY        213 

sideration  with  reference  to  their  transport."  ^  The  point 
is  that  practically  all  of  the  traffic  has  to  be  collected  by 
rail  in  any  case;  and  the  transshipments  to  waterway's 
would  dissipate  any  advantage  that  might  come  from  their 
being  sent  any  portion  of  the  way  by  water.  People  who 
believe  that  canals  should  be  run  out  across  the  prairies 
of  the  United  States,  and  those  who  believe  that  the  con- 
stant Federal  appropriations  for  the  development  of  insig- 
nificant streams  in  remote  congressional  districts  of  the 
West  and  South  are  bona  fide,  and  for  the  best  commer- 
cial interests  of  the  country,  would  do  well  to  ponder  over 
the  history  of  the  waterways  of  eastern  Germany.  With 
such  a  river  as  the  Vistula  carrying  little  more  than  100,- 
000  tons  of  traffic  each  year,  and  the  amount  gradually 
decreasing,  what  is  the  probability  that  a  great  canal, 
in  that  section  of  the  country,  with  its  huge  cost  of  con- 
struction and  maintenance,  would  be  of  economic  value 
to  the  nation  ? 

13.  There  remains  one  more  of  the  seven  great  rivers 
of  Germany  to  be  considered,  namely,  the  Weser.  This 
river  crosses  central  Prussia  for  a  distance  of  227  miles,  mid- 
way between  and  parallel  with  the  Elbe  River  and  the  Dort- 
mund-Ems Canal.  It  passes  through  the  densely  popu- 
lated industrial  district  of  Hanover  to  the  great  port  of 
Bremen,  and  by  means  of  the  canalized  Fulda  it  connects 
with  the  important  inland  port  of  Cassell,  in  southern 
Prussia.  The  average  fall  per  mile  is  only  1.67  feet,^  while 
the  depth  is  about  the  same  as  that  of  the  Elbe.  With  a 
combination  of  such  apparently  favorable  conditions,  one 
might  expect  to  find  a  tremendous  tonnage  on  the  Weser. 
No  statistics  are  available  earlier  than  1901,  but  for  the 
last  eight  years  the  traffic  at  Bremen  has  been  as  follows:  ^ 

^  Nasse,  die  Sch'ffakrt  der  deutschen  Strome.  In  Schriften  des  Vereins 
fur  Social  politik,  vol.  I,  p.  152. 

2  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  supra,  p.  182. 
'  Staiistik  des  deutschen  Reichs,  sufra,  p.  13. 


214        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 


Year 
(annual  average) 

Dispatched 

Received 

Total 

Floating  timber 

1901-05    .      . 

06  .     . 

07  .     . 

08  .     . 

151,000 
194 

188 
168 

280,000 
299 
323 
304 

431,000 
493 
511 
472 

1,000 
1 
1 
1 

The  tonnage  is  seen  to  have  been  at  a  virtual  standstill  for 
eight  years,  and  in  1908  the  total  is  only  one  twenty-ninth 
that  received  at  Hamburg,  and  only  one  eleventh  the 
amount  traveling  on  the  Dortmund-Ems  Canal. 

In  order  to  develop  this  traffic,  the  State  has  expended 
upon  the  river,  including  the  canalized  tributary,  the 
Fulda,  the  sum  of  $3,101,241. ^  The  net  deficit  from  opera- 
tion in  1905  was  $148,844.  If  to  this  be  added  the  interest 
and  sinking  fund  at  the  usual  rate,  the  total  yearly  deficit 
becomes  $257,388. ^  These  figures  do  not  include  expend- 
itures upon  harbors.  Now,  if  one  leaves  out  of  the  reckon- 
ing the  insignificant  amount  of  local  tonnage  along  the 
route,  the  deficit  for  the  431,000  tons  carried  in  1905  is 
equal  to  59  cents  a  ton.  A  yearly  donation  on  one  of  the 
great  natural  waterways  of  Germany  of  $257,388  secures 
a  traffic  of  under  500,000  tons  a  year.  An  annual  gift  equal 
to  59  cents  for  every  ton  of  freight  carried  utterly  fails  to 
attract  any  considerable  traffic  to  the  waterway. 

The  explanation  of  the  failure  of  the  Weser  to  develop 
traffic,  even  with  the  encouragement  of  heavy  Govern- 
ment subsidies,  seems  to  lie  mainly  in  the  fact  that  coal 
and  ores,  again,  are  wanting  here.  The  coal  from,  and  the 
ores  to,  the  Westphalian  industrial  region  are  more  con- 
veniently shipped  either  by  the  Rhine  or  by  the  Dort- 
mund-Ems Canal.  Since  Hanover  and  Bremen  are  much 
smaller  than  Berlin,  the  traffic  in  building-materials  is  rela- 
tively less  important  than  it  is  on  the  "  Mark  Waterways." 
The  upper  territory  drained  by  the  river  is  not  productive  of 


*  Peters,  supra,  pp.  250  and  254. 


*  Ibid. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  GERMANY         215 

large  amounts  of  raw  materials,  and  the  industries  of  ri- 
parian cities  are  mainly  manufacturing.  Hence  the  water 
traffic  is  inconsiderable.  The  Weser  is  an  excellent  illustra- 
tion of  the  waste  entailed  in  encouraging  water  traffic  in  a 
section  of  country  where  there  is  not  a  large  amount  of  coal 
or  other  raw  materials  awaiting  transport. 

14.  We  pass  now  to  a  consideration  of  the  greatest  in- 
land canal  of  Germany,  the  well-known  Dortmund-Ems. 
Constructed  between  1882  and  1899,  its  purpose  was  to 
afford  an  additional  outlet  for  the  coal  of  the  Westphalian 
district,  an  outlet  to  the  North  Sea  in  German  territory, 
something  hitherto  lacking.  It  was  thus  to  insure  a  de- 
gree of  independence  from  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands, 
via  the  Rhine,  and  to  benefit  the  northwest  German  port 
of  Emden  as  against  the  ports  of  the  Low  Countries.^  The 
location  could  hardly  be  improved  upon.  From  the  very 
centre  of  the  mining  territory  the  canal  runs  almost  due 
north,  a  distance  of  155  miles  to  the  North-Sea  port  of 
Emden.  (See  map  on  page  223.)  The  country  is  almost 
perfectly  level,  and  for  62  miles  of  the  distance  existing 
waterways  were  utilized,  leaving  only  93  miles  to  be  en- 
tirely excavated.  The  capacity  is  sufficient  for  barges  car- 
rying 600  tons.2 

The  statistics  of  total  traffic  since  the  year  of  its  opening 
are  as  follows :  ^  — 

1899 201,000  1904 1,186.000 

1900 476  5 1,518 

1 681  6 1,721 

2 876  7 2,011 

3 1,249  8 2,313 

The  following  table  shows  the  complete  cost  of  the 

project,  including    the    branch,    Ems-Jade    Canal,  near 

Emden :  — 

»  International  Ausstellung  (Mailand,  1906),  p.  172.  «  Ibid, 

•  Handworterhuch  der  Staatswisaenschaften,  vol.  v,  p.  768. 


216        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

Canal  proper  to  April  1, 1906 $17,812,243* 

Dortmund  Harbor l,306,888t 

Emden  Harbor l,725,000t 

Later  canal  works 1,375,000§ 

Ems-Jade  Canal 2,273,94211 

Total $24,493,073 

♦  Peters,  supra,  p.  264.  t   Ibid.,  p.  270. 

t  Report  of  the  Royal  Commission,  vol,  VI,  p.  197. 

§  Weltausstellung,  supra,  pp.  178-80.  II  Peters,  supra,  p.  264. 

This  total  cost  of  $24,493,073  is  equal  to  $157,648  per  mile 
for  the  155  miles  of  main  canal;  this  is  once  and  a  half  as 
much  as  the  average  capitalization  of  German  railways 
which  are  fully  equipped  for  both  freight  and  passenger 
service,  and  probably  three  times  what  it  would  have  cost 
to  build  an  all-freight  railroad.  The  above  statistics,  more- 
over, do  not  include  the  cost  of  boats,  a  very  important 
item,  as  is  apparent  from  the  amount  of  the  traffic. 

The  statistics  which  will  be  found  of  greatest  signifi- 
cance, however,  are  those  which  reveal  the  yearly  cost  of 
operation  and  maintenance.  The  State  fixes  the  tolls  that 
are  charged  for  the  use  of  the  waterway  at  a  very  low 
figure,  varying  from  7.5  to  14.5  cents  a  ton,  according  to 
the  character  of  the  freight;  while  the  harbor  dues  are  from 
.5  to  1.5  cents  a  ton.^  Although  the  harbor  dues  are  suffi- 
cient to  cover  the  mere  operation  outlays,  those  on  the 
canal  are  not  adequate  to  cover  even  running  expenses. 
In  both  cases  a  large  yearly  interest  has  to  be  paid  from 
general  taxation  sources.  In  the  following  table  are  gath- 
ered together  statistics  showing  the  yearly  deficit.  The  only 
available  statistics  are  those  for  the  year  1905,  as  furnished 
by  Mr.  Peters  :2  — 

Operation  deficit  on  Dortmund-Ems  Canal  $174,432 

Yearly  interest  and  sinking  fund,  at  3.5  per  cent  623,428 

Operation  deficit  on  Ems-Jade  Canal  16,471 

Yearly  interest  and  sinking  fund  at  3.5  per  cent  79,588 

Operation  surplus  on  Dortmund  Harbor  $31,361 

Yearly  interest  and  sinking  fund  at  3.5  per  cent       45,801 

Net  deficit  14.440 

Total  deficit  *  $.Q08,359 
*  Emden  Harbor  is  not  iucluded,  statistics  not  being  arailable. 
»  International  Ausstellung,  supra,  p.  180.      *  Peters,  supra,  pp.  264-70. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  GERINIANY        217 

The  astonishing  fact  is  here  disclosed  that,  in  order  to  en- 
courage traffic  on  the  prize  canal  of  Germany,  the  Govern- 
ment and  interested  cities  were  obliged  to  donate  to  the 
waterway  more  than  $900,000  in  the  single  year  of  1905. 
Let  us  see  what  this  amounts  to  in  the  way  of  freight  rates. 
In  the  year  1905  the  tonnage  carried  was  1,518,000. 
The  donation  in  that  year,  therefore,  amounted  to  a  frac- 
tion less  than  60  cents  a  ton.  It  is  regretted  that  financial 
statistics  of  a  later  date  are  not  available;  but  it  is  prac- 
tically certain  that  there  can  have  been  little  improvement. 
While  the  traffic  has  increased,  thereby  perhaps  apprecia- 
bly reducing  the  cost  of  haulage  for  each  unit  of  traffic, 
there  have  been  increased  capital  outlays  amounting  to 
$1,375,000,  the  interest  on  which  is  probably  sufficient  to 
counterbalance  the  saving  from  increased  tonnage.  The 
year  1905  may  consequently  be  regarded  as  typical. 

This  60  cents  a  ton,  however,  by  no  means  represents 
the  total  cost  of  transportation  on  the  canal.  It  is  merely 
a  bonus  given  to  attract  the  traffic  away  from  the  rail- 
ways. The  State's  tolls,  the  harbor  dues,  and  the  freight 
charges  of  the  boat  companies  are  yet  to  be  added.  We 
have  seen  that  the  tolls,  according  to  the  class  of  freight, 
vary  between  7.5  and  17.5  cents  per  ton.  Since  the  larger 
portion  of  the  tonnage  is  low-class  freight,  the  average 
charge  should  perhaps  be  placed  as  low  as  9  cents  a  ton. 
The  harbor  dues  varied  from  .5  to  1.5  cents  per  ton;  an 
even  cent  per  ton  will  not  be  far  from  the  average.  These 
dues,  then,  amount  to  about  10  cents  per  ton.  The  freight 
rates  on  the  canal  are,  for  all  classes  of  freight,  1.9  pfen- 
niges  per  ton  per  kilometer.^  At  least  three  fourths  of  this 
traffic  travels  practically  the  full  length  of  the  canal.  In 
1908,  of  the  downstream  traffic  through  the  Meppen 
locks,  76.5  per  cent  was  coal,  and  of  the  upstream  tonnage, 
67  per  cent  was  iron  ore.^  All  of  this,  at  least,  traveled 
practically  the  entire  length  of  the  canal.  Since  the  total 

^  Sympher,  London  Daily  Chronicle,  June  2,  1906. 

•  Slalistik  des  deutschen  Reichs,  supra,  p.  6. 


218        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

length  of  the  route  Is  250  kilometers,  one  may  safely  take 
200  kilometers  as  the  average  haul.  At  1.9  pfenniges  per 
ton  per  kilometer,  the  freight  cost  proper  is,  then,  approxi- 
mately 95  cents  a  ton.  Summarizing  :  $.60  (deficit)  ,+  $.09 
(tolls),  4-  $.10  (harbor  dues),  -|-  $.95,  (freight  charge )  = 
$1.74,  the  cost  per  ton  of  carrj'ing  low-class  freight  an 
average  distance  of  about  200  kilometers,  or  123  miles. 

It  should  be  noted  here  that  since  Prussian  railroads  are 
conducted  at  a  very  good  profit,^  this  waterway  rate  is  not 
computed  on  the  same  basis  as  are  railway  rates.  Were 
the  waterway  to  yield  a  large  net  revenue  to  the  State, 
the  rates  would  obviously  havt  to  be  much  more  than 
$1.74  a  ton.  It  should  be  stated  that  the  boat  companies 
attempt  to  make  a  profit  on  the  carrying  business,  but 
since  the  capital  invested  in  barges  is  very  small  in  com- 
parison with  that  invested  in  the  waterway  itself,  it  cannot 
be  said  that  this  fact  materially  affects  the  situation.  To 
earn  a  net  profit  of  2.5  per  cent  on  the  total  capital  invested 
in  the  waterways,  as  in  the  case  of  railways,  would  necessi- 
tate raising  the  water  rate  to  more  than  $2  a  ton.  These 
figures,  it  will  be  seen,  are  only  roughly  approximate,  for  by 
the  nature  of  the  case  it  is  impossible  to  make  a  mathe- 
matically exact  computation.  Accepting  the  above  figure, 
then,  as  only  approximately  accurate,  let  us  compare  it 
with  the  German  railway  rates. 

The  rates  on  the  German  railroads  are  2.49  pfenniges 
per  ton  per  kilometer  for  coal,  and  3.55  pfenniges  per  ton 
per  kilometer,  for  the  average  on  all  classes  of  goods. ^  If  all 
of  this  1,518,000  tons  of  canal  traffic,  therefore,  were  carried 
at  the  coal  rate,  the  cost  per  ton,  using  the  same  distances 
as  above,  would  be  $1 .25.  If  it  were  carried  at  the  average 
rate  of  all  commodities  on  the  railways  of  the  country,  the 
cost  would  be  $1.78  per  ton.   Since  76.5  per  cent  of  the 

*  See  page  231.  The  net  revenue  on  all  the  railways  of  Prussia  in  1905 
amounted  to  2.57  per  cent. 
'  Sympher,  London  Daily  Chronicle,  June  2,  1906. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  GERM\NY        219 

downstream  traffic  is  coal,  67  per  cent  of  that  upstream  is 
iron  ore,  and  nearly  the  whole  is  low-class  freight,  the  aver- 
age freight  rate  would  doubtless  be  under  $1.40  a  ton.  This 
is  as  against  more  than  $2  by  water.  And  even  yet,  it  should 
be  observed,  the  cost  of  transshipment  from  rail  to  water, 
and  vice  versa,  is  not  included  in  the  water  computation.  All 
in  all,  therefore,  water  transportation  is  here  seen  to  be 
much  more  costly  than  that  by  rail.^  No  better  illustration 
could  be  desired  than  the  Dortmund-Ems  Canal,  to  show 
the  fallacy  of  the  almost  universal  contention  that  canal 
transportation  is  essentially  cheaper  than  that  by  rail. 

A  word  should  perhaps  be  added  relative  to  the  success 
of  the  canal  in  fulfilling  its  mission  of  diverting  traffic  away 
from  the  ports  of  the  Low  Countries.  As  we  have  seen,  the 
traffic  on  the  Rhine  across  the  Holland  border  at  Emmer- 
ich has  increased  for  many  years  with  great  rapidity;  the 
fact  is  that  it  has  increased  more  rapidly  than  ever  since 
the  opening  of  the  canal. ^  Moreover,  the  canal  is  far  from 
capacious  enough  to  handle  the  more  than  twenty  million 
tons  of  Rhine  traffic;  consequently  a  very  large  degree  of 
independence  from  the  ports  of  Holland  and  Belgium  has 
not  yet  been  attained.  Still,  the  considerable  traffic  now 
passing  through  Emden  may  be  regarded  as  traffic  that,  in 
the  absence  of  the  canal,  might  have  passed  to  and  from 
the  sea  through  foreign  ports.  The  advantage  of  this  to 
Germany  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  gives  employment  to 
German  capital  and  labor  in  a  carrying  and  transshipping 
business  which  might  otherwise  go  to  the  Dutch  and  the 
Belgians.  We  shall  not  here  attempt  to  discover  if  these 
gains  are  more  than  sufficient  to  offset  the  greater  cost  of 
transport  by  the  canal  than  by  the  freely  navigable  Rhine. 
The  vital  point  is  whether  this  traffic  can  be  carried  to 

*  The  comparison  that  has  just  been  made,  it  is  needless  to  say,  is 
between  a  canal  and  a  railway  of  the  German  type.  Rates  on  American 
railroads  for  similar  traffic  are  substantially  lower  than  those  of  Ger- 
many. 

*  See  table,  page  176. 


220        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

Emden  cheaper  by  the  canal  than  it  could  be  by  rail.  The 
above  discussion  has  shown  that  the  odds  are  greatly  in 
favor  of  the  railway. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  in  another  connection,  in 
attempting  to  show  that  the  Dortmund-Ems  Canal  has 
not  injured  the  railways  of  that  district,  a  German  com- 
mission states,  in  proof  of  its  hypothesis,  that  the  railway 
traffic  between  Dortmund  and  Emden  has  greatly  in- 
creased since  the  opening  of  the  canal. ^  If  such  be,  indeed, 
the  fact,  —  if  with  tolls  so  low  that  the  canal  must  be 
supported  at  tremendous  public  expense,  it  still  does  not 
injure  the  railways,  it  must  follow  that  a  canal  on  even 
terms  would  be  a  poor  competitor  indeed.  The  increase 
of  traffic  on  the  railways  has  not  been  alone  in  high-class 
freight,  and  the  railways  have  not  lowered  their  rates  to 
meet  the  competition  of  the  canal.  Does  not  the  fact 
that  the  unsubsidized  railways  are  increasing  their  traffic 
in  spite  of  the  canal  indicate  that,  if  the  annual  subsidy 
paid  to  the  waterway  were  donated  instead  to  the  rail- 
ways, freight  rates  could  be  reduced  much  below  what 
they  now  are  either  by  water  or  by  rail  ?  It  is  at  least 
good  collateral  evidence  in  support  of  the  above  compu- 
tation showing  the  railway  cost  to  be  substantially  less 
than  the  complete  cost  by  water. 

15.  The  Kiel,  Kaiser- Wilhelm,  or  North-Baltic  Sea 
Canal,  as  it  is  variously  called,  furthers  rather  the  ocean 
than  the  inland  trade  of  Germany,  and  its  purpose  is 
strategic  rather  than  commercial.  The  canal  was  con- 
structed between  the  years  1887-95,  at  a  cost  of  $39,000,- 
000.2  The  length  is  53  miles,  and  it  saves  a  distance  of 
about  200  miles  for  vessels  bound  from  the  North  to  the 
Baltic  Seas,  avoiding  at  the  same  time  the  navigation  of 

1  Kommissionsbericht  iiber  die  wasserstrassen,  Vorlage  des  Jahres  1904, 
p.  51. 

*  Weltausstellung,  supra,  p.  170. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  GERMANY        221 

the  narrow  and  often  dangerous  waters  around  Denmark.* 
It  has  a  depth  of  29  feet  and  a  bottom  width  of  72  feet.^ 
The  strategic  importance  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  permits 
a  more  rapid  mobilization  of  the  German  fleet  in  either 
Baltic  or  North  Sea  waters,  as  the  exigencies  of  war  may 
demand,  and  at  the  same  time  obviates  the  necessity  of 
traversing  neutral  or  perhaps  hostile  waters. 

But  though  the  prime  purpose  of  the  ship  canal  is  thus 
strategic,  and  though  its  success  must  be  measured  on 
naval  and  not  on  commercial  grounds,  we  may  neverthe- 
less consider  its  commercial  side  with  profit,  as  it  is  obvi- 
ously freely  available  for  commercial  usage  in  time  of 
peace.  The  statistics  of  traffic  development  since  its 
opening  are  as  follows :  ^  — 

No.  of  Vesssels         Tonnage 

July  1,  1895-June  30,  1896 16,834  1.50.5,983 

1898 23,108  2,469,795 

1900 26,279  3,488,767 

1902 30,161  4.285,301 

1904 32,038  4,990,287 

1906 34,187  6,045,963 

1908 34,121  6,012,178 

While  this  table  shows  that  the  development  has  been 
steady,  the  totals,  considering  the  size  of  the  vessels  that 
the  canal  accommodates,  are  far  from  enormous.  The 
total  barge  traffic  at  Emmerich  on  the  Rhine  was  three  and 
one  half  times  the  total  of  the  Kiel  Canal  tonnage.  The 
St.  Mary's  Falls  Canal,  between  Lakes  Superior  and 
Huron,  had  a  traffic  in  1909  of  nearly  eight  times  as  much, 
—  46,751,717  tons.'*  At  the  same  time  the  initial  cost  of 
the  St.  Mary's  Falls  Canal  was  only  $10,000,000,  about 
one  fourth  that  of  the  Kiel  Canal. 

*  Preliminary  Report  of  National  Waterways  Commission,  p.  41. 

*  Weltausstellung,  supra,  p.  171. 

*  Preliminary  Report  of  National  Waterways  Commission,  supra,  p.  42. 

*  Monthly  Summary  of  Commerce  and  Finance  (U.  S.),  December,  1909| 
p.  1129. 


222        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

It  is  not  contended  that  the  savings  eflFected  through 
the  lessening  of  the  distance  for  commercial  vessels  plying 
between  the  Baltic  and  North  Seas  are  by  any  means 
sufficient  to  justify  on  commercial  grounds  alone  the  cost 
of  the  project.  Many  merchant  vessels  naturally  use  it, 
however,  in  preference  to  the  longer  route  around  Den- 
mark. 

It  is  interesting  to  know,  since  it  throws  light  on  the 
whole  question  of  ship  canals,  that  in  spite  of  its  great 
depth  and  capacity,  the  Kiel  Canal  has  already  proved 
inadequate.  Commercial  vessels  have  on  several  occasions 
gone  aground  and  tied  up  the  traffic  of  the  entire  route. 
Such  a  mishap  in  time  of  war,  either  to  a  commercial  or 
to  a  war  ship,  would  prove  fatal.  This  danger,  together 
with  the  fact  that  the  increased  size  of  both  merchant  and 
naval  vessels  since  the  opening  of  the  canal  in  1895  has 
rendered  it  already  too  small  for  the  larger  ships,  has  led 
to  an  enlargement  which  is  now  under  way.^  When  com- 
pleted, the  depth  will  be  36  feet  and  the  bottom  width 
134  feet.  The  estimated  cost  of  the  enlargement  is  $55,- 
750,000,^  considerably  more  than  the  entire  original  cost. 
This  will  make  a  total  cost  for  the  project  of  $94,750,000, 
or  $1,787,736  per  mile  of  waterway. 

16.  After  having  developed  the  navigation  possibilities 
of  the  principal  rivers  of  the  country,  and  having  sup- 
plemented the  routes  to  the  northern  coasts  by  the  Dort- 
mund-Ems Canal,  nothing  was  more  to  be  expected  than 
that  an  agitation  should  develop  for  the  joining  of  the 
several  parallel  north-and-south  routes  by  a  great  east- 
and-west  waterway.  A  glance  at  the  map  on  the  next 
page  shows  the  Rhine,  the  Dortmund-Ems  Canal,  the 
Weser,  the  Elbe,  the  Oder,  and  the  Vistula  to  form  a  series 
of  great  parallel  water  routes  from  north  to  south;  while 
dn  the  east,  the  Warthe,  the  Netze,  and  the  Bromberger 

*  Weltausstellung,  st{pra,  p.  172,  *  Ibid.,  pp.  173  and  176. 


224        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

Canal  form  an  east-and-west  line  almost  halfway  across 
the  country.  Why  not  complete  this  system  by  building 
a  great  canal  from  the  Rhine  to  the  Elbe,  there  connect- 
ing with  the  "Mark  Waterways,"  and  the  Oder;  and,  thus 
with  all  the  waterways  of  eastern  Prussia? 

The  attractiveness  of  the  project  led  to  the  introduction 
Df  appropriation  bills  in  the  Reichstag,  but  sufficient 
opposition  developed  to  defeat  the  scheme.  The  agricul- 
tural interests  of  the  East,  first  of  all,  opposed  it  because 
they  feared  that  it  might  stimulate  the  importation  of  for- 
eign grain  to  their  own  disadvantage.^  In  addition  there 
were  two  other  classes  of  opponents.  The  one  held  that 
the  waterways  of  the  country  were  already  sufficiently  de- 
veloped, and  that  a  further  expenditure  of  public  funds 
thereon  was  uncalled  for.  The  other  was  opposed  be- 
cause the  bill  carried  with  it  a  change  of  financial  policy 
as  regards  the  waterways  of  the  country,  a  change  propos- 
ing henceforth  to  levy  tolls  sufficiently  high  to  cover  all 
the  expenses  of  operation,  to  pay  interest,  and  to  provide 
a  sinking  fund  for  the  amortization  of  the  capital  involved.^ 
The  fear  in  the  minds  of  these  men  was  that  tolls  thus  high 
would  prohibit  extensive  traffic.  Although  the  Waterway 
Department  prepared  most  voluminous  reports,  tending 
to  show  the  economic  advantages  of  the  project  to  the 
country,  and  although  the  Government  attempted  coer- 
cion in  order  to  force  the  passage  of  the  bill,  the  opposition 
was  strong  enough  to  defeat  the  measure.^  It  is  still  hoped, 
nevertheless,  eventually  to  put  it  through. 

The  victory  of  the  opposition  was,  however,  only  par- 
tial. Another  bill,  to  connect  the  Rhine  with  the  Weser, 
with  an  extension  as  far  as  Hanover,  was  later  passed,  on 
April  1,  1905.*  (This  law  also  authorized  the  Berlin- 
Stettin  Waterway,  which  we  have  already  treated.)    We 

'  Statement  of  Professor  Schmoller. 

*  Peters,  Schiffahrtsahgahen,  part  III,  p.  305. 
'  See  page  256. 

*  Sympher,  Die  neuen  wassermrtschaftlichen  Gesetze,  supra,  p.  51. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  GERMANY         225 

may  profitably  spend  a  few  moments  in  considering  the 
Rhine-Weser,  or  Rhine-Hanover  Canal,  as  it  is  designated 
on  the  map  on  page  223. 

The  waterway  is  composed,  as  is  seen,  of  several  di\'is- 
ions,  but  for  our  purposes  we  may  consider  it  as  a  single 
project.  The  combined  length  of  the  route,  including  the 
branch  canals,  is  236.5  miles,  and  the  total  cost  is  esti- 
mated at  $62,687,500,1  or  an  average  of  $265,625  per  mile. 
The  capacity  is  for  vessels  of  600  tons,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  the  Rhine-Herne  stretch,  which  will  accommodate 
boats  of  1000  tons'  burden.^ 

The  purpose  of  this  canal  is  to  join  the  Rhine  River  and 
the  rich  industrial  Westphalian  region  with  the  important 
manufacturing  district  along  the  Weser  and  with  the  city 
of  Hanover.  At  present  there  is  no  water  connection  at  all 
in  German  territory  between  the  North  Sea  and  the  Rhine; 
and  this  while  affording  an  all-German  route,  will  at  the 
same  time  greatly  shorten  the  water  distance  between 
Dortmund  and  the  Weser  territory.  Elaborate  calculations 
have  been  made  to  show  that  with  tolls  high  enough  to 
leave  no  deficit  from  operation,  high  enough  even  to  pay 
interest  and  to  provide  a  sinking  fund  for  eventual  amor- 
tization of  the  capital,  traffic  will  speedily  develop  and 
accomplish  the  end  in  view.^  As  the  works  will  not  be  fully 
completed  until  1917,  we  must  wait  many  years  to  learn 
whether  the  fond  hopes  now  entertained  by  the  supporters 
of  the  project  will  be  realized.  A  few  comparisons  may 
be  made,  however,  which  will  furnish  some  indication  as 
to  the  probable  success  of  the  enterprise. 

It  has  been  seen  that  the  Dortmund-Ems  Canal,  though 
excellently  located,  forming  a  direct  water  route  from  the 
heart  of  the  coal  region  to  the  North  Sea,  left  a  deficit  in 
the  seventh  year  of  its  operation  of  $908,359.  It  has  been 
seen,  moreover,  that  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  canal 

*  Sympher,  ibid.  *  Ibid.,  p.  31. 

*  Sympher,  Die  Rhine-Weser  Kanal;  and  Kommissionsbericht,  supra. 


226        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

dues  were  very  low,  the  railway  tonnage  parallel  with  the 
route  continued  to  develop  rapidly.  Now,  while  in  this 
case  the  low  dues  may  be  responsible  for  the  large  de- 
ficit, is  it  not  likely  that  the  very  high  dues  on  the  new 
waterway  will  result  in  a  traffic  so  small  that  an  even 
greater  deficit  will  accrue  than  in  the  case  of  the  Dort- 
mund-Ems? And  if  the  Dortmund-Ems  Canal,  with  tolls 
not  even  sufficient  to  defray  the  annual  cost  of  operation, 
cannot  attract  all  the  bulky  traffic  in  its  territory,  what 
is  the  probability  that  the  Rhine- Weser  Canal,  with 
tolls  calculated  to  cover  the  running  expenses,  pay  interest, 
and  provide  a  sinking  fund,  will  be  able  to  secure  any 
considerable  tonnage?  The  cost  of  this  waterway  will  be 
more  than  twice  that  of  the  Dortmund-Ems  Canal,  — 
$!265,625  per  mile,  as  against  $114,917  per  mile  for  the 
original  works  of  the  Dortmund-Ems  proper.  This  means 
more  than  twice  as  great  a  per  mileage  outlay  for  inter- 
est and  sinking  fund.  Likewise,  the  operation  and  main- 
tenance expenses  will  probably  be  heavier  here  because  of 
the  greater  distance  to  be  traversed  and  kept  in  repair  — 
236  miles,  as  against  155  miles. 

Computations  of  the  sort  mentioned  on  the  previous 
page  are  at  best  practically  worthless.  It  is  necessary  to 
choose  a  certain  rate  ;  and  compute  on  this  basis  the  quan- 
tity of  traffic  required  to  yield  a  sufficient  revenue  to  make 
ends  meet.  Then  if  the  traffic  at  the  rate  taken  is  not  forth- 
coming, a  new  guess  has  to  be  made.  Experience  alone  wall 
tell.  A  little  light,  however,  may  be  thrown  upon  the  ques- 
tion. On  the  river  Elbe  in  the  third  quarter  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  traffic  failed  to  develop  when  tolls  were 
levied  to  cover  the  cost  and  operation  of  the  waterway.' 
If  such  were  the  case  on  a  great  natural  river,  it  raises  a 
presumption  that  it  would  prove  even  more  the  case  on 
a  canal,  with  its  enormous  cost  of  construction. 

It  should  be  added  that  little  through  traffic  with  the 

1  See  below,  p.  306. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  GERMANY        227 

Rhine  is  to  be  expected,  both  because  there  is  little  occa- 
sion for  it,  and  because  the  large  Rhine  boats  of  1000  and 
2000  tons'  capacity  cannot  navigate  the  waters  of  a  600- 
ton  canal. 

But  suppose  suflBcient  traflBc  should  develop  to  make  the 
waterway  pay  for  itself.  Would  this  prove  that  the  capital 
would  have  been  well  invested?  We  saw  that  on  the  same 
basis  of  computation  on  both  sides  of  the  equation,  water 
transportation  on  the  Dortmund-Ems  Canal  was  nearly 
twice  as  costly  as  that  by  rail.  It  follows,  since  this  canal 
is  more  than  twice  as  costly  per  mile  as  the  Dortmund- 
Ems,  that  the  advantage  in  favor  of  the  railway  would  be 
much  greater  here.  It  is  therefore  impossible  to  foresee  a 
suflBcient  traflBc  development  to  insure  financial  success. 
It  seems  certain  that  the  construction  of  this  water  route 
will  involve  a  heavy  economic  loss  to  the  country. 


CHAPTER  X 

EXAMINATION    OF  THE  GERMAN   TRANSPORTATION 
POLICY 

1.  The  discussion  of  waterways  in  Germany,  which  formed 
the  subject  of  the  preceding  chapter,  attempted  to  show 
to  what  extent  waterway  traflSc  has  developed  on  the  prin- 
cipal rivers  and  canals  of  the  countr5%  and  to  compute 
at  what  cost  such  development  has  been  obtained.  The 
result  of  the  investigation  has  been  to  bring  out  the  sur- 
prising fact  that  the  Rhine  River  alone  seems  to  have 
been  financially  successful.  While  the  traflBc  has  rapidly 
developed  on  some  of  the  other  waterways,  we  have 
seen  that  it  has  been  accomplished  only  by  means  of  such 
heavy  subsidies  that  the  freight  costs,  all  things  consid- 
ered, have  proved  much  heavier  than  they  would  have 
been  by  rail.  It  has  been  found  that  on  many  of  the  Ger- 
man rivers  and  canals  traffic  has  but  slightly  increased  in 
thirty  years,  and  that  on  some  it  has  even  declined.  Hav- 
ing finished  this  important  part  of  our  study,  a  discussion 
of  the  general  transportation  policy  of  Germany  may  now 
be  undertaken.  It  is  hoped  that  this  will  throw  light  upon 
the  causes  for  the  degree  of  waterway  development  that 
has  occurred,  upon  the  feasibility  of  waterway  develop- 
ment in  the  United  States,  and  upon  the  whole  question 
of  transportation.  In  the  following  pages,  therefore,  the 
attempt  will  be  to  describe  precisely  what  the  German 
policy  in  regard  to  both  waterways  and  railways  is,  and  to 
examine  it  from  the  German  rather  than  from  the  Ameri- 
can point  of  view. 

Dr.  Sympher,  head  of  the  Waterways  Division  of  the 
Department  of  Public  Works,  tells  us,  that  "It  was  not 


GERMAN  TRANSPORTATION  POLICY     229 

until  the  middle  of  the  '70's  that  a  change  took  place  in 
their  [the  waterways']  favor.  It  then  began  to  be  felt  that 
it  was  absolutely  necessary  to  revive  water  communica- 
tion, as  the  railways,  notwithstanding  all  modern  advan- 
tages, were  unable  to  lower  sufficiently  their  tariffs  for  the 
transport  of  merchandise  carried  in  large  masses."  ^ 

Again,  in  speaking  of  the  new  waterway  appropriations 
of  1904  and  1905,  Dr.  Sympher  says,  "The  main  advan- 
tages arising  from  the  recent  extensions  will  be  the  reduc- 
tion of  the  cost  of  transport  of  merchandise  sent  in  large 
quantities;  the  bringing  together  of  various  districts 
hitherto  wide  apart,  the  raising  of  Germany's  competitive 
strength,  not  only  in  the  home  markets,  but  in  foreign  mar- 
kets as  well."  ^  These  official  statements  furnish  us  the  key 
to  the  German  waterway  policy.  It  is  officially  believed 
that  water  transportation,  whether  by  canal  or  river,  is 
cheaper  than  by  rail  for  commodities  carried  in  large 
quantities.  Though  we  shall  later  see  that  there  are  other 
reasons  for  the  improvement  of  German  waterways,  the 
argument  of  cheapness  is  the  basic  one. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  waterway  policy  of  Germany 
is  based  on  the  assumption  that  waterways  offer  an  econo- 
mical means  of  transport,  and  in  view  of  what  has  been  dis- 
closed in  the  above  study  seeming  to  show  the  contrary,  it 
is  important  to  inquire  how  it  is  proved  by  the  Waterways 
Department  that  water  transportation  costs  less  than  that 
by  rail.  Dr.  Sympher  states :  "The  cost  of  transportation  on 
German  waterways  is  considerably  less  than  by  rail.  The 
freight  charges  between  places  that  are  situated  directly 
on  the  waterways,  and  are  reached  without  the  aid  of  rail- 
ways, are  generally  far  less  than  the  railway  charges,  and 
on  long  water  stretches  this  is  all  the  more  perceptible,  as 
the  State-levied  taxes  cannot  be  considered."^  He  then 
quotes  various  rates  illustrating  the  extent  of  the  sav- 

1  Sympher,  London  Daily  Chronicle,  April  7,  1906. 

2  Ibid.,  June  5,  1906.  »  Ibid.,  June  2,  1906. 


230        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

ings  by  water.  The  rates  for  cities  located  on  the  water- 
ways show  in  every  case  a  considerable  margin  of  differ- 
ence in  favor  of  the  water  route.  It  is  also  contended  that, 
including  the  cost  of  transshipment  from  rail  to  water  and 
back  again,  the  combination  rail  and  water  route  is  often 
cheaper  than  a  through  route  by  rail,^  though  the  degree 
of  difference  is  here  admittedly  much  reduced.  Now,  a 
comparison  of  rates  is  ordinarily  regarded  as  proving  the 
point  in  question.  If  waterway  rates  are  considerably 
lower  than  those  by  rail,  does  it  not  conclusively  show  that 
water  transportation  is  the  cheaper  of  the  two?  The  an- 
swer is  that  it  does  not  necessarily  prove  anything  of  the 
sort. 

It  appears  that  the  Germans  have  either  overlooked  or 
refused  to  consider  a  very  important  point  in  connection 
with  transportation  by  water.  The  closing  words  of  the 
above  quotation  are,  "The  State-levied  taxes  cannot  be 
considered."  That  is  to  say,  although  the  yearly  deficit 
on  the  Main  River  is  nearly  $600,000,  this  amount  cannot 
be  considered  as  a  charge  against  water  transportation. 
Though  the  amount  that  the  Imperial  Exchequer  pays  out 
every  year  is  equal  to  about  60  cents  a  ton  for  the  traflfic 
passing  over  the  Dortmund-Ems  Canal,  the  same  for  that 
on  the  Weser  River,  and  about  23  cents  a  ton  for  the  traflSc 
of  the  "Mark  Waterways,"  these  expenditures  are  not  to 
be  considered  as  chargeable  to  water  transportation.  It  is  to 
be  regretted  that  Dr.  Sympher  has  told  us  neither  why  they 
may  not  be  considered,  nor  to  what  account  they  should  be 
debited. 

In  order  better  to  appreciate  the  bearing  of  the  method 
of  accounting  employed  by  Dr.  Sympher,  upon  the  ques- 
tion of  comparative  costs  of  transportation  by  rail  and  by 
water,  one  should  know  the  extent  of  the  waterway  deficit 
as  a  whole  and  the  extent  of  the  railway  deficit,  or  profit, 

'  Frachtvergleichungenfiir  gemsse  Giiter  aufdem  Bahn,  See,  und  Binnen- 
VDOsserwege. 


GERMAN  TRANSPORTATION  POLICY     231 

as  the  case  may  be.  The  following  table  accordingly  places 
them,  as  nearly  as  they  can  be  computed,  side  by  side. 

To  April  1, 1906,  there  had  been  spent  upon  water  trans- 
portation in  Prussia  the  amounts  shown  in  the  following 
table.  The  total  deficit  uncovered  by  the  receipts  of  the 
year  1905  is  given  in  the  third  column:  ^  — 


Classification 

Miles 

Capitalization 

Deficit  (int. 
&  siuk.  fund 
3.5  p«r  cent) 

Deficit 
pet  mile 

Uncanalized  rivers    . 

Canalized  rivers  and 
canals 

State  harbors  *     .     . 

City  and  private  har- 
bors*   

2324 
1508 

$68,132,572 

61,853,664 
39,826,841 

28,677,193 

$4,787,473 

6,869,667 
1,435,255 

406,382 

$2060 
4555 

Totals     .     . 

3832 

$198,420,270 

$13,498,777 

$3523 

*  Sea  harbors  are  not  included. 

One  item  is  necessarily  omitted  from  this  computation. 
Since  the  boats  are  owned  by  a  large  number  of  private 
companies  and  individuals,  their  cost  cannot  be  given.  At 
the  same  time  their  profits  from  operation  must  similarly 
be  omitted.  These  would  reduce  the  deficit  totals  to  some 
extent,  but  not  greatly,  both  because  the  profits  of  these 
companies  are  said  to  be  usually  small,  —  oftentimes  none 
at  all,  —  and  because  the  cost  of  the  boats  on  which  pro- 
fits are  to  be  earned  is  but  a  small  fraction  of  the  cost  of  the 
waterways  themselves.  Taking  it  as  it  stands  in  the  above 
table,  however,  the  deficit  on  the  waterways  of  Prussia  in 
1905  equaled  7.8  per  cent  of  their  capitalization.  In  con- 
trast to  this,  the  surplus  revenue  derived  from  the  railways 
of  Prussia  amounted  to  $56,900,000  or  2.57  per  cent  on 
their  total  capitalization.  This  represents  a  net  revenue  to 
the  State,  after  providing  for  the  interest  and  sinking  fund 
on  the  railway  bonded  debt,  of  $1,518,400,000,  and  after 
meeting  all  the  expenses  of  maintenance  and  operation 
of  the  roads  and  of  conducting  the  governmental  admin- 
*  Compiled  from  Peters,  supra,  pp.  260-74. 


232        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

istrative  machinery.  It  is  a  net  profit  which  the  State 
may  use  for  various  public  ends,^ 

The  number  of  miles  of  Prussian  railway  in  1905  was 
31,319.2  The  year's  net  profit  was,  therefore,  equal  to 
$1814  per  mile.  The  waterways  involved  an  outlay  of 
$3523  per  mile  on  the  part  of  the  State;  the  railways 
yielded  a  net  revenue  equal  to  $1814  per  mile.  It  is  ob- 
vious that  if  the  Rhine  River  were  excluded,  the  showing  of 
the  waterways  would  be  far  worse.  In  view  of  these  facts, 
can  a  quotation  of  existing  rates  prove  waterway  transport- 
ation actually  cheaper  than  that  by  rail?  Suppose  that 
the  situation  were  reversed,  that  the  railways  were  run  at  a 
heavy  loss,  while  the  waterways  were  conducted  at  a  hand- 
some profit  to  the  Government  as  well  as  to  the  owners  of 
the  boats.  Might  not  the  resulting  rates  then  show  that 
it  is  the  railways  that  are  the  agents  in  the  "raising  of 
Germany's  competitive  strength,  not  only  in  the  home 
markets  but  in  foreign  markets  as  well"? 

It  is  evident  that  the  reason  why  the  waterways  of  Ger- 
many have  been  able  to  secure  a  large  share  of  the  traflSc  of 
the  country  is  none  other  than  that  the  Government  wills 
that  they  shall  do  so.  The  vast  majority  of  the  railways 
and  practically  all  of  the  waterways  of  the  country  are  the 
property  of  the  State;  and  in  the  words  of  Dr.  Sympher, 
"This  is  why  it  is  possible  to  arrange  that  railway  and  canal 
do  not  enter  into  competition  with  one  another,  but  mutu- 
ally unite  in  the  forwarding  of  merchandise."  ^ 

It  should  be  stated  here  that  while  the  Government  di- 
rectly fixes  the  rates  on  the  railways,  it  exercises  only  an 

'  The  profits  on  German  railways  are  usually  set  down  as  about  six  per 
cent;  but  we  have  preferred  to  eliminate  all  but  the  strictly  net  revenue. 
The  above  statistics  were  taken  from  the  Bericht  iiber  Ergebnisse  des 
Betriehes  der  vereinigten  jtreussischen  und  hessischen  Staatseisenbahn$n, 
1908,  pp.  241,  242. 

'  StatisHsches  Jahrbuch,  1909,  p.  85. 

•  Sympher,  Loadon  Daily  Chronicle,  June  2,  1906. 


GERMAN  TRANSPORTATION  POLICY     233 

indirect  influence  over  the  water  rates.  The  boat  lines  are 
owned  by  private  companies  and  the  haulage  charges  are 
consequently  fixed  by  them.  It  is  obvious,  however,  that 
the  Government  does  in  reality  play  an  important  part  in 
fixing  the  general  level  of  water  rates  through  its  policy  of 
assuming  the  burden  of  the  fixed  charges  on  the  waterways. 
By  levying  only  slight  tolls  on  canals  (and  none  at  all  on 
rivers)  the  Government  permits  the  boat  companies  to 
charge  much  lower  rates  than  would  otherwise  be  possible. 

This  virtual  absence  of  competition  between  railways  and 
waterways  is  maintained  in  divers  ways.  In  cases  where 
both  a  railway  and  a  waterway  might  be  rivals  for  given 
traflfic,  the  Government  may  force  such  tonnage  to  go  by 
water,  by  means  of  arbitrarily  fixing  the  rail  rate  so  high 
that  it  becomes  more  advantageous  for  the  shipper  to  send 
his  freight  by  water.  This  is  done  in  many  cases.  It  should 
also  be  remembered,  in  this  connection,  that  the  whole 
policy  of  conducting  the  waterways  at  a  deficit,  as  outlined 
above,  has  substantially  this  effect. 

An  excellent  illustration  of  the  administrative  policy  of 
directing  certain  commodities  to  travel  by  water  is  afforded 
by  the  case  of  fertilizers.  When  a  project  for  a  canal  from 
the  Rhine  to  the  Elbe  was  under  discussion,  it  was  pointed 
out  that  fertilizers,  which  constituted  an  important  traffic 
between  the  East  and  the  West,  would  not  travel  by  water 
on  account  of  the  very  low  "exceptional  tariff"  already 
offered  by  the  railways.  The  reply  was  that,  if  necessary, 
the  rail  rate  for  fertilizers  could  be  raised  sufficiently  to 
give  the  waterways  the  advantage.  Being  of  low  value, 
such  traffic  belonged  to  the  waterways,  and  rates  should 
be  adjusted  so  as  to  insure  its  transit  by  boat,' 

In  cases  where  transshipment  is  involved,  the  German 
Government  has  followed  a  policy  of  virtually  developing 
the  railways  and  waterways  as  a  single  system.  In  the  re- 
gion of  great  rivers  and  important  canals,  railways  are  often 
*  Frachtvergleichungen,  tupra,  p.  2. 


234        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

developed  merely  as  feeders  to  the  waterways.  For  in- 
stance, from  the  mines  of  Westphalia  the  coal  railways  are 
run  as  far  as  the  Rhine  or  the  Dortmund-Ems  Canal,  and 
no  farther.  Arrangements  and  facilities  are  there  provided 
for  the  transshipment  to  boats,  by  which  the  coal  is  carried 
to  destination,  or  to  the  point  of  distribution  by  rail.  It  is 
thus  in  reality  a  united  system,  so  developed  now  that  it 
would  be  impossible  to  carry  the  entire  quantity  of  coal 
sent  out  each  year  all  the  way  to  destination  by  rail.  There 
are  enough  railways  within  the  mining  district,  from  the 
mines  to  the  waterways;  but  beyond  that  in  some  sections 
there  are  not  sufficient  railway  facilities  to  handle  the 
traffic.  The  reason  is  merely  that  the  Government  has 
chosen  to  develop  and  to  use  the  waterways  instead  of 
developing  and  using  the  railways.  The  waterways  are 
the  main  lines,  the  railways  the  branches.  As  a  result,  the 
shippers  in  some  places  have  no  practical  alternative  to  the 
use  of  the  waterways  for  at  least  a  part  of  the  distance. 

The  cost  of  transshipment  from  railways  to  canals  and 
back  again  is  of  comparatively  little  importance  to  the  Ger- 
man shipper,  for  the  reason  that  he  is  obliged  to  pay  only  a 
part  of  it.  "Distinctly  favorable  terms  are  given  to  the 
transfer  between  railway  and  waterway.  .  .  .  The  freight 
charges  for  changing  from  boat  to  railway  wagon,  or  vice 
versa,  are  always  moderate,  so  that  no  difficulty  arises  in 
transferring  merchandise  from  one  method  of  transport 
to  the  other."  ^  Merely  an  arbitrary  transshipment  charge 
is  fixed,  and  it  is  not  pretended  that  it  will  cover  the 
actual  cost  of  transferring  the  goods.  For  instance,  at 
Frankfort-on-the-Main  the  writer  observed  the  process  of 
unloading  flour  from  a  river  barge  to  a  box  car.  Ten  men 
and  a  boy  were  at  work  aiding  the  operation  of  a  single 
crane.  Two  men  with  the  boy  were  in  the  barge;  six  men 
were  in  each  other's  way  in  the  box  car;  one  man  was  run- 
ning the  crane;  and  the  tenth  one  was  acting  as  overseer. 
^  Sympher,  London  Daily  Chronicle,  June  2,  1906. 


GERMAN  TRANSPORTATION  POLICY     235 

The  combined  force  was  unloading  little  more  than  100 
tons  a  day.  Now,  the  wages  amounted  to  about  $13  a  day, 
and  the  rent  of  the  machine  is  fixed  at  $1.62'  an  hour,  or 
$16.20  for  a  ten-hour  day.  Altogether  the  cost  of  a  single 
transshipment  was,  therefore,  in  the  neighborhood  of  25  or 
30  cents  a  ton.  The  State-fixed  rate  for  this  transshipment, 
however,  is  5  cents  a  ton.^  This  amount  is  paid  by  the 
shippers;  the  remainder  comes  out  of  general  taxation. 

In  view  of  the  governmental  policy  of  artificially  en- 
couraging waterway  traflBc  in  the  ways  above  noted,  it 
seems  a  surprising  fact  that  the  waterways  do  not  carry  an 
even  larger  proportion  of  the  bulky  commodities  of  traffic 
than  they  now  do.  We  found  that  in  the  Berlin  district 
the  railways  were  carrying  more  than  half  the  entire  quan- 
tity of  low-class  freight  and  constantly  increasing  their 
share  of  the  total.  The  only  explanation  of  this  pheno- 
menon is  that,  strange  as  it  may  seem,  in  spite  of  all 
the  artificial  encouragement  bestowed  upon  the  water- 
ways surrounding  the  metropolis,  many  shippers  of  bulky 
freight  still  prefer  to  use  the  railways.  Before  the  tendency 
of  shipping  an  ever-increasing  proportion  of  this  traffic  by 
rail  can  be  overcome,  it  would  seem  that  the  Government 
must  still  further  increase  the  artificial  margin  of  rate  ad- 
vantage in  favor  of  the  waterways.  It  must  go  still  further 
into  the  vaults  of  the  treasury,  into  the  pockets  of  the  tax- 
payers; it  must  meet  an  even  larger  annual  deficit  than  the 
present  enormous  one. 

Aside  from  the  attempt  to  prove  the  greater  cheapness 
of  water  transportation  by  a  quotation  of  rates  which  are 
based,  as  we  have  seen,  on  wholly  dissimilar  policies,  the 
only  effort  that  has  been  made  in  Germany  to  show  the 
economies  of  water  transit,  so  far  as  the  writer  has  been 

^  Tarif  fur  die  stadtischen  Hafenanstalten  zu  Frankfurt-a-M .,  October 
22,  1908,  p.  3. 
2  Ibid. 


236        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

able  to  discover,  is  that  contained  in  the  report  of  a  special 
commission  on  the  waterway  proposals  of  the  year  1904. 
It  was  there  stated  that  on  account  of  the  less  friction  en- 
countered by  a  boat  in  the  water  than  by  the  wheels  of  a 
car  upon  steel  rails,  the  same  burden  could  be  moved  a 
given  distance  with  a  much  less  expenditure  of  energy  by 
water  than  by  rail.^  This  may  very  well  be  true;  yet  it  by 
no  means  necessarily  follows  that  the  savings  in  this  con- 
nection are  not  far  more  than  offset  by  the  greater  initial 
cost  of  the  highway  itself,  by  transshipment,  by  slow  speed 
and  delays,  and  by  a  number  of  other  waterway  disadvan- 
tages. Selecting  but  a  single  item  of  cost,  and  that  not  the 
most  important  one,  the  commission  attempts  thereby  to 
prove  the  entire  case. 

It  has  been  suggested  a  number  of  times  in  these  pages 
that,  in  order  to  make  a  fair  comparison  of  transportation 
costs  by  water  and  by  rail,  it  is  necessary  to  include  all  the 
items  of  cost  on  both  sides  of  the  equation.  It  happens 
that  precisely  such  a  study  has  been  made  in  Germany. 
Dr.  Walther  Rathenau  and  Professor  William  Cauer,  of 
Berlin,  having  raised  the  question  in  their  own  minds  as 
to  whether  the  supposed  cheapness  of  water  transporta- 
tion were  not  a  myth  if  all  factors  were  considered,  under- 
took recently  a  painstaking  investigation  of  the  question, 
the  results  of  which  were  published  in  1909.  Without 
placing  too  implicit  faith  in  the  accuracy  of  the  computa- 
tions, or  the  conclusiveness  of  the  results  obtained,  we  may 
nevertheless  profitably  spend  a  few  moments  in  consider- 
ing the  conclusions  reached  by  these  men. 

The  comparison  was  made  between  the  Rhine-Elbe 
Canal  and  a  suppositious  "Guterbahn,"  or  all-freight  rail- 
way, between  the  Rhine  River  and  Berlin.  The  statistics 
used  for  the  waterway  were  the  official  figures  for  the  pro- 

^  Kommissiorubericht  iiber  die  wasserstrassen  Vorlage  des  Jahrea  190i, 
p.  35. 


GERMAN  TRANSPORTATION  POLICY     237 

posed  canal,  as  furnished  by  the  Waterways  Department. 
The  railway  costs  were  computed  on  the  basis  of  statistics 
given  in  the  Railway  Archives.  The  result  of  the  comput- 
ation was  to  show  that  the  cost  of  the  canal,  of  only  six 
hundred  tons'  capacity,  was  almost  twice  that  of  a  double- 
track  railway.^  It  was  found,  also,  that  the  water  rates 
would  have  to  be  almost  double  those  by  rail  if  they  covered 
the  cost  of  the  waterway  as  well  as  the  cost  of  hauling  the 
goods.  "If  it  is  also  considered  that  often  the  railway  has 
return  freight,  and  that  at  certain  periods  of  the  year  the 
waterway  must  use  smaller  boats  on  account  of  low  water, 
or  boats  only  partly  loaded,  it  is  not  too  high  an  estimate 
to  hold  that  the  pure  shipping  cost  from  the  Rhine  to  the 
Elbe  is  at  least  double  that  by  rail."^  Attention  is  also 
called  to  the  fact  that  this  is  exclusive  of  the  cost  of  trans- 
shipping. 

Another  very  important  and  very  interesting  conclusion 
was  also  drawn  from  this  study.  The  question  of  carrying 
capacity  was  considered,  and  it  was  found  that  the  capac- 
ity of  a  double-track  railway  devoted  wholly  to  freight 
traflSc  would  be  very  much  greater  than  that  of  a  canal 
deep  enough  for  600-ton  barges  and  wide  enough  for  boats 
to  pass  each  other.  ^ 

At  first  blush  this  might  perhaps  seem  improbable,  for 
it  is  sometimes  believed  that,  since  a  canal  boat  has  a 
much  greater  capacity  than  a  box  car,  the  capacity  of  a 
canal  is  likewise  greater  than  that  of  a  railway.  A  600-ton 
barge,  for  instance,  varies  somewhat  in  dimensions,  but  a 
rough  average  length  is  200  feet.'*  On  the  other  hand,  a  15- 
ton  German  freight  car  is  about  30  feet  in  length.  Stretched 
out  over  the  same  length,  therefore,  about  100  tons  could 
be  loaded  on  a  railway  as  against  600  tons,  or  six  times  as 

^  Rathenau  and  Cauer,  Massenguterbahn,  p.  73. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  81.  »  Ibid.,  pp.  83-84. 

*  Thackara,  Railway  Freight  Rates,  Inland  Waterways,  and  Canals  of 
Oermany  (Doc.  19,  National  Waterways  Commission,  p.  Si). 


238        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

much,  on  a  canal.  It  should  be  borne  in  mind,  however, 
that  a  railway  possesses  counterbalancing  advantages 
which  more  than  offset  this.  First,  a  far  greater  speed  can 
be  maintained  on  a  railway  than  on  a  canal.  On  an  all- 
freight  railway,  with  mainly  through  traffic,  as  would  be 
the  case  here,  a  speed  of  20  miles  an  hour  could  easily 
be  attained.  As  against  this  the  downstream  speed,  not 
counting  stops,  for  through  traffic  on  the  Rhine  is  from 
9  to  11  miles  an  hour,  and  upstream  it  is  only  from  3  to 
3.75  miles  an  hour.^  Obviously  the  average  speed  on  a  great 
river  of  the  character  of  the  Rhine  is  much  greater  than 
could  possibly  be  made  in  the  restricted  channel  of  a  small 
canal.  Three  miles  an  hour  is  very  good  speed  for  canal 
boats.  On  the  canals  of  France  the  average  speed  is  but 
1.67  miles  an  hour.^  This  is  largely  due  to  the  many 
interruptions  which  occur.  Vessels  must  slow  up  when 
meeting  each  other,  and  there  are  great  losses  of  time  in  the 
passing  of  locks  and  in  the  entering  and  leaving  of  harbors. 
A  speed,  therefore,  of  only  about  one  seventh  that  by  rail 
seems  a  fair  estimate.  This  practically  offsets  the  canal 
advantage  cited  above. ^ 

Second,  railway  traffic  can  travel  at  night  with  scarcely 
any  impediment,  and  with  little  additional  expense; 
whereas  the  operation  of  canals  at  night  is  usually  entirely 
impracticable.  In  order  to  permit  night  traffic,  a  canal 
must  be  brilliantly  lighted  with  electricity  on  both  sides 
and  throughout  its  length;  and  even  then  there  is  consid- 

^  Nasse,  Die  Schiffahrt  der  deutschen  Strome,  pp.  142-43. 

*  Re-port  of  British  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vi,  p.  14. 

'  It  would  be  necessary  to  run  the  railway  trains  at  distances  of  a  mile 
apart  in  order  to  avoid  accidents,  but  this  loss  would  be  nearly  if  not 
quite  compensated  by  a  similar  Joss  on  a  canal,  granted  that  boats,  so  far 
as  safety  is  concerned,  may  be  run  much  closer  together  than  trains  of 
cars.  Fifteen  minutes  would  be  the  very  minimum  of  time  required  to 
pass  a  lock.  It  would  be  necessary,  therefore,  for  one  boat  to  be  6fteen 
minutes  behind  another.  Now,  if  the  speed  of  the  boats  is  only  three 
miles  an  hour,  this  means  that. the  boats  ^uust  be  more  tbaa  three  quar- 
ters uf  a  mile  apart. 


GER]MAN  TRANSPORTATION  POLICY     239 

erable  danger,  and  the  speed  must  be  lessened.  The  great 
Kiel  Ship  Canal  is  so  lighted,  and  is  used  at  night,  but 
inland  waterway  traflBc  at  night  is  almost  unknown  in 
Germany. 

Third,  on  the  canal  in  question  navigation  would  be 
closed  on  account  of  ice  for  about  two  months  each  year. 
This  means  a  reduction  of  one  sixth  from  the  capacity  it 
might  have  if  subject  to  no  interruptions. 

Fourth,  accidents  on  canals  are  a  far  greater  impediment 
to  traffic  movement  than  they  are  on  railways.  Mishaps  at 
locks  are  liable  to  occur  at  any  time,  and  barges  and  ships 
not  infrequently  run  aground  and  block  the  traffic  of  a 
large  part  of  the  entire  canal.  In  case  of  a  railway  wreck, 
the  track  can  usually  be  speedily  repaired,  or  a  new  one 
laid  around  the  debris,  and  the  duration  of  the  blockade 
is  generally  but  a  few  hours  at  most.  But  in  the  case  of  a 
mishap  on  a  canal  the  problem  is  more  difficult.  A  dam- 
aged lock  must  usually  be  fully  repaired  before  traffic  can 
be  resumed;  and  a  sunken  barge  —  a  most  unaccommodat- 
ing burden  to  handle  —  must  be  completely  removed  from 
the  path  of  traffic  before  the  commerce  of  the  waterway 
can  proceed  as  before.  These  four  railway  advantages  — 
greater  speed,  night  operation,  uninterrupted  service 
throughout  the  year,  and  comparatively  less  interruption 
to  traffic  on  account  of  accidents  —  much  more  than  offset 
the  single  advantage  of  the  waterways.  We  must  conclude, 
therefore,  that  the  assertion  of  Rathenau  and  Cauer,  that 
the  capacity  of  an  all-freight  double-track  railway  is  very 
much  greater  than  that  of  a  600-ton  barge  canal,  seems 
well  founded.  Such  being  the  case,  it  is  evident  that  the 
larger  tonnage  which  a  railroad  might  enjoy  would  per- 
mit a  considerable  reduction  in  the  railway  rate  given  in 
the  above  tables. 

By  constructing  canals  capacious  enough  for  2000-ton 
barges,  the  total  carrying  capacity  might  be  made  to 
exceed  that  of  a  double-line  railway  track  of  the  German 


210        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

type;  but  in  the  case  of  such  a  canal,  the  cost  of  construc- 
tion would  be  so  greatly  increased  that  the  margin  of 
saving  would  be  more  than  overcome  thereby.  This  is 
recognized  by  the  Waterway  Department,  and  it  consti- 
tutes the  only  reason  why  the  Rhine- Weser  Canal  was 
limited  to  600-ton  barges,  except  for  the  stretch  from  the 
Rhine  to  Heme,  where  the  needs  of  the  Rhine  boats  and 
the  tremendous  traffic  promised  led  to  the  construction  of 
a  1000-ton  waterway.^  In  general,  in  Germany,  600-ton 
canals  are  considered  to  be  the  practical  limit  of  size,  on 
account  of  the  disproportionately  heavier  costs  for  broader 
and  deeper  artificial  channels.^ 

Before  concluding  this  discussion  of  the  relative  cost  of 
rail  and  water  transportation,  attention  should  be  called 
to  the  situation  that  developed  in  Germany  in  the  third 
quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century.  Prior  to  the  adoption 
of  the  present  policy,  about  1875,  the  railways  of  the  dif- 
ferent German  States  were  for  the  most  part  left  to  the 
exploitation  of  private  capital.  And  in  Germany,  as  every- 
where else,  the  railroads  were  rapidly  destroying  the  use- 
fulness of  the  waterways  as  carriers  of  traffic.  It  is  stated 

1  Kommissionshericht,  supra,  p.  44. 

*  Were  a  comparison  made  between  a  railway  of  the  American  type 
and  a  600-ton  barge  canal,  the  advantage  in  favor  of  the  railway  would 
be  found  to  be  very  much  greater.  German  railway  engines  and  freight 
cars  are  much  smaller  than  those  of  the  United  States.  "Of  the  382,185 
freight  cars  in  use  in  Prussia  in  1907,  35.8  per  cent  had  a  capacity  of  10 
tons,  60.7  per  cent  a  capacity  of  15  tons,  and  3.5  per  cent  a  capacity  of  20 
tons."  (McPherson,  Transportation  in  Europe,  1911,  p.  127,)  On  the 
other  hand,  the  size  of  freight  car  now  in  use  in  the  United  States  varies 
from  25  to  50  tons.  Trainloads  of  from  600  to  800  tons  are  not  uncommon 
in  regions  of  heavy  traflBc,  but  in  Germany  trainloads  of  over  half  that 
amount  are  rare.  There  have  been  individual  cases  in  the  United  States, 
indeed,  of  trainloads  of  6000  tons.  Since  the  cost  of  transporting  goods 
decreases  as  the  capacity  and  efficiency  of  a  railway  increases,  it  follows 
that  -American  railroads  can  (if  they  will)  charge  lower  rates  than  those 
of  Germany.  This  obviously  greatly  increases  their  competitive  strength  as 
against  waterways.  (See  chapter  xix  for  a  comparison  of  the  relative  cost 
and  capacity  of  the  Erie  Canal  and  an  all-freight  American  railway.) 


GERMAN  TRANSPORTATION  POLICY     241 

by  Dr.  Sympher  that  "the  development  of  railways,  in 
the  third,  fourth,  and  fifth  decades  of  the  last  century, 
was  the  cause  of  canals  losing  much  of  their  importance."^ 
The  decline  was,  however,  not  confined  to  canals  alone; 
even  the  great  rivers  were  affected  by  the  rise  of  the 
railways.  On  some  of  the  waterways  the  falling-off  in  traffic 
during  these  years  was  absolute,  but  on  others  it  was  only 
relative.  On  the  river  Main,  in  spite  of  a  series  of  reduc- 
tions and  the  final  abolishment  of  tolls,  the  traffic  declined 
with  great  rapidity. ^  The  Main-Danube  Canal  was  a 
private  project  enjoying  some  Government  aid;  and  we 
have  seen,  in  a  preceding  section,  that  in  spite  of  a  constant 
reduction  in  tolls  the  traffic  rapidly  fell  off  until  it  became 
of  very  little  consequence.  The  causes  of  this  decline  are 
set  down  as  the  insufficient  size  of  the  canal  and  the  devel- 
opment of  parallel  lines  of  railway  at  the  following  dates: 
1844,  1859,  1873,  1875,  1888.'  Now,  a  glance  at  the  table 
on  page  190  shows  that  these  dates  closely  correspond  with 
the  period  of  the  decline  of  waterway  traffic  on  the  canals. 
The  former  of  the  two  causes  —  namely,  the  small  capacity 
of  the  canals  —  seems  to  have  had  little  effect,  for  the  mean 
depth  of  the  canal  is  4.8  feet  from  Bug  to  Dietfurt  and  5 
feet  from  Dietfurt  to  Kelhein;*  while  the  busy  "Mark 
Waterways"  of  the  Berlin  region  have  only  a  depth  vary- 
ing from  5.2  to  6.2  feet.^  Running  at  a  heaN-y  annual 
deficit,  the  Main-Danube  Canal  has  not  been  able  to  pre- 
vent a  diversion  of  its  traffic  to  railways  which  are  con- 
ducted at  a  profit.  Whether  it  is  because  of  absolutely  lower 
railway  rates,  or  of  better  facilities,  it  matters  not.  Su- 
perior accommodation  is  only  another  name  for  cheapness. 
Even  the  great  naturally  navigable  rivers,  the  Rhine  and 
the  Elbe,  strongly  felt  the  competition  of  the  railways  until 

^  Sympher,  London  Daily  Chronicle,  April  7,  190G. 

^  Die  Wasscr  und  Hafenbauten,  Frankfuri-a.-M .,  pp.  9-10. 

'  Schranz,  Donau-Main  Kanal,  p.  105. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  62. 

*  Sympher,  London  Daily  Chronicle,  April  6,  1906. 


242 


WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 


after  the  adoption  of  the  present  policy  of  waterway  encour- 
agement. "The  Baden  Line  (opened  1846)  from  Mannheim 
to  Basle,  parallel  to  the  Rhine,  was  the  first  great  compet- 
itor to  the  river,  whose  traffic  above  Strassburg  it  killed 
with  a  single  blow."  ^  Even  on  the  great  lower  Rhine  the 
traffic  development  was  comparatively  slight  for  many 
years  after  the  development  of  the  railways  of  that  section. 
"The  Rheinisch,  the  Cologne-Minden,  and  the  Bergisch- 
Markisch  Railways  increased  their  freight  traffic,  in  the 
period  from  1850  to  1870,  from  102,000  to  20,965,000  tons, 
or  as  1  to  20;  the  traffic  on  the  Rhine  at  Emmerich  (on  the 
Dutch  border)  increased  during  the  same  period  from  573,- 
000  to  1,913,000  tons,  or  as  1  to  3.5."  2 

For  the  Elbe,  thanks  to  an  excellent  study  by  Professor 
Fischer,  of  Jena,  we  are  able  to  present  some  comparative 
statistics  of  particular  interest.  The  table  below  shows  the 
traffic  of  the  Elbe  and  of  the  Berlin-Hamburg  Railway,  a 
line  paralleling  the  river,  in  the  years  1847  and  1869:'  — 


Upstream 

DOWNSTRKAM 

TOTAl 

Elbe 

Railway 

Elbe 

Railway 

Elbe 

Railway 

1847 
1869 

256.986 

418,483 

40,733 
225,132 

151,583 
388,833 

9,990 
191,148 

408,569 
807,316 

50,723 
416,380 

"The  fearful  results  of  the  dues  on  the  Elbe  and  the  con- 
sequent aid  to  the  ruinous  competition  of  the  railways  is 
clearly  shown  by  the  above  table.  ...  It  appears  still 
more  meaningful,  however,  when  one  reflects  that  the 
slight  increase  in  traffic  on  the  Elbe  has  been  alone  on  low- 
value  freight,  which  is  subject  to  the  lowest  dues,  and  that 
on  commodities  of  greater  value  it  has  greatly  fallen  ofiF."* 

*  Clapp,  The  Navigable  Rhine,  p.  26. 

^  Ibid.,  p.  29. 

'  Fischer,  Eine  Studie  iiber  die  Elbschiffahrt  in  den  letzten  hundert  Jahren 
unter  speziellen  Beriicksichligung  der  Frage  der  Erhebung  von  Schiffahrtt 
Abgaben,  p.  135. 

<  Ibid. 


GERMAN  TRANSPORTATION  POLICY     243 

It  appears  from  the  above  table  and  quotation  that  the 
Berlin-Hamburg  Railway  had  diverted  a  large  part  of  the 
Elbe's  traffic  to  itself,  and  that  even  bulky  freight,  "nat- 
urally belonging  to  the  waterways,"  relatively  declined  on 
this  river.  The  dues  complained  of  as  being  ruinous  to 
the  waterway  were  not  high  enough  to  yield  a  profit  on 
the  capital  invested  in  regulative  and  canalization  work 
on  the  river.  (It  is  unconstitutional  to  levy  tolls  more 
than  sufficient  to  cover  the  cost  of  improvements  to 
navigation;  the  waterways  of  Prussia  have  for  centuries 
not  been  allowed  to  be  used  as  a  source  of  profit  to  the 
State.  0  The  railway,  on  the  other  hand,  was  a  private 
enterprise  conducted  at  a  profit. 

From  these  examples  the  case  seems  clear  that  during 
the  third  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  railways  of 
Germany  were  w^inning  in  an  open  fight  for  traffic.  But 
in  the  seventies  the  Government  assumed  control  of  both 
railways  and  waterways.  It  then  developed  the  railroads  as 
mere  feeders  to  the  waterways,  wherever  that  was  possible; 
it  established  tolls  on  the  waterways  so  low  that  the  yearly 
deficit  now  amounts  to  between  three  and  four  thousand 
dollars  a  mile;  it  fixed  rates  on  the  railways  so  high  that  the 
annual  net  profit  to  the  Government  amounts  to  nearly 
two  thousand  dollars  a  mile.  The  arbitrary  rates  thus  es- 
tablished have  succeeded  in  stimulating  water  commerce. 
But  inasmuch  as  there  is  at  present  little  competition 
between  railways  and  waterways,  and  inasmuch  as  the 
rates  bear  virtually  no  relation  to  the  cost  of  the  service, 
a  quotation  of  comparative  rail  and  water  rates  can  hardly 
be  considered  as  proof  of  the  economies  of  waterway  trans- 
portation. 

Attached  to  the  waterway  bills  of  1901,  1904,  and  1905 

were  provisions  for  the  establishment  of  tolls  sufficiently 

high  to  cover  the  cost  of  the  works,  though  of  course  not 

high  enough  to  yield  any  profit,  that  being  unconstitu- 

^  Sympher,  London  Daily  Chronicle,  June  i,  1006. 


244        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

tional.  The  result  was  a  great  storm  of  protest  in  all  parts 
of  the  country.  We  have  seen  how  opposition  on  this 
ground  was  instrumental  in  the  defeat  of  the  Rhine-Elbe 
Canal  project.  The  contention  of  the  opposition  was  that 
an  increase  of  dues  would  destroy  the  present  rate  advan- 
tages offered  by  the  waterways.  In  support  of  this  con- 
tention a  number  of  studies  have  been  made,  of  which 
Professor  Fischer's,  above  quoted,  is  a  notable  one,  showing 
that  the  high  dues  of  earlier  periods  were  ruinous  to  the 
waterways,  and  that  a  return  to  that  policy  will  spell  the 
fate  of  water  transport.  The  oflacial  seal  of  the  Minister  of 
Public  Works  for  the  inauguration  of  high  dues  on  the  new 
waterways  was,  however,  given  on  February  6,  1908;'  but 
the  discussion  of  the  subject  has  not  yet  ceased.  We  read 
in  a  late  number  of  the  "Handworterbuch  der  Staats- 
wissenschaften,"  "The  question  whether  tolls  on  canals 
shall  be  raised  has  been  long  a  stirring  one  and  is  to-day 
differently  answered."^ 

On  the  new  waterways,  the  Government  will  establish 
a  monopoly  of  shipping,  taking  it  out  of  the  hands  of  a 
large  number  of  boat  owners  or  companies,  hoping  thereby 
to  effect  savings  sufficient  in  amount  to  insure  the  success 
of  the  waterways,  even  with  higher  dues.  But  the  attempt 
is  only  an  experiment;  and  it  remains  to  be  seen  what  the 
issue  will  be.  The  fortunate  circumstance  is  that  the  dues 
may  be  speedily  lowered  if  it  be  found  that  traffic  does  not 
develop;  and  since,  according  to  Dr.  Sympher,  the  deficit 
cannot  be  counted  anyhow,  water  transportation  would 
doubtless  still  be  proved  cheaper  than  that  by  rail. 

It  should  be  remembered  that  these  higher  dues  are  not 
calculated  to  yield  a  profit  on  the  capital  invested,  as  do 
the  rates  on  the  railways.  There  is  not  the  shadow  of  a 
doubt  that  were  it  constitutional  to  use  the  waterways, 
like  the  railways,  as  a  source  of  public  revenue,  a  bill  to 
raise  the  rates  on  waterways  sufficiently  to  yield  an  annual 

1  Peters,  supra,  p.  339.  ^  Handworterbuch,  1910,  vol.  v,  p.  762. 


GERMAN  TRANSPORTATION   POLICY     245 

profit  equal  to  that  on  the  railways  would  be  almost 
unanimously  voted  down.  Not  even  the  ^Yate^way 
Department  would  sanction  such  a  step.  Why?  Because 
it  is  known  that  the  waterways,  with  the  probable  excep- 
tion of  the  Rhine,  could  not  compete  with  the  railroads  on 
even  terms. 

2.  There  are  other  reasons  for  the  development  of  the 
waterways  of  Germany,  however,  than  that  of  economy  of 
transport.  Hence,  even  though  it  be  settled  that  water 
transportation  is  more  costly  than  that  by  rail,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  pursue  our  inquiry  further.  It  is  conceivably  pos- 
sible that  the  other  ends  they  are  supposed  to  serve  may 
still  prove  the  feasibility  of  waterways.  It  is  necessarj% 
therefore,  to  subject  in  turn  each  of  the  various  other 
arguments  to  the  test  of  validity,  as  was  done  with  the 
argument  of  cheap  transit.  The  first  contention  to  be  con- 
sidered is  that  the  waterways  of  Germany  are  necessary 
in  order  to  relieve  the  overburdened  railways  in  regions 
of  congested  traffic. 

There  are  two  districts  in  which  it  is  said  that  waterway 
facilities  are  indispensable :  the  one,  about  Berlin;  the  other, 
the  territory  between  the  Rhine  and  Weser  Rivers  in  north- 
western Germany.^  It  is  these  two  regions  which  are  to  be 
served  by  the  new  canals,  provided  under  the  law  of  1905: 
the  argument  that  the  railways  are  overburdened,  was, 
indeed,  chiefly  instrumental  in  securing  the  passage  of  that 
law. 

Now,  we  found  in  the  preceding  chapter  that  the  rail- 
ways of  the  Berlin  district  have  in  recent  years  been, 
constantly  increasing  their  proportion  of  the  traflSc,  even 
of  such  bulky  commodities  as  "naturally  belong  to  the 
waterways."  This  fact  would  seem  to  indicate  that  the 
present  Berlin  railways  have  not  yet  reached  the  limit  of 
their  carrying  capacity.  Moreover,  there  is  no  reason  for 
*  Symphcr,  Die  neuen  wasserwiriachaf (lichen  Gesetze,  p.  19. 


246        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

believing  that  the  railway  net  cannot  be  still  greatly  de- 
veloped. The  huge  traffic  centring  in  the  metropolitan 
district  of  London,  vastly  greater  than  that  at  Berlin,  is 
largely  carried  by  rail;  and  the  waterway  advocates  in  Eng- 
land could  not  advance  the  argument  that  the  railways  were 
in  need  of  aid. ^  The  traffic  handled  at  both  New  York  and 
Chicago  by  rail  is  greater  than  the  entire  amount  centring 
about  the  German  metropolis,  and  never  except  for  a  brief 
period  in  the  crop-moving  seasons  of  1905  to  1907,  for 
reasons  already  made  clear,  ^  have  the  existing  railways 
been  seriously  overworked.  Moreover,  no  one  considers 
that  the  railway  systems  of  these  cities  have  reached  the 
ultimate  physical  limit  of  extension. 

But  let  us  turn  to  the  second  region  of  dense  traffic,  the 
Westphalian  industrial  district.  It  is  said  that  here,  in 
a  region  comprising  only  one  one  hundred-fiftieth  of  the 
area  of  the  empire,  the  railway  tonnage  is  equal  to  one 
fourth  the  entire  railway  traffic  of  the  country,^  and  that 
as  a  consequence  the  railways  of  the  district  are  not  only 
taxed  beyond  their  present  carrying  capacity,  but  actually 
beyond  their  possibilities.  Extensive  further  development 
is  said  to  be  physically  impossible.  We  shall  see  whether 
this  contention  stands  the  test  of  reason. 

It  should  be  observed  in  this  connection  that  practically 
all  the  traffic  must  travel  over  the  railways  for  at  least  a 
short  distance,  even  when  waterways  are  employed.  Coal, 
for  instance,  constituting  the  great  bulk  of  the  waterway 
traffic  of  the  region,  is  all  brought  from  the  mines  to  the 
waterw^ays  by  rail.  Suppose  that  the  already  enormous 
traffic  should  double  in  the  next  ten  years;  it  would  require 
a  doubling  of  the  railway  capacity  for  the  region  between 
the  mines  and  the  waterways.  This  is  evidently  not 
deemed  impossible.  It  appears,  then,  that  the  waterways 
are  to  relieve  the  burden  on  the  railroads  only  outside  the 
region  of  most  dense  traffic.    When  the  writer  asked  an 

*  See  page  103.    •  See  chapter  iv.    '  Kommissionsbericht,  supra,  p.  35. 


GERMAN  TRANSPORTATION   POLICY     247 

engineer  in  the  Waterway  Department*  how  it  was  that, 
if  the  railways  were  able  to  carry  all  the  traffic  for  a  short 
distance,  the  lines  could  not  be  made  thick  enough  for  a 
longer  distance,  especially  since  outside  the  immediate 
productive  area  the  routes  would  naturally  spread  out 
rather  than  converge,  the  only  reply  forthcoming  was  that 
the  cars  would  have  to  be  used  a  longer  time  on  account 
of  the  greater  distance.  Now,  while  this  is  perfectly  true, 
it  in  nowise  explains,  it  rather  evades,  the  point  in  question. 
More  cars  would  be  needed,  to  be  sure,  but  not  a  greater 
number  would  be  required  within  the  area  of  densest 
traffic.  Suppose  five  hundred  cars  to  leave  the  mines  in  a 
day  and  travel  twenty  miles  to  a  waterway,  be  unloaded, 
and  sent  back  to  the  mines.  Suppose,  now,  five  hundred 
cars  to  leave  the  mines  for  a  trip  of  several  hundred  miles 
to  various  markets  direct,  without  the  use  of  the  waterways. 
Suppose,  in  the  mean  time,  five  hundred  other  cars  to 
return  from  distant  points  and  to  reach  the  mines  to  be 
reloaded.  Is  there  any  greater  congestion  near  the  mines 
in  the  second  than  in  the  first  case?  Obviously  not.  On 
the  contrary,  there  is  less  crowding  in  the  second  case, 
because  in  the  former  instance  the  cars  remained  in  the 
congested  area  while  being  switched  and  unloaded,  but  in 
the  latter  case  they  passed  outside  the  district  of  densest 
traffic  before  stopping.  At  Dortmund  one  may  see  a  score 
of  trainloads  of  coal  standing  on  the  tracks  waiting  to 
be  unloaded.  Were  they  sent  directly  to  destination,  the 
congestion  in  such  a  district  would  be  considerably  re- 
lieved. So  long  as  practically  all  the  traffic  within  the 
congested  area  has  to  be  handled  by  the  railways  in  any 
case,  the  contention  that  the  waterways  are  relieving  the 
congestion  is  entirely  without  foundation. 

There  is  another  side  to  this  question,  however.    Sup- 
pose canals  could  be  constructed  to  the  very  mouths  of 
the  mines,  so  that  the  railways  would  not  have  to  handle 
1  Mr.  Oppermann. 


248        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

the  traflBc  even  for  a  short  distance.  Would  not,  then,  the 
congestion  of  traffic  be  relieved?  The  answer  is,  —  only  in 
case  a  waterway  offers  greater  carrying  capacity  in  propor- 
tion to  the  space  it  occupies  than  does  a  railroad.  Now, 
with  the  exception  of  one  short  stretch,  the  canals  of  this 
region  have  all  been  constructed  to  float  boats  of  only  600 
tons'  capacity.  We  have  seen  above  that  the  total  carry- 
ing capacity  of  a  double-track  railway  is  much  greater  than 
that  of  a  600-ton  barge  canal.  Moreover,  a  canal  wide 
enough  for  boats  to  pass  each  other  occupies  at  least  twice 
the  lateral  area  that  a  double-track  railway  does.  In  view 
of  these  facts,  how  is  it  possible  for  canals  to  unburden  the 
railways,  to  relieve  the  congestion  in  areas  of  dense  traffic? 

The  above  reasoning  applies  equally  well  to  the  Berlin 
district,  in  particular  to  the  new  Berlin-Stettin  600-ton 
canal.  A  freight  railway  of  much  greater  carrying  capacity 
than  the  canal  possesses  could  be  constructed  from  the 
metropolis  to  Stettin  to  relieve  any  congestion  that  might 
exist;  and  it  could  be  built  for  at  least  half  the  cost  of  the 
waterway. 

The  above  arguments,  it  should  be  added,  do  not  apply 
with  quite  the  same  force  to  a  great  river.  In  the  case  of  a 
river  the  ground  space,  so  to  speak,  is  occupied  whether  the 
river  is  used  or  not.  Its  utilization,  therefore,  means  the 
employing  of  space  which  could  not  be  used  for  railroad 
building.  A  river  thus  materially  differs  from  a  canal.  The 
first  argument  presented  above,  however,  holds  with  equal 
force  for  a  river.  A  river  cannot  relieve  the  traffic  con- 
gestion where  it  is  most  needed.  The  greater  part  of  the 
freight  —  all  of  the  coal  —  must  still  be  carried  for  at  least 
a  short  distance  by  rail,  from  the  source  of  the  supply  to 
the  banks  of  the  waterway.  On  only  strictly  riparian  traflSc 
can  a  river  relieve  the  railways. 

Closely  connected  with  the  contention  that  waterways 
are  a  relief  to  railroads  in  regions  of  dense  traffic,  is  the 


GERMAN  TRANSPORTATION  POLICY     249 

idea  that  somehow  or  other  water  transportation  in  gen- 
eral is  never  an  impediment,  but  often  rather  an  aid  to  the 
railroads.  This  argument  has  been  advanced  in  Germany, 
no  less  than  in  the  United  States. 

After  showing  that  between  1875  and  1905  the  tonnage 
on  the  waterways  of  Germany  increased  from  2.9  to  1.5  })il- 
lion  ton-kilometers,  as  against  an  increase  of  from  10.9  to 
44.6  billion  ton-kilometers  on  the  railways,  the  growlh  of 
water  traffic  taking  place,  moreover,  with  scarce  any  in- 
crease of  waterway  mileage,  whereas  the  length  of  the  rail- 
ways more  than  doubled  during  the  period  in  question, 
Dr.  Sympher  hastens  to  add  that  since,  however,  the  rail- 
way traffic  of  Germany  has  increased  faster  than  that  of  any 
other  country  of  Europe,  one  can  conclude  that  the  water- 
ways have  not  damaged  the  railways.^  Indeed,  he  goes  so 
far  as  to  say  that  the  waterways  have  been  the  cause  of 
the  railways'  prosperity.  "When  one  considers  that  the 
German  railways,  notwithstanding  the  dimensions  of  the 
traffic  on  the  inland  waterways,  have  obtained  such  re- 
markable prosperity  and  development,  and  that  in  Prussia, 
where  inland  navigation  is  so  successful,  the  railways  are 
most  profitable,  it  appears  evident  that  the  harmonious 
cooperation  of  waterways  and  railways  is  distinctly  to  the 
advantage  of  the  latter."  ^ 

In  a  thriving  frontier  town  is  a  single  merchant.  He  is 
able  to  expand  his  business  and  continually  meet  all  the 
needs  of  his  customers.  A  second  merchant,  however,  ap- 
pears in  the  place,  and  in  thirty  years  has  secured  one  half 
the  trade  of  the  town.  At  the  same  time,  however,  because 
of  the  very  rapid  growth  of  the  place,  the  first  merchant 
has  constantly  increased  his  business,  and  has  continued 
prosperous.  Can  it  therefore  be  said  that  the  second  mer- 
chant has  not  injured  the  first?  Can  it  be  contended  that 
he  has  even  been  a  blessing  in  disguise?  The  truth  is,  as  we 

^  Weltausstellung,  supra,  pp.  42-43. 

*  London  Daily  Chronicle,  June  2,  1906. 


250        WATERWAYS  \1ERSUS  RAILWAYS 

have  earlier  pointed  out,  that  Germany  has  passed  through 
a  great  industrial  revolution  during  the  last  thirty  years, 
and  her  business  has  expanded  with  astonishing  rapidity. 
Hence  it  is  that  both  railways  and  waterways  have  been 
able  rapidly  to  increase  their  tonnage.  The  railways  would 
seem  to  have  prospered  in  spite  of  rather  than  because  of 
the  waterway  policy. 

The  contention  that  waterways  are  an  aid  to  the  rail- 
ways can  be  based  only  on  the  following  ground.  The  low 
cost  of  water  transportation  makes  possible  the  ready  as- 
sembling of  raw  materials,  for  the  purpose  of  manufacture. 
The  resulting  manufacturing,  which  would  otherwise  be  im- 
possible, leads  to  a  general  expansion  of  trade,  and  creates 
an  extensive  traffic  in  higher  grades  of  freight  which  natur- 
ally goes  to  the  railways.  The  obvious  fallacy  lies  in  the 
assumption  that  the  cost  of  transportation  is  less  by  water 
than  by  rail.  WTien  that  assumption  is  proved  untrue 
the  whole  argument  falls  down.  If  subsidies  correspond- 
ing to  those  given  to  the  waterways  were  granted  to 
the  railroads  a  much  greater  industrial  stimulus  would 
result. 

3.  Another  end  which  German  waterways  are  said  to 
serve  is  a  military  one.  The  railways  of  Germany  have 
been  laid  down  with  an  eye  to  the  greatest  possible  na- 
tional service  in  time  of  war,  and  in  like  manner  it  is  con- 
tended that  the  rivers  and  canals  of  the  country  must  be 
developed  with  military  ends  in  view.  This  argument  has 
been  put  forward  particularly  in  connection  with  the  Rhine- 
Weser  Canal  which  is  now  being  constructed.  The  military 
importance  of  this  canal  is  said  to  lie  in  the  possibility  that 
munitions  of  war  might  thereby  be  carried  by  water  from 
the  North  Sea  to  the  Rhine  district  without  having  to  tra- 
verse foreign  waters,  as  is  at  present  necessary.  ^  A  reference 
to  the  map  on  page  223  will  show  that  the  new  canal  will 

*  Kommissionshericht,  supra,  p.  54. 


GERMAN  TR.\NSPORTATION  POLICY     251 

furnish  an  all-German  route  from  the  Rhine  to  the  North 
Sea  and  thence  to  all  the  waterways  of  eastern  Prussia. 

The  probability  that  such  a  waterway  connection  would 
be  extensively  employed  in  the  shipping  of  war  supj)lies, 
of  foodstuffs  for  the  armies,  etc.,  from  the  East  to  the  West 
is  so  remote  that  the  subject  hardly  needs  discussion.  It  is 
well  knov^Ti  that  speed  and  certainty  of  delivery  are  an  ab- 
solute essential  in  time  of  war.  Recall  now  the  handicaps 
suffered  in  these  regards  by  canals  as  compared  with  rail- 
ways. Attempted  haste,  moreover,  would  be  almost  sure 
to  precipitate  an  accident  somewhere,  causing  long  delay. 
The  disadvantages  have  been  so  concisely  stated  by  Rath- 
enau  and  Cauer  that  we  cannot  do  better  than  quote  them 
here:  "For  the  traffic  of  war,  canals  would,  aside  from  their 
small  carrying  capacity  for  such  traffic,  on  account  of  the 
slowness  of  their  service,  on  account  of  the  ice  during  two 
months,  on  account  of  the  impossibility  of  bringing  the 
materials  transported  to  their  destination  on  the  canals 
themselves  (also  on  account  of  transshipments),  possess 
in  general  no  great  importance.  Altogether  different,  how- 
ever, is  the  case  on  railway  freight  lines,  with  their  extraor- 
dinarily great  carrying  capacity,  and  the  possibility  of 
carrying  the  traffic  everyuhere  by  means  of  the  ordinary 
railway  lines.  Also,  a  possible  destruction  of  a  lock,  a  por- 
tion of  the  canal,  or  of  a  canal  bridge  is  much  more  serious 
than  an  injury  to  the  railway,  which  can  be  quickly  re- 
paired again." ^  The  last  point  is  particularly  worth  not- 
ing. With  very  little  trouble  an  enemy  could  destroy  the 
locks  of  a  canal  and  render  it  wholly  useless  for  a  consid- 
erable period  of  time  before  it  could  be  repaired.  On  the 
other  hand,  a  portion  of  destroyed  railway  track  may  be 
very  quickly  relaid  sufficiently  well  to  permit  the  passage 
of  traffic.  The  case  is  so  obviously  against  the  canals  that 
it  is  unnecessary  to  argue  it  further. 

It  is  sometimes  stated,  however,  that  waterways  may  be 
*  Rathenau  und  Cauer,  supra,  p.  85. 


252        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

of  service  to  the  country  in  time  of  war,  not  in  carrying 
the  military  goods  themselves,  but  by  relieving  the  rail- 
roads from  much  of  the  ordinary  traffic  of  commerce,  thus 
leaving  the  latter  free  to  transport  both  the  armies  and 
their  necessary  supplies  from  place  to  place  as  occasion 
requires.  Thus  stated,  there  is  considerably  more  point  to 
the  argument;  but  still  the  alternative  seems,  on  the  whole, 
to  be  much  more  advantageous.  Instead  of  developing 
the  waterways  for  military  purposes,  military  railways 
could  be  constructed,  or,  as  has  been  suggested,  pure 
freight  railways  which  could  be  especially  devoted  to  mili- 
tary needs  in  time  of  war,  either  directly,  that  is,  by  send- 
ing the  military  supplies  over  them,  or  indirectly,  by  using 
them  in  the  relief  of  the  ordinary  railways  at  such  a  time. 
Such  railways,  as  we  have  seen,  are  more  capacious,  more 
convenient,  and  much  less  costly  than  canals. 

In  the  case  of  river,  as  against  canal,  development  for 
such  purposes,  the  deciding  factor  for  each  river  would 
needs  be  the  cost  of  the  regulation  and  canalization  works 
as  compared  with  the  cost  of  building  the  railway,  regard 
being  had  also  to  comparative  capacity  and  serviceability. 
The  question  might  be  answered  diflFerently  for  different 
rivers,  but  in  general  it  would  unquestionably  have  to  be 
admitted  that  the  balance  lay  in  favor  of  railways.  The 
decisive  factors  here  are  that  the  course  of  a  river  is  fixed 
by  nature  and  hence  its  route  may  not  follow  a  direction 
which  meets  the  needs  of  the  troops,  and  that  transship- 
ment to  and  from  railways  will  almost  always  be  neces- 
sary. However  we  look  at  the  question,  therefore,  the 
military  argument  in  favor  of  waterway  development  does 
not  assume  any  very  great  importance. 

4.  A  further  argument  for  the  improvement  of  the  water- 
ways of  Germany  is  that  by  means  of  water  transporta- 
tion a  very  desirable  decentralization  of  industry  is  effected. 
Factories  and  industrial  establishments  of  all  kinds  move 


GERMAN  TRANSPORTATION   POLICY     253 

out  from  the  great  industrial  centres  and  locate  along  the 
waterways.  This  makes  it  possible  for  the  laboring  j)opu- 
lation  to  live  in  less  crowded  quarters  and  to  enjoy  a  more 
comfortable  existence  than  is  the  lot  of  the  toilers  of  the 
city.  Even  small  garden  plots  may  be  acquired,  and  the 
laborer  then  finds  not  only  occupation  for  his  leisure  time 
and  for  his  family,  but  he  experiences  as  well  some  of  the 
joys  of  a  real  home  life.  Very  extensive  maps  in  color  have 
been  prepared  by  the  Waterways  Department,  showing 
the  growth  of  industry  along  water  routes  during  the  past 
thirty  years,  and  the  considerable  degree  of  industrial  de- 
centralization which  has  already  taken  place.  ^  The  maps 
show,  naturally,  a  development  concurrent  with  that 
shown  by  the  statistics  of  waterway  traffic  which  have 
been  presented  in  the  preceding  chapter.  It  has  varied 
greatly  in  different  cases:  along  the  Rhine  and  the  Elbe 
there  has  been  a  very  extensive  decentralization,  while 
along  the  waterways  of  eastern  Germany  there  has  been  al- 
most none.  It  is  not  to  be  denied,  however,  that  on  the 
whole  the  waterways  have  tended  to  decentralize  industry. 
This  desired  result,  however,  has  obviously  been  accom- 
plished only  by  the  arbitrary  fixing  of  low  freight  rates  on 
the  waterways,  of  conducting  them  at  a  heax'y  annual 
deficit.  We  have  seen  that  an  all-freight  railway  between 
the  Rhine  and  Berlin  could  be  constructed  and  run  at  about 
half  the  cost  of  a  600-ton-barge  canal,  and  that  in  every  case, 
except  on  the  Rhine,  water  transportation  in  Germany  is  less 
economical  than  that  by  rail.  It  follows,  therefore,  that,  if 
the  railways  were  conducted  at  a  loss  corresponding  to  that 
on  the  waterways,  much  lower  freight  rates  could  be  offered, 
and  hence  a  correspondingly  greater  stimulus  to  industrial 
decentralization  would  result  than  has  come  from  the  pre- 
sent waterway  policy. 

*  Denkschrift  hetreffend  den  Einflvss  der  Wasscr.itrassen  auf  die  Ansiede- 
lung  der  Indiistrie  und  deren  Decentralisierung,  1904  (Haus  der  Abgcord- 
neten,  No.  96). 


254        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

5.  The  improvement  of  rivers  and  the  construction  of 
canals  in  Germany  has  carried  with  it  certain  benefits  to 
agriculture,  and  this  may  be  regarded  as  a  final  purpose  of 
waterway  development.  The  better  control  of  rivers  has 
checked  to  some  extent  the  annual  spring  floods  and  conse- 
quent overflow  of  low-lying  riparian  lands ;  and  canals  have 
in  a  few  instances  served  as  aids  in  the  drainage  of  swampy 
tracts  of  territory.  While  these  benefits  are  of  real  import- 
ance, they  are  properly  regarded  in  Germany  as  merely  in- 
cidental. The  floods  could  be  controlled^  and  the  marshes 
drained  at  infinitely  less  cost  than  is  required  to  canalize 
turbulent  or  shallow  streams  and  to  construct  canals  for 
shipping  purposes.  In  no  sense,  therefore,  can  the  aid  to 
agriculture  be  considered  a  prime  cause  of  waterway  de- 
velopment. The  great  benefits  claimed  are  those  that  we 
have  been  discussing  in  previous  paragraphs. 

6.  If  the  above  analysis  of  German  waterway  trans- 
portation be  sound,  we  may  conclude  in  particular  that  the 
Rhine  River  alone  may  be  regarded  as  successful,  and  that, 
in  general,  waterway  traffic  has  been  developed  in  Germany 
only  through  the  aid  of  a  governmental  policy  which  com- 
pels the  taxpayers  to  contribute  an  enormous  sum  for  the 
support  of  water  transportation.  We  have  found  that  on 
even  terms,  computing  on  the  same  basis  on  both  sides 
of  the  equation,  the  railways  possess  decided  economic 
advantages  over  the  waterways  as  carriers  of  traffic.  It 
follows,  therefore,  that  if  the  waterway  subsidies  were  dis- 
continued, and  if  attention  were  concentrated  upon  rail- 
way development,  the  total  cost  of  transporting  the  traffic 
of  Germany  might  be  substantially  reduced.  It  should 
perhaps  be  added  here,  that  Germany  has  no  need  of 
waterways  as  a  means  of  regulating  railway  rates  ;  gov- 

^  Because  of  the  forestry  policy,  the  naturally  more  equable  distribu- 
tion of  rainfall,  and  the  less  quantity  of  snow  suddenly  meltint?  in  the 
springtime,  floods  in  Germany  are  as  nothing  compared  with  those  in 
the  United  States. 


GERMAN  TRANSPORTATION  POLICY     255 

eminent  ownership  of  railways  being  a  suflScient  guarantee 
against  extortionate  railway  charges.  The  waterways  can 
justify  themselves  only  as  actual  carriers  of  traffic. 

7.  The  transparent  fallacies  in  the  arguments  which  we 
have  been  discussing  lead  one  to  query  \^hether  it  be  pos- 
sible that  the  German  waterway  officials  and  the  German 
people  in  general  can  themselves  be  unaware  of  the  econo- 
mic losses  involved  in  waterway  expenditure.  Is  there  some- 
thing back  of  the  scenes,  some  political  interest,  or  some 
dominating  force  which  virtually  compels  the  Govern- 
ment to  continue  the  policy  of  subsidizing  the  waterways, 
or  are  the  German  people  simply  in  the  dark  as  to  the 
economic  waste  involved? 

The  committee  in  charge  of  the  preparations  for  the 
International  Railway  Congress  which  met  at  Berne, 
Switzerland,  in  July,  1910,  submitted  in  advance  to  the 
delegates  of  the  different  countries  a  series  of  questions  to 
be  used  as  a  basis  of  discussion  at  the  conference.  Question 
number  thirteen  related  to  the  possibility  of  an  extension  of 
present  railway  lines  sufficient  to  meet  the  increasing  needs 
of  commerce.  To  this  question  the  German  railway  offi- 
cials replied,  "We  regret  that  we  must  refuse  to  reply  to 
Question  XIII. "^  During  the  discussion  of  this  point  at 
the  Berne  Congress,  the  Prussian  delegates  maintained  a 
discreet  silence,  neither  affirming  nor  denying  the  possibility 
of  a  further  development  of  the  railway  net  of  Germany. 
During  the  long  and  spirited  debate  on  the  canal  bills,  from 
1899  to  1905,  the  argument  had,  however,  been  officially 
put  forward  that  the  railways  of  Westphalia,  as  we  have 
above  noted,  had  reached  the  limit  of  development.  As- 
tonished that  such  an  argument  should  be  advanced,  M. 
Colson,  Director  of  Roads  and  Bridges,  and  Councillor  of 
State  of  France,  made  inquiries  of  some  officials  high  in  the 
Prussian  railway  service  as  to  the  reason  for  such  a  conten- 
*  Colson,  Revue  Politique  et  Parlemenlaire,  August,  1910,  p.  364. 


256        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

tion.  The  only  reply  that  he  could  obtain  was,  "We  were 
not  consulted."  ^  What  is  the  meaning  of  these  guarded 
remarks  and  this  disconcerting  silence  on  so  crucial  a  ques- 
tion ? 

After  a  careful  first-hand  study  of  German  waterways, 
M.  Colson  asserts  that  Kaiser  Wilhelm  is  the  power  be- 
hind the  movement.  The  Kaiser,  it  is  said,  believes  that 
Germany's  future  is  dependent  upon  the  development  of 
her  sea-power,  and  he  "is  suffering  from  a  delusion"  that 
the  development  of  inland  navigation  is  an  absolute  essen- 
tial to  the  expansion  of  ocean  commerce.  Now,  it  is  well 
known  that  when  the  Kaiser's  mind  is  made  up,  that  when 
he  has  received  an  "inspiration,"  as  the  Germans  them- 
selves say,  it  matters  not  if  sound  arguments  are  wanting. 
Since  he  is  satisfied  in  his  own  mind  that  the  Father- 
land needs  waterways,  the  Kaiser  virtually  compels  their 
development,  regardless  of  the  wishes  of  his  subjects.  In 
1899  he  dismissed  twenty  members  from  the  Prussian 
upper  house  who  had  voted  against  the  canal  bills  and 
appointed  twenty  men  to  take  their  places  who  were  favor- 
able to  waterway  development.^  A  compromise  measure 
was  then  forced  through  the  national  legislature.  Since 
the  Kaiser  holds  the  power  of  appointment  and  removal 
of  the  railway  and  waterway  officials,  it  is  not  difficult  to 
understand  how  the  former  may  be  constrained  to  silence 
on  the  question  of  waterways  and  the  latter  obliged  to 
lend  active  support  to  the  present  policy. 

It  seems  probable,  however,  that  the  support  of  the 
waterways  policy  in  Germany  may  be  in  no  small  degree 
explained  on  other  grounds.  The  attitude  of  the  Kaiser, 
himself,  as  well  as  that  of  many  of  his  subjects,  is  doubtless 
due  to  the  importance  that  is  almost  always  attached  to 
the  seen,  as  against  the  unseen.  It  is  apparent  to  the  eye 

1  Colson,  R^vue  Politique  et  Parlementaire,  August,  1910,  p.  364, 

2  Ihid.  See  also  Die  Nation,  April  5,  1901,  and  J ahrbuch  fur  Gesetzge- 
bung,  Verwaltung  und  Volkswertschajt  im  Deutschen  Reich,  vol.  24,  Heft  3 
(articles  by  SchmoUer  and  Lotz), 


GERMAN  TRANSPORTATION  POLICY     967 

that  a  large  traffic  is  handled  on  the  waterways  of  Ger- 
many, and  it  is  observed  that  the  rates  charged  are  sub- 
stantially lower  than  those  on  the  railroads.  To  all  out- 
ward appearances  the  waterways  are  doing  for  the  country 
all  that  is  claimed  for  them;  and  the  average  person 
seldom  sees  beneath  the  surface.  What  might  be  accom- 
plished by  subsidizing  the  railways,  instead  of  the  water- 
ways, is  something  which  is  not  apparent  to  the  senses;  it  is 
the  unseen;  and  hence  it  seldom  enters  into  the  conception 
of  the  average  individual.  There  can  be  little  doubt  that 
large  numbers  of  people  firmly  believe  that  the  waterways 
are  of  great  benefit  to  the  industrial  life  of  Germany. 

Again,  the  movement  receives  steady  support  from  inter- 
ests which  are  directly  benefited  by  the  present  policy. 
Representatives  of  cities  located  along  water  routes  are 
favorable  to  their  development,  because  the  low  water 
rates  arbitrarily  guaranteed  them  are  a  direct  advantage 
to  such  communities.  So  long  as  the  Government  adheres, 
on  the  one  hand,  to  the  policy  of  subsidizing  the  waterways, 
thereby  offering  low  rates  to  favored  shippers,  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  general  taxpaying  public ;  and  of  fixing  rail- 
way rates,  on  the  other  hand,  high  enough  to  yield  a  large 
national  revenue,  which  comes  out  of  the  shippers  directly, 
representatives  of  river  and  canal  towns  may  be  expected 
to  remain  favorable  to  waterway  development.  These 
people,  together  with  the  Kaiser  and  those  who  believe  with 
him  that  the  waterways  are  the  basis  of  the  prosperity  of 
the  Fatherland,  are  still  able  to  put  down  the  opposition 
to  further  expenditures  upon  inland  navigation. 


CHAPTER  XI 

A    COMPARISON    OF  GERMAN    AND   AMERICAN 
TRANSPORTATION   CONDITIONS 

1.  In  the  present  chapter  we  shall  undertake  a  compara- 
tive study  of  transportation  conditions  in  Germany  and 
the  United  States.  Do  the  conclusions  of  the  preceding 
chapters  indicate  that  water  transportation  in  the  United 
States  would  be  more  or  less  successful  than  in  Germany? 
Or  may  any  conclusions  applicable  to  American  conditions 
fairly  be  drawn  from  the  German  study?  For  clearness  of 
exposition  the  conditions  affecting  transportation  may  be 
divided  into  geographical,  industrial,  and  governmental. 
These  will  be  discussed  in  turn. 

The  first  point  to  be  noted  under  the  geographic  head 
is  that  of  extent  of  territory.  The  area  of  the  entire  Ger- 
man Empire  is  considerably  less  than  that  of  our  single 
State  of  Texas,  or  about  one  fifteenth  that  of  the  United 
States.^  The  natural  result  of  this  is  that  the  distances  to 
be  traversed  in  the  transport  of  produce  are  very  short 
in  Germany  as  compared  with  those  in  the  United  States. 
The  bearing  of  this  fact  is  of  much  importance  in  canal, 
as  distinguished  from  river  transportation.  It  was  seen 
in  chapter  iv,  that  the  chances  of  the  financial  success  of 
a  canal  are  rapidly  reduced  as  its  length  increases.  This 
is  due,  it  may  be  repeated,  to  the  heavier  cost  per  mile  of 
canal  as  compared  with  railway  construction.  For  a  short 
distance  this  disparity  may  not  seriously  affect  the  chances 
of  success,  but  if  a  long  distance  must  be  traversed  in  order 
to  join  markets,  the  heavy  costs  of  canal  construction  may 
easily  more  than  counterbalance  possible  advantages  in 

^  Exclusive  of  Alaska. 


GERMAN  AND  AMERICAN  CONDITIONS    2o9 

other  respects.  The  advantage  in  this  connection  is  evi- 
dently decidedly  with  Germany. 

A  second  geographical  consideration  is  the  extent  of  the 
natural  waterways  in  the  two  countries.  We  have  talked 
so  much  in  the  United  States  about  our  marvelous  system 
of  some  18,000  miles  of  navigable  waters,  that  we  have  in 
general  overlooked  the  fact  that,  considered  in  relation  to 
area,  we  are  not  so  wondrously  blessed  with  natural  ave- 
nues of  commerce  as  many  another  country.  Little  Ger- 
many has  5260  miles  of  actually  important  rivers.^  With 
one  fifteenth  the  area,  Germany  possesses  nearly  one  third 
the  river  mileage  of  the  United  States. 

But  more  important  for  purposes  of  commercial  naviga- 
tion than  the  mere  extent  of  river  mileage  are  the  char- 
acter and  location  of  the  various  streams.  First,  as  to 
the  nature  of  the  waterways.  The  average  gradient  on 
the  1948  miles  of  free  rivers  in  Prussia  is  only  1.26  feet 
per  mile.2  Interruptions  to  traffic  on  account  of  floods, 
droughts,  and  ice,  have  been  seen  to  be  of  the  greatest 
importance  in  determining  the  feasibility  of  water  trans- 
port. The  following  table  shows  the  average  yearly  traffic 
interruptions  on  the  important  rivers  and  canals  of  Ger- 
many. They  are  based  on  statistics  collected  by  the 
various  river  and  harbor  boards  for  periods  of  from  ten 
to  twenty  years: '  — 


Caxise 

Rhine 

Elbe 

Oder 

Vistula 

Floods      .    . 
Ice  .    .    .     . 

2  days 
17 

Iday 
63 

3  days 

78 

3  days 
101 

Total 

19 

64 

81 

104 

On  the  canalized  rivers  and  canals,  according  to  loca- 

1  Sympher,  London  Daily  Chronicle,  April  7,  1906. 
*  Report  of  British  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vi,  p.  59. 
»  Ibid.,  p.  68. 


260        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

tion,  the  average  total  yearly  interruptions  are  as  fol- 
lows: *  — 

a.  Western  Germany 25  to    75  days 

b.  Central 50  to    90 

c.  Eastern 90  to  135 

On  the  great  rivers  the  interruptions  on  account  of  high 
water  are  seen  to  be  from  one  to  three  days  each  year.  In 
contrast  to  this,  the  annual  floods  on  American  rivers  work 
utter  havoc  w^th  navigation  for  weeks  every  spring.  The 
following  table  shows  the  variations  in  water  level  at  vari- 
ous points  along  the  Ohio  and  ]Mississippi  Rivers:  ^  — 

Ohio  at  Cincinnati 60       feet 

Mississippi  at  Grafton,  Illinois 29.6 

Mississippi  at  St.  Louis 43.92 

Mississippi  below  Cairo  and  the  mouth  of  the  Ohio 

River 45.6 

Mississippi,  Memphis  to  Helena,  Arkansas 54.75 

Mississippi  at  Vicksburg 58.98 

Mississippi  at  New  Orleans 21.02 

The  disadvantages  of  such  variations  in  level  are  felt,  not 
only  in  navigating  the  rivers  at  times  of  high  water,  but 
in  the  erection  of  transshipping  equipment  along  their 
banks  as  well.  Rivers  that  rise  and  sweep  away  great 
buildings,  devastate  miles  of  territory,  and  cut  themselves 
new  channels  to  the  sea  obviously  always  imperil  station- 
ary wharves,  storehouses,  and  loading  and  unloading 
machinery.  And  without  these  facilities  the  costs  of  trans- 
shipment are  enormously  increased.  From  this  standpoint 
the  rivers  of  Germany  are  greatly  superior  to  those  of  the 
United  States. 

The  closing  of  navigation  on  account  of  ice  is  an  equally 
important  point.  On  all  the  important  waterways  of  our 
Northern  States,  the  average  number  of  days  that  naviga- 
tion is  closed  on  account  of  ice  is  greater  than  is  the  case  on 
any  except  the  most  eastern  waterways  of  Germany.   The 

*  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vi,  p.  59. 

*  Preliminary  Report  of  {U.  S.)  National  Waterways  Commission,  p.  7. 


GERIVIAN  AND  AMERICAN  CONDITIONS    2G1 

Erie  Canal  may  be  taken  as  an  example.  Between  the 
years  1885  and  1905,  the  average  number  of  days  that  the 
canal  was  navigable  each  year  was  204/  or  less  than  seven 
months  a  year. 

Of  still  greater  importance  to  successful  river  trans- 
portation is  the  geographical  location  of  the  rivers  of  the 
country.  A  glance  at  the  map  on  page  223  shows  the 
Rhine,  the  Weser,  the  Elbe,  the  Oder,  and  the  Vistula  all 
to  extend  from  the  heart  of  the  country  to  the  North  or 
Baltic  Seas.  They  thus  follow  the  natural  direction  of 
German  commerce,  and  each  river  in  itself  comi)rises  a 
through  route  to  the  sea.  On  the  other  hand,  the  United 
States  has  hardly  a  single  river  route  that  extends  for 
a  considerable  distance  in  the  prevailing  east-and-west 
direction  of  traffic.  The  Columbia  in  the  Northwest,  and 
the  Missouri  from  Kansas  City  to  St.  Louis  are  the  prin- 
cipal ones;  the  importance  of  the  Missouri  is,  however, 
greatly  lessened  because  it  has  no  through  connection  with 
the  East.  On  practically  all  of  our  east-and-west  routes 
long  artificial  connections  are  required  to  make  them  serv- 
iceable for  through  traffic.  As  compared  with  Germany's 
through  routes  to  the  only  seacoast  our  disadvantage  is 
readily  apparent. 

The  location  of  German  rivers,  relatively  to  each  other, 
has  also  a  very  important  bearing  upon  the  question  of 
canal  digging.  The  great  rivers  of  Germany  lie  verj-  close  to 
each  other,  and  hence  the  east-and-west  connections  need 
cut  through  no  great  extent  of  territory.  The  new  canal 
from  the  Rhine  to  the  Dortmund-Ems,  for  instance,  is 
only  47  miles  in  length;  and  the  extension  to  the  Weser 
is  but  77  miles.  The  new  Berlin-Stettin  Canal  is  62  miles 
long;*  the  canals  of  the  "Mark"  are  all  very  short,  as  is 
also  the  Bromberger  Canal  connecting  the  Netze  and  the 
Vistula.  In  the  United  States,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Erie 

'  Whitford,  History  of  New  York  Canals,  vol.  n,  p.  1060. 

*  Sympher,  Die  neuen  teasscrwirtschafUichen  Gesetze,  pp.  50-51. 


262        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

Canal  is  342  miles  long,  and  the  distance  from  Chicago  to 
the  Mississippi  River  is  327  miles.  ^ 

Equally  important  with  the  shorter  distances  in  Ger- 
many is  the  less  cost  of  construction  of  canals  per  mile. 
Below  is  a  table  of  the  cost  per  mile  of  the  more  important 
German  canals.  Harbor  costs  are  not  included :  — 

Waterways  Capacity       Cost  per  mile 

Dortmund-Ems  (proper) 600  tons  $114,911* 

Rhine  to  Dortmund-Ems 1000  396,277t 

Dortmund-Ems  to  Weser 600  £63,000$ 

Berlin-Stettin 600  173,348§ 

*  Peters,  p.  264.  t  Sympher,  Die  neuen  wasserwirtachaflHchen  QeaeUe ,  p.  51. 

t  Ibid.  §  Ibid. 

As  compared  with  these  figures,  the  estimated  cost  of 
deepening  the  Erie  Canal  from  7  to  12  feet,  with  a  new  cut 
for  part  of  the  distance,  is  $297,000  per  mile,  exclusive  of 
terminals;^  while  the  total  cost,  including  all  that  has  been 
expended  upon  the  old  canal,  approximates  $420,000  per 
mile.^  The  present  Kiel  Canal,  29,4  feet  in  depth,  cost 
$735,849  per  mile,^  as  compared  with  a  cost  of  more  than 
$1,600,000  per  mile  for  the  Chicago  Drainage  Canal,  with 
a  depth  of  only  24  feet.^ 

The  much  smaller  cost  of  canal  construction  in  Germany 
/  is  partly  due  to  the  lower  cost  of  materials  and  labor, 

partly  to  economy  in  building,  and  partly  to  the  favoring 
engineering  conditions  there  present.  But  whatever  the 
chief  cause,  the  fact  must  be  recognized  that  canal  con- 
struction is  much  less  costly  in  Germany  than  in  the 
United  States. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  railways  of  Germany  have  prob- 
ably cost  much  more  than  those  of  the  United  States  in 

*  Report  on  Survey  of  Des  Plaines  and  Illinois  Rivers,  1905-06,  House 
Document  no.  26.S,  p.  8. 

*  The  total  cost  is  estimated  at  $101,000,000. 

'  For  cost  to  1882,  see  Whitford,  supra,  p.  1068. 

♦  See  page  220. 

•  Sanitary  District  qf  Chicago,  1903,  p.  23. 


GERMAN  AND  AMERICAN  CONDITIONS    263 

proportion  to  mileage.  The  capitalization  per  mile  in 
Germany  is  about  $110,000,^  as  against  about  $G0,000  in 
this  country,  including  watered  stock  in  both  cases.  The 
railroads  of  Prussia  are  said  to  be  greatly  overcapital- 
ized, the  purpose  in  view  being  to  conceal  the  excessive 
earnings,  and  to  prevent  thereby  a  protest  against  high 
railway  freight  rates. ^  Whether  this  betrue  the  writer  has 
been  unable  to  ascertain;  but  in  any  event  it  is  probable 
that  the  actual  cost  of  the  German  railways  has  been  con- 
siderably greater  per  mile  than  those  of  the  United  States. 
If,  therefore,  both  sides  of  the  equation  be  taken  into  con- 
sideration, the  railways  costing  much  more  and  the  canals 
much  less  in  Germany  than  in  this  country,  it  is  clear  that 
canals  there  stand  a  much  better  competitive  chance  than 
they  do  in  the  United  States. 

2.  The  first  in  importance  among  the  industrial  con- 
ditions affecting  the  transportation  question  in  the  two 
countries  under  discussion  is  that  of  the  density  of  popu- 
lation and  of  traffic.  In  1910  the  population  of  the 
United  States  was  about  91,000,000,  or  about  26  per 
square  mile,  while  in  Germany  it  is  290  per  square  mile.' 
Were  the  eastern  half  of  the  United  States  alone  con- 
sidered, the  disparity  would  obviously  be  much  less,  but 
the  advantage  would  still  be  greatly  in  favor  of  Germany. 
A  dense  population  means  a  relatively  hea\'j'  traffic,  and, 
in  a  thriving  industrial  nation,  an  enormous  tonnage.  The 
bearing  of  this  upon  our  question  is  that  an  abundance 
of  traffic  is  thereby  afforded  for  the  support  of  both  the 
waterways  and  the  railways.  A  comparison  between  Ger- 
many and  France  is  instructive  in  this  connection.  In 
the  two  countries  the  waterway  and  railway  tonnage  has 
been  as  follows :  *  — 

'  vSee  page  185.     ^  See  Roberts,  in  Scribner's  Magazine,  February,  1911. 

*  Preliminary  Report  of  National  Waterways  Commission,  p.  30. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  32. 


264        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 


Fbancx 

Gbkmant 

Wy.          Ry. 
Miles       Miles 

Wy. 

Tonnage 
000 

Ry- 

Tonnage 
000 

Wy. 
Miles 

Ry- 

Miles 

Wy. 
Tonnage 

000 

Ton rage 
000 

1885 
1905 

7676 
7483 

18,500 
24,459 

19,573 
34,030 

75,192 
139,000 

6200 
6200 

22.940        27,600 
33,730      103,400 

1 

200,000 

588,700 

With  a  waterway  mileage  greater  than  that  of  Germany, 
France  had  in  1905  but  one  third  as  much  water  tonnage 
as  the  former  country;  twenty  years  earher  France  pos- 
sessed nearly  three  fourths  as  much  as  Germany.   With  a 
railway  mileage  in  1905  nearly  three  fourths  as  great  as 
Germany's,  France  had  less  than  one  fourth  as  great  a 
tonnage;  in  1885,  with  about  four  fifths  the  railway  mile- 
age, France  had  a  railway  tonnage  of  considerably  less  than 
half  that  of  the  German  railways.    The  total  tonnage, 
both  water  and  rail,  is  now  about  four  times  as  great  in 
Germany  as  in  France.    These  two  countries  are  almost 
equal  in  size,  but  the  population  of  Germany  has  in- 
creased with  tremendous  rapidity,  while  that  of  France 
has  remained  almost  stationary  for  many  years.    Ger- 
many now  has  a  population  of  112.14  per  square  kilo- 
meter as  against  73.17  per  square  kilometer  for  France.^ 
And  as  the  above  table  indicates,  the  industrial  capacity 
of  the  Germans  is  much  the  greater  per  capita.   The  table 
shows  admirably  the  relative  advantages  enjoyed  by  the 
agents  of  transportation  in  the  two  countries.   We  are  not 
in  possession  of  the  statistics  of  total  traffic  for  a  similar 
area  in  the  United  States,  but  they  would  show  only  a 
fraction  of  the  German  total.   Consider  more  than  60,000,- 
000  of  industrious  people  living  in  the  State  of  Texas 
and  an  idea  is  obtained  of  the  possibilities  of  transporta- 
tion under  German  conditions.  This  point  of  density  of 
population  and  of  traffic  must  be  set  down  as  decidedly 
advantageous  to  the  waterways  of  Germany. 
»  Statistische  Mittdlungen,  1909,  p.  430. 


GER]VL\N  AND  AMERICAN  CONDITIONS    265 

But  more  important  for  the  waterways  than  mere  quan- 
tity of  traffic  within  the  country  is  the  location  of  that 
traffic  in  relation  to  navigable  rivers  or  practicable  canul 
routes.  We  have  seen  that  all  of  the  important  coal 
regions  of  Germany  lie  near  navigable  rivers,  the  great 
Westphalian  district  being  cut  in  two  by  the  Rhine,  the 
Saar  district  lying  along  the  Saar  River,  and  the  Silesian 
coal-fields  near  the  upper  Oder.  We  have  found,  moreover, 
that  coal  and  ores  constitute  a  very  large  percentage  of  the 
total  of  German  waterway  traffic.  On  the  other  hand,  in 
the  United  States,  our  coal  deposits  are  as  a  rule  not  so 
favorably  located.  The  chief  exception  is  that  along  the 
Monongahela  River  in  western  Pennsylvania,  and,  natu- 
rally enough,  this  river  is  the  chief  exception  in  this  coun- 
try to  the  general  decline  of  river  traffic  in  the  past  thirty 
years.  The  chief  traffic  that  the  entire  Ohio -Mississippi 
River  system  now  enjoys  is  this  very  coal.  The  greater 
part  of  the  tonnage  on  the  Great  Lakes  is  iron  ore  from  the 
mines  near  Lake  Superior,  and  coal  carried  as  return  cargo 
from  Lake  Erie  ports  to  Duluth.  Aside  from  these  instances, 
our  coal  and  ores  are  not  conveniently  located  near  great 
natural  waterways;  canals  would  be  needed  to  reach  them. 
And  in  this  connection  it  is  a  point  well  worth  noting  that, 
even  were  canals  as  easy  of  construction  in  the  United 
States  as  in  Germany,  they  would  still  be  more  uncertain 
of  permanent  success,  because  of  frequent  shifting  of  in- 
dustrial centres  in  the  United  States.  In  Germany,  as  in 
all  Europe,  there  is  much  greater  fixity  of  conditions.^  Like 

*  The  Preliminary  Report  of  the  National  Waterways  Commission  (p.  31 ) 
says:  "Another  difference  as  compared  with  the  United  States  is  the 
greater  fixedness  in  Europe  in  the  location  of  manufacturing  cities,  as 
well  as  in  the  lines  of  distribution  of  raw  material  due  to  the  earlier 
development  of  coal  mines  and  other  sources  of  material.  The  shifting 
of  the  centres  of  production  which  arises  from  the  development  of  new  coal 
mines  and  new  centres  of  manufacturing,  as  well  as  from  the  great  growth 
of  population,  is  much  less  common  in  Europe  than  in  the  United  States. 
This  makes  it  possible  to  utilize  an  established  waterway,  with  a  greater 


266        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

the  geographical  conditions,  the  industrial  factors,  with- 
out exception,  are  thus  seen  to  be  much  more  favorable 
to  water  transportation  in  Germany  than  in  the  United 
States. 


3.  The  greatest  differences  between  the  two  countries, 
however,  are  governmental.  In  the  United  States  the 
railways  are  in  the  hands  of  private  individuals,  and  we 
have  not  yet  been  able  to  subject  them  to  suflScient 
national  control  to  insure  rival  waterways  even  against 
unfair  competition.  In  Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  both 
railways  and  waterways  are  almost  entirely  owned  by  the 
Government,  and  transportation,  whether  by  water  or  by 
rail,  is  regarded  as  a  single  problem.  We  have  seen  that 
the  Government  has  aimed  to  permit  no  competition,  fair 
or  unfair,  against  the  waterways  for  certain  kinds  of 
freight.  We  have  seen  that  where  possible  the  railways  are 
developed  as  mere  feeders  to  the  waterways  and  that 
"distinctly  favorable  terms  are  given  to  the  transfer  be- 
tween railway  and  waterway,"  so  as  to  make  the  two  agents 
"mutually  unite  in  the  task  of  forwarding  merchandise," 
the  cost  of  the  transshipments,  meanwhile,  being  largely 
borne  by  the  general  public  rather  than  by  the  shippers  of 
the  goods.  Under  such  conditions  waterways  obviously  en- 
joy a  supreme  advantage  as  compared  with  the  conditions 
in  a  country  where  every  effort  is  put  forth  on  the  part  of 
powerful  railway  companies  to  divert  the  last  vestige  of 
traffic  from  the  water  routes,  and  where  the  last  thing  to  be 
expected  would  be  a  mutual  cooperation  in  the  forwarding 
of  merchandise.  Even  if  we  should  succeed  in  the  United 
States  in  preventing  the  anomaly  of  a  profit-seeking  railway 
carrying  bulky  traffic  below  the  actual  cost  of  handling  it, 
while  crushing  competition,  we  should  still  have  the  task  of 
stimulating  cooperation  between  railways  and  waterways  in 

assurance  of  profit,  and  with  greater  dependence  upon  it  as  a  means  of 
transportation." 


GERMAN  AND  AMERICAN  CONDITIONS    267 

the  handling  of  freight,  and  of  encouraging  transshipments. 
This  latter  could  be  done,  as  in  Germany,  only  by  fixing  low 
rates  therefor,  and  by  covering  the  margin  of  loss  out  of 
general  taxation.  Harmony  and  cooperation  between  rail- 
ways and  waterways  will  probably  never  be  attained  so  long 
as  one  or  both  agents  of  transport  remain  under  private 
management.  To  secure  harmonious  relationship  between 
the  waterways  and  railways  of  the  United  States,  it  would 
certainly  be  necessary  to  place  them  both  under  the  con- 
trol of  a  single  department  of  the  Government, 

From  another  administrative  standpoint,  also,  do  Ger- 
man waterways  possess  a  very  great  advantage  as  com- 
pared with  those  of  the  United  States.  Waterway  appro- 
priations in  Germany  have  never  been  looked  upon  as  a 
most  convenient  instrument  by  which  precarious  Con- 
gressmen may  satisfy  their  constituencies  that  they  are 
"doing  something"  for  the  districts  they  respectively 
represent;  that  is,  such  a  thing  as  a  "pork  barrel"  is  un- 
known. The  story  of  the  hundreds  of  millions  of  dollars 
that  have  been  poured  into  our  rivers  and  creeks  and  ponds, 
and  into  the  pockets  of  those  who  are  on  the  "inside,"  will 
fill  one  of  the  most  shameful  pages  in  the  history  of  Ameri- 
can corruption.  Senator  Tillman  once  said,  "The  whole 
scheme  of  river  improvement  is  a  humbug  and  a  steal,  but, 
if  you  are  going  to  steal,  let  us  divide  it  up  and  not  go  to 
complaining."  ^  Although  a  board  of  engineers  and  a  state 
committee  once  condemmed  the  scheme  of  canalizing  Great 
Salt  Pond,  somewhere  in  New  England,  the  latter  stating 
that  "this  committee  is  convinced  that  the  public  interests 
have  not  been  subserved  by  the  expenditure  of  money  at 
Great  Salt  Pond  .  .  .  and  that  further  expenditures  of 
money  on  this  enterprise  would  be  wasteful,"  a  further 
sum  of  $199,000  has  since  been  sunk  in  the  briny  waters  of 
the  pond.'^ 

When  bills  are  introduced  into  the  National  Congress 

1  World's  Work,  August,  1910,  p.  13.259.  ^  Ibid. 


268        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

for  the  "Canalization  of  the  roaring  Kiskiminetas,"  ^  and 
for  the  digging  of  artesian  wells  as  a  source  of  water  supply, 
looking  to  eventual  navigation  on  an  unknown  Arkansas 
rivulet,  what  is  to  be  expected  in  the  way  of  a  systematic 
development  of  the  waterway  possibilities  of  the  country? 

In  sharp  contrast  to  the  American  method  of  dealing  out 
national  funds,  Germany  requires  from  interested  districts 
either  definite  contributions  for  the  building  of  waterways, 
or  else  an  absolute  guaranty  of  a  defrayal  of  a  portion  of 
the  annual  deficit.  In  this  way  are  thwarted  all  attempts 
to  draw  funds  from  the  National  Treasury  for  schemes  in 
which  localities  would  never  dream  of  venturing  money 
of  their  own.  Moreover,  the  national  funds  for  waterway 
development  are  not  turned  over  to  irresponsible  local 
agents  to  become  a  source  of  profit  for  political  grafters  in- 
terested in  construction  companies.  Entire  supervision  of 
waterways  is  under  the  control  of  a  special  Waterways 
Department  in  the  Ministry  of  Public  Works.  This  makes 
possible  a  systematic  development  of  the  waterways  along 
national  lines.  Furthermore,  the  careful  training  which 
the  officials  have  had  in  administration  has  made  it  possi- 
ble to  determine  the  probable  cost  of  an  undertaking  with 
great  accuracy,  and  to  complete  the  works  within  the  lim- 
its of  the  time  set.  When  a  particular  project  is  decided 
upon,  the  entire  funds  necessary  are  appropriated  at  once, 
and  the  work  is  speedily  carried  to  completion,  rather  than, 
as  in  the  United  States,  appropriating  a  little  every  few 
years  for  projects  which  at  that  rate  would  require  genera- 
tions to  complete,  even  were  the  improvements  thus  made 
not  wholly  destroyed  by  the  action  of  the  waters  during  the 
lapse  of  time.  When  the  German  government  appropriates 
money  for  waterway  construction,  it  is  certain  that  it  is 
going  to  be  spent  on  waterways,  and  spent  economically 
and  systematically. 

A  word  should  be  said  here  of  another  handicap  to  a 
^  Literary  Digest,  June  18,  1910. 


GERMAN  AND  AMERICAN  CONDITIONS    2G9 

systematic  development  of  waterways  in  the  United 
States,  one  growing  out  of  the  nature  of  our  system  of 
government.  In  Germany  the  central  Government  is  su- 
preme, and  waterways  are  developed  by  that  Government 
to  serve  national,  not  sectional  ends.  In  this  country,  how- 
ever, under  our  dual  system  of  government,  we  find  the 
various  states  developing  their  waterways  along  state 
lines,  regardless  of  national  interests.  The  best  present 
illustration  of  this  is  to  be  found  in  New  York,  v  here  sec- 
tional interest  alone  determined  the  enlargement  of  the 
Erie  Canal  now  being  carried  out.^  A  uniform  depth  or  a 
comprehensive  system  of  waterways  can  never  be  secured 
so  long  as  improvements  are  not  conducted  along  strictly 
national  lines. 

To  place  the  United  States  in  a  position  equal  to  that 
of  Germany  in  the  administration  of  wateru'ay  appropria- 
tions something  more  is  necessary,  however,  than  the  mere 
abolishing  of  the  "pork  barrel."  That  is  a  step  greatly  to 
be  desired,  but  it  is  only  a  step  after  all.  The  real  difference 
between  Germany  and  the  United  States  lies  deeper  than 
this.  Germany  is  an  old  administrative  state.  The  citizens 
are  proud  of  their  Government,  and  the  honor  of  hold- 
ing an  Imperial  position  is  one  of  the  greatest  in  the  land. 
Pecuniary  perquisites  of  office,  in  the  way  of  shares  in  cor- 
ruption funds  or  opportunities  of  extending  Government 
protection  to  corporations  in  which  the  office-seeker  is  in- 
terested, are  not  deemed  necessary  inducements  to  office- 
holding,  as  is  unfortunately  often  the  case  in  the  United 
States.  Honor  among  legislators  is  not  followed  by  a  ques- 
tion mark.  In  a  word,  business  does  not  dominate  the 
Government,  as  it  so  largely  does  in  the  United  States  of  to- 
day. Until  we  can  greatly  raise  the  standard  of  our  polit- 
ical life,  until  we  can  insure  that  money  appropriated  for 
waterways  is  spent  for  waterv\'ays,  until  we  can  place  the 
development  of  inland  navigation  on  a  systematic  national 
*  See  chapter  xix. 


270        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

basis,  there  is  little  chance  of  developing  an  extensive  water- 
way commerce  in  this  country. 

From  every  point  of  view,  —  geographic,  industrial,  and 
governmental,  German  waterways  are  greatly  favored  as 
compared  with  those  of  the  United  States.  The  combina- 
tion presents  an  almost  immeasurable  degree  of  advantage. 
What,  then,  is  to  be  said  of  the  future  of  American  inland 
waterways?  Some  of  the  present  handicaps  may  eventually 
be  overcome.  The  "pork  barrel"  method  of  appropria- 
tions may  be  abolished;  and  in  time  we  may  conceivably 
develop  a  conscientious  and  systematic  administration  of 
waterways  along  national  lines.  Population  and  traffic  will 
increase,  and  industrial  conditions  will  come  to  assume  a 
greater  degree  of  fixity.  But  the  geographic  handicaps 
will  always  remain.  We  cannot  change  the  direction  of 
our  rivers;  we  cannot  direct  a  more  favorable  location  of 
our  mines  of  coal  and  ores,  and  the  great  distances  across 
which  canals  must  be  cut  will  ever  continue  the  same. 
Though  we  may  eventually  regulate  our  turbulent  rivers 
by  huge  impounding  reservoirs,  by  vast  systems  of  leveesj 
■and  other  controlling  works,  the  comparative  handicap 
will  not  thereby  have  been  overcome.  It  will  still  exist 
in  the  vastly  greater  cost  of  regulating  the  streams  for 
purposes  of  navigation.  We  might  control  our  railways, 
even  place  them  under  Government  ownership  and  run 
them  so  as  not  to  compete  with  water  transportation;  we 
might  emulate  Germany  and  conduct  the  railways  at  a 
substantial  margin  of  profit  while  at  the  same  time  ex- 
tending to  the  waterways  a  large  annual  subsidy;  yet  we 
could  not  develop  water  traffic  to  the  extent  Germany 
has  done  on  account  of  our  more  unfavorable  geographic 
conditions. 


CHAPTER  XII 

TRANSPORTATION    IN  FRANCE 

1.  No  other  country  has  expended  so  many  millions  of  doK 
lars  upon  waterways  and  no  other  country  has  so  consist- 
ently striven  to  develop  a  systematic  network  of  railway 
lines  as  has  France.  For  many  years  the  waterways  of 
the  country  have  been  almost  entirely  Government  owned, 
and  from  the  very  beginning  French  railways  have  been 
dominated  by  the  National  Government.  As  a  conse- 
quence, France  possesses  to-day  a  transportation  system 
which  is  less  the  product  of  chance  development,  and 
more  the  result  of  a  conscious  national  policy  than  that 
of  any  other  country.  The  history  of  French  transporta- 
tion, therefore,  presents  an  unusually  favorable  field  of 
study. 

Before  taking  up  the  question  of  the  cost  of  transporta- 
tion in  France,  and  the  economic  results  of  the  French 
policy,  it  will  be  well  to  give  a  brief  sketch  of  the  Govern- 
ment's relation  both  to  the  waterways  and  to  the  railways 
of  the  country.  The  present  waterway  policy  in  France 
was  adopted  in  1879,  when  M.  de  Freycinet  was  Minister 
of  Public  Works.  A  law  passed  in  that  year  carried  appro- 
priations for  the  improvement  of  2500  miles  of  rivers  and  of 
2250  miles  of  canals,  and  for  the  construction  of  870  miles 
of  new  canals,  at  a  total  cost  of  $186,000,000.^  The  money 
was  to  be  raised  by  means  of  extraordinary  funds,  granted 
in  each  fiscal  year,  and  by  the  issue  of  three  per  cent  Gov- 
ernment bonds,  payable  in  seventy-five  years.  Provision 
was  made  for  the  gradual  repurchase  of  concessions  which 
had  been  from  time  to  time  given  to  private  companies  and 
*  Report  of  {British)  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vi,  p.  5. 


272        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

to  individuals ;  and  for  the  standardization,  so  far  as  pos- 
sible, of  the  entire  waterway  system.  Finally,  all  tolls  and 
dues  were  abolished.^ 

The  tremendous  drain  on  the  National  Treasury  result- 
ing from  this  policy,  amounting  between  the  years  1879 
and  1900  to  $5,741,880  a  year  for  construction  and  to  $2,- 
189,700  for  maintenance  (a  total  of  over  $166,000,000), 
exclusive  of  the  expenses  of  administration,  led  to  a  reor- 
ganization of  the  policy  under  the  ministry  of  M.  Boudin 
in  1903.2  'pjjg  jjg^  \q^  Iq^^  down  the  following  princi- 
ples :  ^  — 

1.  All  parties  directly  interested  in  particular  routes 
may  be  called  on  for  financial  aid  in  the  construction  of  the 
works. 

2.  All  interested  parties  must  contribute  at  least  half  the 
cost  of  new  works. 

3.  These  parties  may  recoup  themselves,  wholly  or  in 
part,  by  obtaining  concessions  of  certain  dues  and  of  the 
monopoly  of  traction. 

4.  The  Government  expenditures  are  henceforth  to 
come  out  of  ordinary  revenue,  experience  having  proved 
extraordinary  advances  and  loans  to  be  bad  policy. 

In  1908,  at  the  request  of  the  Minister  of  Public  Works 
the  Conseil  General  du  Fonts  et  Chaussees  made  a  care- 
ful investigation  of  the  feasibility  of  further  developing 
the  water  routes  of  the  country.  After  a  prolonged  dis- 
cussion centring  chiefly  about  the  question  of  means  of 
raising  additional  revenue,  the  committee  recommended 
some  increase  in  appropriations  and  a  continuation  of  the 
general  policy  adopted  in  1903.*  Whether  another  change 
of  policy  will  soon  come  it  is  impossible  to  predict.  It  will 

1  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  toI.  VI,  p.  5. 

*  Preliminary  Report  of  {U.  S.)  National  Waterways  Commission,  p.  63. 
'  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vi,  p.  37. 

*  Preliminary  Report  of  National  Waterways  Commission,  p.  54. 


TRANSPORTATION  IN  FR.\NCE  273 

depend  upon  the  success  of  the  plan  of  cooperation  be- 
tween the  Government  and  interested  localities  aiyi  upon 
the  condition  of  the  National  Treasury. 

2.  Turning  our  attention  now  to  railway  development 
in  France,  we  find  that  the  basis  of  the  present  system  was 
laid  down  in  a  law  of  1842.  This  law  provided  that  the 
State,  contributing  $50,000  a  mile,  should  own  the  road- 
beds, and  that  private  enterprise  should  furnish  the 
equipment,  amounting  to  about  $40,000  a  mile.  Twenty- 
five  thousand  miles  of  line  were  authorized.  The  Revolu- 
tion of  1848,  however,  checked  progress.  Building  opera- 
tions were  resumed  in  1851,  and  the  number  of  companies 
was  reduced  from  thirty-three  to  six.  Five  of  these  radi- 
ated from  Paris  like  spokes  from  a  hub,  while  the  sixth 
was  in  the  extreme  southwest.  But  too  much  attention  to 
systematic  development,  neglect  of  local  traffic,  and  the 
financial  panic  of  1857  led  to  bankruptcy  and  a  consequent 
reorganization  in  1859.  Under  the  new  plan  many  addi- 
tional lines  were  built.  Charters  were  granted  to  the  com- 
panies for  a  period  of  ninety-nine  years.  The  Government 
issued  four  per  cent  guaranteed  bonds,  and  those  roads 
that  were  able  to  pay  off  their  obligations  to  the  Govern- 
ment were  permitted  thereafter  to  receive  full  profits,  al- 
though the  construction  expenditures  had  been  borne  by 
the  Government.  At  the  same  time  those  roads  which 
were  unable  to  meet  their  obligations  to  the  Government 
were,  curiously  enough,  permitted  to  pocket  the  four  per 
cent  bond  dividends  which  the  Government  had  guaran- 
teed. Thus  for  the  railway  companies  it  was  veritably  a 
case  of  "heads  we  win,  tails  you  lose."  The  policy  was 
financially  disastrous  to  the  Government  and  it  led  to  a 
final  "settlement"  in  1883. 

By  the  terms  of  this  agreement,  which  is  still  in  force, 
the  State  operates  only  in  the  southwest.  Each  company 
is  given  a  monopoly  of  its  "reseau,"  or  the  district  which  it 


274        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

naturally  serves.  The  State  raises  by  annual  installments 
the  necessary  funds  for  all  new  construction.  This  is  to 
continue  until  the  expiration  of  the  charters  in  1958.^  The 
railroad  companies  have  to  meet  all  the  expenses  of  equip- 
ping, maintaining,  and  operating  the  lines,  and  are  asked  to 
contribute  large  sums  to  the  Government  in  the  way  of 
taxes,  and  to  perform  gratuitously  certain  special  services 
for  the  Government.  The  roads  are  guaranteed  dividends, 
but  beyond  a  certain  point  the  State  receives  two  thirds  of 
the  profits.^ 

At  the  present  time  there  are  seven  groups  of  railways, 
of  which  two  are  owned  and  operated  by  the  State,  while 
the  others  are  in  the  hands  of  private  companies.  All, 
however,  are  subjected  to  a  very  strict  governmental  con- 
trol of  rates.  The  process  of  rate  regulation  is  exceedingly 
complicated  and  it  is  unnecessary  to  give  the  details  in  this 
connection.  In  brief,  there  is  an  organized  body  of  salaried 
railway  oflScials,  whose  function  is  to  investigate  rates  and 
collect  information  for  the  use  of  railways.  On  the  basis  of 
their  findings  the  railways  from  time  to  time  propose  rate 
changes  to  the  Minister  of  Public  Works,  who  ratifies  or 
rejects  the  proposal  according  to  the  advice  of  a  non-par- 
tisan Consultative  Committee  of  one  hundred  and  fifty 
members,  which  has  passed  In  review  all  of  the  evidence 
presented  by  the  railway  officials,^  The  importance  of 
this  railway  rate  regulation  in  relation  to  the  waterways 
will  shortly  appear. 

3.  The  theory  on  which  the  Government  of  France  bases 
its  policy  of  rate  regulation  is,  that  competition  should  be 
maintained  in  order  to  prevent  the  monopolization  of 
transport  by  a  single  agent  and  the  establishment  there- 
with of  exorbitant  transportation  charges.  In  pursuance 
of  this  end  the   Consultative    Committee,   which    pos- 

^  Hadley,  Railway  Transportation,  chap.  x.  ^  Ibid. 

'  Buchler,  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics,  vol.  XX,  pp.  279-86. 


TRANSPORTATION  IN  FRANCE  27o 

sesses  the  power  of  rate  homologation  (ratification),  has 
adopted  a  twenty  per  cent  rate  differential  in  favor  of  the 
waterways.  "In  practice  the  committee  allows  a  differ- 
ence of  twenty  per  cent  for  the  benefit  of  water  carriage  in 
order  to  allow  for  the  difference  of  conditions  between  rail 
and  water  carriage,  the  latter  being  unable  to  offer  the 
same  advantages  from  the  point  of  view  of  rapidity  of  trans- 
port, and  being  obliged  in  most  cases  to  exact  a  minimum 
of  tonnage  much  higher  than  that  with  which  the  raih\  ay 
can  be  satisfied.  The  difference  of  twenty  per  cent  is  al- 
lowed in  all  cases  of  maritime  as  well  as  inland  transporta- 
tion." ^  To  take  a  concrete  case,  in  1903  the  Paris-Lyons- 
Mediterranean  Railway  Company  submitted  a  proposal 
for  a  reduction  of  fixed  charges  in  a  special  tariff  affecting 
the  transportation  of  chalk  from  Sens  and  Souppes  to 
Marseilles.  The  committee  decided  against  the  reduc- 
tion, "on  the  ground  that  the  proposal  did  not  keep  intact 
a  difference  of  twenty  per  cent  in  relation  to  rates  which 
could  be  obtained  by  using  the  waterway."  ^ 

It  appears  from  these  quotations  that  shippers  are  arbi- 
trarily denied  the  combined  advantages  of  speedy  service, 
convenient-sized  consignments,  and  low  freight  charges. 
If  they  wish  to  make  a  speedy  shipment  or  send  a  small 
cargo,  they  must  forego  the  advantage  of  low  rates.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  they  wish  to  utilize  low  transport 
charges,  they  must  ship  by  water  and  thus  forego  the  ad- 
vantages inherent  in  a  railway. 

It  should  be  pointed  out,  however,  that  while  this 
twenty  per  cent  differential  is  the  usual  extent  of  advan- 
tage guaranteed  to  the  waterways,  it  is  not  an  absolute 
margin.  Sometimes  the  degree  of  difference  is  increased 
and  in  rare  instances  it  is  lessened,  dependent  upon  the  exi- 
gencies of  particular  conditions.  In  1905  the  ^Vcstcrn  Ruil- 
vvay  Company  submitted  for  confirmation  a  proposal  to 

1  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  svpra,  p.  117. 
«  Ibid.,  p.  118. 


276        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

give  exceptional  fixed  rates  for  carrying  cement  in  com- 
plete trainloads  of  10,000  kilograms  each.  The  difference 
to  the  advantage  of  the  waterways  still  remained  at  thirty^ 
three  per  cent.  On  March  2,  1905,  the  Consultative  Com- 
mittee vetoed  the  proposal,  on  the  ground  that  "the  aim 
of  the  railway  was  without  doubt  to  attract  to  its  line  a 
traffic  which  really  belonged  to  the  waterways,  and  that 
such  a  competition  in  such  a  form  was  not  tolerable."  ^ 

The  cases  where  the  twenty  per  cent  margin  of  differ- 
ence has  been  set  aside  are  exceptional.  Railway  rates, 
less  than  twenty  per  cent  in  excess  of  water  rates,  are 
granted  only  when  it  has  been  proved  beyond  question 
that  it  is  impossible  for  the  waterways  to  care  for  the  traffic 
to  the  satisfaction  of  shippers.  The  benefit  of  a  doubt  is 
always  given  to  the  waterways. ^ 

*'The  railways  are  always  deterred  from  attempting 
to  lower  rates  of  which  the  success  is  doubtful,  or  which 
would  serve  only  temporary  needs,  because  of  the  practical 
impossibility  of  raising  them  again."  ^  The  Consultative 
Committee  almost  invariably  refuses  to  permit  a  rate  once 
lowered  to  be  restored  again  to  its  former  height.  The 
result  of  this  policy  is  frequently  to  prevent  the  railways 
from  lowering  their  schedules  to  the  minimum  figure  al- 
lowed by  the  committee.  Practically  all  experimentation 
in  railway  ratemaking  is  thus  prohibited;  for,  as  is  well 
known,  it  is  often  impossible  to  foresee  the  results  of  low- 
ered rates.  They  may  generate  an  increased  traffic  suffi- 
cient to  yield  larger  returns  than  were  afforded  by  the 
higher  charges;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  they  may  bring 
heavy  losses  to  the  railway.  The  uncertainty,  the  fear 
which  a  railway  faces  under  such  conditions,  prevents 
elasticity  in  ratemaking. 

^  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  ibid.,  p.  117. 
2  Ibid.,  p.  118. 

'  Bulletin  de  r Association  du  Congrhs  International  des  Chemina  de  Fer, 
November,  1904,  vol.  23,  p.  1447. 


TRANSPORTATION  IN  FRANCE 


277 


This  policy  of  guaranteeing  water  traffic  is,  however,  ap- 
plied in  the  main  only  to  such  commodities  as  are  deemed 
naturally  to  belong  to  the  waterways.  As  in  other  coun- 
tries, the  greater  part  of  the  waterway  traffic  of  France  is 
composed  of  a  comparatively  few  bulky  articles.  The  fol- 
lowing table  gives  the  percentages  of  different  commod- 
ities carried  by  water  in  1907:^  — 


Commodity 

River 

Canal 

Total         !  Per  cent 

Coal,  coke,  and  briquette 
Stone,  gravel,  and  lime 

a 

2,693,525 
7,586,768 
777,1^45 
827,297 
379,149 
378,061 
508,611 
1,899,353 
158,985 
109,384 

7,359,550 

4,779,640 

652.113 

95(1,726 

488,742 
1,099,701 

613,006 
2,585,531 

139,275 
22,395 

10,053,085 

12,336,408 

1,429,758 

l,77H,l>23 

867,891 

1,497,762 

1,121,617 

4,484,884 

299,260 

131,779 

29.6 
36.3 

4.2 

Wood  and  lumber  .     . 
Metals  and  machinery 
Oils,  sugar,  and  sand  . 
Industrial  products 
Agricultural  produce  . 
Unclassified   .... 
Raft  wood 

5.2 
2.6 
4.4 
3.3 
13.2 
0.9 
0.4 

Total 

15,339,788 

18,690,679 

34,030,467      |     100.0 

The  table  shows  coal  products  and  building  materials  to 
constitute  about  two  thirds  of  the  total  waterway  tonnage, 
while  the  greater  part  of  the  remainder  is  of  a  kindred  na- 
ture. Agricultural  produce,  comprising  13.2  per  cent  of 
the  total,  makes  a  better  showing  than  it  does  in  Germany. 
This  is  primarily  due  to  the  large  quantities  of  wines  which 
are  shipped  in  casks  over  the  water  routes.  We  find,  there- 
fore, that,  in  order  to  force  bulky  commodities,  "naturally 
belonging  to  the  waterways,"  to  travel  by  boat,  the  Gov- 
ernment is  obliged  to  cripple  the  competitive  possibilities 
of  the  railways,  and  to  give  a  usual  margin  of  freight  advan- 
tage to  the  waterways  of  twenty  per  cent. 

4.  In  order  to  appreciate  the  extent  of  the  aid  given  to 
the  waterways,  and  in  order  to  ascertain  to  what  degree 
they  would  be  able  to  stand  alone,  it  is  necessary  to  look 

1  National  Waterways  Commission,  Doc.  no.  16.  Report  of  Frank  H. 
Mason  on  "Railway  Freight  Rates,  Waterways,  and  Canals  in  France," 
p.  74. 


278        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

further  than  to  the  mere  guaranteed  margin  of  rate  differ- 
ence. It  is  necessary  to  inquire  what  enters  into  the  mak- 
ing of  rates  on  the  rival  agents  of  transport. 

In  the  case  of  the  waterways,  the  carriers,  that  is,  the 
boatmen,  have  to  bear  no  part  of  the  cost  of  canal  con- 
struction or  river  improvement,  nor  contribute  anything 
towards  the  maintenance  and  operating  expenses  of  the 
highways  which  they  use.  All  tolls  and  all  dues  were  abol- 
ished in  1880.^  Since  that  year  the  State  has  constantly 
borne  a  heavy  deficit  from  waterway  transportation. 
During  recent  years  the  cost  of  maintenance  and  opera- 
tion of  all  the  waterways  of  France  has  ranged  from  $4,- 
000,000  to  $5,000,000  per  annum,^  exclusive  of  interest  on 
the  capital  invested.  The  cost  of  constructing  the  entire 
waterway  system  of  France  is  estimated  at  $360,000,000, 
and  the  annual  loss  of  interest  on  this  capital,  computed  at 
four  per  cent,  is  $14,400,000.^  Adding  this  to  the  mainten- 
ance deficit,  we  find  that  the  State  contributes  approxi- 
mately $19,000,000  a  year  for  the  support  of  inland  navi- 
gation. Since  there  are  7483  ^  miles  of  navigable  waters  in 
France,  the  average  yearly  deficit  per  mile  borne  by  the 
State  is  about  $2500.  This  amount  represents  an  out-and- 
out  donation  to  water  traflSc.  The  total  waterway  ton- 
nage for  the  country  in  1905  was  34,030,000;^  hence  the 
State's  donation  was  equal  to  about  fifty -six  cents  a  ton 
for  all  the  low-class  freight  that  traveled  by  water. 

But  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  waterways  are  furnished 
them  free  of  charge,  and  kept  in  repair  by  the  State,  and 
that  their  labor  cost  is  slight,  the  boatmen  have  a  hard 
time  to  make  ends  meet.  "The  barge  master  or  captain  is 
usually  the  owner  of  his  boat,  and  derives  his  compensation 
from  the  earnings  of  the  business,  which  vary  with  the 

1  National  Waterways  Commission,  ibid.,  p.  62.       ^  Ibid.,  p.  51. 
'  Four  per  cent  is  used  here  because  it  is  used  in  France. 
*  Preliminary  Report  of  National  Waterways  Commission,  p.  32. 
'  Ibid. 


TRANSPORTATION  IN  FRANCE  279 

abundance  of  freight,  the  current,  rates,  stage  of  water, 
and  other  contingencies,  but  as  a  rule  his  profits  are  small 
in  proportion  to  the  capital  involved.^  Individual  cases 
are  cited  in  which  a  bargeman  owning  two  boats,  represent- 
ing together  an  investment  of  $6000,  and  giving  his  entire 
time  to  the  business  of  navigating  them,  has  come  out  at 
the  end  of  the  year  with  a  net  profit  not  exceeding  $200.^ 
All  accounts  agree  that  the  competition  of  the  railways, 
especially  in  miscellaneous  freights,  is  very  serious,  and 
that  barges  on  canals  and  rivers  are  less  profitable  than 
they  were  a  few  years  ago."  ' 

Turning  now  to  the  railways,  we  find  quite  a  different 
state  of  affairs.  In  the  year  1907  the  Government  received 
from  the  railways,  in  the  way  of  taxes  and  special  services, 
an  income  valued  at  $58,200,000.  The  entire  railway  ad- 
ministrative expenditures  incurred  by  the  Government, 
on  the  other  hand,  were  only  $45,200,000,  leaving  a  net 
revenue  to  the  State  of  $13,000,000;*  this  is  approximately 
equal  to  $525  per  mile.  In  direct  contrast  to  the  canal 
men,  therefore,  the  railway  companies  are  required  to 
make  rates  which  will  yield  a  revenue  sufficient  to 
cover  interest  on  the  capital  invested  by  the  State,  meet  all 
of  the  expenditures  of  the  State  railway  administration, 
furnish  the  Government,  in  addition,  a  handsome  revenue, 
cover  all  the  costs  of  maintenance  and  operation  of  the 
roads,  and  pay  dividends  if  they  can;  and,  indeed,  in  spite 

^  About  two  fifths  of  all  the  canal  boats  belong  to  small  bargemen, 
and  the  rest  to  a  great  canal  company.  In  1907  there  were  13,300  barges 
in  operation  in  France,  on  which  were  living  18,600  men,  10,800  women, 
and  16,200  children.  These  bargees  are  very  illiterate,  their  wages  are 
small,  and  the  standard  of  living  is  very  low.  The  various  classes  of 
petty  officials  and  employees  along  the  canals  and  navigable  rivers  of 
France  are,  as  a  rule,  meagrely  paid,  and  are  obliged  in  many  cases  to 
devote  their  leisure  hours  to  some  other  form  of  employment.  {National 
Waterways  Commission,  Doc.  no.  16,  p.  76.) 

2  This  probably  means  inclusive  of  wages  for  himself. 

»  Ibid.,  p.  77. 

*  Bulletin  de  F Association,  swpra,  p.  1403. 


280        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

of  all  the  financial  handicaps  imposed  upon  them,  and  in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  they  are  almost  universally  forbidden 
to  compete  against  the  waterways  for  certain  kinds  of 
traffic,  the  net  revenue  of  the  railways  in  1907  was  $149,- 
200,000,  or  4.18  per  cent  on  the  capitalization.^  Were  a 
similar  policy  applied  to  the  waterways,  rather  than  earn- 
ing dividends,  canal  boats  would  soon  utterly  disappear 
from  the  country.  By  means  of  this  policy  the  French 
Government  may  maintain  water  transportation,  but  it 
should  be  observed  that  it  does  so  by  the  complete  de- 
struction of  competition. 

5.  The  next  point  to  be  considered  is  the  extent  of  traflBc 
development  upon  the  two  systems  of  transportation  that 
has  resulted  from  the  above-outlined  policy.  From  1850 
to  1880  the  annual  tonnage  on  the  waterways  of  France 
remained  almost  constant.'^  In  that  year  tolls  were  abol- 
ished, and  in  succeeding  years  the  waterways  were  greatly 
improved  and  extended  as  authorized  by  the  law  of  1879. 
Between  1879  and  1905,  2072  miles  of  new  waterways 
were  constructed,  increasing  the  total  mileage  from  905 
to  2977.='  From  1880  to  1905  the  French  railway  mile- 
age increased  from  14,315  miles  to  24,459  miles.*  The 
result  of  the  waterway  improvement  has  been  a  steady 
increase  in  water-borne  freight  during  the  last  thirty  years. 
But,  as  the  diagram  (on  page  281)  indicates,  the  increase 
in  water  traffic  has  been  less  rapid  than  that  of  the  rail- 
ways even  in  similar  kinds  of  freight.  The  total  quan- 
tity of  water  traffic  is  a  little  more  than  one  fourth  that 
of  the  slow  freight  carried  by  the  railways;  the  former 
thus  having  a  greater  traffic  density  so  far  as  bulky  freight 
alone  is  concerned.    This  probably  means  little  one  way 

1  BuUelin  de  V Association,  ibid.,  p.  1403. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  1404. 

'  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vi,  p.  5. 
*  Ibid.,  p.  155. 


TRANSPORTATION  IN  FRANCE 


281 


IfiOO 

y 

900 

/ 

Tonnage,  Slow  Frelgh 

,  Railwara 

/ 

.... 

/\^ 

^ 

800 

/ 

700 

/ 

/ 

/ 

600 

/- 

/ 

600 

r- 

'\ 

/ 

/ 

V 

400 

J 

300 

/^ 

200 

^^--^ 

.-^-^ 

100 

p.    .     ^ 

"^ 

mmna 

IN  KILL- 

20 


10 


13 


17 


14 


13 


12 


11 


10 


7 
6 
S 
4 
3 
2 

Tiatiai»- 
ucron  m 


1S7.2  1S77  18S2  1887  1892  1897  1902  ,1907 

Slow  Freight  on  the  Railways  and  Waterways  of  Franco 


or  the  other,  however,  for  the  reason  that  they  do  not 
compete  for  this  traflBc.  Most  of  the  bulky  freight  of  the 
railways  is  in  regions  not  served  by  water  routes. 

6.  The  distribution  of  waterway  traffic  in  France,  also 
aCFords  very  interesting  information.  From  the  geograph- 
ical point  of  view  it  may  be  said  that  in  the  north  and 
northeastern  part  of  the  country,  on  one  fifth  of  the  na- 
tional area  is  carried  four  fifths  of  the  entire  waterway 


282       WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

traffic.^  This  is  due  to  the  existence  in  the  northeast  of  the 
French  and  Belgian  coal-fields,  and  in  the  north  to  the 
large  river  Seine,  connecting  Paris  with  Rouen  and  Havre. 
In  1905  the  total  waterway  traffic  of  France  was  34,030,- 
000  tons;2  and  in  that  year  10,202,828  tons  were  moved  on 
the  waterways  in  Paris,'  nearly  one  third  of  the  entire  ton- 
nage of  the  country.  A  brief  description  of  the  more  favor- 
ing waterway  conditions  in  this  region  will  suffice  to  explain 
the  phenomenon. 

The  Seine  River  connects  Paris  with  the  port  of  Rouen, 
and  a  "maritime  way"  extends  from  Rouen  to  Havre. 
Above  Paris  the  canalized  river,  together  with  a  canal,  ex- 
tends for  a  distance  of  120  miles  into  central  France.  The 
total  length  of  this  route  is  345  miles,  and  below  Paris  the 
river  is  capacious  enough  for  1100-ton  barges.'*  A  large 
part  of  the  traffic  received  at  Paris  by  water  is  Welsh  coal. 
It  is  brought  from  Wales  to  the  port  of  Rouen  by  boat,  and 
is  there  transshipped  to  barges  which  tie  up  alongside  the 
larger  vessels.  The  transshipment  under  such  conditions 
is  less  costly  than  it  would  be  from  the  boats  to  railway 
cars.  Sixty  per  cent  of  the  upstream  traffic  from  Havre  to 
Rouen  is  coal.^  This,  with  two  other  commodities,  namely, 
grain  and  wine,  make  up  the  greater  part  of  the  Paris 
waterway  freight. 

For  the  importation  of  grain  and  wine  the  conditions  are 
equally  favorable.  Large  quantities  of  foreign  grain  and  of 
Spanish  and  Italian  wines  enter  at  the  port  of  Havre,  and 
are  sent  by  boat  up  the  Seine  to  Paris.  The  railways  are 
especially  debarred  from  competing  for  import  traffic.  The 
governing  powers,  under  the  influence  of  protectionism, 
use  the  railways  as  a  means  of  protecting  home  industry. 
"Everywhere  opinion  and  the  public  powers  demand  un- 

*  Bulletin  de  V Association,  supra. 

*  Preliminary  Report  of  National  Waterways  Commission,  p.  82. 
'  National  Waterways  Commission,  Doc.  no.  16,  p.  75. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  111.  B  jjjid,,  p.  70. 


TRANSPORTATION  IN  FRANCE  283 

ceasingly  that  lower  railway  rates  shall  be  given  on  grain 
for  export  [in  order  to  make  competition  with  foreign 
grain  easier],^  while  they  constantly  oppose  any  lowering 
of  rates  on  imported  grain."  ^  A  strange  inconsistency  is 
apparent  when  one  observes  that  at  the  same  time  the 
public  powers  offer  every  opportunity  for  low  rates  on  the 
waterways  on  imported  commodities  of  all  kinds;  that  is, 
by  furnishing  the  boatmen  with  fully  equipped  waterways 
free  of  cost  and  by  imposing  no  tolls  upon  them.  "  One  un- 
derstands with  difficulty  the  attitude  of  protectionists  in 
France  who  laud  the  construction  of  waterways  and  at  the 
same  time  protest  energetically  against  the  least  lowering 
of  rates  proposed  by  the  railways  for  the  purpose  of  re- 
diverting  to  themselves  traffic  which  the  waterways  have 
taken  from  them."  '  As  a  result  of  this  sort  of  logic  the 
waterways  are  able  to  enjoy  a  large  part  of  the  import 
trade  of  the  country. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  discuss  separately  the  many  canals 
and  rivers  of  other  sections  of  France.  It  appears,  from 
the  fact  that  four  fifths  of  the  waterway  traffic  is  in  one 
fifth  the  area  of  the  country,  that  the  extensive  waterway 
mileage  in  central  and  southern  France  must  fare  but 
poorly.  It  is  only  necessary  to  quote  from  M.  Colson, 
General  Inspector  of  Bridges  and  Highways  of  France,  and 
a  widely  recognized  authority  on  transportation  questions, 
to  show  the  results  of  the  French  waterway  policy  in  these 
regions.  He  stated  to  the  writer  that  "the  expenditures 
upon  the  waterways  of  central  and  southern  France  are 
absolutely  a  waste  of  national  resource."  Rough  country 
to  be  traversed,  innumerable  locks,  and  scanty  traffic  were 
assigned  as  the  causes  of  their  utter  failure. 

7.  Wherever  it  is  practicable  in  France,  the  Govern- 
ment has  attempted  to  aid  water  transportation  by  pro- 

*  Brackets  mine. 

*  BHlletin  de  V Aaaocialion,  supra,  p.  1440.  '  Ihid. 


284        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

viding  special  facilities  for  transshipments  from  railways 
to  waterways.  "Railroad  tracks  are  invariably  located 
on  terminals  of  inland  waterways,  permitting  direct  trans- 
fer between  railroad  and  water  lines.  In  most  places, 
thanks  to  the  deliberate  and  predetermined  way  in  which 
the  waterways  and  terminals  have  been  constructed  and 
enlarged  from  time  to  time,  there  has  been  a  patent  and 
successful  effort  to  bring  the  railway  yards  and  the  port 
and  river  docks  into  reasonable  and  logical  proximity. 
When  different  lines  of  railway  enter  a  single  port  there  is 
always  a  'belt-line'  connection  by  which  cars  can  be  han- 
dled from  one  line  to  another  without  transshipment  of 
freight."  ^ 

But  in  spite  of  this  attempt  to  facilitate  transshipments, 
waterway  traffic  in  France  is  almost  wholly  made  up  of 
strictly  riparian  freight,  transshipment  being  very  rare.* 
The  reason  is  that  the  cost  of  transshipment  more  than 
offsets  the  artificial  rate  advantage  conferred  by  the  Gov- 
ernment upon  the  waterways.  It  is  cheaper  to  ship  all  the 
way  by  rail  than  to  break  bulk.  It  will  be  recalled  that 
in  Germany  this  difficulty  is  circumvented  by  making  the 
transshipment  charges  merely  nominal,  —  only  a  fraction 
of  the  actual  cost,  —  the  difference  being  borne  by  the 
Government.  France  follows  no  such  policy,  and  accord- 
ingly transshipments  are  very  infrequent. 

8.  In  the  foregoing  analysis  of  French  transportation  it 
has  been  shown  that  the  Government  supports  the  water- 
ways by  enormous  annual  outlays,  and  that,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  derives  a  large  yearly  revenue  from  the  railways, 
asks  them  to  support  themselves,  and  at  the  same  time  at- 
tempts to  prevent  them  from  competing  with  the  water- 
ways for  low-grade  freight.  We  have  seen  that  before  the 
waterway  tolls  were  abolished,  traffic  had  failed  to  increase 

*  National  Waterways  Commission,  Doc.  no.  16,  p.  60. 
'  BuUetin  de  I' Association,  supra,  p.  1453. 


TRANSPORTATION  IN  FRANCE 


285 


in  thirty  years,  and  that  even  since  the  waterways  have 
been  free  of  dues,  the  railways  have  still  been  able  stead- 
ily to  increase  their  proportion  of  even  slow-moving  traffic. 
It  is  beyond  all  doubt,  therefore,  that  were  the  railways 
favored  on  even  terms  with  the  waterways  they  would 
be  able  to  divert  the  greater  part  of  the  present  waterway 
traffic  to  their  lines.  There  is  good  reason  for  believing, 
moreover,  that  they  could  do  so  were  they  merely  per- 
mitted to  reduce  their  rates  on  competitive  traffic,  leaving 
the  waterways  still  supported  as  at  present  out  of  the 
national  treasury.  There  are  a  number  of  cases  where  pre- 
cisely this  result  has  occurred.  Where  general  public  in- 
terest has  undeniably  demanded  it,  or  where  it  has  been 
deemed  necessary  to  extend  to  certain  industrial  centres 
transport  advantages  corresponding  to  those  of  other 
localities,  the  railways  have  now  and  then  succeeded  in 
inducing  the  Government  to  permit  them  to  lower  their 
rates.^   A  few  illustrations  may  be  cited. 

In  July,  1903,  the  Eastern  Railway  Company  secured 
a  reduction  in  its  tariff  on  coal.  The  results  are  shown  in 
the  following  table  :^  — 


Tear 

Total  tons 

Railway 

Waterway 

TonB 

Per  cent 

Tons 

Per  cent 

1901  .     .     . 
1903  .     .     . 

1903  .     .     . 

1904  .     .     . 

1905  .     .     . 

2,322,000 
2,283,000 
2,736,000 
2,847,000 
2,379,000 

1,743,000 
1,726.000 
2,052.000 
2,194,000 
2,676,000 

75 

75.6 

75 

77 

79.1 

579,000 
557,000 
684,000 
653.000 
703.000 

25 

24.4 

25 

23 

20.9 

It  is  seen  that  in  two  years  the  railway  substantially  in- 
creased its  proportion  of  the  total.  It  is  worthy  of  notice, 
also,  that  the  railway  carries  nearly  four  fifths  of  all  the 
coal  of  the  district.    Another  example  is  that  of   ship- 


1  Bulletin  de  V Association,  ibid.,  p.  1447. 
«  Ibid.,  p.  1448. 


286        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

ments  between  Rosieres  and  Paris,  a  reduction  of  the 
railway  rates  having  been  secured  on  April  20,  1898. 
The  results  were  as  follows:^  — 


Total  tons 

Railway 

Waterway 

Tear 

Tons 

Per  cent 

Tons 

Per  cent 

1895  .     , 

1896  .     . 

1897  .     . 

1898  .     . 

1899  .     . 

26,800 
29,400 
27.400 
34,600 
37,900 

4,800 
3,500 
4,900 
8,800 
15,900 

17.9 
11.9 

17.8 
27.8 
41.9 

23,000 
25,900 
22,500 
22.800 
22,000 

82.1 
88.1 
82.2 
73.2 
58.1 

In  two  years  the  railway  increased  its  proportion  of  the 
total  from  17.8  to  41.9  per  cent. 

A  third  example,  somewhat  different,  but  equally  note- 
worthy, is  afforded  by  the  Midi  Railway.  In  1898  the 
"Lateral  canal  toward  Garonne"  was  repurchased  by  the 
State  from  the  Midi  Railway  Company,  which  had  held  it 
as  a  concession.  All  dues  on  the  canal  were  abolished,  and 
the  railway  demanded  the  right  to  reduce  its  rates  on  wines, 
cereals,  sugar,  wood,  and  cement,  in  order,  if  possible,  to 
protect  itself  from  the  toll-free  waterway.  Since  the  rail- 
way as  concessionnaire  clearly  had  rights  in  the  case,  per- 
mission was  granted  for  a  reduction  of  railway  charges. 
"It  has  attained  its  end,  for  the  railroad  has  retained  al- 
most all  its  traffic,  and  that  of  the  canal  has  hardly  in- 
creased, in  spite  of  a  reduction  in  tolls  amounting  to  several 
centimes  per  kilometre."  ^  It  should  not  be  forgotten  that 
the  railways  have  been  able  to  accomplish  these  results 
while  contributing  a  large  revenue  to  the  Government 
and  earning  dividends  for  their  shareholders;  and  while 
the  waterways  are  entirely  supported  at  public  expense 
and  yield  only  a  precarious  income  to  the  owners  of 
barges. 

*  Bulletin  de  V Association,  ibid. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  1449. 


TRANSPORTATION  IN  FRANCE  287 

No  further  evidence  is  necessary  to  show  how  complete 
a  failure  are  the  waterways  of  France.  It  may  be  well,  how- 
ever, to  repeat  here  the  statements  of  M.  Colson,  General 
Director  of  Bridges  and  Highways  of  France.  He  stated 
to  the  writer :  "  I  am  very  sure  that  the  spending  of  money 
upon  inland  waterways  —  except  upon  great  inland  lakes, 
or  upon  mighty  rivers  of  gentle  gradient,  as  the  Rhine  and 
Volga,  where  the  regulative  costs  are  small  —  is  stupid. 
Canals  on  which  tolls  are  charged  can  almost  never  com- 
pete with  the  railways  for  any  kind  of  freight.  Discrimina- 
tions must  always  be  made  in  their  favor.  In  northern 
France  alone  do  French  canals  enjoy  any  considerable  de- 
gree of  prosperity,  due  to  the  large  quantities  of  coal  and  to 
the  import  trade.  But  this  traffic  could  be  handled  much 
more  economically  and  much  more  satisfactorily  by  rail 
than  it  is  by  water.  In  the  present  state  of  railway  devel- 
opment the  spending  of  money  upon  artificial  waterways 
is  the  worst  sort  of  policy.  To  attempt  to  have  canals  com- 
pete against  railways  is  like  attempting  to  run  sail  boats 
in  competition  with  great  ocean  steamers."^ 

9.  It  has  been  seen  that  France  has  chosen  to  divide  her 
freight  traffic  between  two  agents  of  transportation  rather 
than  to  allow  a  single  agent  to  carry  the  entire  amount.  It 
is  now  our  purpose  to  consider  the  economic  results  of  such 
a  policy  The  advantages  of  large-scale  operation  are,  per- 
haps, in  no  other  branch  of  industry,  so  important  as  in 
transportation.  We  have  called  attention  many  times  to 
the  tremendous  amount  of  fixed  capital  involved  in  both 
the  railway  and  the  waterway  business.  In  the  case  of  a 
railway,  the  roadbed,  the  tracks,  the  terminals,  the  stations, 
the  machinery  of  administration,  —  all  are  required  for 

*  Yves  Guyot,  a  noted  French  publicist  and  economist,  and  one-time 
Minister  of  Public  Works,  is  equally  strong  in  asserting  that  the  expend- 
iture of  money  on  waterway  development  is  a  pure  waste  of  resource. 
For  a  brief  summary  of  his  beliefs,  see  McPberson,  Transportation  in 
Europe  (1910),  pp.  185-86. 


288        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

however  small  an  amount  of  traffic  that  is  handled.  Allow- 
ing for  an  increase  of  rolling-stock  and  trainmen,  the  same 
equipment  may  handle  ten  thousand  tons  of  freight  almost 
as  cheaply  as  a  hundred  tons.  Similarly,  a  canal  must  be 
of  full  capacity  and  thoroughly  equipped  with  locks  and 
sluices,  whether  a  hundred  or  ten  thousand  boats  pass  over 
its  waters  in  a  year.  Probably  in  no  other  line  of  industry 
is  the  law  of  increasing  profits  with  increasing  business  so 
admirably  illustrated  as  here.  As  a  consequence  the  divis- 
ion of  the  traffic  of  a  country  between  two  agents  of  trans- 
port, when  one  of  them  could  handle  the  total  tonnage,  in- 
volves an  enormous  economic  loss.  For  the  rates  charged 
on  the  less  amount  of  traffic  handled  by  each  agent  when 
the  traffic  is  divided,  must  be  proportionately  higher  than 
they  would  needs  be  if  a  single  agent  enjoyed  the  full 
advantages  of  a  large-scale  operation.  Until  the  limit  of 
carrv'ing  capacity  is  reached,  it  is  obvious  that  increasing 
amounts  of  traffic,  handled  at  only  a  slight  increase  of  cost, 
raises  the  margin  of  profits  at  given  rates,  or,  better  stated, 
permits  a  lowering  of  charges  without  decreasing  the  net 
earnings.  The  larger  the  volume  of  traffic,^  the  less  is  the 
expense  of  handling  it  per  unit.  This  is  a  principle  univer- 
sally recognized  by  transportation  men,  and  is  the  founda- 
tion of  all  transportation  policy  where  private  initiative 
holds  sway.  Dividing  traffic  between  waterways  and  rail- 
ways does  not  permit  a  material  reduction  in  the  amount  of 
capital  invested  in  either;  and  on  the  other  hand,  it  neces- 
sitates higher  rates  on  each  unit  of  traffic  handled.  It  is 
a  national  loss,  therefore,  in  two  ways:  two  transporta- 
tion systems  cost  nearly  double  what  one  does,  and,  when 
completed,  they  are  unable  to  offer  as  low  rates  to  ship- 
pers as  could  a  single  agent.  It  is  a  case  where  competi- 
tion raises  prices  rather  than  lowers  them.  Granting  that 
monopolistic  freight  charges  can   be  prevented  by  rate 

*  The  law  of  diminishing  returns  will  eventually  operate,  but  in  the 
case  of  iransportatioQ  the  point  where  it  begins  to  act  is  far  removed. 


TRANSPORTATION  IN  FRANCE  289 

legislation,  it  is  absolutely  impossible  to  secure  the  lowest 
scale  of  charges  by  means  of  two  systems  of  transporta- 
tion. 

The  above  reasoning  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  a 
single  agent  is  physically  able  to  handle  all  the  tonnage 
of  the  country.  Is  such  an  assumption  warranted  ?  It  is 
everywhere  recognized  that  waterways,  by  their  nature, 
are  not  adapted  to  meet  all  the  needs  of  commerce.  It  is 
acknowledged,  by  even  their  most  vigorous  supporters,  — 
except,  perhaps,  in  the  United  States,  —  that  the  best  they 
can  do  is  to  supplement  the  railways  in  the  carrying  of 
a  limited  number  of  bulky  commodities  of  low  value.  In 
all  countries  where  they  are  now  used  their  service  is 
almost  wholly  thus  confined.  Hence  we  must  look  to  the 
railways  as  the  one  agent  able  to  carry  all  the  traflSc  of  the 
country.  The  railways  of  the  United  States  and  of  Great 
Britain  have  demonstrated  their  ability  to  handle  all  the 
traffic  in  regions  of  very  heavy  tonnage.  We  found  that  in 
Prussia,  although  the  railways  have  not  been  permitted  to 
develop  their  facilities  to  meet  all  the  needs  of  commerce, 
there  is  no  doubt  that  they  could  meet  all  demands  if  they 
were  permitted  by  the  Government  to  do  so.  In  France, 
according  to  M.  Colson,  "  There  is  absolutely  no  question 
as  to  the  ability  of  the  railways  to  care  for  all  the  traffic 
of  the  country.  It  is  absurd  to  hold  that  waterways  are 
an  indispensable  aid  to  railways."  ^  The  fact  is  so  self- 
evident  that  it  needs  no  further  discussion. 

At  an  enormous  public  expense  of  about  $19,000,000 
a  year,  France,  then,  is  supporting  a  great  system  of  in- 
land waterways,  which  results  only  in  diverting  a  part  of 
the  low-class  freight  from  the  railways  and  to  prevent  a 
lowering  of  railway  freight  rates.  The  cost  of  handling  the 
freight  which  travels  by  water  is,  counting  the  expenses  in- 
curred by  the  Government,  far  more  than  it  would  be  if 
it  were  handled  by  railways  specially  constructed  for  the 
*  Statement  to  the  writer. 


290        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

purpose.  The  fact  is,  however,  that  the  existing  roads  are 
far  from  being  pushed  to  the  limit  of  their  capacity.  In 
1905  the  density  of  traffic  on  the  French  railways  was 
448,467  ton-miles  per  mile;^  on  those  of  Germany,  819,804 
ton-miles  per  mile;^  and  on  those  of  the  United  States 
in  1909,  953,986.'  In  1908  the  average  tonnage  per 
mile  on  the  Pennsylvania  Railway  was  4,723,834.^  Since 
the  waterway  tonnage  of  France  in  1905  was  only  34,- 
030,000,  or  only  a  little  more  than  one  fifth  the  railway 
tonnage,  which  amounted  to  139,000,000  tons,^  it  is  cer- 
tain that  all  the  present  freight  traffic  of  France  could 
easily  be  handled  by  the  existing  railways.  It  is  unques- 
tionable, in  the  face  of  these  facts,  that  the  French  Gov- 
ernment is  heavily  taxing  its  citizens  for  the  support  of  a 
great  system  of  inland  waterways  which  is  almost,  if  not 
quite,  wholly  unnecessary.  It  is  likewise  not  to  be  doubted 
that  the  result  of  this  mistaken  transportation  policy  is  to 
keep  railway  freight  rates  at  a  much  higher  level  in  France 
than  would  otherwise  be  necessary.  M.  Colson  stated  to 
the  writer  that  there  is  no  question  but  that,  if  the  rail- 
ways were  allowed  to  take  over  the  present  waterway 
traffic,  they  could  reduce  the  rates  of  transport  on  the 
entire  volume  of  traffic. 

10.  It  is  interesting,  in  the  light  of  the  above  discussion, 
to  make  a  comparison  of  French  and  American  railway 
rates.  Typical  waterway  commodities  are  chosen  in  order 
to  show  best  the  results  of  the  division  of  traffic  of  which 
we  have  spoken.  The  French  rates  chosen  are  special 
rates,  appreciably  lower  than  the  general  tariff  schedule:  — 

*  Report  of  British  Royal  Commission,  supra,  p.  155. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  211. 

'  Delano,  Speech  before  U.  S.  Rivers  and  Harbom  Congress,  December  S, 
1910. 

*  Ibid. 

'  Preliminary  Report  of  National  Waterways  Commission,  p.  32. 


TRANSPORTATION  IN  FRANCE 


291 


France 


Commodity 

From 

To 

Distance 
(miles) 

Rate 

(«) 

Coal  *  .     .     .     . 

Havre   .     .     . 

Paris     .     .     . 

142 

1.35 

Coal  *  ,     .     .     . 

Marseilles  .     . 

Paris     .     .     . 

536 

3.00 

Iron  Ore  +      .     . 
Iron  Ore  j     .     . 

Havre   .     .     . 

Paris     .     .     . 

142 

1.10 

Brest     .     .     . 

Paris     .     .     . 

388 

2.82 

Grain  J     .     .     . 

Havre    .    .     . 

Paris     .     .     . 

142 

1.45 

Grain  %     ■     •     ■ 

Marseilles  .     . 

Lyons   .     .     . 

217 

2.70 

*  National  Waterwayi  ComvUssion,  Doc.  no.  16,  p.  11.     t  Ibid.,  p.  19.      J  Ibid.,  p.  31. 


The  United  States 


Commodity 

From 

To 

Distance 
(miles) 

Rat« 

(«) 

Coal*  .... 

Duquoin    .     . 

Chicago     .     . 

287 

0.90 

Coalf  .... 

Pocahontas, 

W.  Va 

Toledo .     .     . 

456 

1.45 

Grain  J      .     .     , 

St.  Louis  .     . 

New  Orleans . 

718 

3.00 

Wheat  ^        .     . 

Buffalo      .     . 

New  York 

440 

1.42 

Iron  Ore  ||      .     . 

Cleveland .     . 

Pittsburg  .     . 

170 

1.18 

•  Report  of  Chicago  Harbor  Commission,  p.  255. 

t  Report  oj  the  Inland  Waterways  Commission,  p.  345. 

§  Report  of  Chicago  Harbor  Commission,  p.  234. 

II  Report  of  Examination  of  the  Ohio  River,  1908,  p.  55. 


t  Ibid.,  p.  235. 


Perhaps  some  general  average  rates  may  prove  more 
significant  than  special  rates  for  the  present  purpose.  Tak- 
ing the  deficit  on  the  waterways  of  France  at  $19,000,000, 
and  applying  this  to  the  5,400,000,000  ton-kilometers  ^  (3,- 
848,000,000  ton-miles)  of  waterway  traflBc  in  1905,  we  find 
that  the  deficit  amounted  to  about  5.7  mills  per  ton-mile. 
Adding  to  this  the  charges  of  the  waterway  carriers,  which 
amounted  to  approximately  four  mills  per  ton-mile,^  gives 
a  total  cost  by  water  of  9.7  mills  per  ton-mile,  allowing 
nothing  in  the  way  of  profit  on  the  capital  investment. 
The  average  railway  rate  in  France  is  about  13  mills  per 
ton-mile.^  This  makes  the  average  rate  on  both  railways 
and  waterways  over  12  mills  per  ton-mile.  This  is  as 
against  7.63  mills  per  ton-mile  for  the  railways  of  the 
I  See  p.  278.  *  Delano,  ibid- 


292        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

United  States  in  1905.  Recognizing  that  there  are  con- 
siderable differences  in  conditions  in  the  two  countries, 
and  that  hence  general  averages  may  be  misleading,  it  is 
nevertheless  clear  that  French  rates  are  exceptionally  high. 
The  cost  of  water  transportation,  exclusive  of  profits  on  the 
fixed  capital  invested,  is  appreciably  higher  than  the  cost 
of  transporting  all  classes  of  freight  in  the  United  States 
over  railways,  which,  as  a  rule,  earn  substantial  dividends 
on  their  investments. 

11.  The  question  may  with  propriety  be  raised,  why  a 
great  nation  like  France  should  persist  in  following  a  trans- 
portation policy  apparently  so  prejudicial  to  the  economic 
welfare  of  the  country.  Is  it  due  to  the  constraint  of  long- 
established  custom .''  is  it  because  certain  influential  parties 
are  personally  interested  in  the  success  of  water  transpor- 
tation ?  or  is  it  because  the  Government  is  grossly  ignorant 
of  the  losses  entailed?  The  truth  seems  to  be  that  all  of 
these  factors  have  been  operative. 

The  many  thousands  of  bargemen  with  their  families, 
who  spend  their  entire  existence  upon  the  waterways,  have 
&  sort  of  vested  interest  in  water  transportation,  and  the 
;hesitation  to  deprive  these  people  of  their  long-established 
means  of  livelihood  is  an  unquestioned  influence  in  deter- 
mining the  Government's  policy  toward  the  waterways. 
Again,  the  fact  that  many  millions  of  money  had  been  ex- 
pended upon  the  waterways  of  the  country  before  the  rail- 
ways were  extensively  developed,  has  also  influenced  the 
continuation  of  waterway  expenditures.  The  railways  of 
France  passed  through  a  very  checkered  history  up  to 
1883,  the  date  of  final  settlement;  and  when  the  great  "na- 
tionalizing" waterway  law  of  1879  was  passed,  the  railroads 
of  France  had  by  no  means  clearly  shown  their  superiority 
over  the  waterways,  or  at  least  had  not  demonstrated  their 
ability  wholly  to  dominate  the  transportation  field.  .They 
were  much  less  efficiently  developed  at  that  time  than 


TRANSPORTATION  IN  FRANCE  293 

those  of  most  of  the  other  great  countries.  It  is  only  nat- 
ural now,  after  the  waterways  have  been  nationalized  and 
extensively  developed,  that  the  Government  should  hesi- 
tate to  declare  the  more  than  $400,000,000  expended  upon 
them  during  the  past  century  wholly  wasted.  It  is  easier 
to  close  the  eyes  to  the  painful  truth  and  to  continue  the 
suicidal  policy  of  subsidizing  the  rivers  and  canals,  to  the 
distress  of  the  railways  and  to  the  detriment  of  the  nation. 
A  much  stronger  reason,  however,  for  the  continuation 
of  the  policy  is  a  political  one.  A  deficit  of  $19,000,000  a 
year  on  account  of  water  transportation  would  hardly  be 
perennially  faced  with  composure  were  the  public  officials 
merely  concerned  with  maintaining  a  favorite  employ- 
ment for  illiterate  bargemen,  or  only  reluctant  to  acknow- 
ledge that  the  Government  has  been  pursuing  a  mistaken 
policy.  Such  forces  have  an  influence,  but  they  are  usually 
much  less  potent  than  more  direct  interests.  A  well-known 
writer  on  European  transportation  asserts  that  the  Con- 
sultative Committee,  which  has  the  power  of  rate  rati- 
fication, is  dominated  by  the  waterway  interests,  thus 
accounting  for  the  persistent  refusal  to  allow  rate  reduc- 
tions which  would  be  prejudicial  to  the  waterways.^  How 
much  truth  there  is  in  this  assertion  the  writer  has  been 
unable  to  discover.  An  effort  was  made  to  ascertain  the 
facts,  but  it  was  to  no  avail.  When  the  question  was  raised 
among  those  who  might  know,  the  writer  met  with  a  dis- 
concerting silence,  although  those  interrogated  were  only 
too  eager  to  tell  what  they  knew  of  the  inside  history  of 
waterway  legislation  in  other  countries.  The  impression 
was  unavoidable  that  "political  interests"  were  at  work 
behind  the  scenes.  When  the  question  was  put  to  a  high 
American  official  resident  in  Paris,  he  stated  emphatically 
that,  although  he  did  not  know  the  facts,  he  would  have  not 
the  slightest  hesitation  in  wagering  that  there  is  political 
chicanery  connected  with  the  determination  of  rates. 

*  Meyer,  H.  R.,  Government  Regulation  of  Railway  Rates,  p.  124. 


294        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

M.  Colson  stated  that  "the  Government  favors  the 
waterways  and  supports  them  from  general  taxation  be- 
cause it  desires  to  create  an  impression  that  it  is  doing 
something  of  great  importance  for  its  citizens.  The  un- 
reasoning public  does  not  appreciate  that  when  the  indi- 
rect waterway  taxes  are  added  to  the  water  freight  rates, 
the  total  transport  cost  is  much  greater  than  it  would  be 
on  an  efficient  railway  system  which  was  allowed  to  de- 
velop the  full  possibilities  of  its  freight  service." 

Again,  there  are  many  honest  citizens  and  officials  who 
really  believe  that  the  waterways  serve  a  valuable  national 
end  in  the  handling  of  low-class  freight,  and  that  they  are 
an  aid  to  the  railways  in  relieving  them  from  the  burden 
of  carrying  great  quantities  of  bulky  traffic.  It  is  the  same 
argument  that  we  have  met  in  Germany.  In  support  of 
this  belief  some  interesting  cases  have  been  cited  in  con- 
nection with  the  Northern  and  the  Eastern  railways.  It 
is  shown  that  a  reduction  of  freight  rates  in  coal  resulted 
in  an  increase  of  coal  tonnage,  but  not  in  a  proportional 
increase  of  revenue.  The  statistics  are  as  follows:^  — 

Northern  Raihcay 
Year  Ton-kilometers       Receipts 

1900 1,811,054,078   $11,051,559 

1905 1,973,769,843      10,734,151 

Eastern  Railway 

Year  Ton-kilometers  Receipts 

1900 539,778,139  $3,842,477 

1905 790,199,453  $9,072,406 

In  the  case  of  the  Northern  Railway  there  was  an  increase 
of  traffic  and  a  decrease  of  revenue.  In  the  latter  case  an 
increase  of  traffic  of  forty -five  per  cent  yielded  merely  a 
five  per  cent  increase  of  revenue. 

At  first  glance  these  figures  are  deceiving.  On  the  sur- 
face it  looks  as  though  the  law  of  diminishing  returns 
'  National  Waterways  Commission,  Doc.  no.  16,  pp.  77,  78. 


TRANSPORTATION  IN  FRANCE  295 

were  surely  operating.  It  is  necessary  to  reflect,  however, 
that  the  railway  rates  had  been  considerably  reduced.  The 
figures  merely  show  that  they  had  been  lowered  so  far  that 
the  diminished  revenue  per  unit,  in  the  one  case,  was  not 
counterbalanced  by  the  increased  traffic  carried,  and,  in 
the  other  case,  were  but  little  more  than  counterbalanced. 
A  rate  midway  between  the  old  rate  and  the  reduced  one 
might  have  yielded  a  larger  revenue  than  did  the  original 
one.  Experimentation  alone  can  decide  where  the  point  of 
maximum  return  lies.  But,  it  may  be  asked,  was  it  not 
necessary  to  lower  the  rate  to  the  full  extent  of  the  reduc- 
tion, which  was  in  fact  made,  in  order  to  secure  a  diver- 
sion of  waterway  traffic,  and  does  not  the  result  prove 
that  the  railways  are  better  off  with  a  smaller  proportion 
of  such  freight? 

It  is,  indeed,  possible  that,  under  existing  conditions,  it 
was  necessary  to  make  the  full  reduction  in  order  to  attract 
the  traffic;  but  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  existing 
conditions  are  conditions  of  inequality,  since  the  water- 
ways are  supported  out  of  the  public  exchequer.  As  has 
been  shown  above,  if  the  waterways  were  deprived  of  this 
subsidy,  or  the  railways  granted  a  similar  one,  it  would  be 
absolutely  impossible  for  the  waterways  to  compete  suc- 
cessfully for  the  traffic.  Hence  it  would  be  unnecessary  for 
the  railways  to  reduce  their  rates  one  iota,  in  order  to  di- 
vert to  their  lines  practically  all  of  the  coal  now  traveling 
by  water.  With  substantially  the  same  margin  of  profit 
on  each  ton  of  coal,  and  with  a  vastly  increased  ton- 
nage, the  total  receipts  of  the  railways  would  be  greatly 
increased. 

But  leaving  out  of  the  consideration  the  inequality  of 
conditions  between  the  two  modes  of  transport,  the  above 
statistics  still  by  no  means  prove  the  truth  of  the  conten- 
tion that  the  waterways  serve  a  useful  national  end  in  shar- 
ing with  the  railways  superabundant  low-class  freight. 
Although  the  increased  tonnage  did  not  yield  a  proper- 


296        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

tional  increase  of  revenue,  there  is  no  evidence  to  show 
that  the  railways  are  not  still  making  a  fair  profit  on  their 
coal  traffic.  It  is  certain,  moreover,  that  the  shippers  of  coal 
are  in  a  better  position  than  before  the  reduction  of  rates. 
It  is  possible,  also,  that  were  the  railways  sure  of  the  entire 
quantity  of  coal  traffic,  they  could  decrease  expenses  of 
operation  sufficiently  to  yield  a  still  larger  margin  of  profit 
per  unit,  and  thus  still  further  reduce  rates.  Be  this  as  it 
may,  it  is  impossible  to  discover  from  these  statistics  any 
evidence  that  shows  that  the  waterways  are  serving  a  valu- 
able end. 

It  should  be  recalled,  moreover,  that,  even  were  there  a 
superabundance  of  low-class  freight,  —  granted  a  few  par- 
ticular lines  were  overburdened,  —  there  is  always  the  alter- 
native method  of  relieving  the  congestion  by  constructing 
additional  railway  lines,  and,  as  has  been  conclusively 
shown  elsewhere,  this  could  be  accomplished  at  a  much 
less  cost  than  by  building  canals.  The  utility  of  canals 
must  rest  upon  their  economy.  Where  their  advocates 
cannot  prove  them  more  economical  carriers  than  the 
railroads,  there  is  left  no  other  argument  to  which  they 
may  resort. 

12.  It  only  remains  to  say  a  few  words  by  way  of  com- 
parison between  French  and  American  transportation  con- 
ditions. Although  the  geographic  factors  in  France  are, 
on  the  whole,  less  favorable  to  waterway  development  than 
they  are  in  Germany,  it  must  be  admitted  nevertheless 
that  they  are  in  general  more  favorable  than  those  of  the 
United  States.  The  great  river  Seine,  carrying  one  third  of 
the  entire  waterway  tonnage  of  the  country,  connects  the 
metropolis  with  the  great  seaport  of  Havre,  and  is  thus  in 
the  very  pathway  of  greatest  traffic.  Our  great  rivers,  on 
the  other  hand,  generally  run  crosswise  to  the  direction  of 
heavy  commerce.  The  distances  to  be  traversed  in  France 
in  the  building  of  canals,  are  very  short  as  compared  with 


TRANSPORTATION  IN  FRANCE  297 

those  of  the  United  States,  a  decided  advantage  on  account 
of  the  heavy  cost  of  construction  per  mile  of  canals  as 
compared  with  railways.  Finally,  the  climate  of  France 
is  very  mild,  and  interruptions  to  traffic  on  account  of  ice 
are  only  from  0  to  10  days  a  year  on  the  open  rivers, 
and  from  0  to  36  days  on  the  canals.^  This  is  as  against 
several  months  of  closed  navigation  each  year  in  all  the 
Northern  States  of  this  country. 

From  the  administrative  point  of  view,  also,  condi- 
tions in  France  are  much  more  favorable  to  successful 
waterway  development  than  they  are  in  the  United 
States.  The  waterways  of  France  belong  to  the  National 
Government  and  are  efficiently  supervised  by  the  Depart- 
ment of  Public  Works.  We  have  seen  how  the  Government 
officials  bestow  all  their  sympathy  upon  the  waterways, 
and  how  they  prevent  the  railways  from  competing  for 
traffic  that  can  be  handled  by  water.  In  contrast  to  this, 
the  United  States  has  no  administrative  machinery  what- 
ever for  developing  a  system  of  waterways.  Our  rivers  now 
are,  and  bid  fair  to  remain,  mere  pawns  in  a  political 
game.  Our  railways,  on  the  other  hand,  are  remarkably 
well  developed,  and  at  present  almost  completely  domi- 
nate the  transportation  field.  We  have  not,  as  yet,  been 
able  to  subject  them  to  sufficient  control  to  guarantee  the 
waterways  against  even  unfair  competition,  while  cooper- 
ation between  railways  and  waterways  in  the  United 
States,  so  long  as  the  former  remain  in  private  hands, 
seems  to  be  a  mere  idle  dream. 

^  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  supra,  p.  14. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE    WATERWAYS   OF  BELGIUM 

1.  Belgium  possesses  an  excellent  system  of  internal  wa- 
terways, which  for  many  years  has  been  under  the  com- 
plete supervision  of  the  National  Government.  Until 
about  1830  the  waterways  of  the  country  had  for  the  most 
part  belonged  to  the  various  provinces  and  communal  cen- 
tres, or  to  concessionnaires,  that  is,  to  private  interests 
controlling  them  either  under  State  guaranty  of  a  mono- 
poly of  traffic,  or  of  a  remission  of  dues.  The  State  owned 
only  about  ten  per  cent  of  the  total  mileage  in  1830,  but 
after  that  date  it  commenced  a  systematic  purchase  of  the 
various  water  routes,  and  by  1870  as  much  as  eighty- three 
per  cent  of  the  total  waterway  mileage  was  owned  by 
the  government;  while  at  the  present  time  practically  the 
entire  mileage  is  State-owned.^  Very  extensive  improve- 
ments of  the  system  have  been  made  since  1875.  Between 
that  year  and  1907  the  sum  of  $119,853,000  was  expended 
by  the  Belgian  Government  on  its  canals  and  rivers,^  and 
many  millions  more  were  spent  by  the  various  cities  for 
harbor  construction  and  improvement.  The  entire  system 
is  now  almost  complete;  and  future  expenditures  will  be 
mainly  for  the  purpose  of  perfecting  the  present  routes, 
and  for  the  completion  of  one  or  two  projects  now  under 
way. 

2.  In  response  to  this  systematic  development  of  water- 
ways in  Belgium,  there  has  been  a  steady  and  rapid  in- 

»  Preliminary  Report  of  {U.  S.)  National  Waterways  Commission,  p.  52. 

2  Naiional  Waterways  Commission,  Doc.  20  (Report  of  Ethelbert  Watts 
on  "Railway  Freight  Rates,  Inland  Waterways,  and  Canals,"  Novem- 
ber 16,  1909),  p.  20. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  BELGIUM        299 

crease  in  the  tonnage  of  water-borne  freight  during  the  past 
twenty -five  years.  The  growth  of  water  traffic  is  shown 
in  the  following  table:'  — 
Year  Metric  tona 

1880  * 24,836,000 

1890 25,242 

1895 30,242 

1900 38.178 

1905 53,345 

*  Preliminary  Report  of  National  Waterways  Commission,  p.  21. 

The  tonnage  is  seen  to  have  more  than  doubled  since  1880, 
and  the  table  seems  to  indicate  the  complete  success  of  the 
Government  policy  in  regard  to  waterways. 

If  we  consider  this  increase  of  tonnage,  in  comparison 
with  that  on  the  railways,  however,  we  find  that  the  devel- 
opment of  traffic  on  the  waterways  has  not  been  phenome- 
nal. During  the  period  from  1875  to  1905  the  total  water- 
way traffic  of  the  country  increased  by  166  per  cent,  while 
during  the  same  years  the  railway  increase  was  nearly  400 
per  cent. 2  Statistics  of  the  value  of  the  traffic  handled 
would  show  even  more  favorably  for  the  railways,  since 
their  freight  is  largely  of  high  grade,  where  tonnage  is  of 
relatively  less  importance.  The  increase  in  railway  mileage, 
however,  has  been  somewhat  greater  than  that  of  the  wa- 
terways. From  1890  to  1905  there  was  no  change  in  th(^ 
waterway  mileage,  while  the  railways  laid  about  five  hun- 
dred miles  of  new  lines.'  At  best,  however,  the  Belgian 
waterways  can  be  regarded  as  having  had  only  a  fair 
increase  of  traffic  in  recent  years.  Let  us  now  inquire 
whether  this  traffic  development  has  occurred  under  con- 
ditions of  even  competition,  or  whether  special  aid  has 
been  extended  to  one  or  the  other  agent  of  transport. 

3.  It  is  necessary  to  state  that  the  railways  of  Belgium, 
like  the  waterways,  are  all  under  State  supervision.    Of 

*  Report  of  {British)  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vi,  p.  1C9. 

*  National  Waterways  Commission,  Doc.  20,  p.  28. 

*  Report  qf  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vi,  p.  176. 


300        (WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

the  2634  miles  of  railroad  within  the  country,  2295  miles 
are  owned  and  operated  by  the  Government;  and  the  re- 
maining 330  miles,  though  privately  owned,  are  subjected 
to  rigid  governmental  control.^  Now,  the  railways  and 
waterways  of  Belgium  are  administered,  as  in  Germany, 
by  a  single  department  of  the  Government,  and,  as  in 
Germany,  a  deficit  from  the  operation  of  one  transport 
agent  is  paid  out  of  the  profits  derived  from  the  other. 
And  here,  as  everywhere,  we  find  that  it  is  the  water- 
ways that  are  conducted  at  a  deficit  while  the  railways 
are  affording  an  annual  surplus. 

Before  the  coming  of  the  railways,  the  expenditures 
upon  the  waterways  of  Belgium  were  largely  met  by  tolls. 
Between  the  years  1840  and  1860  the  receipts  from  tolls 
covered  not  only  the  cost  of  improvements  and  upkeep, 
but  also  afforded  a  surplus  to  be  applied  in  part  payment 
of  the  annual  interest.^  "The  tolls  have  been  considerably 
reduced  since  that  time,  but  they  still  cover  a  part  of  the 
cost  of  current  improvements  and  maintenance,  which  in 
1905  amounted  to  $440,000,  not  including  cost  of  person- 
nel. When  the  interest  on  the  capital,  invested  at  3.5  per 
cent,  is  added  to  the  deficit  for  maintenance,  the  total 
annual  charge  to  the  State  is  about  $2,740,000. "^  The  year 
1905  was  an  exceptionally  good  traflBc  year,  and  hence  this 
deficit  may  be  considered  as  a  minimum  average.  For 
comparison  it  may  be  stated  that  the  year  1902  showed  a 
net  loss  from  operation  of  $602,412,^  as  against  $440,000 
in  1905.^  The  interest  charged  was  of  course  practically 

*  National  Waterways  Commission,  Doc.  no.  20,  p.  7. 

*  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  supra,  p.  49. 

*  Preliminary  Report  of  National  Waterways  Commission,  p.  53. 

*  Report  of  Antwerp  Consulate  on  "Waterways  of  the  Consular  Dis- 
trict of  Antwerp,"  August  10,  1909,  p.  161. 

*  As  in  Germany,  the  Government  does  not  directly  6x  the  canal  rate. 
It  merely  assumes  the  entire  support  of  the  physical  equipment  of  the 
waterways,  thus  leaving  the  bargemen  free  to  make  rates  which  need 
yield  a  profit  merely  on  the  capitalization  of  the  boats. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  BELGIUM         301 

the  same.^   The  annual  deficit,  using  1905  as  a  basis,  is 
equal  to  about  $2700  per  mile  of  waterw-ay.'^ 

4.  In  contrast  to  the  policy  in  regard  to  the  waterways, 
the  railways  of  Belgium  are  conducted  at  an  annual  profit, 
and  the  surplus  is  applied  in  paying  the  deficit  on  account 
of  water  transportation.^  The  railway  rates  are  arbitrarily 
fixed  by  the  Government  from  forty  to  fifty  per  cent 
higher  than  those  on  the  waterways  for  certain  kinds  of 
traffic.^  As  a  consequence,  comparisons  of  rates  can  obvi- 

*  The  above  amounts,  however,  do  not  represent  the  total  deficits  on 
account  of  water  transportation  in  Belgium.  They  are  merely  the  statis- 
tics for  the  central  Government.  Besides  these,  the  various  cities  con- 
tribute large  amounts  each  year.  They  frequently  spend  large  sums  of 
their  own  accord  on  the  improvement  of  their  particular  water  shipping 
facilities.  For  example,  between  1900  and  1908  Brussels  expended  upon 
her  port  and  upon  the  canal  connection  with  Rupel  a  total  of  $3,416,100. 
(Brussels  Consulate  Report,  Nov.  16,  1909,  p.  8.)  Similarly,  the  competi- 
tive cities  of  Antwerp,  Ghent,  and  Bruges  spend  large  sums  from  time 
to  time;  statistics  of  the  exact  amounts,  however,  are  not  at  hand. 
The  chief  cities  have  together  probably  expended  to  date  about  $25,000,- 
000  on  their  harbors,  quays,  and  docks.  (Report  of  (U.  S.)  Inland  Water- 
ways Commission,  p.  401.)  The  various  communal  districts  are,  more- 
over, required  to  provide  and  maintain  a  certain  part  of  their  harbor 
works;  the  apportionment  of  expenditures  between  the  Government  and 
the  cities  being  made  on  this  basis:  the  Government  provides  and  main- 
tains the  harbors,  buoys,  lights,  etc.,  —  in  short,  everything  pertaining 
to  the  water,  —  while  the  city  must  provide  and  keep  in  repair  its  own 
land  equipment,  docks,  dry-docks,  loading  machinery,  etc.  (Antwerp 
Consulate  Report,  supra,  p.  158.)  Statistics  of  the  amounts  thus  spent, 
and  of  the  yearly  deficits  incurred,  are  not  available,  but  it  is  obvious 
that  for  a  great  port  such  as  Antwerp,  ranking  fourth  in  the  world, 
these  outlays  are  of  no  little  importance.  On  account  of  the  fierce  com- 
petition with  the  ports  of  the  Netherlands,  moreover,  the  harbor  dues 
have  to  be  made  very  low,  and  there  is  little  doubt  that  a  large  deficit 
has  here  to  be  met  each  year.  While  a  large  portion  of  these  expenditures 
are  chargeable  to  ocean-going,  rather  than  inland  traffic,  it  is  none  the 
less  true  that  inland  navigation  receives  much  of  the  benefit. 

*  The  total  length  of  Belgian  waterways  is  1344  miles,  of  which  330  is 
of  little  importance.  (Preliminary  Report  of  National  Waterways  Com- 
mission, p.  52.) 

*  Statement  of  the  American  Vice-Consul  at  Antwerp. 

*  Antwerp  Consulate  Report,  supra,  p.  159. 


302        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

ously  prove  nothing  as  to  the  relative  costs  by  the  two 
methods  of  transport;  cost  of  service  not  being  the  basis  of 
ratemaking.  So  far  as  one  is  able  to  draw  any  conclusion 
on  this  point,  without  making  a  detailed  study  of  par- 
ticular routes,  it  would  seem  that  the  necessity  of  greatly 
reducing  the  tolls  on  the  waterways,  in  order  to  preserve 
the  traflSc  since  the  advent  of  the  railways,  indicates  that 
the  conclusion  must  be  the  same  for  Belgium  as  for  other 
countries,  —  wholly  unfavorable  to  the  waterways. 

5.  As  in  France  and  Germany,  so  also  in  Belgium  there 
is  practically  no  competition  between  the  railways  and 
waterways.  While  there  is  no  definite  differential  in  rates, 
as  is  the  case  in  France,  and  while  there  are  many  varia- 
tions in  schedules  in  order  to  meet  the  varying  exigencies 
of  traffic,  it  has  been  seen  that  rail  rates  are  fixed  as  a 
rule  from  forty  to  fifty  per  cent  higher  than  those  on  the 
waterways;  and  it  is  a  firmly  established  policy,  moreover, 
that "  State  railways  do  not  try  to  compete  with  canals 
ior  carrying  certain  goods  which  naturally  belong  to  water- 
•ways."^  Thus  again  we  find  this  favored  expression,  of 
freight  "which  naturally  belongs  to  the  waterways."  It 
seems,  in  the  psychology  of  European  transportation,  to  be 
"natural  waterway  traffic,"  even  though  it  must  be  forced 
to  travel  in  boats  by  wholly  artificial  means.  This  is  an 
excellent  illustration  of  the  persistence  with  which  old 
ideas  survive,  long  after  the  days  when  they  may  have 
had  force  have  passed  into  history.  There  may  have  been 
a  time  when  bulky  freight  "naturally"  traveled  by  water, 
but  the  fact  that  nearly  everywhere  in  Europe  the  water- 
ways of  to-day  have  to  be  supported  by  huge  Government 
subsidies,  surely  can  indicate  only  that  the  "naturalness" 
has  given  place  to  artificiality. 

This  situation  exists  in  Belgium,  as  in  France  and  Ger- 
many, even  though  the  railways  are  not  efficiently  devel- 
»  Brussels  Consulate  Report,  Nov.  16,  1909,  p.  5. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  BELGIUM         803 

oped  for  the  carrying  of  hea\7'  freight.  The  question  may 
well  be  raised,  therefore.  If,  where  no  attempt  is  made  by 
the  railways  to  compete  for  bulky  traflBc,  it  is  still  necessary 
to  run  the  waterways  at  an  annual  deficit  of  about  $2700 
per  mile,  in  order  to  prevent  shippers  from  using  the  rail- 
ways, what  chance  would  the  waterways  have  against 
railways  which  were  free  to  compete,  by  offering  both  ex- 
cellent facilities  and  attractive  rates  for  low-class  freight? 
The  question  is  self-answering. 

In  explanation  of  the  policy  of  conducting  the  waterways 
at  a  loss,  it  is  contended  in  Belgium  that  the  Government 
looks  upon  its  waterway  system  from  a  broad  national,  as 
against  a  sectional,  viewpoint,  and  that  thus  viewed  the 
results  are  wholly  beneficial.  "The  Government  of  Bel- 
gium considers  it  a  wise  policy  to  keep  up  the  canals  and 
waterways  for  the  public  benefit,  and  has  arranged  its 
canal  system  so  as  to  be  a  benefit  to  the  entire  industrial 
community  and  not  to  any  particular  branches  of  industry, 
with  the  endeavor  to  have  every  section  of  the  manu- 
facturing centres  in  direct  touch  with  all  the  large  cities, 
with  the  seaports,  and  with  the  manufacturing  centres  of 
neighboring  countries."^  Now,  while  it  may  well  be  wise 
national  policy  to  attempt  to  stimulate  industry  in  all 
parts  of  the  realm  by  means  of  favoring  transport  charges, 
the  above  statement  hardly  touches  the  real  point  at  issue. 
It  does  not  follow,  merely  from  the  fact  that  transporta- 
tion is  regarded  from  a  broad  national  standpoint,  that 
the  waterways  are  able  to  subser\^e  the  ends  in  view  more 
efficiently  and  more  economically  than  could  the  railways 
under  a  policy  of  similar  encouragement.  Unless  the  his- 
torical lesson  drawn  above  is  wholly  erroneous,  it  seems^ 
certain  that  the  ends  might  be  better  served  by  a  compre- 
hensive development  of  the  railways  of  the  country. 

6.  In  addition  to  encouraging  water  transportation  by 
*  Antveerp  Consulate  Report,  supra,  p.  161. 


304        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

discriminative  rates  in  favor  thereof,  the  Belgian  Govern- 
ment has  made  excellent  provision  for  the  mutual  coop- 
eration of  railways  and  waterways.  "Railroad  tracks  are 
located  everywhere  on  terminals  of  inland  waterways,  and 
in  every  important  place  these  lines  form  a  belt  railway 
connecting  all  the  railways  at  given  ports;  such  is  the 
case  in  Brussels,  Antwerp,  Ghent,  and  other  ports."^  The 
railways  are  thus  built  up  around  the  waterway  system, 
serving  as  feeders  thereto,  and  facilitating  the  transfer  of 
commodities  from  rail  to  water  and  vice  versa.  Assistance 
of  this  kind  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  the  success  of 
waterways,  for  they  can  seldom  rely  entirely  upon  strictly 
riparian  traflSc.  They  must  have  connecting  railway  lines, 
both  for  the  collection  and  for  the  distribution  of  a  large 
part  of  their  traffic.  And  as  shown  elsewhere  the  rates 
must  be  so  adjusted  that  the  cost  (to  the  shipper)  will  be 
less  by  the  broken  rail  and  water  route  than  by  an  all-rail 
route.  Though  the  railroads  are  able  to  stand  alone,  har- 
mony between  the  two  agents  of  transport  is  an  absolute 
essential  to  the  waterways. 

7.  We  may  now  turn  our  attention  to  a  comparison  of 
the  conditions  of  transportation  in  Belgium  and  the 
United  States.  First,  as  to  the  geographic  factors. 

Belgium  has  an  area  of  little  more  than  11,000  square 
miles,^  and  is  thus  but  slightly  larger  than  the  State  of 
Maryland;  yet  within  this  small  territory  are  1015  miles 
of  navigable  waters,  only  334  miles  of  which  are  canals.' 
In  proportion  to  area,  therefore,  Belgium  has  been  far 
more  favored  with  natural  highways  of  commerce  than  has 
the  United  States.  Practically  all  these  rivers,  moreover, 
as  is  the  case  in  Germany,  connect  directly  with  the  great 
shipping  and  exporting  centres.   The  incalculable  advan- 

'  National  Waterways  Commission,  Doc.  no.  20,  p.  24. 

*  Statistische  Mitteilungen,  1909,  p.  430. 

*  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vi,  p.  43. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  BELGIUM         305 

tage  of  this  situation  need  not  be  dwelt  upon  again  at  this 
time. 

In  the  second  place,  the  physical  character  of  Belgium 
is  favorable  to  water  transportation.  The  larger  part  of 
the  country  lies  low  and  flat,  and  no  considerable  eleva- 
tions need  be  traversed  in  the  construction  of  canals,  the 
average  height  overcome  by  the  334  miles  of  existing  canals 
being  only  4.3  feet.^  This  is  but  little  less  favorable  than 
the  condition  in  Germany,  where  the  average  height  over- 
come is  3.55  feet  per  mile.^  Canal  building  is  accordingly 
beset  with  no  great  engineering  difficulties,  and  hence  the 
cost  of  construction  is  relatively  low.  River  regulation, 
likewise,  is  comparatively  inexpensive.  There  are  no  great 
torrential  streams,  as  in  the  United  States,  the  control  of 
which  well-nigh  baffles  the  science  of  river  engineering. 
The  interruption  to  navigation  on  account  of  floods  aver- 
ages but  4.5  days  a  year.^ 

In  the  third  place,  the  warm  climate  of  Belgium  is  a 
distinctly  favorable  circumstance  for  water  transporta- 
tion. Ice  closes  navigation  on  an  average  of  but  12.5  days 
each  year,^  even  less  than  is  the  case  on  the  Rhine  in 
Germany.  The  advantage  of  this,  as  compared  with  the 
situation  in  eastern  Germany  and  in  the  northern  half  of 
the  United  States,  where  the  waterways  are  frozen  over  for 
several  months  each  year,  is  very  great.  In  Belgium  water 
traffic  is  interrupted  from  all  causes,  including  suspension 
of  operation  for  repairs,  only  27  days  a  year.^ 

From  the  industrial  standpoint,  we  find  that  the  density 
of  population  and  of  traffic  is  greater  in  Belgium  than  in 
any  other  country  in  the  world.  Within  an  area  but  little 
greater  than  that  of  Maryland  are  6,693,548  industrious 
people.®  The  population  per  square  mile  in  the  United 
States  is  about  26;  in  Germany  290;  and  in  Belgium  it  is 

*  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vi,  p.  43. 

«  Ibid.,  p.  59.  '  Ibid.,  p.  46.  *  Ibid.  »  Ibid. 

•  Statistische  Mitteilungen,  1909,  p.  430. 


306        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

620.^  No  section  of  the  United  States  has  a  density  of 
population  comparable  to  that  of  Belgium.  The  density  of 
traflBc  is  still  more  noteworthy.  In  the  year  1905  the  com- 
bined waterway  and  railway  tonnage  of  Belgium,  France, 
and  Germany,  with  their  respective  areas,  was  as  follows : 


Belgium 

France 

Germany 


Tonnage  * 


118,664,000 
173,030.000 
692,100,000 


Area  t 
eq.  km. 


29,455 
536,464 
540,778 


Tonnage 
per  Bq.km. 


4,028 

323 

1,279 


•  Preliminary  Report  of  National  Waterways  Commitsion,  p.  32. 
t  Slatistische  Milteilungen,  1909,  p.  430. 

With  one  eighteenth  the  area  of  France,  Belgium  has  a 
total  traffic  tonnage  sixty-nine  per  cent  as  great.  With 
only  one  nineteenth  the  area,  little  Belgium  has  a  traffic 
tonnage  equal  to  one  fifth  that  of  mighty  Germany. 

This  tremendous  traffic  is  to  be  accounted  for  partly 
by  the  fact  that  Belgium  has  a  much  denser  population 
than  France  or  Germany,  and  partly  by  the  fact  that  per- 
petual peace  is  guaranteed  to  her  without  the  existence 
of  a  huge  standing  army  and  powerful  navy.  Practically 
all  of  her  people  and  her  capital  may  constantly  be  de- 
voted to  industrial  pursuits.  But  a  third  very  import- 
ant factor  is  the  passage  of  an  enormous  foreign  traffic 
through  Belgian  territory.  Twenty-four  per  cent  of  the 
entire  traffic  is  international,  and  of  this  amount,  twenty- 
five  per  cent  is  with  France,  and  seventy -five  per  cent  with 
the  Netherlands  and  Germany.^ 

This  international  traffic  is  entirely  due  to  the  geo- 
graphic location  of  Belgium,  and  might  have  been  included 
under  the  geographic  advantages  enumerated  above.  It 
seems  more  naturally  to  belong,  however,  to  a  discussion  of 
traffic  conditions.   The  rivers  of  Belgium  lead  across  her 

1  Prelimiriary  Report  of  National  Waterways  Commission,  p.  80. 
'  Report  of  Royal  Commission,  vol.  vi,  p.  46. 


THE  WATERWAYS  OF  BELGIUM         307 

borders  and  connect  with  the  waterways  of  France  and 
Holland,  and  with  the  Rhine  River  from  Germany.  In 
early  days  the  Belgian  rivers  formed  practically  the  only 
outlet  for  the  traffic  originating  along  these  international 
streams,  within  the  borders  of  the  other  countries,  and  the 
Belgians  found  the  development  of  the  carrying  and  trans- 
shipping business  extremely  lucrative.  It  gave  employ- 
ment to  men  and  capital  within  the  country  and  it  built 
up  Belgian  ports,  greatly  stimulating  the  ocean  trade  of 
the  nation.  Of  particular  importance  has  always  been  the 
traffic  coming  down  from  the  Rhine. 

The  Rhine  reaches  the  sea  in  Holland,  but  navigation 
on  its  lower  course  was  always  very  difficult,  owing  to 
obstructions  near  its  mouth.  As  a  consequence,  Antwerp 
found  little  difficulty  until  the  opening  of  the  Rotterdam 
Waterway,  about  1870,^  in  diverting  to  itself,  by  way  of 
the  river  Scheldt,  a  large  share  of  the  Rhine  trade.  Com- 
petition with  Rotterdam  became  more  severe  after  the 
opening  of  the  Rotterdam  outlet  to  the  sea,  but  the  con- 
struction of  the  Hansweert  Canal  in  1867,^  connecting 
Antwerp  with  the  canals  of  South  Holland,  and  with  the 
Meuse  and  Rhine  Rivers,  a  canal  with  locks  large  enough 
for  the  passage  of  several  Rhine  boats  at  once,  has  enabled 
Belgium  to  retain  a  share,  though  admittedly  a  decreasing 
share,  of  this  German  freight.  Every  effort  is  being  put 
forward  to  maintain  Antwerp  in  her  proud  position  in  the 
shipping  world.  Ruinously  low  rates  are  offered  in  order 
to  attract  traffic  away  from  Rotterdam,  and  huge  Rhine 
barges  are  towed  all  the  way  down  the  river  Scheldt  to 
Antwerp,^  although  they  can  travel  to  Rotterdam  under 
their  own  propulsion.  Since  Antwerp's  prosperity  is  largely 
based  on  her  shipping  business,  it  is  deemed  an  imperative 
necessity  to  maintain  and  develop  that  shipping  at  almost 
any  cost. 

*  See  chapter  xiv,  p.  311. 
Antwerp  Consulate  Report,  supra,  p.  166.  •  Ibid.,  p.  159. 


308        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

It  is,  indeed,  quite  possible  that  the  business  generated 
in  Belgium  as  a  result  of  attracting  foreign  produce  to  her 
ports,  both  for  export  and  import,  may  much  more  than 
overbalance  the  deficits  from  operation  incurred  on  the 
waterways.  These  advantages,  however,  do  not  exist  on 
the  strictly  internal  routes  of  the  country,  and  hence  the 
latter  should  be  judged  solely  on  a  basis  of  comparison 
with  the  railways. 

Finally,  from  an  administrative  point  of  view,  Belgian 
waterways,  like  those  of  Germany  and  France,  are  favored 
by  being  under  the  control  of  an  honest  and  eflficient 
Government  body.  When  money  is  appropriated,  it  is 
appropriated  for  definite  and  feasible  projects;  it  is  certain 
to  be  used  for  the  purposes  for  which  it  is  appropriated, 
and  the  construction  of  the  works  is  speedily  carried  to 
completion.  The  utter  lack  of  system,  or  even  honesty,  in 
connection  with  waterway  development  in  America  has 
been  suflSciently  dwelt  upon  in  the  chapter  on  Germany, 
and  the  contrast  need  not  be  redrawn  here.  The  point 
should,  however,  be  borne  in  mind  as  one  absolutely  essen- 
tial to  the  success  of  water  transportation.  On  the  whole, 
therefore,  it  must  be  concluded  that  conditions  are  far 
more  favorable  to  waterway  development  in  Belgium  than 
they  are  in  the  United  States. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE  CANALS  OF  THE  NETHERLANDS 

1.  Attention  has  so  often  been  called  to  the  success 
attained  by  "the  thrifty  Dutch,"  in  the  building  of  canals 
and  in  the  utilization  of  natural  waterways,  that  our  dis- 
cussion of  European  transportation  would  be  incomplete 
were  we  to  devote  no  space  here  to  a  consideration  of  trans- 
portation conditions  in  the  Netherlands.  We  shall  accord- 
ingly present  in  the  following  pages  a  brief  history  of  the 
inland  waterways  of  Holland.  It  is  a  story  of  transporta- 
tion development  which  should  prove  unusually  interest- 
ing and  suggestive,  as  showing  the  part  played  by  unique 
geographic  and  commercial  conditions  in  shaping  the 
transportation  policy  of  a  country. 

There  are  at  present  as  many  as  265  different  canals 
in  the  Netherlands,  which  approximate  a  total  length  of 
2100  miles.  Twenty  of  these,  aggregating  a  length  of  S26 
miles,  have  been  constructed  and  maintained  by  the  Gov- 
ernment, while  the  remainder  belong  to  the  various  pro- 
vinces, communities,  "polders,"  and  societies,  or  to  private 
persons.^  Since  the  Government  owns  and  controls  only 
about  one  thirteenth  of  the  total  number  of  canals  and  but 
one  seventh  of  the  mileage,  it  might  appear  that  it  had 
exercised  comparatively  little  influence  upon  the  trans- 
portation development  of  the  country.  This  is  far  from 
being  the  case,  however,  since  only  the  minor  projects  are 
privately  owned,  as  will  hereafter  appear.  For  convenience 
of  discussion  these  canals  may  be  divided  into  four  classes, 
—  ship  canals,  canals  connecting  with  the  Rhine  River,  in- 
land canals,  and  lateral  canals.  We  shall  describe  the  devel- 
*  National  Waterways  Commission,  Doc.  no.  18,  p.  50. 


310        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

opment  of  each  class  separately,  because  each  has  been  the 
outgrowth  of  peculiar  geographic  or  commercial  conditions. 

2.  The  wider  known,  and  perhaps  the  more  important, 
of  the  two  ship  canals  of  Holland  is  the  North  Sea  Canal, 
which  extends  from  the  western  coast,  across  the  peninsula 
which  reaches  into  the  North  Sea,  to  the  city  of  Amster- 
dam on  the  Zuider  Zee.  Largely  because  of  its  favorable 
commercial  situation,  Amsterdam  had  become  as  early  as 
the  seventeenth  century  a  very  important  banking  and 
commercial  city;  but  the  growing  size  of  ocean-going  ves- 
sels, together  with  the  increasing  shallowness  of  the  Zuider 
Zee,  in  time  virtually  closed  the  old  port  of  Amsterdam, 
and  necessitated  the  building  of  what  was  called  the  North 
Holland  Canal,  from  the  extreme  northern  end  of  the 
peninsula,  south  for  a  distance  of  fifty  miles,  to  the  city 
of  Amsterdam.  This  canal,  which  admitted  vessels  with  a 
draft  of  seventeen  feet,  was  constructed  by  the  Govern- 
ment between  the  years  1820  and  1852.  Becoming,  in 
turn,  of  insufficient  capacity  for  the  ever-increasing  size 
of  ocean  vessels,  it  was  determined  in  1865  to  cut  a  deep 
waterway,  the  present  North  Sea  Canal,  directly  across 
the  peninsula,  a  distance  of  fifteen  miles;  and  in  1876  the 
work  was  completed.  Improvements  and  enlargements 
have  since  been  made,  and  the  waterway  is  now  navigable 
for  vessels  720  feet  in  length,  79  feet  in  width,  and  30  feet 
in  draft.  ^ 

It  is  evident  from  this  brief  sketch  that  the  motive  for 
building  this  ship  canal  was  an  entirely  unique  one,  that  of 
maintaining  a  seaport  which  had  long  played  an  important 
part  in  international  commerce.  Amsterdam  was  doomed 
to  decadence  unless  she  could  maintain  her  ocean  trade; 
hence  a  ship  canal  seemed  an  absolute  necessity.  It  should 
perhaps  be  added  that  the  demand  for  this  new  outlet  to 
the  "deep  water  ocean"  arose  before  the  era  of  railways; 
^  National  Waterways  Commission,  Doc.  no.  18,  p.  47. 


THE  CANALS  OF  THE  NETHERLANDS    311 

and  even  the  final  plan  of  a  huge  ship  canal  was  decided 
on  before  the  real  importance  of  railways  had  become  fully 
established. 

The  second  deep  waterway  of  the  Netherlands  is  known 
as  the  "Maas"  or  Rotterdam  Waterway,  connecting  the 
city  of  Rotterdam  with  the  North  Sea.  The  Rhine  River 
of  Germany  reaches  the  sea  through  Dutch  territory. 
Navigation  on  the  lower  course  was  always  very  difiicult, 
owing  to  many  obstructions,  including  ever-moving  sand 
banks  near  its  mouth  in  the  North  Sea.  As  a  consequence 
of  this,  a  large  and  increasing  portion  of  the  Rhine  traffic 
was  being  diverted  to  Antwerp  in  Belgium,  and  the  Dutch 
were  thereby  losing  the  exceedingly  profitable  transship- 
ping business  afforded  by  the  German  freight.  Now  the 
city  of  Rotterdam  was  favorably  located  on  the  Nieuwe 
Maas  River,  and  had  become  by  1850  a  thriving  com- 
mercial city,  and  a  doughty  rival  of  Antwerp.  It  became 
evident  that  if  the  greater  part  of  the  Rhine  freight  could 
be  diverted  to  Rotterdam  and  that  city  be  made  the  point 
of  transshipment  to  ocean  vessels,  not  only  would  Rotter- 
dam be  given  a  tremendous  impetus,  but  traffic  which 
would  otherwise  pass  to  the  sea  through  Belgian  territory 
would  thereby  be  saved  to  Holland.  These  considerations 
proved  sufficiently  strong  to  induce  the  Government  of 
Holland  to  begin  the  construction  in  1866,  the  same  year 
that  the  North  Sea  Canal  was  undertaken,  of  the  Rotter- 
dam Waterway,  connecting  the  Rhine  River  with  the  sea 
by  a  new  channel,  utilizing  the  Maas  River  from  Rotter- 
dam to  the  ocean.  It  is  navigable  for  vessels  drawing  as 
much  as  thirty -two  feet  of  water.  ^ 

3.  The  second  class  of  Dutch  canals  is  composed  of  the 

*  There  is  a  third  deep  water  canal  entering  Holland  territory,  namely, 
the  one  from  Ghent  in  Belgium  to  Terneutzen  in  the  Netherlands,  on  the 
river  Schelde;  but  since  this  is  a  Belgian  undertaking  it  cannot  properly 
be  classed  with  Holland  waterways. 


S12        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

smaller  canals  which  connect  with  the  Rhine  River.  Not 
only  the  Rhine,  but  many  other  rivers  in  Holland  are 
international  streams,  and  as  such  their  navigation  in- 
volves international  commercial  considerations.  The  de- 
velopment of  the  railroads  of  the  Netherlands  eventually 
necessitated  the  construction  of  railway  dikes  across  the 
Easter  Schelde  and  the  Sloe  Rivers,  two  streams  forming 
the  connecting  links  in  the  waterway  route  between  Ant- 
werp and  the  Rhine.  It  was  incumbent  upon  Holland  to 
compensate  Belgium  for  the  closing  of  this  important  high- 
way; and  an  arrangement  was  consequently  entered  into 
by  the  two  Governments,  whereby  two  canals  were  con- 
structed to  replace  the  now  impassable  river  route,  the 
South  Beveland  Canal,  completed  in  1866,  and  a  second 
through  Walcheren,  finished  seven  years  later. 

The  third  so-called  Rhine  Canal  owes  its  existence  to 
the  need  of  connecting  the  port  of  Amsterdam  with  the 
Rhine  River  and  the  German  hinterland.  Amsterdam  had 
early  shared  in  the  interior  trade  through  the  avenue 
afforded  by  two  small  rivers,  the  Vecht  and  the  Krumme- 
Rhine,  passing  through  Utrecht  and  Vreeswyk.  The  tortu- 
ous course  and  shallow  depth  of  this  route,  however,  in 
time  proved  unable  to  meet  the  needs  of  transport,  and  in 
order  to  maintain  the  German  traffic  the  Merwede  Canal 
was  planned,  and  carried  to  completion  in  1893. 

The  competition  of  the  three  rival  ports  of  Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam,  and  Antwerp  —  the  first  two  Dutch,  and  the 
latter  Belgium  —  has  thus  been  seen  to  have  been  the  de- 
termining factor  in  this  waterway  development.  The  rich 
commerce  from  the  Rhine  provinces  of  Germany,  with  the 
tremendous  transshipping  business  afforded  thereby,  was 
the  prize  sought.  We  have  seen  that  the  commercial  pos- 
sibilities of  Rotterdam  led  to  the  construction  of  the  great 
Rotterdam  Waterway,  and  that  the  desire  of  Antwerp  to 
maintain  her  former  share  of  the  Rhine  traffic  forced  the 
Netherlands  to  aid  in  the  perpetuation  of  a  route  through 


THE  CANALS  OF  THE  NETHERLANDS    313 

her  own  territory  to  that  city.  It  remains  to  inquire  why 
the  Government  of  Holland  should  furnish  the  necessary 
funds  for  constructing  a  second  outlet  for  the  German 
traffic,  by  way  of  Amsterdam,  when  already  a  great  part  of 
the  Rhine  trade  was  insured  to  Holland  by  means  of  the 
Rotterdam  Waterway.  Why  Amsterdam  should  desire 
water  connection  with  the  Rhine  requires  no  explanation, 
but  why  the  Government  should  further  the  project  is 
perhaps  not  immediately  apparent. 

In  Holland,  as  in  other  countries,  political  pressure  not 
infrequently  plays  a  leading  role  in  the  shaping  of  admin- 
istrative policy,  especially  in  the  matter  of  distributing 
funds  for  internal  commercial  development.  Amsterdam, 
as  the  chief  city  of  the  country,  was  not  disposed  to  con- 
tribute through  the  avenue  of  taxation  to  a  Government 
enterprise  which  would  accrue  only  to  the  benefit  of  her 
commercial  rival,  Rotterdam,  without  receiving  in  return 
some  corresponding  stimulus  to  her  own  interior  trade. 
Amsterdam  needed  a  canal  connection  with  the  Rhine, 
and,  moreover,  was  in  a  position  to  ask,  with  a  reasonable 
expectation  of  success,  for  a  Government  contribution 
therefor.  Furthermore,  viewed  solely  from  the  Govern- 
ment's point  of  view,  there  was  an  undoubted  commercial 
advantage  in  possessing  a  second  outlet  for  the  German 
trade.  Established  business  connections  and  traffic  routes 
through  Amsterdam,  and  the  great  commercial  import- 
ance of  that  city  naturally  caused  a  considerable  portion 
of  the  interior  traffic  to  prefer  Amsterdam  to  either  Rot- 
terdam or  Antwerp.  Again,  good  waterway  connections 
through  Amsterdam  might  divert  thither  some  North  Ger- 
man traffic,  which  would  otherwise  find  an  outlet  through 
German  ports.  At  any  rate,  it  was  certain  that  the  two 
routes  would  place  Holland  in  a  much  more  favorable  com- 
petitive position,  as  against  Belgium,  than  would  merely 
a  single  route  alone.  Hence  no  difficulty  existed  in  inducing 
the  Government  to  connect  Amsterdam  with  the  Rhine. 


314        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

4.  The  third  class  of  canals  in  Holland  includes  the  vast 
number  of  small  waterways,  which  everywhere  traverse 
the  lowlands  of  the  country,  and  which  have  been  con- 
structed mainly  by  private  persons,  societies,  communi- 
ties, or  provinces.  The  majority  of  these  canals  were  con- 
structed ages  ago  for  the  purpose  of  meeting  needs  far  more 
pressing  than  those  of  transportation.  It  is  well  known 
that  a  large  part  of  the  territory  of  Holland  lies  even  be- 
low the  level  of  the  ocean.  The  wonderful  achievement  of 
the  Dutch  people  in  creating  a  country  in  which  to  live  by 
driving  back,  by  means  of  huge  sea  walls,  the  ocean  cover- 
ing their  land,  has  been  universally  extolled ;  though  some- 
what less  has  been  written  of  their  perhaps  equally  great 
achievement  in  solving  the  perennial  problem  occasioned 
by  the  annual  rainfall.  When  once  the  sea  was  removed,  it 
yet  remained  to  devise  a  means  of  making  water  run  up- 
hill, as  it  were.  While  in  other  countries  the  chief  problem 
in  connection  with  the  run-off  of  the  annual  rainfall  is  the 
prevention  of  its  running  so  fast  that  it  endangers  naviga- 
tion, property,  and  life,  in  Holland  the  problem  has  been 
only  how  to  make  it  flow  ofiF  at  all.  Some  artificial  means 
of  draining  the  country  was  of  imperative  necessity.  The 
means  devised  was  a  system  of  belt  canals,  or  "Ring- 
vaart,"  as  they  are  called.  An  elevated  canal  was  built 
around  every  reclaimed  "polder,"  high  enough  above  the 
level  of  the  land  to  be,  paradoxical  as  it  seems,  also  above 
the  level  of  the  sea.  Into  these  belt  canals  the  water  is 
pumped  from  the  ditches  and  surface  canals  of  the  sur- 
rounding territory  by  means  of  the  ever-working  Dutch 
windmills.  It  goes  almost  without  saying,  further,  that  the 
surfaces  of  these  reclaimed  districts  must  be  crossed  by  a 
veritable  network  of  ditches  in  order  to  make  the  land 
cultivable.  For  purposes  of  drainage,  then,  rather  than 
for  purposes  of  transportation,  were  these  semi-private 
canals  of  Holland  constructed.  That  they  should  be  used 
incidentally  for  transportation  purposes  was  of  course  in- 


THE  CANALS  OF  THE  NETHERLANDS    315 

evitable.  Indeed,  in  early  times  they  were  almost  the  sole 
means  of  transit,  ordinary  road-building  being  exceedingly 
difficult  and  expensive  on  account  of  the  lowness  and  con- 
sequent sponginess  of  the  land.  We  shall  later  see  that 
this  same  consideration  has  hampered  the  development 
of  the  railways  of  the  country. 

To  the  third  class  of  inland  canals,  also,  belong  those  of 
northeastern  Holland,  in  the  provinces  of  Drenthe,  Gronin- 
gen,  and  Oberysel,  and  in  North  Brabant.  This  section 
of  the  country  was  originally  covered  to  a  considerable 
depth  with  a  great  peat  fen,  the  removal  of  which  offered 
a  twofold  source  of  profit.  Not  only  could  the  peat  be 
marketed  as  fuel,  but  the  underlying  soil  was  excellent 
agricultural  land.  Canals  were  consequently  constructed 
by  the  enterprising  inhabitants  for  the  purpose  of  exploit- 
ing this  rich  resource.  Though  these  canals  were  mainly 
constructed  before  railways  were  in  existence,  it  is  alto- 
gether probable  that  even  to-day  canals  would  meet  the 
needs  of  similar  conditions  better  than  any  other  agents. 
The  peat  was  distinctly  a  canal  commodity.  But  more  im- 
portant than  this,  the  low,  marshy  fens  were  exceptionally 
favorable  to  canal  building;  but  unfavorable  to  railway 
construction.  Moreover,  the  canals  served  as  aids  in  drain- 
ing such  a  territory.  To  render  the  fen  lands  tillable  re- 
quired, as  in  the  case  of  the  polders,  innumerable  ditches, 
and  the  canals  furnished  the  necessary  main  arteries  in  the 
drainage  system.  Such  considerations  appear  to  have 
tipped  the  balance  decidedly  in  favor  of  canals.  Though 
most  of  these  waterways  are  no  longer  needed  for  the  re- 
moval of  peat,  they  are  now  maintained  and  extensively 
used  for  the  transportation  of  the  produce  of  the  reclaimed 
underlying  soil. 

5.  There  is  what  may  be  called  a  fourth  class  of  canals 
in  Holland,  which  is  commonly  referred  to  as  the  "lateral 
canals."  A  large  number  of  small  rivers  cross  the  upland 


S16        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

portions  of  the  country,  and,  early  and  late,  the  Govern- 
ment has  laid  out  large  sums  of  money  in  the  improve- 
ment of  their  courses  and  in  the  connecting  of  them  by 
artificial  channels,  namely,  the  lateral  canals.  In  the  early 
days  these  rivers  naturally  formed  invaluable  highways  of 
commerce.  Anything  that  could  be  done  to  improve  the 
navigation  thereon  and  to  join  their  sources  with  one  an- 
other was  a  direct  benefit  to  the  riparian  and  intervening 
land.  Conditions,  moreover,  were  exceptionally  conducive 
to  a  full  development  of  all  the  waterway  possibilities  of 
the  country.  The  almost  perfectly  flat  territory  and  the 
numerous  parallel  rivers,  separated  by  insignificant  dis- 
tances, peculiarly  invited  the  construction  of  lateral  canals; 
while  the  vast  system  of  drainage  canals,  already  con- 
structed, had  developed  on  the  part  of  the  inhabitants  an 
aptitude  for,  and  at  the  same  time  a  habit  of  canal  build- 
ing. This  last  consideration  leads  us  to  a  slight  diversion 
on  the  question  of  why  these  canals  and  rivers  may  have 
been  continually  nurtured  and  improved,  even  since  rail- 
ways have  come  into  use  in  Holland.  It  is  a  diversion  which 
it  is  believed  will  throw  light,  not  only  on  this  particular 
class  of  waterway,  but  on  the  general  transportation  policy 
of  the  country  in  recent  times  as  well. 

6.  Nations,  like  individuals,  generally  shape  their  courses 
not  as  the  result  of  any  definitely  reasoned-out  and  carefully 
prearranged  plan,  but  rather  as  the  result  of  historical 
events,  particular  exigencies,  and  the  constraint  of  custom. 
We  have  seen  how  the  dire  necessities  of  the  situation  in 
which  the  Dutch  people  early  found  themselves  forced  them 
into  the  construction  of  inland  waterways,  there  being  no 
alternative  other  than  migration.  Now  a  people  whose 
entire  history  has  been  one  continuous  struggle  to  control 
the  flow  of  w^ater,  whose  whole  national  life  has  been  bound 
up  with  the  construction  of  dikes,  of  ditches,  and  of  canals, 
would  naturally  come  to  regard  the  waterways  of  the  coun- 


THE  CANALS  OF  THE  NETHERLANDS    317 

try  as  an  inseparable  part  of  their  existence.  When  this 
history  is  borne  in  mind,  it  is  not  difficult  to  understand 
why  the  Dutch  should  have  continued  to  improve  the  ca- 
nal facilities  of  the  country  long  after  the  imperative  neces- 
sities of  the  early  days  were  passed.  It  would  have  been 
unnatural,  or  at  least  unexpected,  had  the  waterways  of 
Holland  been  allowed  to  languish  in  recent  times,  as  has 
been  the  case  in  countries  where  they  have  played  a  much 
less  important  role  in  national  development.  We  shall 
further  see  that  this  same  historical  habit  has  had  a  de- 
cided influence  upon  the  maintenance  of  waterway  traffic 
and  upon  the  policy  of  the  Government  in  the  matter  of 
tolls. 

7.  One  who  believes  that  comparisons  can  be  drawn 
between  Dutch  and  American  transportation  conditions, 
who  believes,  that  since  waterways  are  extensively  used  in 
the  one  country,  it  follows  that  they  would  be  in  the  other 
if  properly  encouraged  and  developed  by  the  Government, 
should  have  the  opportunity  of  observing  the  interest- 
ing spectacle  afforded  by  the  market-place  of  a  Dutch 
city  in  the  early  morning.  Even  in  the  largest  cities  canals 
enter  the  very  centre  of  the  business  districts.  The  market 
produce  of  the  surrounding  country  is  brought  into  the 
city  in  boats  by  the  good  Dutch  farm  wives,  is  spread  out 
for  display  in  the  market-place,  and  sold  direct,  in  large 
part,  to  families  desiring  a  day's  supply  of  fresh  fruit  or 
vegetables.  This  has  been  the  custom  for  centuries  past 
and  it  wnll  doubtless  be  the  custom  for  centuries  yet  to 
come.  Having  seen  this  spectacle  the  observer  should  call 
to  mind  the  great  commission  businesses  of  American  cit- 
ies, and  the  fast  freight  trains  which  bring  milk  or  per- 
ishable fruit  to  market  from  distances  many  times  as  far 
as  the  entire  expanse  of  Holland. 

The  above  is  but  one  illustration  of  the  peculiar  condi- 
tions which  serve  to  maintain  traffic  on  Dutch  waterways. 


318        WATERWAYS   VERSUS   RAILWAYS 

Many  more  might  be  given,  but  it  is  suflBcient  to  note  that 
everywhere  business,  whether  agricultural  or  industrial, 
has  been  built  up  around  the  waterways ;  and  even  did  the 
constraint  of  custom  not  forbid  the  inhabitants  to  think 
of  changing  to  another  mode  of  transport  than  the  one 
with  which  they  have  from  time  immemorial  been  asso- 
ciated, the  process  of  change  itself  would  involve  many 
inconveniences,  and  often  actual  losses.  This  is  undoubt- 
edly a  strong  deterrent.  Furthermore,  since  the  great 
ramifying  waterway  system  is  there  at  hand,  since  many 
millions  of  dollars  have  been  laid  out  on  its  development, 
since  the  country  is  committed  to  waterways,  whether  for 
good  or  for  ill,  why  should  they  not  be  used  as  much 
as  possible?  If  a  transportation  system  had  to  be  con- 
structed anew  under  modern  conditions,  a  different  de- 
velopment might  follow  in  some  sections  even  of  Holland. 
This  general  consideration  will  bear  emphasis.  In  all 
of  the  Continental  countries  which  we  have  been  consider- 
ing the  present  governments  are  face  to  face  with  this  pro- 
position: Hundreds  of  millions  have  been  expended  upon 
waterways,  and  industries  have  been  built  up  along  them. 
To  give  up  the  waterways  now  and  go  over  to  the  railways 
entirely  would  involve  enormous  losses.  If  the  water- 
ways have  cost,  for  instance,  $200,000,000  and  the  rail- 
ways $200,000,000,  the  total  cost  of  the  transportation 
system  has  been  $400,000,000.  Were  it  to  be  constructed 
anew,  of  railways  entirely,  it  could  be  done  for,  let  us  say, 
$300,000,000.  But  if  the  present  waterways  be  replaced 
by  railways  costing  $100,000,000,  the  total  government 
expenditures  will  have  amounted  to  $500,000,000.  It  often 
appears  to  a  government  to  be  good  economy  to  continue 
the  use  of  the  existing  waterways  rather  than  to  discard 
them.  Then  there  is  the  further  consideration  that  a 
change  would  involve  a  reconstruction  of  a  large  part  of 
the  industrial  machinery  of  the  country.  In  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States,  on  the  other  hand,  conditions  are 


THE  CANALS  OF  THE  NETHERLANDS    319 

the  opposite  to  these.  The  railways  have  been  thoroughly 
developed  and  industries  have  been  established  primarily 
with  the  view  of  using  the  railways  to  carry  their  freight. 
A  change  to  water  transportation,  therefore,  would  occa- 
sion enormous  losses  in  the  readjustment  of  industry  to 
the  altered  conditions  of  transport.  To  reconstruct  the 
terminal  railways  at  a  great  centre  like  Chicago,  for  in- 
stance, would  involve  tremendous  outlays. 

Another  point  of  sharp  contrast  between  transportation 
conditions  in  the  Netherlands  and  in  the  United  States  is 
that  of  the  density  of  trafSc.  It  is  well  known  that  the 
Low  Countries,  with  the  probable  exception  of  portions  of 
China  and  India,  are  the  most  thickly  populated  districts 
in  the  world.  The  abundant  energy  of  the  Dutch  has  pro- 
duced a  tremendous  volume  of  traflac  requiring  transport 
within  a  small  area.  Attention  should  also  be  directed  to 
the  geographic  position  of  Holland,  no  less  than  Belgium,  as 
an  entrepot  of  the  great  Continental  hinterland.  When  to 
its  own  vast  freight  tonnage  is  added  the  enormous  traffic 
passing  to  and  fro  between  Rhenish  Germany  and  the  sea, 
Holland  is  found  to  possess  a  greater  density  of  traffic 
than  exists  anywhere  else,  with  the  possible  exception  of 
Belgium.  The  result  of  this  is  to  furnish  an  abundance  of 
freight  for  both  agents  of  transport.  The  conditions  are 
at  least  so  infinitely  superior  to  those  of  the  United  States 
as  to  be  beyond  comparison. 

8.  We  have  now  to  consider  another  phase  of  the  trans- 
portation question  in  Holland,  namely,  the  development 
of  the  railways  and  their  relation  to  and  effect  upon  the 
canal  transportation  of  the  country.  We  find  that,  whereas 
conditions  have  been  peculiarly  favorable  to  the  develop- 
ment of  water  transportation  in  the  Netherlands,  they 
have  been,  on  the  other  hand,  unusually  discouraging  to 
railway  development. 

The  low,  marshy,  and  soggy  soil  of  the  country  has  ren- 


820        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

dered  the  maintenance  of  a  solid  roadbed  exceedingly 
costly,  while  the  vast  number  of  bridges  required  in  the 
crossing  of  the  great  network  of  waterways  has  involved 
extraordinary  expense.  On  a  single  line  between  Amster- 
dam and  Rotterdam,  there  are  no  less  than  eighty  bridges, 
of  which  eight  are  of  the  swing-bridge  type. 

Perhaps  an  even  greater  impediment  to  railway  develop- 
ment, however,  than  these  natural  handicaps  has  been 
the  indirect  one  of  governmental  control.  Of  the  approxi- 
mately 1600  miles  of  railway  in  the  Netherlands,  about 
900  miles  are  operated  by  the  State  through  a  "Com- 
pany for  the  Exploitation  of  the  State  Railway."  The  re- 
mainder, of  which  205  miles  also  belong  to  the  State,  is 
operated  by  the  Dutch  Iron  Railway  Company.^  These 
companies  pay  a  rental  to  the  Government  for  the  use  of 
the  lines  belonging  thereto  and  in  addition  they  must  share 
with  the  State  in  all  profits  over  five  per  cent  on  the  capi- 
talization.^  The  result  of  this  has  been  to  discourage  pri- 
vate railway  enterprise,  to  deter  the  investment  of  large 
sums  of  money  in  railway  building,  and  consequently  to 
prevent  the  development  of  eflScient  railway  systems. 

Furthermore,  the  action  of  the  Government  in  main- 
taining its  waterways  free  of  toll  has  resulted  in  rendering 
the  railway  development  one-sided,  facilities  for  freight 
carriage  being  largely  neglected.  It  is  of  course  obvious 
that  the  poorer  the  railway  freight  service  the  greater  is  the 
possibility  of  successful  canal  competition. 

9.  Tolls  were  abolished  upon  all  of  the  Government 
canals  and  rivers  in  1900,  since  which  time  the  waterways 
have  been  a  source  of  constant  loss  to  the  Government. 

*  Moody  s  Magazine,  January,  1910,  p.  48. 

^  In  1899  the  railway  companies  paid  dividends  of  4.5  and  5  per  cent 
respectively.  In  1908  they  paid  3  per  cent.  The  yearly  rental  paid  to  the 
State  averages  about  1 .5  per  cent  on  the  State's  investment.  (McPher* 
SOD,  Transportation  m  Europe,  p.  171.) 


THE  CANALS  OF  THE  NETHERLANDS    S21 

In  1908  the  outlay  for  the  maintenance  of  its  326  miles  of 
canals  was  $700,000,  or  $2147  per  mile.^  In  the  case  of  the 
third  class  of  canals,  those  not  owned  by  the  Government, 
dues  are  as  a  rule  still  levied  upon  carriers,  but  they  are 
small  in  amount  and  in  most  cases  insuflBcient  to  yield 
profitable  returns  from  transportation.  "In  many  cases 
the  cost  of  maintenance  exceeds  the  amount  collected  for 
toUs,"^  and  "it  is  only  in  exceptional  cases  that  the  increase 
from  dues  is  enough  to  pay  for  maintenance,  as  w^ell  as  for 
the  establishment  of  a  sinking  fund  for  the  original  cost 
of  construction.  This  might  be  reached  by  levying  higher 
rates  on  vessels  using  the  canals,  but  it  is  feared  that  navi- 
gation under  such  circumstances  would  not  be  able  to  com- 
pete with  other  modes  of  transportation.  It  must  further 
be  taken  into  consideration  that  a  large  number  of  canals 
are  essential  for  the  drainage  of  the  country  and  it  would 
thus  be  unjust  to  charge  navigation  with  all  the  expenses."' 
It  has  now  become  apparent  that,  whereas  the  railways 
of  Holland  are  expected  to  earn  a  reasonable  profit  upon 
their  investments  by  charging  rates  suflBciently  large  there- 
for, it  is,  on  the  other  hand,  not  expected  that  either  the 
Government  or  private  waterways  shall  yield  such  returns, 
at  least  so  far  as  transportation  alone  is  concerned.  In  the 
case  of  the  Government  waterways,  no  tolls  whatever  are 
charged;  in  the  case  of  the  private  or  community  canals,  a 
portion  of  the  expense  of  maintenance  is  charged  off  against 
incidental,  or  perhaps  it  would  be  better  to  call  them 
extraordinary  sundry  benefits.  This,  may,  indeed,  under 
the  circumstances,  be  quite  a  proper  method  of  accounting. 
But  when  making  a  comparison  of  the  freight  tarifl^s  that 
exist,  and  when  estimating  the  comparative  advantages 
of  canals  and  railways  from  the  transportation  point  of 
view,  we  should  not  forget  that  this  is  the  method  of 
accounting  employed. 

1  National  Watertcays  Commission,  Doc.  no.  18,  p.  50. 
«  Ibid.,  p.  51.  '  Ibid. 


322        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

Whether  the  railways  under  free  competition  could 
succeed  in  diverting  the  watenvay  traffic  to  themselves 
is  another  question.  It  would  seem,  from  the  fact  that  the 
Government  deems  it  necessary  to  protect  its  waterways 
by  abolishing  all  tolls,  and  that  the  private  canals  refrain 
from  raising  their  transportation  rates  to  a  level  that 
would  yield  profitable  returns,  through  fear  "that  naviga- 
tion under  such  circumstances  would  not  be  able  to  com- 
pete with  other  modes  of  transportation,"  that  the  rail- 
ways would,  indeed,  even  in  Holland,  be  able  to  secure  a 
large  portion  of  the  present  water  traffic,  were  it  not  for 
the  artificial  handicap  imposed  upon  them  by  the  Govern- 
ment.^ Be  that  as  it  may,  it  is  perfectly  obvious  that,  under 
the  existing  unequal  conditions,  no  conclusions  as  to  com- 
parative economic  advantages  of  the  two  systems  of  trans- 
portation may  fairly  be  drawn. 

10.  Only  a  few  words  by  way  of  conclusion  are  neces- 
sary. To  the  query.  Does  the  history  of  the  canals  of  Hol- 
land indicate  that  the  development  of  canal  transporta- 
tion in  the  United  States  is  advisable?  the  answer  must 
unqualifiedly  be  in  the  negative.  Transportation  condi- 
tions in  the  two  countries  are  altogether  non-comparable. 
To  the  question,  Have  the  canals  of  Holland  been  success- 
ful from  the  Holland  point  of  view?  the  answer  seems  to  be 
that  not  only  have  they  aided  in  the  material  development 
of  the  country,  but  that  without  them,  on  account  of  the 
exceptional  conditions  there  existing,  the  present  degree 
of  development  would  have  been  impossible.  To  a  third 
question,  In  view  of  the  possibilities  of  railway  develop- 
ment, is  the  continued  improvement  of  waterways  in 
the  Netherlands  advisable?  the  answer  is  less  certain. 
Since,  however,  the  waterways  of  Holland  are  apparently 
handling  the  traffic  of  the  country  with  reasonable  satis- 

*  In  point  of  fact,  the  railways  handle  only  about  ten  per  cent  of  the 
freight  traflSc  of  the  country. 


THE  CANALS  OF  THE  NETHERLANDS    323 

faction  to  the  shippers,  since  a  large  part  of  them  are  still 
needed  for  purposes  of  drainage,  and  since  the  industries 
of  the  country  have  been  built  up  around  them,  it  may  well 
be  sound  policy  to  continue  to  encourage  water  transporta- 
tion. A  change  to  extensive  railway  transportation  would 
involve  a  heavy  immediate  loss,  as  well  in  the  cost  of  thor- 
oughly developing  a  second  transportation  agent  as  in  the 
necessary  readjustments  of  industry  to  the  changed  condi- 
tions of  transport.  Consequently,  it  may  be  best  to  main- 
tain the  waterways  as  the  chief  freight  carriers  of  the  coun- 
try, and  to  use  the  railways  mainly  for  passenger  traffic, 
and  only  incidentally  for  freight,  —  where  special  condi- 
tions seem  to  demand  it.  This  problem,  however,  is  for 
the  Dutch  rather  than  for  us  to  decide. 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE  LAKES-TO-GULF  SHIP  CANAL 

1.  The  most  important  water  transportation  project  be- 
fore the  United  States  at  present  is  what  is  known  as  the 
Lakes-to-GuIf  Waterway.  The  proposed  route  extends 
from  Lake  Michigan  at  Chicago,  by  way  of  the  Chicago 
Drainage  Canal,  the  Des  Plaines,  and  Illinois  Rivers,  to 
the  mouth  of  the  latter  at  Grafton,  Illinois,  a  short  distance 
above  St.  Louis;  and  thence  directly  down  the  Mississippi 
to  the  Gulf.  Varying  depths  have  been  proposed.  The 
Government  engineers  urge  a  depth  of  nine  feet;  "four- 
teen feet  through  the  Valley"  has  met  with  much  favor; 
and  there  are  many  who  advocate  a  great  ship  canal  deep 
enough  to  permit  the  passage  of  large  ocean  vessels  to  the 
inland  waters  of  the  Great  Lakes.  Our  attention  will  first 
be  given  to  the  consideration  of  a  Lakes-to-Gulf  Ship 
Canal,  discussion  of  the  less  ambitious  projects  being  re- 
served for  following  chapters. 

The  argument  for  a  ship  canal  from  Chicago  to  the  Gulf 
is  based  on  several  notions.  In  the  first  place,  there  are 
■those  who  believe  that  if  Chicago  could  be  given  a  deep 
waterway  connection  with  the  ocean,  she  might  soon  sup- 
plant New  York  as  the  metropolis  of  the  country.  Her 
.position  on  the  Lakes  makes  her  a  natural  transshipping 
point,  both  of  commodities  destined  for  export  and  for  the 
finished  goods  yearly  distributed  to  the  consumers  of  the 
.great  West.  To  use  the  words  of  Professor  Goode:  "The 
manifest  destiny  of  Chicago  is  that  she  shall  become  the 
commercial  focus  between  the  rich  central  plain  and  all 
the  rest  of  the  world.  To  do  this  one  absolutely  essential 
step  is  plain,  Chicago  must  become  her  own  seaport."  ^ 
*  Report  of  Chicago  Harbor  Commission,  1909,  p.  149. 


THE  LAKES-TO-GULF  SHIP  CANAL      325 

A  second  argument  for  a  deep  waterway,  as  opposed  to 
one  of  moderate  capacity,  is  advanced  by  James  J.  Hill. 
He  urges  that  "waterways  that  are  to  play  an  important 
part  in  traffic  must  be  deep  waterways.  This  point  cannot 
be  emphasized  too  strongly.  A  vessel  that  carries  1000  tons 
cannot  compete  with  a  box  car.  With  a  steamer  of  10,000 
tons,  you  have  it  beaten."*  Mr.  Hill  considers  that  a 
depth  of  at  least  twenty  feet  is  necessary  in  order  to  meet 
the  competition  of  the  railways. 

A  third  argument  for  a  ship  canal  from  Chicago  to  the 
Gulf  is  that  it  is  essential  in  order  to  meet  the  competition 
of  Canada.  It  is  well  known  that  Canada  has  been  con- 
templating the  building  of  a  canal  twenty-two  feet  deep 
from  the  St.  Lawrence  River  to  the  Georgian  Bay  on  Lake 
Huron  via  the  Ottawa  River,  Lake  Nipissing,  and  Lake 
George.  It  is  pointed  out  that  the  opening-up  of  this  great 
route  through  Canadian  territory  would  divert  a  vast 
amount  of  traflSc  from  American  to  Canadian  ports,  unless 
the  United  States  should  provide  a  correspondingly  deep 
waterway  through  American  soil. 

The  far-reaching  possible  consequences  of  a  Lakes-to- 
Gulf  ship  canal  are  readily  apparent.  If  it  is  practicable, 
hardly  any  undertaking  could  be  of  greater  importance 
to  the  country.  On  the  other  hand,  if  for  any  reason  it  is 
impracticable,  either  from  an  engineering  or  a  commercial 
standpoint,  scarce  any  undertaking  could  prove  more  waste- 
ful. Our  present  problem,  then,  is  to  ascertain  whether  the 
project  is  in  fact  economically  feasible. 

2.  It  is  necessary,  in  the  first  place,  to  consider  the  prob- 
able cost  of  the  undertaking.  Unfortunately  for  our  pur- 
poses, no  engineering  estimate  of  the  complete  cost  of  a 
Lakes-to-Gulf  waterway  twenty  or  more  feet  in  depth  has 
ever  been  made.  The  Government  engineers  have  con- 
fined their  investigations  to  the  fourteen  and  eight  or  nine 
»  World's  Work,  1910,  "Highways  of  Progress,"  p.  12,785. 


326  WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

foot  projects.  Hence  the  estimates  presented  here  can  be 
made  only  on  the  basis  of  collateral  evidence.  This  is 
admittedly  an  unsatisfactory  method,  and  it  is  adopted 
only  because  direct  data  are  wanting. 

Since  the  waterway  convention  which  was  held  at  St. 
Louis  in  November,  1910,  placed  itself  on  record  as  favor- 
ing an  eventual  draft  of  twenty-four  feet  (fourteen  feet 
being  but  a  step  on  the  way),  and  since  that  is  likewise 
the  depth  of  the  Chicago  Drainage  Canal,  twenty -four  feet 
may  best  be  taken  as  the  basis  of  our  present  estimates. 
Now  the  Chicago  Drainage  Canal,  thirty -four  and  one  half 
miles  in  length,  and  twenty-four  feet  in  depth,  cost  $53,- 
000,000,  equal  to  nearly  $1,100,000  a  mile.^  The  distance 
from  the  end  of  the  Drainage  Canal  to  the  Mississippi  is 

327  miles.^  At  an  equal  per  mileage  cost  with  the  Drain- 
age Canal,  it  would  require  approximately  $500,000,000 
to  connect  the  Drainage  Canal  with  the  Mississippi.  The 
Lockport-to-Utica  division,  sixty-one  miles  long,  is  in  the 
**  Rock-Bound  Valley,"  and  bedrock  would  have  to  be 
excavated  all  the  way.  In  the  Illinois  River,  while  it  is 
thought  that  a  depth  of  fourteen  feet  could  be  secured  by 
means  of  dredging  in  the  alluvial  bottom,  to  secure  a 
depth  of  twenty-four  feet  would  require  the  excavation 
of  bedrock. 

By  way  of  comparison  it  should  be  recalled  that  the 
State  of  New  York  has  appropriated  $101,000,000  with 
which  to  deepen  the  Erie  Canal  from  seven  to  twelve  feet. 
The  length  here  is  but  little  greater  than  is  that  of  the  Illi- 
nois project  and  the  increased  depth  to  be  secured  is  but 
five  feet,  though  for  a  considerable  portion  of  the  distance 
a  new  channel  is  to  be  excavated.  It  would  seem  that  the 
construction  of  this  great  ship  canal,  with  a  depth  of  twenty- 

*  Proceedings  of  the  Board  of  Trustees  of  the  Sanitary  District  of  Chicago, 
January  26,  1910,  p.  78. 

'  Report  of  a  Special  Board  of  Engineers  on  a  Fourteen-Foot  Waterway 
from  Chicago  to  the  Mississippi  River. 


THE  LAKES-TO-GULF  SHIP  CANAL      827 

four  feet,  would  be  at  the  very  least  three  times  as  costly 
an  undertaking  as  the  enlargement  of  the  Erie. 

Another  method  of  estimating  the  probable  cost  of  the 
undertaking  is  by  comparison  with  other  ship  canals.  A 
statement  of  the  dimensions  and  cost  of  the  principal  deep- 
water  canals  of  the  world  is  presented  below:  — 


Len^h 

(miles) 

Depth 
(feet) 

Cost 
(8000,000) 

Per  mile 

(5000) 

Kiel  Canal  * 

Suez  Canal  f 

Manchester  Sliip  Canal  $  . 
Forth  and  Clyde  Ship  Ca- 
nal (estimated)  §  .     .     . 
Panama  Canal  (estimated) 

53 
100 
35.5 

35 

49 

29 

26 
28 

30 
41 

39 

m 

74 

100 
375 

735 

800 
2,100 

2,850 
9,100 

*  Weltausstelhmg,  Briissel,  1910,  p.  170.  t  Encyclopedia  Americana. 

t  See  pp.  147-48.  §  See  p.  165. 

D  Preliminary  Report  of  National  Waterways  Commission,  p.  41. 


These  statistics  show  the  cost  of  the  leading  canals  of 
the  world,  excluding  the  Panama,  to  have  varied  between 
$735,000  and  $2,850,000  per  mile  for  depths  of  from  twenty- 
six  to  thirty  feet.  Since  engineering  conditions  vary 
greatly  from  place  to  place,  more  than  a  roughly  approxi- 
mate estimate  cannot  safely  be  made  on  the  basis  of  these 
figures.  While  the  science  of  engineering  has  greatly  im- 
proved in  recent  years,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that 
the  cost  of  labor  and  materials  is  to-day  higher  than  ever 
before,  and  in  America  higher  than  elsewhere,  and  that 
American  public  works  are  notorious  for  the  lack  of  eco- 
nomy in  construction.  It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  a 
canal  from  Chicago  to  the  Mississippi  would  cost  at  least 
as  much,  according  to  capacity,  as  any  of  those  enumer- 
ated above.  The  average  cost  shown  in  the  above  table 
is  about  $1,600,000  per  mile.  At  that  rate  a  canal  of 
like  size  through  Illinois  would  cost  over  $500,000,000. 
One  twenty-four  feet  in  depth  would  doubtless  cost, 
then,  at  the  very  least,  $300,000,000.    Such  seems  to  be 


328        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

the  verdict  of  all  the  collateral  evidence  that  is  to  be 
found.  ^ 

To  construct  the  second  portion  of  the  route,  from  the 
mouth  of  the  Illinois  River  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  would 
be  no  less  an  undertaking  than  that  which  has  just  been 
considered.  As  it  is  not  generally  understood  how  difficult 
is  the  task  of  subjecting  the  Mississippi  River  to  control,  a 
brief  statement  of  the  engineering  problems  is  here  pre- 
sented. 

The  engineering  investigations  that  have  thus  far  been 
made  have  had  in  mind  the  feasibility  of  a  channel  four- 
teen, or  eight  to  nine  feet  in  depth.  Consequently,  there 
are  as  yet  no  data  bearing  directly  upon  the  question  of 
a  waterway  twenty-four  feet  deep,  and  as  before,  we  must 
be  content  with  indirect  evidence. 

A  Special  Board  of  Engineers,  under  the  direction  of  the 
War  Department,  submitted  a  report  in  1909  on  the  cost 
of  providing  a  channel  in  the  Mississippi  from  St.  Louis  to 

*  Tentative  estimates  have  been  made  by  engineers  in  the  employment 
of  the  Lakes-to-GuIf  Waterway  Association  which  show  a  cost  consider- 
ably less  than  this  amount  for  a  depth  of  twenty-four  feet.  These  esti- 
mates must,  however,  be  taken  with  a  grain  of  salt,  because  these  engineers 
know  that,  in  order  to  secure  appropriations  from  the  National  Govern- 
ment, the  coat  of  the  project  must  be  made  to  appear  not  excessive.  They 
are  willing  to  take  chances  on  securing  additional  appropriations  for  the 
completion  of  the  work.  In  case  they  do  not  succeed  in  getting  the  extra 
amounts,  they  will  nevertheless  have  had  many  millions  to  spend  and 
years  of  work  to  do.  A  bird  in  the  hand  is  worth  having. 

Attention  should  also  be  called  to  the  fact  that  the  cost  of  undertakings 
of  this  kind  almost  invariably  greatly  exceeds  the  original  estimates,  how- 
ever unbiased  they  may  be.  It  was  at  first  estimated  that  the  Drainage 
Canal  could  be  constructed  for  $16,000,000  {Journal  of  Political  Eco- 
nomy, May,  1910,  p.  582),  but,  as  seen  above,  it  required  more  than  three 
times  that  amount  to  complete  the  work.  It  was  thought  that  the  Pan- 
ama Canal  could  be  built  for  $140,000,000;  the  present  estimate  of  the 
engineers  is  $375,000,000  (ibid.).  The  estimates  for  the  Suez  Canal 
began  at  $30,000,000,  but  $80,000,000  was  required  to  complete  the 
project  {Encyclopoedia  Americana,  vol.  xv).  The  Manchester  Ship 
Canal  cost  nearly  twice  the  amount  of  the  exceedingly  careful  prelimin- 
ary engineering  estimates  (see  page  149). 


THE  LAKES-TO-GULF  SHIP  CANAL      3:29 

the  Gulf,  with  a  depth  of  fourteen  feet  throughout  the  year. 
Seven  different  means  of  securing  the  end  in  view  were 
considered:  Dredging,  regularization,  canalization  with 
movable  dams,  canalization  with  fixed  dams,  lateral  canals, 
reservoirs,  and  a  combination  of  methods.  It  is  unneces- 
sary to  discuss  all  of  these  methods  at  this  time  or  to  con- 
sider any  of  them  in  great  detail.  The  Board  recommended 
a  combination  method,  namely,  the  completion  of  a  regu- 
larization project,  which  had  been  proposed  in  1881  to 
secure  a  permanent  controlling  depth  of  eight  feet  between 
St.  Louis  and  Cairo,  and  then  to  rely  upon  perennial  dredg- 
ing to  secure  and  maintain  the  further  increase  in  depth. 
Two  other  methods  have,  however,  received  so  much  atten- 
tion in  recent  discussions  that  a  few  words  should  be  said 
of  them  here.  The  one  calls  for  regularization  works 
which  would  confine  the  river  to  a  narrow  channel  of  the 
desired  depth.  The  other  is  by  means  of  impounding 
reservoirs  in  the  upper  valleys,  which  would  hold  back  the 
water  in  time  of  flood  and  increase  the  flow  in  time  of  low 
water,  thereby  insuring  navigability  throughout  the  year. 
As  to  the  first  of  these  two  methods,  engineers  are  in 
disagreement.  It  is  contended  by  one  party  that  if  the 
river  were  confined  to  its  own  natural  bed  by  means  of  em- 
bankments, the  more  concentrated  and  rapid  flow  of  the 
water  would  cause  a  permanent  scouring  which  would  ren- 
der dredging  unnecessary,  and  perhaps  eventually  make  it 
possible  to  dispense  with  the  levees  themselves.^  On  the 
other  hand,  the  conclusion  of  the  Special  Board  of  Engi- 
neers is  that,  while  revetments  might  be  feasible  for  a 
depth  of  eight  feet  between  St.  Louis  and  Cairo,  and  ten 
feet  below  Cairo,  they  are  impracticable  for  a  channel  with 
a  depth  of  fourteen  feet.  For  the  shallower  depths  revet- 
ment would  involve  no  serious  change  in  the  regimen  of  the 
river.  It  would  be  allowed  to  follow  the  sinuous  course 
to  which  it  naturally  tends,  with  deep  pools  in  the  bends, 
»  World's  Work,  May.  1910,  p.  12,899. 


330        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

and  sandbars  between,  which  rise  and  fall  with  variations 
in  gauge  height.^  In  the  case  of  a  channel  fourteen  feet 
deep,  however,  conditions  are  changed.  The  Board  states 
that  "great  care  would  have  to  be  exercised  in  making  so 
great  a  contraction  as  would  be  necessary  to  confine  the 
river  to  a  fourteen-foot  channel.  As  a  river  is  reduced  in 
width  and  increased  in  depth,  a  much  smaller  proportion 
of  the  discharge  comes  in  contact  with  the  river  bed,  and 
the  velocity  of  the  river  current  rapidly  increases.  A  con- 
dition soon  obtains  where,  instead  of  the  bar  being  alter- 
nately scoured  out  and  filled  up  as  the  river  discharge  de- 
creases and  increases,  there  is  a  constant  scour.  The  dam 
which  nature  has  placed  between  the  pools  is  then  de- 
stroyed. The  material  which  formed  this  dam  is  washed 
into  the  lower  pool,  tending  to  raise  it,  while  the  upper  pool 
tends  to  fall  to  the  same  level.  If  those  dams  between  pools 
were  destroyed  for  long  distances,  as  between  St.  Louis  and 
Cairo,  a  very  serious  change  in  the  regimen  of  the  river 
would  result.  Its  slope  w^ould  be  diminished,  immense 
quantities  of  material  would  be  washed  down  into  the 
lower  river,  adding  enormously  to  its  bars,  filling  up  its 
pools,  raising  its  flood  levels,  and  making  necessary  expens- 
ive additions  to  its  levee  system;  and  falls  or  rapids  might 
be  created  at  the  Chain  of  Rocks  above  St.  Louis,  which 
would  be  destructive  to  the  navigation  of  this  portion  of 
the  river."  ^  It  would  seem  that  whatever  truth  there  may 
be  in  this  contention  would  be  increased  rather  than  dimin- 
ished in  the  case  of  a  waterway  twenty -four  feet  deep. 

The  reservoir  scheme  of  control  was  proposed  by  Mr. 
M.  O.  Leighton,  Chief  Hydrographer  of  the  United  States 
Geological  Survey,  and  the  full  details  of  the  plan  are 
printed  in  the  "Preliminary  Report  of  the  Inland  Water- 
ways Commission."  Mr.  Leighton's  scheme  is  for  the  con- 

1  Report   by  a  Special  Board  of  Engineers  on  Survey  of  Mississippi 
River,  1909,  p.  14. 
*  Ibid. 


THE  LAKES-TO-GULF  SHIP  CANAL      331 

trol  of  the  Ohio  River,  and  consequently  his  cost  compu- 
tations are  not  applicable  to  the  present  study.  The  Spe- 
cial Board  of  Engineers,  however,  has  made  some  investi- 
gations of  the  approximate  cost  of  reservoirs  adequate  to 
hold  back  the  waters  of  the  Mississippi.  The  Board  esti- 
mates that  it  would  cost  approximately  $400  per  million 
cubic  feet  of  water  restrained.^  Now, since  "the  maximum 
reservoir  facilities  of  the  river,  including  10,000  cubic  feet 
per  second  that  may  come  through  the  Chicago  Sanitary 
Canal  and  the  Illinois  River,  amounts  to  about  69,500 
cubic  feet  per  second  for  ninety  days,  equal  to  a  total  stor- 
age of  about  540,000,000,000  cubic  feet,"^  the  total  cost 
would  approximate  $216,000,000.  This  is  nearly  twice  the 
cost  of  the  regularization  and  dredging  method  favored  by 
the  Board.  It  is  very  important  to  learn,  moreover,  that 
the  540  billion  cubic  feet  of  total  storage  which  is  possible 
would  be  sufficient  to  maintain  throughout  the  year  be- 
tween St.  Louis  and  Cairo  a  depth  of  only  eight  feet,  and 
that,  to  secure  a  depth  of  fourteen  feet,  more  than  5000 
billion  cubic  feet  of  annual  storage  would  be  required,  or 
about  ten  times  the  amount  that  is  available.^  The  reser- 
voir scheme  is,  then,  clearly  impracticable,  at  least  so  far  as 
the  Mississippi  River  is  concerned.^ 

*  Report  of  Special  Board,  supra,  p.  18.  *  Ibid.  '  Ibid. 

*  Grave  doubt  has  been  cast  upon  the  feasibility  of  the  reservoir  scheme 
which  Mr.  Leighton  proposes  for  the  Ohio  River.  The  project  has  been 
attacked  by  various  army  engineers  as  visionary  in  the  extreme.  It  is 
pointed  out  that  the  surface  covered  by  the  reservoirs  would  be  hundredl 
of  square  miles  in  extent,  that  much  valuable  land  now  occupied  bj'  thou 
sands  of  people  would  have  to  be  condemned  and  permanently  submerged. 
It  is  held  that  the  reservoirs  would  rapidly  611  up  with  sediment  and  be- 
come useless;  and  6nally  it  is  contended  that  the  great  pressure  of  the 
enormous  quantity  of  water  that  it  would  be  necessary  to  hold  back 
would  subject  the  impounding  walls  to  the  constant  danger  of  breaking. 
The  bursting  of  a  dam  far  up  in  a  system  of  dams  would  let  loose  such  a 
volume  of  water  as  to  sweep  away  all  the  dams  below  and  carry  death 
and  destruction  in  its  path. 

The  issue  of  the  debate  that  has  waged  over  the  scheme  is  not  decisive, 
but  it  appears  that  Mr.  Leighton  had  undoubtedly  greatly  underestimated 


332        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

The  Board  of  Engineers  favor,  as  has  been  said,  a 
combination  method  of  control,  by  means  of  regulation 
works  and  dredging.  They  estimate  that  the  cost  of  pro- 
viding by  this  method  a  channel  fourteen  feet  deep  from 
Chicago  to  the  Gulf  would  be  approximately  $158,697,462.  ^ 
These  estimates  do  not  include  the  cost  of  the  necessary 
improvements  between  St.  Louis  and  the  mouth  of  the 
Illinois  River  at  Grafton,  a  distance  of  thirty-seven  miles. 
Now  it  is  obviously  impossible  to  say  precisely  how  much 
more  a  twenty -four  foot  channel  would  cost  than  one  only 
fourteen  feet  in  depth.  Some  idea  of  the  probable  cost  of 
the  larger  undertaking  may  be  gained,  however,  by  a  con- 
sideration of  the  character  of  the  river. 

In  the  year  1908,  between  Cairo  and  the  mouth  of  the 
Red  River,  there  were  as  many  as  eighty -eight  places  that 
would  have  required  dredging  in  order  to  maintain  a  depth 
of  fourteen  feet.^  Above  Cairo  there  was  an  even  greater 

the  cost  of  the  reservoirs,  and  at  the  same  time  greatly  overestimated 
the  profits  to  be  derived  from  the  sale  of  water  power.  Some  of  the 
army  engineers  contend  that  the  reservoirs  would  cost  $500,000,000, 
while  Mr.  Leighton's  estimate  is  only  $125,000,000.  It  is  admitted  by 
Mr.  Leighton  that  the  reservoirs  in  themselves  would  not  be  sufficient 
to  insure  a  depth  of  nine  feet  in  all  parts  of  the  Ohio  River;  that  canali- 
zation would  still  be  necessary  in  the  worst  parts  of  the  stream.  (For 
the  engineering  debate  on  Mr.  Leighton's  project  see  Engineering  News 
for  the  following  dates:  May  7,  June  11  and  24,  October  8,  and  Novem- 
ber 4  and  5,  1908.) 

Out  of  this  engineering  debate  rose  another  discussion  which  is  unusually 
interesting  to  the  layman,  and  closely  related  to  the  question  of  river 
regulation  by  whatever  means.  Colonel  Hiram  M.  Chittenden,  of  the 
Corps  of  Army  Engineers,  has  attacked  the  plan  of  reforestation  as  a 
means  of  preventing  destructive  floods.  A  general  discussion  has  ensued, 
in  which  expert  opinion  seems  fairly  evenly  divided.  One  faction  con- 
tends that  floods  are  no  more  destructive  now  than  formerly,  and  no 
worse  in  forested  than  in  deforested  lands.  The  opposition  holds  exactly 
the  reverse.  Neither  side  is  lacking  either  in  theory  or  in  historical  data 
in  support  of  its  contention.  What  the  verdict  will  be  we  do  not  wish  to 
predict.  (For  a  brief  account  of  the  discussion  see  Quick,  American  Inland 
Waterways,  pp.  195-211.) 

^  Report  by  Special  Board,  supra,  p.  5.  '  Ibid.,  p.  13. 


THE  LAKES-TO-GULF  SHIP  CANAL      333 

number  of  shallow  places  in  proportion  to  the  distance. 
Obviously  for  a  channel  twenty -four  feet  in  depth  a  vastly 
greater  amount  of  dredging  would  be  required,  and  at  the 
same  time  it  would  become  increasingly  difficult.  The 
Board  states  that  while  the  character  of  the  material 
requiring  removal  for  a  fourteen-foot  channel  "is  mainly 
soft,  easily  handled  material  such  as  mud  and  sand,  with 
occasional  clay,  gravel,  boulders,  and  logs,  the  dredging 
at  greater  depths  would  likely  encounter  a  greater  pro- 
portion of  more  solidly  bedded  material,  through  reach- 
ing deposits  longer  undisturbed."^  At  one  place,  below 
Thebes,  Illinois,  bedrock  has  been  disclosed  at  a  depth  of 
only  seventeen  feet.^ 

The  unruly  character  of  the  Mississippi,  and  the  very 
great  difficulties  in  the  way  of  controlling  its  flow,  are  not 
commonly  appreciated.  In  the  first  place,  the  width  of  the 
river  at  low  water  varies  greatly  from  place  to  place.  Be- 
tween St.  Louis  and  Cairo  there  are  variations  of  from  650 
to  4900  feet,  and  below  Cairo  from  1000  to  7500  feet.^ 

In  the  second  place,  the  destructiveness  of  floods  on  the 
Mississippi  are  hardly  paralleled  anywhere  else.  The  vast 
extent  of  territory  from  which  the  river  draws  its  water 
supply  gives  rise  in  time  of  hea\'y  rains  to  an  enormous 
discharge  of  water  into  the  main  channel  of  the  stream. 
Again  the  sudden  melting  of  the  accumulated  snows  of 
winter  produces  annual  floods  which  are  well-nigh  un- 
controllable. 

In  the  third  place,  the  character  of  the  river  bed  is  very 
unfavorable  to  navigation.  "The  Mississippi  River  from 
St.  Louis  to  the  Gulf  is  typically  a  river  with  an  unstable 
bed,  —  that  is,  one  of  caving  banks  and  shifting  bottoms. 
No  river  in  the  world  under  improvement  for  purposes  of 
navigation  equals  it  in  the  magnitude  of  its  bed  disturb- 
ances."* "The  extent  and  variety  of  caving  banks  on  the 

*  Report  by  Special  Board,  swpra,  p.  124.  *  Ihid.,  p.  10. 

»  Ibid.,  p.  33.  «  Ibid.,  p.  40. 


334        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

Mississippi  are  not  realized,  as  a  rule,  even  by  members  of 
the  engineering  profession,  unless  they  have  had  the  op- 
portunity of  inspecting  the  river  during  all  of  its  stages."^ 
The  caving  of  the  banks  is  due  to  erosion.  "  In  aggravated 
cases  within  the  past  twenty-five  years  erosion  has  been 
known  to  cut  the  bank  back  at  one  place  a  distance  of  500 
feet  in  three  months,  at  another  800  feet  in  a  single  year, 
and  1.5  miles  in  sixteen  years  at  a  third  place."  ^  Between 
1884  and  1906  the  Commerce  "cut-off"  and  the  Bordeau 
Chute  "  cut-off '  caused  the  destruction  of  over  600,000,000 
cubic  yards  of  earth. ^  This  is  six  times  the  volume  of  the 
excavations  of  the  Panama  Canal. 

Equally  serious  with  the  eroding  banks  are  the  shifting 
bottoms.  Sandbars  are  formed  in  the  river,  for  the  most 
part  from  the  deposits  of  material  that  has  been  eroded 
from  the  banks.  These  bars,  as  a  rule,  extend  diagonally 
across  the  stream,  and  have  a  length  equal  to  two  or  three 
times  the  width  of  the  river.  "A  bar  once  formed  .  .  . 
moves  gradually  downstream,  its  upstream  material  being 
washed  down  by  the  current  and  redeposited  on  its  down- 
stream side,  its  height  diminishing  as  it  moves  along  and 
its  old  location  in  many  places  being  occupied  by  a  new  bar 
as  troublesome  as  itself  originally.  Such  traveling  bars, 
as  actually  found  in  the  lower  river  and  measured,  have 
shown  heights  as  great  as  22  feet,  distance  between  crests 
as  great  as  1000  feet,  and  daily  travel  downstream  as  great 
as  40  feet,  and  have  been  found  in  depths  of  water  as  great 
as  90  feet."^  "Between  St.  Louis  and  Cairo  the  amount 
of  material  rolling  along  the  bottom  is  so  great  that,  where 
the  bottom  is  scoured  out  at  one  stage  of  river  (even  if  to 
twenty  feet,  as  sometimes  near  Thebes  and  Grand  Tower), 
it  may  be  filled  up  again  regularly  at  the  next  opposing 
stage,  and  where  reaches  of  two  or  more  miles  in  length 
show  continuous  deep  pools  along  the  best  channel  in  one 

*  Report  by  Special  Board,  tupra,  p.  48.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  40. 

»  Ibid.,  p.  42.  *  Ibid.,  p.  44. 


THE  LAKES-TO-GULF  SHIP  CANAL      335 

year,  these  pools  may  be  found  converted  into  shoals,  and 
the  converse  after  an  interval  of  a  few  years. "^ 

These  facts  furnish  some  indication  of  the  enormity  of 
the  task  of  maintaining  deep-water  navigation  in  the  Mis- 
sissippi. To  control  the  river  in  a  manner  that  would  pre- 
vent the  yearly  floods  that  now  devastate  the  valley,  let 
alone  maintain  deep-water  navigation  throughout  the 
year,  is  said  by  engineers  to  be  a  greater  task  than  building 
the  Panama  Canal. '^  It  is  a  safe  statement  that  no  engi- 
neer would  contract  to  provide  a  channel  twenty -four  feet 
deep  in  the  Mississippi  River  between  St.  Louis  and  the 
Gulf  for  less  than  $500,000,000.  In  all  probability  it  would 
cost  far  more  than  that  amount. 

We  have  now  considered  two  portions  of  the  Lakes-to- 
Gulf  Waterway,  the  one  from  the  end  of  the  Chicago  Drain- 
age Canal  to  the  mouth  of  the  Illinois  River  at  Grafton, 
the  other  from  St.  Louis  to  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi 
River.  On  the  basis  of  such  data  as  is  available,  it  has  ap- 
peared that  the  former  portion  would  doubtless  cost  in  the 
neighborhood  of  $300,000,000,  and  the  latter  at  least  $500,- 
000,000.  To  complete  the  route  it  would  still  be  necessary 
to  deepen  the  portion  of  the  Mississippi  between  Grafton 
and  St.  Louis,  a  distance  of  thirty-seven  miles.  This  part 
of  the  river  has  at  present  a  low-water  depth  of  less  than 
eight  feet.  To  give  this  stretch  a  minimum  depth  of  twenty- 
four  feet  at  all  times  would  without  doubt  cost  many  mil- 
lions. In  order  to  be  extremely  conservative,  however,  we 
shall  omit  this  from  the  computation  and  consider  $800,- 
000,000  to  represent  approximately  the  total  cost  of  the 
entire  route. 

It  has  come  to  be  recognized  only  recently  that  ade- 
quate harbors  and  terminal  facilities  are  as  essential  to 
water  transportation  as  is  a  waterway  itself.  To  the  above 
costs,  which  are  for  the  waterway  alone,  it  will  therefore 

*  Report  by  Special  Board,  supra,  p.  44. 
»  World's  Work,  May,  1910,  p.  12,899. 


336        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

be  necessary  to  add  the  costs  of  providing  extensive  harbor 
facilities  along  the  route  and  of  bringing  railway  terminals 
into  harmonious  relation  with  the  waterway. 

Plans  for  a  Chicago  harbor  have  been  under  discussion 
for  some  time.  Now,  whatever  may  be  the  merits  of  an 
outer  harbor  on  the  Lake  front  as  compared  with  an  in- 
crease of  shipping  facilities  along  the  Calumet,  or  Chicago 
River,  or  the  Drainage  Canal,  when  the  end  in  view  is  to 
meet  the  needs  of  present  Lake  shipping  or  of  a  shallow- 
depth  waterway  to  the  Mississippi,  it  is  certain  that  if  great 
ocean  vessels,  in  sufficient  numbers  to  render  feasible  the 
construction  of  a  costly  ship  canal,  are  to  come  inland 
to  Chicago,  a  great  outer  harbor  is  an  absolute  essential. 
Some  idea  of  the  probable  cost  of  such  a  harbor  may  be 
gained  by  a  comparison  with  the  cost  of  harbors  elsewhere. 
Below  is  a  statement  of  expenditures  that  have  been  made 
on  important  harbors  of  the  world  in  recent  times  :^  — 

New  York  City  (1870-1907) $  89,292,109 

Glasgow  (1860  -  1909) 44,000,000 

Liverpool   (1859-1907) 150,000,000 

Newcastle-on-Tyne  (1860-1909) 85,000,000 

Hamburg  (1880-1909) 100,000,000 

San  Francisco  (improvements  recommended, 1909).    50,000,000 

The  cities  listed  above  have,  from  the  beginning,  at- 
tempted to  develop  their  harbor  facilities  with  a  view  to 
providing  an  economical  transfer  from  the  railways  to 
ocean-going  vessels.  The  railway  men  likewise  have  con- 
structed the  railroad  terminals  with  the  same  end  in  view. 
But,  on  the  contrary,  the  vast  net  of  railways  centring  in 
Chicago  has  not  been  laid  down  with  a  view  to  Chicago's 
becoming  a  port  for  ocean  vessels.  For  the  most  part  the 
railways  have  rather  attempted  to  cripple  shipping  on  the 
Lakes  by  refusing  to  facilitate  transshipment  to  Lake 
vessels.  It  is  by  no  means  certain  that  the  railways  can 
be  induced  to  act  in  conjunction  with  a  waterway  which 
*  Report  of  the  Chicago  Harbor  Commission,  1909,  pp.  25  and  26. 


THE  LAKES-TO-GULF  SHIP  CANAL      337 

has  been  constructed  primarily  for  purposes  of  competition 
with  them.  But  granting  the  possibility  that  they  may  be 
brought  into  harmonious  relation  with  the  waterway,  it  is 
evident  that  a  complete  reorganization  of  existing  railway 
lines  within  the  city,  and  a  reconstruction  of  practically 
the  entire  present  terminal  system,  would  require  the  ex- 
penditure of  an  enormous  amount  of  money.  It  seems  im- 
possible that  it  could  be  done  for  less  than  $100,000,000, 
while  it  is  more  than  likely  that  it  would  cost  twice  that 
amount.  At  any  rate,  it  is  beyond  question  that  to  build 
a  harbor  which  would  accommodate  ocean  vessels  and  to 
reconstruct  the  railway  terminals  of  Chicago  would  re- 
quire an  expenditure  of  at  least  $200,000,000. 

The  other  cities  along  the  route  would,  in  like  manner, 
be  obliged  to  provide  harbor  facilities  and  to  reconstruct 
existing  terminal  arrangements  to  meet  the  changed  con- 
ditions of  shipping.  It  is  unnecessary  to  attempt  to  esti- 
mate here  what  the  cost  in  the  various  important  river 
towns  would  be.  It  is  enough  that  we  recognize  that  such 
expenditures  should  not  be  overlooked,  and  that  they  are 
of  no  little  importance. 

It  appears  from  the  above  rough  estimates  that  it  is 
reasonable  to  believe  that  a  ship  canal,  twenty-four  feet 
deep  between  Chicago  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  could  not 
be  constructed  and  placed  in  harmonious  relationship  with 
the  railways  for  less  than  $1,000,000,000.  It  should  be 
added  that,  if  the  plan  of  building  first  a  fourteen-foot 
waterway,  to  be  enlarged  later  to  twenty -four  feet,  be  fol- 
lowed, the  total  cost  would  in  all  probability  prove  greatly 
in  excess  of  this  amount.  The  Board  of  Engineers  states 
that  "in  case  it  should  become  necessary  to  obtain  increased 
depth  (beyond  fourteen  feet),  canals,  dams,  and  complete 
regularization  works  would  have  to  be  modified  under  great 
difficulties  and  at  great  cost.  Canal  locks  would  have  to  be 
rebuilt  and  canal  trunks  deepened  and  partially  relocated. 
Movable  dam  wickets,  larger  than  any  yet  built,  would 


338        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

become  more  difficult  of  manipulation  and  their  opera- 
tion perhaps  impracticable,  and  the  substructure  would 
have  to  be  rebuilt.  Cross-sills  of  complete  regularization 
works  would  have  to  be  taken  out  and  rebuilt  at  lower 
levels  in  the  channel-way,  or  extensively  raised  outside  the 
channel- way .  In  each  case  the  difficulty  and  cost  of  securing 
the  increased  depth  would  of  course  be  much  greater  than 
if  the  extra  depth  were  obtained  at  the  time  of  first  con- 
struction."^ The  experience  of  the  German  Government 
in  enlarging  the  Kiel  Canal  affords  a  good  illustration  of 
the  cost  of  reconstructing  waterways.  The  original  cost  of 
the  canal,  for  a  depth  of  twenty-nine  feet  and  a  bottom 
width  of  seventy-two  feet,  was  $39,000,000.  To  enlarge  it 
to  a  depth  of  thirty-six  feet  and  a  bottom  width  of  one 
hundred  and  thirty -four  feet  is  to  cost  $55,750,000,  con- 
siderably more  than  the  entire  original  amount.^  If  we 
consider,  therefore,  that  a  twenty -four-foot  waterway  from 
Chicago  to  the  Gulf,  if  constructed  at  all,  will  doubtless  be 
built  on  a  step-at-a-time  plan,  the  conclusion  is  unavoid- 
able that  the  total  cost  would,  in  the  end,  greatly  exceed 
a  billion  dollars. 

3.  Having  estimated  the  probable  cost  of  a  Lakes-to- 
Gulf  ship  canal,  it  will  now  be  interesting  to  inquire  how 
large  a  traffic  would  be  necessary  in  order  to  yield  returns 
on  the  capital  investment.  For  this  purpose  we  shall 
assume  the  cost  to  be  an  even  billion  dollars. 

Were  the  Government  to  issue  bonds  to  the  extent  of 
a  billion  dollars  there  is  little  doubt  that  the  interest 
rates  thereon  would  be  at  least  three  per  cent.  At  that 
rate  the  annual  interest  charges  would  be  $30,000,000. 
This  amount,  plus  the  annual  maintenance  charges,  repre- 
sents the  minimum  total  savings  which  the  canal  would 
eventually  be  expected  to  effect  each  year  in  order  to 
prove  successful.  What  the  maintenance  costs  of  such  a 
*  Report  by  Special  Board,  supra,  p.  20.  *  See  page  222. 


THE  LAKES-TO-GULF  SHIP  CANAL      339 

waterway  would  be  cannot  be  stated  out  of  hand;  but  the 
Special  Board  of  Engineers,  above  referred  to,  has  esti- 
mated, on  the  basis  of  ten  years  of  practical  experience, 
that  the  annual  cost  of  dredging  a  fourteen-foot  channel 
between  St.  Louis  and  the  mouth  of  the  Red  River  would 
be  $4,100,000  a  year.^  For  the  entire  distance  of  1610  miles 
between  Chicago  and  the  Gulf  the  cost  of  dredging  in  a 
twenty -four  foot  channel  would  obviously  be  exceedingly 
heavy.  It  costs  about  $6000  per  mile  each  year  to  dredge 
the  Manchester  Ship  Canal  in  England. ^  At  an  equal 
rate  the  Lakes-to-Gulf  Waterway  would  require  nearly 
$10,000,000  a  year  for  dredging.  The  Manchester  Ship 
Canal  is  only  thirty-five  miles  in  length  and  is  fed  by 
two  or  three  small  rivers.  The  amount  of  sediment  that 
is  yearly  carried  into  the  Mississippi  River  from  its  thou- 
sands of  miles  of  tributaries  and  from  its  own  eroding 
banks  is  incomparably  greater.  Erosion  may  be  prevented 
by  revetments,  but  the  sediment  coming  down  from  the 
tributaries  must  always  be  reckoned  with. 

Dredging  is  only  one  of  the  sources  of  annual  expense, 
though  it  is  doubtless  the  heaviest  of  any.  Repair  of  locks, 
of  regulation  works,  and  of  general  equipment  are  sources 
of  perennial  outlay  that  cannot  be  escaped.  Without  at- 
tempting to  estimate  the  extent  of  these  expenditures  in 
particular,  it  may  safely  be  predicted  that  the  total  annual 
charges,  including  interest,  would  not  be  less  than  $50,000,- 
000.  We  may  now  inquire  into  the  amount  of  traffic  that 
would  be  necessary  in  order  to  effect  so  great  savings. 
Since  this  obviously  depends  on  the  extent  of  reductions 
in  freight  rates  that  could  be  made,  it  will  be  necessary'  to 
take  up  first  the  question  of  rate  reduction. 

The  distance  from  Chicago  to  the  Gulf  over  the  proposed 
route  is  1610  miles.  We  may  call  the  round  trip  approxi- 
mately 3200  miles.  Assuming  the  average  capacity  of  the 
vessels  entering  to  be  10,000  tons  (a  high  average),  the 
^  Report  by  Special  Board,  supra,  p.  13.  *  See  page  153. 


340        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

number  of  ton-miles  of  traffic  handled  in  a  round  trip 
would  be  32,000,000.  Now,  it  is  difficult  to  compute 
accurately  what  the  possible  savings  per  ton-mile  might 
be,  but  the  approximate  amount  may  nevertheless  be 
estimated.  The  average  rate  per  ton  per  mile  on  all  the 
railways  of  the  country  in  1909  was  7.63  mills.  As  was 
stated  in  an  earlier  chapter  this  figure  was  derived  by 
averaging  the  ton-mile  rates  on  all  classes  of  freight, 
traveling  under  all  manner  of  conditions.  It  averages 
rates,  which  are  low  on  account  of  a  long  haul,  water 
competition,  or  low  value  of  the  freight,  with  those  which 
are  high  for  opposite  reasons.  Now,  it  is  certain  that  the 
average  railway  rates  from  the  Central  West  to  the  Gulf 
are  much  lower  than  the  average  for  the  entire  country. 
They  have  at  all  times  been  subject  to  the  potential  if  not 
actual  competition  of  the  Mississippi  River;  and  at  the 
same  time  the  railways  leading  to  the  south  have  been 
forced  to  meet  the  competition  of  the  roads  leading  to  the 
Atlantic  seaboard.  As  is  well  known,  these  east-and-west 
lines  have  in  turn  been  forced  to  give  low  rates  on  account 
of  the  water  competition  in  that  direction,  as  well  as  the 
competition  with  each  other.  It  is  probable,  therefore, 
that  the  average  level  of  rates  to  be  affected  by  the  ship 
canal  is  not  over  four  mills  per  ton-mile.  The  average  rate 
on  the  Illinois  Central  is  5.96  mills;  and  on  the  Wabash 
it  is  5.73,  while  the  average  cost  is  set  down  at  4.31.* 
Since  it  is  the  vast  number  of  very  high  rates  charged 
for  short  hauls  under  non-competitive  conditions  that 
raises  the  general  level  of  rates  to  nearly  eight  mills  per 
ton-mile,  it  would  seem  that  the  through  rates  on  the 
Illinois  Central  and  Wabash  could  hardly  average  more 
than  four  mills  per  ton-mile.  It  is  necessary  to  ascertain, 
in  the  next  place,  for  how  much  less  than  this  amount 
10,000-ton  vessels  could  carrv'  the  traffic. 
We  shall  assume  the  canal  to  be  supported  at  public 
»  Annual  Report.  1910,  p.  29. 


THE  LAKES-TO-GULF  SHIP  CANAL      341 

expense,  and  to  be  entirely  free  of  dues.  Only  the  haulage 
charge  is  to  be  considered.  The  Great  Lakes  furnish  us  a 
basis  for  estimates.  In  1907  the  average  freight  rate  per 
ton  per  mile  was  .8  mill.  In  considering  this  low  rate  it 
should  be  borne  in  mind  that  much  the  largest  portion  of 
the  tonnage  was  of  the  lowest  class  of  freight,  —  raw  iron 
brought  down  from  Lake  Superior  to  South  Chicago  or  to 
ports  on  Lake  Erie,  and  coal  on  the  return  trip  to  the  Upper 
Lakes.  It  should  be  considered,  also,  that  the  Lake  lines 
which  handle  this  traffic  are  the  property  of  the  United 
States  Steel  Corporation,  and  hence  that  there  is  no  at- 
tempt to  make  a  profit  on  the  transport  of  the  ore.  The 
coal  for  the  return  voyage,  moreover,  can  be  profitably 
hauled  at  exceptionally  low  rates,  on  the  principle  that 
something  is  better  than  nothing.  In  the  absence  of  this 
traffic  the  ore  boats  would  have  to  make  the  return  trip 
empty. 

Now,  the  character  of  the  traffic  that  would  be  shipped 
to  and  from  Chicago  over  the  ship  canal  would  not  be 
so  distinctly  low-grade.  Coal  and  ore  is  not  exported 
to  foreign  countries.  A  very  considerable  portion  of  the 
traffic  would  be  of  manufactured  goods,  which  always  are 
expected  to  pay  higher  transport  rates  than  raw  materials. 
Again,  it  is  not  to  be  expected  that  the  vessels  on  the  ship 
canal  would  be  extensively  owned  by  companies  which 
were  using  them  to  transport  their  own  produce,  as  in  the 
case  of  the  ore  boats  on  the  Lakes.  The  owners  of  the 
ocean  vessels  would  expect  a  profit  on  their  carrying  busi- 
ness, and  since  the  cost  per  ton  of  carrj^ing  capacity  of 
ocean  vessels  is  much  greater  than  that  of  the  Lake  boats, 
this  means  in  itself  much  higher  rates  than  would  be 
necessary  in  order  to  earn  profits  on  the  Lake  vessels.  If 
it  be  further  considered  that  the  average  speed  that  can 
be  made  on  a  canal  or  river  is  not,  at  best,  more  than  one 
fifth  (movement  at  night  is  practically  impossible)  what 
can  be  attained  on  the  open  Lakes,  and  that  at  the  same 


342        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

time  the  risks  of  navigation,  and  hence  the  rates  of  marine 
insurance,  are  greatly  increased,^  it  is  apparent  that  the 
average  rate  per  ton-mile  on  the  deep  waterway  could  not 
possibly  be  less  than  two  mills  per  ton-mile,  while  it  might 
well  exceed  the  level  of  rail  rates. ^  Taking  it  at  two  mills 
per  ton-mile,  however,  the  saving  over  the  assumed  rail 
rates  would  be  two  mills  on  each  ton-mile. 

It  should  be  further  noted  that  since  the  distance  from 
Chicago  to  the  Gulf  by  water  is  much  greater  than  by  rail, 
the  ton-mile  rate  by  water  must  be  much  lower  than  by 
rail  if  the  cost  of  shipping  between  the  two  points  is  to  be 
the  same.  The  distance  by  water  from  Chicago  to  New 
Orleans  is  1610  miles,  as  against  930  miles  by  rail.  A  rate 
of  two  mills  per  ton-mile  by  water,  therefore,  is  equivalent 
to  more  than  3.5  mills  per  ton-mile  by  rail.  In  the  present 
computation,  however,  we  shall  overlook  this  consideration 
and  assume  the  saving  by  the  water  route  to  be  two  mills 
per  ton-mile. 

At  an  average  saving  of  two  mills  per  ton-mile,  25,000,- 
000,000  ton-miles  of  traffic  would  be  required  to  efifect  a 
saving  of  $50,000,000  a  year.  At  32,000,000  ton-miles  per 
round  trip,  as  estimated  above,  it  would  require  about 
780  vessels,  of  10,000  tons'  capacity  each,  to  handle  the 
necessary  tonnage.  Making  allowance  for  the  closing  of 
navigation  on  account  of  ice  during  the  winter  months 
and  on  account  of  floods  at  other  times,  the  waterway 
would  not  be  open  for  much  over  250  days  each  year.  This 
means  that  an  average  of  about  three  ships  would  have  to 
enter  and  three  clear  at  the  port  of  Chicago  each  day. 
As  will  be  shown  in  a  later  paragraph,  it  would  require 
about  45  days  for  a  vessel  to  make  the  round  trip  from  the 
Gulf  to  Chicago.  This  being  true,  it  is  apparent  that  about 

*  These  points  will  be  treated  more  fully  in  following  pages. 

*  It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  cheapest  method  of  handling 
water  traflBc  is  in  barges.  The  cost  of  a  steam  vessel  is  so  much  greater 
than  that  of  a  long  flat  barge  that  rates  must  be  very  much  higher  in  order 
to  cover  capital  charges. 


THE  LAKES-TO-GULF  SHIP  CANAL      343 

135  ships  would  have  to  be  on  the  waterway  at  all  times; 
this  means  that  the  ships  would  have  to  be  only  about 
twenty-four  miles  apart  in  each  direction;  it  means  one 
ship  for  about  every  twelve  miles  of  waterway. 

To  look  at  this  matter  in  another  way,  it  may  be  stated 
that  the  total  tonnage  of  the  780  vessels  entering  and 
clearing  at  Chicago  would  be  7,800,000.  Now,  in  the  year 
1909  the  tonnage  of  vessels  entering  and  clearing  at  our 
greatest  American  seaports  was  as  follows :  — 

New  York 24,395,136  tons 

Boston 4,833,828 

Philadelphia 4,500,011 

New  Orleans 4,186,670 

Baltimore 2,459,565 

San  Francisco 1,774,533 

This  table  indicates  that  the  tonnage  at  Chicago,  on  the 
basis  of  the  above  estimate,  would  have  to  be  nearly  twice 
that  of  any  of  our  great  seaports  except  New  York.  It 
should  be  recalled  here  that  the  savings  on  this  7,800,000 
tons  of  traflSc  would  merely  meet  the  annual  outlay  on 
account  of  the  ship  canal.  To  effect  the  enormous  savings 
to  the  nation  that  are  promised  by  the  advocates  of  the 
project,  it  is  evident  that  a  much  greater  tonnage  would  be 
required. 

4.  Having  estimated  the  probable  cost  of  a  ship  canal 
from  the  Great  Lakes  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the  amount 
of  traffic  that  would  be  required  to  make  the  project 
feasible,  it  remains  to  inquire  as  to  the  probability  of  ocean 
vessels  making  extensive  use  of  such  a  waterway.  Is  there 
assurance  that  if  the  route  were  open  ships  from  all  the 
world  would  choose  to  come  sixteen  hundred  miles  inland 
to  discharge  and  receive  their  cargoes  at  Chicago? 

It  is  a  well-known  fact  that  the  old  so-called  "tramp" 
steamers  are  rapidly  disappearing  from  the  ocean.  The 
*  Statistical  Abstract  of  the  United  States,  1909,  pp.  309-10. 


344        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

size  of  the  tramps  that  remain,  moreover,  is  rapidly  in- 
creasing. According  to  Lloyd's  "Register  of  British  Ship- 
ping" there  were  in  1893-94  only  87  British  steamers  with 
a  capacity  as  large  as  5000  tons  or  more,  while  in  1908-09 
the  number  had  increased  to  599.  During  the  same  years 
the  number  of  vessels  with  a  capacity  of  between  2000  and 
3000  tons  decreased  from  1277  to  1013.^  A  large  Phila- 
delphia shipping  firm  reports  that  twenty  years  ago  it 
possessed  thirty  or  forty  vessels  with  a  capacity  of  from 
1800  to  2000  tons,  but  that  to-day  it  has  only  twelve  or 
fifteen  with  a  capacity  as  low  as  4500  to  6000  tons.^  "A 
memorandum  supplied  by  the  Savannah  Chamber  of 
Commerce  in  November,  1909,  states  that  the  increase 
in  the  size  of  ships  at  that  port,  owing  to  the  increase  of  the 
depth  of  the  channel  to  twenty -two  feet  at  low  water,  has 
been  forty  per  cent  in  the  last  ten  years,  and  that  during 
the  same  period  marine  insurance  has  fallen  twenty-five 
per  cent,  and  freight  rates  thirty-seven  per  cent."^  The 
deepening  of  the  harbor  of  Boston  has  in  the  last  fifteen  or 
twenty  years  lowered  the  freight  rates  from  that  port  by 
about  fifty  per  cent.^ 

The  larger  and  more  strongly  constructed  vessels  are 
much  less  subject  to  damage  at  sea.  "A  light-draft  steamer 
in  rough  water  is  thrown  about  by  every  wave;  her  way  is 
deadened  by  pitching  into  a  heavy  sea  and  her  engines  are 
always  in  danger  of  breaking  down,  owing  to  the  racing 
of  the  propeller  as  the  stern  rises  out  of  the  water.  .  .  . 
Both  the  small  ship  and  her  cargo  are  liable  to  serious 
damage  by  heavy  rolling."^  It  is  clear,  therefore,  why  the 
rates  of  marine  insurance  should  be  materially  higher  on 
small  vessels  than  on  those  of  sufficient  size  to  weather  with 
reasonable  safety  the  heavy  seas  to  which  they  are  subjected. 

*  PreliminaTy  Report  of  National  Waterways  Commission,  p.  40. 

*  Report  of  Commissioner  of  Corporations  on  Transportation  by  Water, 
part  I,  p.  138. 

'  Preliminary  Report,  supra,  p.  40.  *  Ibid.  ^  Ibid. 


THE  LAKES-TO-GULF  SHIP  CANAL      345 

Again,  the  costs  of  operating  a  large  vessel  do  not  in- 
crease in  proportion  to  capacity.  "A  modern  ocean  carrier 
of  5000  tons'  displacement  requires  1000  indicated  horse 
power  to  drive  her  at  a  speed  of  ten  knots,  and  a  carrier 
of  the  same  type,  symmetrically  enlarged  to  10,000  tons' 
displacement,  requires  only  1587  horse  power  to  drive  her 
at  the  same  speed;  that  is,  the  cargo-carrj'ing  capacity  is 
doubled  at  the  same  speed  with  an  increase  of  a  little  more 
than  fifty  per  cent  for  fuel.  The  increased  expense  of  labor 
is  less  than  one  per  cent."^ 

In  the  light  of  these  considerations  it  is  easy  to  under- 
stand the  tendency  for  ocean  vessels  constantly  to  increase 
in  size  as  far  as  the  depth  of  water  in  the  harbors  will  per- 
mit. The  same  reasons  explain  also  why  harbors  the  world 
over  have  been  constantly  deepened  in  recent  years. 

At  present  a  ship  canal  twenty-four  feet  in  depth  from 
Chicago  to  the  Gulf  would  be  large  enough  to  accommo- 
date many  of  the  vessels  still  traveling  the  ocean.  But  the 
draft  of  the  larger  freighters  is  now  around  twenty-eight 
feet,  and  for  these  such  a  canal  would  obviously  be  too 
small.  In  another  twenty  years,  judging  from  the  ten- 
dency shown  by  the  above  statistics,  a  depth  of  more 
than  twenty -four  feet  will  have  become  the  rule.  It  would 
take  twenty  years  to  construct  the  waterway,  at  the  end 
of  which  time  it  would  be  practically  out  of  date. 

Turning  now  to  another  consideration,  we  find  that  the 
cost  of  ocean  vessels  per  ton  of  carrying  capacity  is  much 
greater  than  those  plying  on  inland  waters.  For  the  steam 
vessels  engaged  in  the  coastwise  trade  along  the  Atlantic 
and  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  the  average  value  per  ton  of 
carrying  capacity  is  $133,  while  on  the  Great  Lakes  and  on 
the  St.  Lawrence  River  it  is  but  $61,  less  than  half  as  much.^ 
The  obvious  reason  for  this  is  that  on  the  ocean  a  vessel 
is  subjected  to  a  severer  strain  and  hence  must  be  more 
strongly  built.  It  will  be  seen  presently  that  this  consider- 
*  Preliminary  Report,  supra,  p.  40.  '  Ibid. 


346        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

ation  has  a  very  important  bearing  on  the  question  of  the 
probability  of  an  ocean  vessel's  navigating  a  ship  canal  for 
hundreds  of  miles  inland. 

Since  ocean-going  vessels  are  very  expensive  in  first  cost 
and  in  daily  operation  as  well,  they  must  be  put  to  the 
fullest  utilization  possible  if  they  are  to  prove  remunerat- 
ive. It  is  well  known  that  steamers  are,  as  a  rule,  run  on 
a  narrow  margin  of  profit,  and  that  a  few  days'  delay  often 
serves  to  eat  up  the  profits  of  an  entire  voyage.  It  will  be 
necessary  to  inquire,  therefore,  how  much  time  would  be 
required  by  a  vessel  to  make  the  trip  from  New  Orleans  to 
Chicago  and  return. 

An  ocean  vessel  cannot  possibly  make  a  speed  of  more 
than  five  miles  an  hour  in  a  canal.  Indeed,  in  a  crooked 
canal,  with  locks  to  pass,  and  where  the  traflBc  in  both  direc- 
tions is  heavy,  the  average  speed  would  probably  be  much 
less  than  this  amount.  Night  traffic,  furthermore,  would 
be  out  of  the  question,  on  account  of  the  dangers  involved. 
In  Europe  traffic  on  inland  waterways  at  night  is  almost 
unknown,  except  on  the  Kiel  Canal,  and  there  it  is  ac- 
complished only  by  means  of  brilliant  electric  lights  on 
both  sides  of  the  canal.  The  naval  importance  of  this 
canal  is  all  that  leads  to  this  practice.  Fourteen  hours  a 
day,  therefore,  must  be  regarded  as  the  maximum  number 
that  could  be  utilized  on  the  Lakes-to-Gulf  Waterway. 
A  ship  could,  therefore,  cover  a  distance  of  about  seventy 
miles  a  day.  At  this  rate  about  forty-five  days  would  be 
required  to  make  the  entire  round  trip  of  thirty-two  hun- 
dred miles.  In  that  period  of  time  a  vessel  could  easily 
make  a  trip  from  an  Atlantic  port  to  Europe  and  return. 

In  addition  to  losses  on  account  of  time  consumed  in 
the  slow  passage  through  the  waters  of  a  ship  canal,  vessel 
owners  would  have  to  reckon  with  an  increase  in  insurance 
rates,  on  account  of  the  great  dangers  involved  in  navigat- 
ing inland  channels. 

In  the  first  place,  there  is  an  ever-present  danger  that  a 


THE  LAKES-TO-GULF  SHIP  CANAL      347 

vessel  may  go  aground.  "  If  the  draft  of  a  vessel  approaches 
very  near  to  the  limit  fixed  by  the  depth  of  the  channel, 
the  suction  is  so  great,  owing  to  the  little  water  between 
the  ship  and  the  bottom  of  the  canal,  that  the  vessel  will 
obey  the  helm  very  sluggishly,  even  if  there  is  neither  wind 
nor  current,  and  an  instant  off  the  course  in  a  narrow  chan- 
nel will  put  the  vessel  aground."^  Ships  have  grounded  a 
number  of  times  in  the  Kiel  Canal,  which  has  a  depth  of 
twenty-nine  feet. 

Again,  there  is  a  possibility  that  a  vessel  may  become 
lodged  in  a  canal.  It  has  happened  on  the  Kiel  Canal  that 
a  ship  has  stuck  against  one  side  of  the  canal  and  swung 
around  at  right  angles,  thus  blocking  up  the  traflac  of  the 
entire  waterway. 

Similarly,  there  is  always  an  element  of  risk  in  the  pass- 
ing of  locks,  and  any  serious  mishap  may  prevent  traffic 
on  a  considerable  portion  of  the  entire  route. 

In  the  case  of  the  Mississippi  River,  in  particular, 
there  are  special  dangers  arising  from  the  character  of  the 
stream.  "In  the  present  state  of  the  art,  even  light-draft 
screw  steamers  cannot  be  used  to  advantage  at  any  con- 
siderable distance  above  New  Orleans.  .  .  .  The  need  for 
constant  backing  and  turning  at  the  innumerable  bends 
makes  the  stern-wheel  paddle  the  only  generally  success- 
ful method.  The  latter,  of  course,  is  useless  in  the  open 
sea."  2 

Special  attention  should  be  given  to  the  consideration 
that  an  accident  of  any  kind  to  a  vessel  on  a  canal  may, 
through  blockading  the  passage,  affect  the  movement  of 
the  majority  of  the  ships  on  the  waterway  at  the  time. 

1  Preliminary  Report,  supra,  p.  42.  It  is  practically  certain  that  towing 
would  have  to  be  resorted  to  for  almost  if  not  quite  the  entire  distance. 
On  the  Manchester  Ship  Canal  the  large  vessels  are  all  taken  inland  in 
tow.  The  expense  and  inconvenience  of  this  would  prohibit  large  vessels 
from  coming  sixteen  hundred  miles  inland,  to  Chicago.  The  freight  could 
be  handled  much  cheaper  by  barge  or  by  rail,  transshipments  included. 

•  Report  of  Commissioner  of  Corporations,  part  i,  p.  10. 


348        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

This  is  a  consideration  which  would  not  be  overlooked  by 
a  shipowner  who  was  considering  the  advisability  of  trust- 
ing his  vessel  to  the  waters  of  a  canal.  Delay  means  heavy 
loss,  and  the  possibility  of  that  delay  might  altogether 
deter  a  ship  from  undertaking  the  trip  inland. 

The  dangers  mentioned  above  would  inevitably  result 
in  greatly  increasing  the  rates  of  insurance  which  vessel 
owners  would  have  to  pay.  As  a  plain  business  proposi- 
tion it  is  apparent  that  no  insurance  company  could  be 
expected  to  offer  as  low  rates  where  the  risks  of  naviga- 
tion are  greatly  increased. 

The  above  considerations  have  shown  that  there  are  two 
factors  which  are  strongly  against  the  use  of  a  Lakes-to- 
Gulf  waterway  by  large  ocean  vessels.  The  great  loss  of 
time  involved  would  greatly  reduce  the  earning  capacity 
of  a  vessel ;  it  would  amount  to  running  the  ship  on  part 
time.  The  higher  insurance  rates  would  greatly  increase 
the  annual  outlays,  and  hence  proportionately  reduce 
profits.  It  is  exceedingly  doubtful,  therefore,  if  any  con- 
siderable number  of  ocean  vessels  would  choose  to  make 
use  of  the  waterway  were  it  placed  at  their  disposal  ab- 
solutely free  of  tolls.  Indeed,  a  recent  writer  says  that  sev- 
eral leading  shipping  companies  have  stated,  over  their 
own  signatures,  that  they  would  make  no  use  of  the  water- 
way were  it  constructed;  that  even  if  they  could  navigate 
it  safely,  the  expense  would  be  prohibitive.^ 

In  this  connection  it  should  be  called  to  mind  that  the 
fourteen-foot  waterway  connection  between  the  Great 
Lakes  and  the  Atlantic  by  way  of  the  Welland  Canal  and 
the  St.  Lawrence  River,  large  enough  for  many  of  the 
smaller  ocean  vessels,  is  wholly  unused.  The  Corinth  Ca- 
nal, connecting  the  Gulf  of  Corinth  with  the  Gulf  of  ^gina, 
four  miles  in  length  and  twenty-three  and  one  half  feet  in 
depth,  shortens  the  voyage  from  the  Adriatic  by  one  hun- 
dred miles.  Nevertheless,  "none  of  the  foreign  steamship 
*  Howard  Gross,  Chicago  Daily  Tribune,  December  8,  1910. 


THE  LAKES-TO-GULF  SHIP  CANAL      349 

companies  navigating  the  Mediterranean  now  use  the 
canal.  It  is  mostly  used  by  small  Greek  passenger  steam- 
ers."' Admiral  Sperry,  of  the  United  States  Na\'y,  holds 
that  great  ocean  vessels  can  never  economically  use  long 
inland  canals,  and  that,  conversely,  "even  the  largest  of 
the  vessels  using  our  inland  waters,  deepen  and  improve 
our  waterways  as  we  may,  can  never  navigate  the  high 
seas  economically  or  safely  as  compared  with  an  ocean 
carrier  of  to-day  of  even  moderate  proportions."^ 

It  is  no  more  to  be  expected  that  the  Lake  vessels  would 
engage  in  the  ocean  carrying  trade.  This  whole  question 
was  exhaustively  considered  by  Major  Thomas  W.  Symons 
of  the  United  States  Engineering  Corps,  apropos  of  the 
much-discussed  ship  canal  from  the  Great  Lakes  to  the 
Atlantic.  The  conclusions  of  Major  Symons  are  stated 
as  follows :  — 

Ocean  vessels,  fitted  for  combating  the  storms  of  the  North 
Atlantic,  are  built  much  heavier,  stronger,  deeper,  and  on  finer 
lines  than  are  the  Lake  ships.  The  machinery  differs  radically, 
owing  to  the  salt  water,  and  is  more  expensive  and  differently 
placed.  In  the  ocean  ships  surface  condensers  are  imperative, 
and  much  brass  or  lead  piping  is  required.  The  machinery,  placed 
amidships,  interferes  with  rapid  loading  and  unloading.  The 
hatches  are  too  small  and  too  few,  and  not  properly  spaced  to 
suit  docks,  elevators,  etc.,  and  the  rapid  handling  of  freight  in 
Lake  ports.  The  coal  bunkers  are  too  large,  occupying  valuable 
room.  All  deck  constructions,  the  rudder,  anchors,  chains,  etc., 
are  heavier  and  more  expensive  than  are  required  for  the  Lakes. 
The  decks  add  weight  and  interfere  with  loading,  storing,  and 
unloading  bulky,  coarse  freight.  Speaking  comparatively,  the 
bottoms  of  ocean  vessels  are  made  for  floating  and  the  bottoms 
of  lake  vessels  for  grounding." 

It  has  been  argued  by  some,  however,  that  American 
ingenuity  might  devise  a  special  type  of  boat  adapted  to 

*  Preliminary  Report  of  National  Waterways  Commission,  p.  42. 

•  Ihid.,  p.  41.  '  Engineering  News,  November,  1897,  p.  319. 


850        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

both  inland  and  ocean  transportation.      On    this    point 
Major  Symons  says:  — 

Vessels  which  ply  upon  the  ocean  and  those  which  ply  upon  the 
Lakes  are  notably  different  in  their  costs,  construction,  and  their 
operation.  So  great  are  the  differences  that  I  am  convinced  the 
two  cannot  economically  change  places.  .  .  .  While  it  is  possible, 
from  an  engineering  standpoint,  to  build  a  vessel  which  shall  com- 
bine to  a  limited  extent  the  particular  necessities  and  advantages 
of  both  Lake  and  ocean  vessels,  such  a  vessel  would  not  be  a  good 
business  enterprise.*  However  carefully  a  vessel  may  be  designed 
for  service  on  both  Lakes  and  ocean,  she  must  necessarily  be  a 
compromise  between  two  widely  differing  types,  and  inferior  to 
each  on  its  own  waters.   She  can  neither  carry  cargoes  on  the 

*  W.  H.  Curtis,  an  engineer  of  Denver,  has  recently  secured  a  patent 
on  a  combination  and  adjustable  steel  barge,  for  the  purpose  of  raising 
seagoing  vessels,  that  they  may  navigate  interior  waterways,  and  elimin- 
ate the  unloading  and  reloading  of  cargoes.  This  barge  is  so  constructed 
that  it  can  be  opened  through  the  centre,  to  any  desired  width,  so  as  to 
allow  a  deep  seagoing  vessel  to  enter  between.  The  end  members  of  the 
barges  are  movable  and  run  in  heavy  cast  grooves.  After  the  vessel  is 
between  the  main  barge  members,  the  end  is  then  run  over  and  locked, 
making  the  vessel  in  the  centre  completely  surrounded  with  a  strong 
and  rigid  steel  floating  structure.  It  is  the  belief  of  the  inventor  that  by 
means  of  this  barge  ocean  vessels,  drawing  twenty  feet  of  water  or  more, 
may  be  raised  so  that  they  can  navigate  inland  waters  with  a  depth  of 
eight  or  ten  feet.  Granting  that  the  scheme  is  practicable  from  an  engi- 
neering standpoint,  and  that  the  more  than  double  lateral  expanse  of 
the  floating  body  that  would  be  necessary  if  the  vessel  were  thus  raised, 
would  not  give  a  width  too  great  for  safo  navigation  and  safe  passing 
in  a  narrow  canal  or  tortuous  river  channel,  let  us  briefly  consider  its 
commercial  feasibility.  The  scheme  involves  the  use  of  tugboats  for  the 
towing  of  the  barge  and  vessel.  If  the  cargo  were  transshipped  to  an  ordin- 
ary self-propelling  barge  or  to  a  railway  train,  only  the  weight  of  the 
cargo  would  need  to  be  carried  inland;  but  here  the  dead  weight  of  both 
the  ocean  vessel  and  the  barge  which  supports  it  would  have  to  be  carried. 
And  it  seems  probable  that  the  cost  of  doing  this  would  in  itself  equal  the 
cost  of  transshipping  the  cargo.  But  more  than  this,  the  ocean  vessel 
would  be  subjected  to  a  great  loss  of  time.  The  speed  maintained  on 
inland  waters  could  be  only  a  fraction  of  that  on  the  open  ocean,  and  the 
profits  for  the  owner  of  the  vessel  would  be  correspondingly  reduced. 
It  appears,  therefore,  that  the  ingenious  invention  offers  little  promise. 


THE  LAKES-TO-GLLF  SHIP  CANAL      351 

Lakes  as  cheaply  as  the  Lake  ships,  nor  on  the  ocean  as  cheaply 
as  the  ocean  ships;  and  even  supposing  that  the  avoidance  of 
transfer  will  more  than  make  up  for  these  disadvantages  and  the 
time  necessarily  lost  in  any  canal  that  can  be  constructed,  she 
would  have  this  advantage  for  little  more  than  half  a  year,  and 
the  remainder  of  the  year  she  must  run  at  a  loss  on  salt  water 
as  compared  with  other  ships.' 

In  the  case  of  a  short  canal  which  saves  a  journey  of 
thousands  of  miles,  as  the  Suez  or  Panama,  the  situation 
is  much  different.  Where  the  length  of  the  canal  is  rela- 
tively short,  it  may  be  possible  to  give  it  a  capacity  great 
enough  to  permit  vessels  to  pass  through  with  reasonable 
safety.  The  cost  of  so  doing  is,  however,  prohibitive  for  a 
canal  of  great  length.  Again,  where  a  voyage  is  shortened 
by  several  thousands  of  miles,  the  savings  in  time  may 
easily  induce  vessels  to  incur  the  costs  and  risks  of  a  canal. 
With  the  Lakes-to-Gulf  Waterway  the  conditions  are  ob- 
viously altogether  different  from  those  of  the  Panama  or 
Suez  Canal. 

5.  This  investigation  has  indicated,  in  the  first  place, 
that  a  ship  canal  from  Chicago  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  to- 
gether with  the  necessary  harbors  and  connections,  could 
not  be  constructed,  in  all  probability,  for  less  than  the  enor- 
mous sum  of  a  billion  dollars;  in  the  second  place,  that 
assuming  a  saving  of  2  mills  per  ton-mile,  a  traffic  nearly 
double  that  of  great  ocean  ports  like  Philadelphia,  Boston, 
and  New  Orleans  would  be  required  in  order  to  effect 
savings  merely  sufficient  to  meet  the  annual  outlays;  and, 
finally,  that  it  is  practically  certain  that  no  considerable 
number  of  ocean  vessels  could  be  induced  to  use  the 
waterway  were  it   at  their  disposal  free  of  toUs.'^  It  is 

^  Engineering  News,  November,  1897,  p.  S18. 

*  It  may  be  contended  that,  even  though  ocean  vessels  should  not  use 
the  canal,  the  waterway  would  nevertheless  force  down  railway  rates 
through  potential  competition  and  thereby  possibly  pay  for  itself.  AW 
that  need  be  said  relative  to  this  point  here  is  that  a  waterway  of  much 


352        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

abundantly  evident,  therefore,  that  the  project  is  vision- 
ary in  the  extreme,  and  that  the  dream  of  one  day  behold- 
ing the  flags  of  all  nations  unfurled  before  Chicago  breezes 
will  never  be  realized.  It  is  fortunate  that  the  National 
Government  is  not  disposed  to  listen  to  the  extravagant 
contentions  of  the  Lakes-to-Gulf  Waterway  Association. 

shallower  depth  could  accomplish  as  much  in  this  way  as  a  ship  canal. 
For  barges  are  more  economical  carriers  than  ocean  vessels  on  an  inland 
water  route.  The  question  of  potential  competition  may  therefore  be 
postponed  until  we  consider  the  fourteen-  and  eight-foot  projects. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

"fourteen  feet  through  the  valley" 

1.  The  immediate  purpose  of  the  Lakes-to-Gulf  Water- 
way Association  is  to  secure  a  water  route  with  a  depth  of 
fourteen  feet  for  the  entire  distance  between  Chicago  and 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  This  is  the  project  which  has  attracted 
the  widest  attention  in  the  agitation  for  a  revival  of  water- 
way transportation  in  this  country.  Passing,  as  it  would, 
through  the  heart  of  the  great  Middle  West,  it  is  of  im- 
mediate interest  to  the  people  of  more  than  thirty  states. 
It  will  be  the  purpose  of  the  present  chapter  to  test  the 
merits  of  this  scheme  which  calls  for  "fourteen  feet  through 
the  Valley." 

It  is  apparent  at  once,  that  if  ocean  vessels  could  make 
little  use  of  a  waterway  twenty-four  feet  deep  to  Chicago, 
a  waterway  with  a  depth  of  only  fourteen  feet  would  be  of 
scarcely  any  service  to  them.  The  comparatively  few  ocean 
vessels  that  have  a  draft  of  less  than  fourteen  feet  would 
not  undertake  to  navigate  a  winding  inland  channel  for 
thousands  of  miles.  They  are  not  constructed  for  such 
purposes,  and  the  loss  of  time,  to  say  nothing  of  the  hea^'y 
insurance  charges,  would  entirely  prevent  the  use  of  the 
proposed  route.  It  would  require  a  special  type  of  shallow 
boat  for  the  purpose;  but  such  a  vessel  could  not  meet  the 
competition  of  the  larger  ocean  steamers  after  it  passed 
out  of  the  inland  channel  to  the  open  sea.  Such  vessels 
would  thus  have  to  confine  their  operations  entirely  to 
inland  carriage. 

It  is  urged  by  many,  however,  that  while  ocean  vessels 
could  not  be  expected  to  navigate  a  waterway  fourteen  feet 
deep,  the  vessels  on  the  Great  Lakes  would  nevertheless 


354         WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

make  extensive  use  of  such  a  channel.  It  is  believed  that 
they  would  make  regular  trips  between  Lake  and  Gulf 
ports.  In  order  to  ascertain  what  ground  there  may  be  for 
such  a  belief,  it  will  be  necessary  to  inquire  what  is  the  pre- 
vailing size  of  vessels  now  navigating  the  Great  Lakes. 

In  1901  the  draft  of  two  thirds  of  the  vessels  entering  the 
Chicago  River  was  more  than  fourteen  feet;^  and  since  that 
time  the  draft  of  Lake  boats  has  been  rapidly  increasing. 
Indeed,  a  chief  reason  for  the  relative  decline  of  shipping 
at  the  port  of  Chicago  in  recent  years  has  been  the  inade- 
quate depth  of  the  Chicago  Harbor.  Like  those  on  the 
ocean,  the  harbors  of  the  Lakes  have  had  to  be  continually 
deepened  to  meet  the  needs  of  modern  shipping.  "At  the 
present  time  the  value  to  commerce  of  a  thirteen-foot  har- 
bor on  the  Great  Lakes  is  entirely  incommensurate  with 
the  cost  of  maintenance.  To  be  accessible  to  even  the 
smaller  available  vessels,  a  harbor  should  have  a  depth  of 
at  least  sixteen  feet."^  "During  the  season  of  1907,  of  a 
freight  tonnage  of  58,217,214  tons  which  passed  through 
the  canals  at  the  Sault  Ste.  Marie,  only  800,000  tons  were 
in  vessels  of  a  registered  draft  of  fourteen  feet  or  less,  and 
10,400,000  tons  were  in  vessels  of  nineteen  feet  registered 
draft,  or  over."'  Only  1.4  per  cent  of  this  tonnage  was  car- 
ried in  vessels  which  would  be  able  to  make  use  of  the  pro- 
posed Lakes-to-Gulf  Waterway.  The  tendency  of  the  Lake 
vessels,  moreover,  will  unquestionably  be  to  continue  to  in- 
crease in  size  in  the  future.  Most  of  the  remaining  shallow 
draft  boats  are  old  vessels  not  yet  discarded.  Practically 
all  of  the  new  boats  draw  more  than  fourteen  feet  of  water, 
and  it  is  probable  that  by  the  time  the  proposed  waterway 
could  be  constructed,  hardly  a  boat  on  the  Lakes  would  be 
able  to  make  use  of  it. 

*  Report  of  a  Board  on  a  Survey  of  a  Waterway  from  Lockport  to  St.  Louia, 
1905.  p.  13. 

*  Report  of  Chief  of  United  States  Army  Engineers,  1908,  p.  1965. 

*  Report  by  a  Special  Board  of  Engineers  on  Survey  of  Mississippi  River, 
1909,  p.  23. 


FOURTEEN  FEET  THROUGH  THE  VALLEY    S55 

There  is  every  reason  to  believe,  moreover,  that  such  re- 
maining Lake  vessels  as  are  small  enough  to  make  use  of  a 
waterway  fourteen  feet  deep  would  choose  not  to  risk  the 
dangers  of  navigating  it.  The  vessels  employed  in  the 
Great  Lakes  service  are  not  adapted  to  the  navigation  of  a 
canal  or  tortuous  river  channel.  "The  ratio  of  length  to 
beam  is  too  great  and  the  rudder  power  insufficient.  Such 
vessels  have  been  constructed  for  special  purposes,  and, 
while  affording  a  most  economical  method  of  transporting 
freight  on  the  Great  Lakes,  would  be  a  failure  if  employed 
in  either  ocean  or  river  navigation."  ^ 

Even  were  it  possible  for  the  Lake  boats  to  navigate  a 
channel  fourteen  feet  in  depth,  it  would  not  be  profitable 
for  them  to  do  so,  for  they  would  be  unable  to  compete 
with  barges.  The  average  cost,  per  ton  of  carrying  capa- 
city, of  constructing  steam  vessels  used  on  the  Great 
Lakes  and  the  St.  Lawrence  River  is  $61.^  On  the  other 

*  Report  by  Specinl  Board,  supra,  p.  26.  During  the  hearings  before  the 
Committee  on  Commerce  of  the  Senate  of  the  United  States,  in  1910, 
representatives  of  two  Lake  shipping  concerns  submitted  testimony,  at  the 
instance  of  the  junior  Senator  from  Illinois,  to  the  effect  that  they  would 
make  use  of  a  fourteen-foot  waterway  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  were  it  avail- 
able. Cross-questioning,  however,  revealed  that  neither  knew  anything 
about  the  diflSculties  in  the  way  of  navigation  on  the  Mississippi.  One 
based  his  case  solely  on  the  fact  that  his  vessels  drew  less  than  fourteen  feet 
of  water;  and  the  other,  on  the  same  fact  with  the  additional  one  that  his 
ships  had  actually  passed  through  the  Soo,  the  St.  Clair,  Detroit,  and  St. 
Lawrence  Rivers.  He  made  no  mention  of  the  difference  in  conditions  of 
navigation  on  such  broad,  deep,  and  straight  channels  as  the  first  three  of 
the  rivers  mentioned,  and  on  the  Mississippi;  and  he  was  forced  to  admit 
that  the  high  insurance  rates  on  the  St.  Lawrence,  charged  on  account  of 
the  dangers  of  navigation  there,  made  shipping  over  that  route  in  Lake 
vessels  very  unprofitable.  This  is  the  sum  total  of  evidence  that  the  advo- 
cates of  the  waterway  have  been  able  to  secure  in  support  of  the  conten- 
tion that  the  Lake  boats  would  use  the  fourteen-foot  channel.  These 
witnesses  were  W.  D.  Hamilton,  a  vessel  builder  in  Chicago,  and  Edward 
Hines,  of  the  Edward  Hines  Lumber  Company  of  Chicago.  See  Hearings 
before  the  Committee  on  Commerce,  Sixty-first  Congress,  Second  Session, 
February  28,  1910. 

*  See  page  3-14. 


356        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

hand,  "a  Mississippi  River  steamboat  and  ten  barges, 
capable  of  transporting  10,000  tons  of  freight  (on  an 
8.o-foot  draft),  can  be  built  for  about  twelve  dollars  per 
ton  of  freight  carried."  ^  Since  a  large  steam  vessel  can 
make  no  greater  speed  on  a  narrow  channel  than  can 
the  barges,  it  is  obvious  that  the  latter  ofiFer  the  cheaper 
means  of  transport.  On  the  open  Lakes  the  larger  steam- 
ers are  necessary  in  order  to  weather  the  storms  which  pre- 
vail ;  while  speed  is  also  a  factor  working  in  their  favor. 
But  on  inland  channels  barges  offer  the  most  economical 
means  of  transport  that  is  known. 

2.  It  is  sometimes  contended,  as  a  final  argument  for  a 
depth  of  fourteen  feet,  that  if  for  any  reason  the  Lake 
vessels  should  not  engage  in  a  regular  carrying  trade  on 
the  waterway,  they  would  nevertheless  be  floated  down  it 
empty  at  the  approach  of  winter  for  the  purpose  of  par- 
ticipating in  the  coasting  trade.  Navigation  on  the  Great 
Lakes  is  closed  for  several  months  each  year  on  account  of 
ice,  and  the  Lake  boats  are  compelled  to  lie  idle  during  the 
winter  months.  Boats  with  a  draft  of  much  more  than 
fourteen  feet  when  loaded  could  easily  be  floated  down  a 
fourteen-foot  channel  when  empty.  Why  not,  then,  give 
the  Lake  boats  an  opportunity  to  engage  in  the  coasting 
trade  during  the  season  of  closed  navigation  on  the  Lakes? 

In  regard  to  this  argument  it  is  only  necessary  to  call 
attention  to  the  fact  that  there  has  been  for  many  years  a 
waterway  fourteen  feet  deep  from  the  Lakes  to  the  ocean, 
by  way  of  the  Welland  Canal  and  the  St.  Lawrence  River. 
The  very  obvious  reason  why  the  Lake  boats  do  not  avail 
themselves  of  the  opportunity  they  now  have  of  engaging 
in  the  coasting  trade  during  the  winter  months  is  that  they 
would  be  unable  to  compete  with  the  regular  coasting  ves- 
sels for  this  trade.  The  amount  of  the  coastwise  traffic  in 
the  winter  is  relatively  small,  and  the  regular  lines  would 
*  Report  by  Special  Board  of  Engineers,  supra,  p.  24. 


FOURTEEN  FEET  THROUGH  THE  VALLEY     357 

have  the  first  claim  upon  it.  The  Lake  vessels,  moreover, 
are  not  constructed  to  withstand  such  severe  storms  as 
occur  ofif  the  Atlantic  and  Gulf  coasts  during  the  winter 
months.^  As  was  shown  in  the  preceding  chapter  the  cost 
of  the  coastwise  vessels  per  ton  of  carrying  capacity  is  more 
than  twice  that  of  the  boats  on  the  Great  Lakes.  The  argu- 
ment appears  conclusive,  therefore,  that  neither  the  ocean 
nor  the  Lake  vessels  would  ever  be  able  to  make  any  con- 
siderable use  of  a  Lakes-to-Gulf  waterway  fourteen  feet  in 
depth. 

3.  If  a  waterway  fourteen  feet  in  depth  is  to  be  con- 
structed, it  must,  therefore,  be  for  the  purpose  of  barge 
traflSc.  This  point  being  settled,  we  may  now  raise  the 
question.  What  depth  of  channel  is  required  for  the  most 
economical  sort  of  barge  transportation? 

On  the  Ohio  and  Mississippi  Rivers  from  Louisville  to 
New  Orleans,  the  steamer  Sprague  sometimes  tows  as 
much  as  60,000  tons  of  freight  at  a  single  trip.  As  com- 
pared with  this,  the  Kaiserin  Auguste  Victoria,  one  of  the 
largest  of  ocean-going  vessels,  has  a  freight  capacity  of 
only  25,000  tons.  At  the  same  time  the  horse  poM^er  of 
the  steamer  Sprague  is  but  2175  as  against  17,000  for  the 
Kaiserin  Auguste  Victoria.^  The  towing  of  barges  in  small 
fleets  is  the  cheapest  method  of  water  transportation  that 
is  known,  and  it  does  not  require  a  great  depth  of  channel. 
The  Ohio  River  below  Louisville  has  a  depth  of  six  feet  for 
only  284  days  each  year,  and  of  more  than  nine  feet  for 
only  230  days.  These  barges  travel  all  the  w^ay  down  the 
Ohio  from  Pittsburg,  and  in  the  upper  part  of  the  river  the 
depth  is  less  than  six  feet  for  the  greater  portion  of  the  year.^ 

On  the  Rhine  River,  in  Germany,  barges  of  2000  tons' 

^  See  discussion  of  preceding  chapter  relative  to  lake  versus  ocean 
vessels,  p.  845. 

*  Report  of  Examination  of  the  Ohio  River  by  United  States  Engineers, 
1908,  p.  17. 

»  Ibid.,  p.  7. 


358        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

capacity  regularly  ascend  the  river  as  far  as  Mannheim, 
where  the  low  mean  channel  depth  is  only  6.52  feet.  Be- 
tween Mannheim  and  Strassburg,  the  head  of  navigation, 
the  low  mean  depth  is  but  3.91  feet,  but  barges  of  800  tons' 
burden  reach  the  latter  port.  And  3000-ton  barges  are 
used  where  the  depth  of  the  river  is  but  10.78  feet.^ 

In  the  light  of  these  facts,  what  ground  is  there  for  the 
contention  that  a  depth  of  fourteen  feet  from  Chicago  to 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico  is  an  absolute  necessity?  Such  a  depth 
would  not  permit  the  use  of  Lake  or  ocean  vessels,  and  is 
several  feet  deeper  than  is  necessary  to  accommodate  the 
most  efficient  sort  of  barge  traffic.  By  the  use  of  long  and 
shallow  barges  a  depth  of  eight  feet  would  be  entirely  ade- 
quate. It  should  be  stated  here  that  barges  of  more  than 
two  or  three  thousand  tons'  capacity  are  not  contemplated 
by  the  advocates  of  the  fourteen-foot  project.  In  general 
they  have  in  mind  the  1000-ton  or  1500-ton  barge,  and  are 
merely  under  a  delusion  that  a  great  depth  is  necessary 
to  float  such  vessels.  It  should  be  said,  also,  that  in  most 
cases  the  1000-ton  barge  is  preferable  to  the  larger  type. 
Grain  is  more  likely  to  be  heated  when  stored  in  the  larger 
mass,  and  there  is  more  breakage  of  coal  when  it  is  loaded 
into  very  large  barges.  The  1000-ton  barge  is  also  fre- 
quently much  more  convenient  for  the  shipper  than  the 
larger  ones.  At  any  rate,  three  barges,  each  of  1000  tons' 
burden,  can  be  towed  as  a  fleet  at  as  low,  if  not  lower,  cost 
than  a  single  barge  of  3000  tons'  capacity.  From  the  trans- 
portation side,  therefore,  there  appears  to  be  absolutely 
no  reason  why  a  depth  of  fourteen  feet  should  be  provided. 

The  cost  of  a  fourteen-foot  waterway,  as  compared  with 
one  eight  feet  in  depth,  would  be  almost  as  dollars  to  dimes. 
It  is  estimated  that  the  division  of  the  waterway  which 
the  State  of  Illinois  proposes  to  construct — namely,  the 
stretch  from  the  end  of  the  Chicago  Drainage  Canal,  at 
Lockport,  to  Utica  —  would  cost  approximately  $20,000,- 
*  Sympher,  in  London  Daily  Chronicle,  April  7,  1906. 


FOURTEEN  FEET  THROUGH  THE  VALLEY    359 

000.  We  shall  presently  see,  however,  that  in  all  proba- 
bility more  than  fifty  millions  would  be  required  to  com- 
plete this  section.  For  the  remainder  of  the  distance  — 
that  is,  from  Utica  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  by  way  of  the 
Illinois  and  Mississippi  rivers  —  it  is  estimated  by  the 
Special  Board  of  Army  Engineers  that  the  total  cost  would 
be  $158,697,462.1  This  makes  the  cost  for  the  entire  dis- 
tance in  the  neighborhood  of  $200,000,000. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  estimated  by  the  government 
engineers  that  the  cost  of  an  eight-foot  project  would 
be  comparatively  small  in  amount.  There  is  already 
throughout  most  of  the  year  a  depth  of  eight  feet  from  St, 
Louis  to  the  Gulf,  and  the  cost  of  completing  the  regular- 
ization  works  now  being  constructed  promises  to  be  not  ex- 
cessive. From  Utica  to  St.  Louis  it  is  estimated  that  the 
total  cost,  if  the  existing  locks  be  used,  would  be  only  $1,- 
050,000.  For  the  stretch  from  Lockport  to  Utica  it  is  be- 
lieved that  the  $20,000,000  voted  by  the  state  for  the  con- 
struction of  a  fourteen-foot  channel  between  these  points 
would  be  ample  to  provide  a  depth  of  eight  feet.^  This 
would  make  the  total  cost  of  the  eight-foot  project  about 
$21,000,000,  in  addition  to  what  is  necessary  to  complete 
the  regularization  works  below  St.  Louis.  Why  spend  sev- 
eral times  this  amount  in  securing  an  extra  depth  of  six 
feet  which  is  not  needed?  The  board  of  Army  Engineers 
has  rightly  condemned  the  fourteen-foot  scheme  as  an 
absurd  proposition. 

4.  One  other  phase  of  the  fourteen-foot  project  remains 
to  be  considered.  The  plan  provides  for  the  withdrawal 
of  10,000  cubic  feet  of  water  per  second  from  Lake  Michi- 
gan, and  it  is  urged  by  the  advocates  of  the  scheme  that 
the  profits  from  the  sale  of  water  power  that  could  be  de- 

*  Report  by  Special  Board  of  Engineers,  on  a  Survey  of  the  Mississippi 
River.  1909,  p.  5. 
'  Report  of  Special  Board,  61st  Cong.,  3d  Session,  House  Doc.  no.  1374. 


360        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

veloped  from  this  flow  would,  in  a  very  few  years,  pay  the 
entire  cost  of  the  Lockport-to-Utica  division,  for  which  the 
people  of  the  state  recently  voted  $20,000,000.  It  is  perti- 
nent to  inquire,  therefore,  if  there  is  any  assurance  that  the 
amount  of  water  power  that  could  be  developed  and  sold 
would  be  of  sufficient  value  to  warrant  the  expenditure  of 
the  large  sums  of  money  which  the  scheme  involves. 

When  the  National  Waterways  Commission,  in  Janu- 
ary, 1910,  submitted  its  report  on  waterway  conditions  in 
Europe,  and  cast  considerable  doubt  upon  the  feasibility  of 
canal  transportation  in  the  United  States,  the  advocates 
of  the  Lockport-to-Utica  division  of  the  Lakes-to-the-Gulf 
Waterway  immediately  changed  tactics.^  The  contention 
has  since  been  that  the  prime  purpose  of  the  Illinois  project 
is  to  develop  water  power,  not  to  carry  traffic.  An  inter- 
esting local  struggle  has  arisen  in  Illinois  over  this,  in  which 
politics,  financial  interest,  and  newspaper  jealousy  are  the 
most  conspicuous  elements.  Those  opposed  to  the  water- 
way contend  that  the  original  purpose  of  the  $20,000,000 
bond  issue,  which  the  people  of  Illinois  voted  in  1908,  was  to 
create  a  waterway  for  the  carrying  of  traffic;  and  that  if  the 
purpose  has  been  changed  now  to  one  merely  for  the  de- 
velopment of  water  power,  the  proposition  should  be  resub- 
mitted to  the  people  at  the  polls,  when  it  should  be  voted 
down  as  a  foolish  enterprise.  The  friends  of  the  scheme, 
on  the  contrary,  claim  that  since  the  people  sanctioned  the 
bond  issue  once  by  an  overwhelming  majority,  there  is  no 
occasion  for  taking  the  trouble  and  time  for  another  vote. 
They  silence  all  doubts  as  to  the  value  of  water  power  by 
pointing  to  the  fact  that  private  interests  are  already  on 
the  ground,  anticipating  the  use  of  power  which  they  hope 
will  be  developed  at  the  expense  of  the  state. 

*  The  leader;^  of  the  movement  are  Governor  Deneen  and  Senator 
Lorimer.  The  former  insists  that  the  State  of  Illinois  should  take  the 
initiative  in  the  matter,  while  the  latter  holds  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
United  States  Government  to  commence  the  work.  Both  favor  the 
scheme.  Perhaps  political  interest  may  explain  their  respective  attitudes. 


FOURTEEN  FEET  THROUGH  THE  VALLEY    361 

Now,  while  no  one  doubts  that  no  inconsiderable  amount 
of  water  power  may  be  developed,  there  is  a  real  question 
whether  it  would  be  of  sufficient  value  to  warrant  the  ex- 
penditure of  the  large  sums  of  money  which  the  scheme 
involves.  In  the  "  Prospectus  of  the  Plan  Proposed  by  the 
Internal  Improvement  Commission  of  Illinois,"  it  is  esti- 
mated that  the  portion  of  the  Lakes-to-the-Gulf  project 
for  which  the  people  of  Illinois  voted  $20,000,000,  namely, 
for  a  cut  fourteen  feet  deep  from  Lockport  to  Utica,  would 
cost  $18,258,986.  It  is  estimated  further  that  "the  net 
salable  power  may  safely  be  taken  as  100,000  horse  power, 
and  a  conservative  rental  for  24-hour  power  is  $25  per 
horse  power  per  year  in  excess  of  operating  expenses.  The 
annual  net  revenue  will  therefore  be  $2,500,000."  Placing 
this  in  a  sinking  fund  bearing  interest  at  two  per  cent, 
would  permit  the  paying-off  of  the  $20,000,000  in  four- 
teen years,  and  in  addition  it  would  leave  a  handsome 
balance  in  the  public  treasury.  There  would  then  be  a 
princely  annual  revenue  to  be  used  in  reducing  the  taxes 
of  the  citizens  of  the  state.  On  page  362  is  given  the  tabu- 
lated statement  which  was  presented  to  the  people  for 
consideration.  The  prospectus  adds  that  "this  presents 
the  case  in  its  most  unfavorable  aspect." 

This  prospectus  will  bear  analysis.  If  the  initial  cost 
should  prove  to  be  more  than  $18,258,986,  the  revenues  to 
the  state  would  of  course  be  proportionally  reduced.  In  this 
connection  it  is  well  to  recall  that  at  the  time  of  the  passage 
of  the  bill  for  the  construction  of  the  Panama  Canal  it  was 
estimated  that  the  cost  would  be  approximately  $140,000,- 
000,  and  that  in  no  case  would  it  exceed  $160,000,000.  The 
engineer  who  is  now  in  charge  estimates  that  the  cost  will 
be  $375,000,000.  The  original  estimate  of  the  cost  of  the 
Drainage  Canal  of  Chicago  was  about  $16,000,000,  whereas 
$53,000,000  has  been  expended  thereon.  In  fact,  such  has 
been  the  history  of  all  public  works.  Why?  Because  it  is 
much  easier  to  secure  an  appropriation  if  it  appear  modest 


362        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 


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FOURTEEN  FEET  THROUGH  THE  VALLEY    363 

in  amount.  After  $20,000,000  has  been  expended,  if  only 
$10,000,000  more  be  required,  the  pressure  for  an  addi- 
tional appropriation  is  very  strong.  The  original  $20,000,- 
000  should  not  be  wasted  for  want  of  another  paltry 
$10,000,000,  it  is  argued,  and  the  remainder  is  usually 
forthcoming. 

The  President  of  the  Board  of  Trustees  of  the  Chicago 
Sanitary  District  states  that  suflBcient  investigations  of  the 
probable  cost  of  the  enterprise  were  not  made  by  the  In- 
ternal Improvement  Association  to  warrant  any  accurate 
estimates,  and  he  points  out  that  the  figures  given  are  with 
the  proviso  that  the  entire  right  of  way  be  furnished  free, 
"an  idea  predicated  upon  the  confiscation  of  the  real  es- 
tate, channels,  and  retaining  walls  of  the  Sanitary  District 
from  Lockport  to  Patterson  Island  in  Joliet,  which  are 
worth  in  their  present  condition  much  over  $2,000,000."  ^ 

It  should  be  noted,  further,  that  the  Special  Board  of 
Army  Engineers,  which  was  appointed  by  the  United  States 
Government  to  investigate  the  project,  estimate  that  the 
$20,000,000  which  was  voted  by  the  people  of  the  state 
would  be  merely  suflScient  to  construct  a  channel  eight  feet 
in  depth. 2 

Again,  the  estimates  make  no  allowance  for  the  cost  of 
maintaining  the  waterway.  The  support  of  an  administra- 
tive office  and  of  a  law  department  for  the  adjustment  of 
claims  would  involve  heavy  annual  outlays.  "With  the 
limited  discharge  of  4200  cubic  feet  per  second,  which  was 
all  that  had  been  authorized  prior  to  1905,  224  suits  had  al- 
ready been  brought  against  the  trustees  of  the  district,  the 
claims  aggregating  $4,409,170."^  The  diversion  of  so  much 
as  14,000  cubic  feet  of  water  per  second  from  Lake  Michi- 
gan into  the  Illinois  River  would  cause  extensive  damage 

^  Proceedings  of  the  Board  of  Trustees  of  the  Sanitary  District  of  Chicago, 
January  26,  1910,  p.  86. 

^  See  page  359. 

'  Report  by  Special  Board  of  U.  S.  Engineers  on  Survey  of  the  Mississippi 
River,  1909,  p.  27. 


364        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

to  the  lands  subject  to  overflow,  for  which  the  Sanitary 
District  of  Chicago  would  be  liable.^ 

Among  the  many  items  of  expense  in  the  maintenance 
of  a  waterway  in  good  condition  for  navigation,  the  cost  of 
dredging  is  particularly  heavy.  The  Drainage  Canal,  al- 
though entirely  without  tributaries,  is  beginning  to  fill  up 
with  sediment,  and  according  to  a  recent  report  of  the 
Board  of  Trustees  provision  must  soon  be  made  for  a  dredg- 
ing equipment.^  The  Lockport-to-Utica  division  would  re- 
ceive the  deposit  of  a  half-dozen  tributary  streams.  The 
Manchester  Ship  Canal,  35.5  miles  in  length,  and  having 
comparatively  few  tributaries,  requires  an  expenditure  of 
more  than  $200,000  a  year  for  dredging.'  Surely,  then, 
in  computing  the  revenues  to  flow  into  the  treasury  of 
the  state,  such  items  as  these  cannot  fairly  be  entirely 
omitted. 

Now,  let  us  consider  the  estimates  of  the  value  of  the 
water  power  to  be  developed.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  to  be 
noted  that  the  computation  assumes  that  all  of  the  water 
power  available  for  sale  can  at  all  times  be  disposed  of. 
Is  it  not  reasonable  to  believe  that  at  least  some  of  the 
available  product  might  for  a  time  be  unable  to  find  a  mar- 
ket? The  above  computation,  while  presenting  the  case  "  in 
its  most  unfavorable  aspect,"  is  based  on  the  assumption 
that  the  very  first  year  that  the  waterway  is  open,  the  full 
100,000  horse  power  would  be  sold.  Of  course  no  one  can 
determine  precisely  how  much  of  the  product  could  be 
marketed  at  all  times,  especially  at  the  rates  named;  but 
there  is  little  question  that  an  estimate  which  purports  to 
be  ultra-conservative  should  make  considerable  deduction 
to  cover  possibilities  of  failure  to  market  all  of  the  available 
supply. 

^  Report  by  Special  Board.  It  would  also  probably  affect  the  level 
of  the  Lakes  and  thus  involve  international  complications.  This  has 
been  a  subject  of  much  dispute  and  is  still  unsettled. 

'  Proceedings,  supra,  p.  87.  '  See  page  153. 


FOURTEEN  FEET  THROUGH  THE  VALLEY    865 

It  should  be  remembered  that  there  are  a  large  number 
of  steam  plants  in  existence  in  and  about  Chicago  which 
could  not  be  expected  to  shut  down  until  they  are  worn 
out,  and  that  there  are  many  plants  which  use  the  by-pro- 
ducts of  their  own  manufactures  in  the  creation  of  steam, 
thereby  making  the  cost  of  power  very  small.  Further- 
more, in  all  these  surrounding  towns  are  public  service 
corporations  with  franchises,  most  of  them  with  existing 
generating  machinery.  They  will  not  shut  down  their 
existing  plants  to  take  water  power,  except  at  a  marked 
advantage;  and,  moreover,  they  are  more  or  less  connected 
in  a  combination  and  will  act  in  concert  against  the  state's 
competition.^ 

In  the  second  place,  it  is  assumed  that  all  the  power 
that  can  be  developed  along  the  route  will  belong  to  the 
state.  Now,  if  private  interests  should  gain  control  of  a 
part  of  the  water  power,  it  is  clear  that  the  revenues  to  the 
state  would  be  proportionally  decreased.  And  the  fact  is, 
that  the  state  is  far  from  being  in  control  of  all  the  water- 
power  rights  along  the  route.  The  Economy  Light  and 
Power  Company,  connected  with  the  Commonwealth  Edi- 
son Company,  acquired  from  the  Illinois  and  Michigan 
Canal  Company  on  September  2, 1904,  a  twenty -year  lease- 
hold interest  in  the  best  site  along  the  entire  waterway,  at 
Dresden  Heights,  about  four  hundred  feet  north  of  the  junc- 
tion of  the  Des  Plaines  and  Kankakee  Rivers  where  they 
form  the  Illinois.  Suit  was  brought  by  the  Governor  of 
Illinois  in  the  name  of  the  people  for  the  purpose  of  eject- 
ing the  Economy  company  from  the  premises.  In  October, 
1909,  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  state  rendered  a  decision 
against  the  people,  sustaining  the  electrical  company  at 
every  point.  The  court  held  that  "if  the  powerful  hand  of 
the  Government  is  to  lay  hold  of  this  gigantic  enterprise, 
it  must  do  so  with  due  regard  to  the  sacred  rights  of  every 
citizen,  however  humble  and  insignificant  those  rights  may 
*  Proceedings  of  the  Board  of  Trustees  of  the  Sanitary  District,  supra,  p.  86. 


366        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

seem  in  contrast  with  the  great  public  consummation."  ^ 
Vested  interests  in  an  unnavigable  stream  are  sacred  in 
the  eyes  of  the  law  and  must  be  protected  even  at  the 
expense  of  what  appears  to  be  public  weal.^ 

Let  us  see  what  effect  this  situation  has  upon  the  pro- 
posed financial  scheme  of  the  state.  Before  the  decision  of 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Illinois  was  given,  Governor  Deneen, 
the  champion  of  the  water-power  idea,  admitted  that  "so 
large  a  deduction  from  the  total  available  power  would  ren- 
der abortive  the  proposed  financial  scheme  of  the  state."' 
The  Illinois  internal  improvement  commissioners  ^  have 
estimated  that  the  water-power  rights  at  Dresden  Heights 
which  are  owned  by  the  Economy  Light  and  Power  Com- 
pany, "are  over  28,000  horse  power,  and  the  holdings  of 
the  same  company  at  Hickory  Creek  are  about  14,000  horse 
power,  making  a  total  of  42,000  horse  power."  ^  They 
further  say  that,  as  the  market  develops,  this  "  power  may 
reach  an  investment  value  of  $1000  per  horse  power,  as  in 
older  countries,  and  it  may  produce  taxable  wealth  of  three 
or  four  times  this  amount."  ^  These  value  estimates  were 
made  of  course  for  the  purpose  of  showing  the  people  how 
rich  they  were  to  grow  from  the  development  of  the  state's 
resources,  and  not  for  the  purpose  of  informing  the  Eco- 
nomy company  what  price  the  state  would  be  willing  to  pay 
for  its  holdings  in  case  the  state  should  wish  to  purchase 
the  site  at  Dresden  Heights.  While  the  present  value  of 
these  sites  is  but  a  fraction  of  this  amount,  the  possi- 
bility of  a  large  future  earning  power  has  been  already 
heavily  capitalized,  and  there  is  little  question  that  it 
the  state  should  desire  to  purchase  these  rights  it  would 

*  Illinois  Reports,  vol.  241,  p.  291. 

*  Had  the  Des  Plaines  River  been  a  navigable  stream  the  decision  would 
Have  been  against  the  electrical  company,  because  the  law  holds  that  the 
public  interest  in  a  navigable  waterway  is  paramount  to  all  others. 

*  Message  to  the  legislature,  November  6,  1907. 

*  Isham  Randolph,  H.  M.  Schmoldt,  and  H.  W.  Johnson. 

'  Report  of  1909,  p.  51.  6  /Jid.,  p.  52. 


FOURTEEN  FEET  THROUGH  THE  VALLEY    367 

be  asked  to  pay  handsomely  therefor.  If  several  million 
dollars  be  added  on  this  account  to  the  original  cost  of 
over  $18,000,000,  the  water-power  scheme  loses  much  of 
its  golden  promise.  The  situation  would  not  be  bettered 
should  the  state  decide  not  to  purchase  these  rights  from 
the  Economy  company;  for  in  that  event  more  than  forty 
per  cent  of  the  estimated  revenues  from  the  sale  of  water 
power  by  the  state  would  have  to  be  canceled. 

There  is  yet  another  assumption  in  this  computation 
which  is  open  to  serious  criticism.  It  is  put  as  a  conserva- 
tive estimate  that  all  of  the  100,000  horse  power  available 
can  be  marketed  at  an  average  price  of  $25  per  horse  power 
per  annum,  net,  —  that  is,  above  operating  expenses.  Let 
us  examine  this  estimate. 

The  United  States  Government  has  leased  water  power 
at  rates  varying  from  50  cents  to  $3  per  horse  power  per 
year  ^  and  even  at  such  low  rates  much  of  the  power  avail- 
able has  found  no  market.  "The  Government  has  many 
dams  already  built  that  give  immense  potential  horse 
power,  and  an  unappreciative  and  unpatriotic  public  coldly 
passes  them  by  and  buys  coal  at  $4  a  ton  with  which  to 
produce  power.  At  the  dams  on  the  Muskingum  River  in 
populous  Ohio,  energy  is  now  sold  at  50  cents  per  horse 
power  per  annum  and  at  .  .  .  Augusta,  Georgia,  it  is  sold 
for  $1  per  annum."  ^  The  amount  of  power  that  can  be 
sold  and  the  price  it  will  bring,  will  of  course  vary  greatly 
in  different  sections  of  the  country  because  of  differences 
in  industrial  conditions.  Some  regions  may  have  compara- 
tively little  demand  for  electrical  power;  other  sections  may 
be  well  supplied  with  cheap  fuel  for  the  manufacture  of 
steam  power;  still  other  places  may  bid  high  for  hydro- 
electric power.  Consequently,  no  general  estimates  of  the 
value  of  hydro-electric  power  can  safely  be  made.  The 
conditions  in  Ohio  may,  however,  be  regarded  as  some- 

»  The  World  To-day,  March.  1910. 

*  Peyton,  The  American  Transportation  Problem  (1907),  p.  23. 


368        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

what  comparable  to  those  in  Illinois.  Again,  conditions 
in  western  New  York  may  be  considered  as  not  greatly 
difiFerent  from  those  in  Illinois.  The  Niagara  Falls  Power 
Company  furnishes  electricity  to  tenant  companies  on  its 
lands  at  rates  ranging  from  $18.60  per  horse  power  per  an- 
num, for  a  60-kilowatt  motor  running  ten  hours  a  day,  to 
$28.80  for  a  10-kilowatt  motor  running  ten  hours  a  day; 
while  for  special  service  in  amounts  of  500  horse  power  or 
more  the  rate  is  $28  per  horse  power  per  year.^  These 
figures,  be  it  observed,  do  not  represent  net  earnings.  They 
include  all  of  the  costs  of  production.  Now,  if  it  be  assumed 
that  the  power  company  makes  a  profit  of  10  per  cent,  the 
net  earnings  per  horse  power  per  year  vary  from  $1.86  to 
$2.88.  "In  North  and  South  Carolina  the  average  charge  is 
$15  per  horse  power  per  year  for  sixty-six  hours  per  week."  * 
Mr.  W.  E.  Herring,  an  engineer  in  the  United  States  Forest 
Service,  states  that  "water  power  can  be  and  is  sold  for  as 
low  as  $20  per  horse  power  per  year  when  necessary  to  se- 
cure the  business."'  That  is,  it  is  sold  for  that  price  except 
where  monopoly  conditions  permit  a  higher  price.^  These 
estimates  all  mean  that  private  companies  can  make  a 
profit  when  selling  hydro-electric  power  at  about  $20  per 
horse  power  per  year.  The  net  profit  would  therefore 
doubtless  be  something  near  $2  per  year.  Such  facts  as 
these  do  not  giv^e  much  assurance  that  the  State  of  Illinois 
would  be  able  to  dispose  of  all  of  its  available  power  at  an 
average  net  profit  of  $25  per  horse  power  per  year. 

It  seems,  moreover,  that  the  rates  paid  for  the  water  power 
would,  in  nearly  every  case,  be  entirely  under  the  control  of 
the  Commonwealth  Edison  Company .  This  company  "con- 
trols all  the  franchises  and  all  the  power  plants,  excepting 

*  These  rates  were  secured  from  the  Niagara  Falls  Power  Company. 
'  Preliminary  Report  of  the  Inland  Waterways  Commission,  p.  449. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  450. 

*  The  only  case  cited  by  Mr.  Herring  where  private  companies  have  a 
virtual  monopoly  is  in  California.  There  in  some  cases  power  has  been 
sold  for  as  much  as  $98  per  horse  power  per  year  {ibid.,  p.  448). 


FOURTEEN  FEET  THROUGH  THE  VALLEY    869 

that  of  the  Sanitary  District  and  three  or  four  insignificant 
municipal  plants,  within  a  radius  of  fifty  miles  of  the  city 
hall  of  Chicago.  From  Waukegan  to  Oak  Park,  from  Jo- 
liet  to  Harvey,  the  Commonwealth  Edison  Company  holds 
sway.  It  owns  the  Cosmopolitan,  it  owns  the  North  Shore, 
it  owns  the  Economy  Light  and  Power  Company,  It  pro- 
poses to  control  all  the  electric  railroads,  surface  and  ele- 
vated, and  to  furnish  power  to  the  steam  roads  as  well.  It 
has  an  enormous  steam  power  production,  and  will  not 
furnish  water  power  except  at  a  bargain.' 

"Now,  the  present  plan  provides  that  the  state  shall 
erect  power  houses,  water  wheels,  and  generators  and  sell 
power  at  the  power  houses.  Who  will  come  to  bid?  The 
Commonwealth  Edison  Company  and  its  constituent  com- 
panies? Yes,  and  at  their  own  price.  Anybody  else?  If 
so,  who  and  how?"^  There  is  no  chance  whatever  for  in- 
dependent concerns  to  compete  with  the  Commonwealth 
Edison  combination. 

In  the  light  of  these  many  considerations  it  is  apparent 
that  very  little  revenue  could  be  derived  from  the  sale  of 
water  power  along  this  route.  The  power  now  being  de- 
veloped along  the  Drainage  Canal  is  sufficient  to  supply 
any  demands  that  may  arise,  and  the  chief  result  of  the 
increased  flow  between  Lockport  and  Utica  would  be  to 
strengthen  the  position  of  the  Commonwealth  Edison 
Company. 

*  Such  a  control  of  all  the  lines  of  the  Chicago  district  has  been  secured 
since  the  above  was  written. 

*  Proceedings  of  the  Board  of  Trustees,  supra,  p.  88. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

A   DEPTH  OF  EIGHT  FEET  FROM  LAKES  TO  GULF 

1.  The  two  previous  chapters  have  considered  the  projects 
for  a  waterway  from  the  Great  Lakes  to  the  Gulf  of  Mex- 
ico which  call  for  depths  of  twenty-four  and  fourteen  feet 
respectively.  It  remains  to  inquire  as  to  the  feasibility  of 
constructing  an  eight-foot  waterway  from  Chicago  to  New 
Orleans.  The  Government  engineers,  who  have  denounced 
the  building  of  a  deep  waterway,  are  nevertheless  disposed 
to  regard  this  project  with  favor.  In  fact,  a  compromise  on 
this  depth  between  the  enthusiastic  advocates  of  waterway 
development,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  more  conservative 
Government  Engineering  corps  and  the  National  Water- 
ways Commission,  on  the  other,  is  not  unlikely.^ 

Plans  for  the  regularization  of  the  Mississippi  River, 
now  nearly  completed,  will  give  it  a  permanent  channel 
depth  of  eight  feet  from  St.  Louis  to  the  Gulf.  The  present 
question,  therefore,  narrows  down  to  a  consideration  of 
the  practicability  of  constructing  a  channel  eight  feet  deep 
from  Chicago  to  St.  Louis. 

The  proposed  route  is  by  way  of  the  Chicago  River 
and  the  Drainage  Canal  for  a  distance  of  thirty-six  miles 
to  Lockport.  This  section  would  need  no  improvements. 
From  Lockport  to  Utica,  a  distance  of  sixty-one  miles,  it 
would  follow  the  Des  Plaines  River  through  what  is  called 
the  "rock-bound  valley."  From  Utica  the  route  would 
utilize  the  Illinois  River  for  a  distance  of  two  hundred 

^  A  depth  of  nine  feet  has  been  given  a  great  deal  of  consideration. 
The  army  engineers  believe,  however,  that  a  present  depth  of  eight  feet, 
which  can  be  extended  to  nine  feet  if  later  developments  so  warrant,  ia 
the  more  feasible. 


EIGHT  FEET  FROM  LAKES  TO  GULF    371 

and  thirty  miles,  to  its  mouth  at  Grafton;  thence  the 
Mississippi  to  St.  Louis,  thirty-six  miles  below.  This  por- 
tion of  the  route,  from  Utica  to  St.  Louis,  already  has  a 
depth  of  about  seven  feet  for  most  of  the  distance.  The 
increased  discharge  of  water  from  the  Drainage  Canal 
would  materially  raise  the  level  of  the  Illinois  River,  and 
it  is  estimated  that  by  means  of  dredging  a  depth  of  eight 
feet  could  be  provided  at  comparatively  small  outlay.^ 

2.  It  is  now  our  purpose  to  consider  the  probability  of 
an  extensive  development  of  traffic  on  the  proposed  route. 
The  spirited  debates  on  the  relative  merits  of  the  dififerent 
depths  of  channel  that  have  been  proposed  have  tended  to 
divert  attention  from  the  question  of  traffic.  The  Govern- 
ment engineers  have  pronounced  a  verdict  that  a  water- 
way eight  feet  in  depth  would  be  of  sufficient  size  to  care 
for  all  the  prospective  traffic,  present  and  future;  but  this 
may  not  be  a  sufficient  justification  for  the  construction 
of  the  waterway.  Ought  not  the  question  to  be  raised 
whether  the  prospective  present  and  future  traffic  is  suffi- 
cient in  amount  to  care  for  the  waterway?  Or,  in  other 
words,  is  there  any  assurance  that  there  is  sufficient 
traffic  which  will  use  the  waterway  to  justify  its  construc- 
tion? 

It  may  be  concluded  at  once  that  it  is  certain  that  this 
waterway,  like  every  other  one  of  shallow  depth,  would 
have  to  rely  almost  entirely  upon  bulky  traffic  of  relatively 
low  value.  It  would  unquestionably  be  of  the  same  general 
character  as  that  which  moves  on  the  present  waterways 
of  this  country  and  on  the  barge  canals  of  Europe.  In  the 
succeeding  pages  we  shall,  therefore,  consider  the  relation 
to  the  route  in  question  of  such  commodities  as  usually 
travel  by  water,  in  an  attempt  to  ascertain  the  extent  of 
traffic  development  that  could  be  expected  between  Lake 
Michigan  and  points  along  the  Mississippi  River. 
*  For  cost  estimate  see  p.  359. 


372        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

3.  It  is  claimed  by  the  advocates  of  the  Lakes-to-Gulf 
Waterway  Association  that  a  vast  quantity  of  grain  and 
other  agricultural  produce  would  be  readily  marketed  by 
means  of  this  waterway;  whereas  now,  for  want  of  ade- 
quate railway  facilities,  it  not  infrequently  must  remain 
for  weeks,  and  often  eventually  spoil,  in  the  hands  of  the 
farmers. 
To  test  the  truth  of  this  contention,  it  is  only  necessary 
to  recall  what  was  learned  in  a  preceding  chapter,  namely, 
that  one  of  the  chief  reasons  for  the  decline  of  traffic  on 
American  waterways  has  been  the  cost  of  transshipment. 
Only  a  small  fraction  of  a  per  cent  of  the  agricultural 
produce  of  the  Middle  West  is  grown  near  enough  to  this 
or  connecting  water  routes,  to  allow  of  direct  loading  from 
the  farmers'  wagons  to  barges.  And,  due  to  the  fact  that 
we  are  consuming  within  this  country  an  ever-increasing 
proportion  of  our  agricultural  produce,  double  transship- 
ments are  becoming  more  and  more  necessary  where  water 
lines  are  used;  that  is,  it  is  necessary  to  transship  freight 
first  from  rail  to  water,  and  then  again  from  the  waterway 
to  the  railroad  which  is  to  carry  the  traffic  to  the  final 
destination.  This  is  in  contrast  with  export  traffic  where 
only  a  single  transshipment  is  required  before  it  reaches 
the  shipping  port.  Where  double  transshipments  are 
necessary,  there  is  no  possibility  that  any  considerable 
amount  of  traffic  will  use  a  waterway.  It  should  be  recalled 
here  that  France  has  been  utterly  unable  to  develop  a 
transshipping  business,  and  that  it  has  been  secured  in 
Germany  only  by  means  of  heavy  subsidies. 

It  is  also  recognized  in  Germany,  it  should  be  recalled, 
that  agricultural  produce  cannot  advantageously  be  carried 
to  market  by  water  for  the  reason  that  farming  is  a  decen- 
tralized industry,  and  the  produce  must  be  collected  from 
a  relatively  wide  area.  The  Germans  recognize  that  when 
it  is  once  on  the  railways  it  is  cheaper  to  allow  it  to  go  all 
the  way  to  market  by  rail.   Only  in  the  case  of  imported 


EIGHT  FEET  FROM  LAKES  TO  GULF    373 

foodstuffs,  the  destination  of  which  is  industrial  towns  on 
the  banks  of  water  routes,  does  agricultural  produce  make 
extensive  use  of  the  waterways  of  Germany;  and  the  same 
is  likewise  true  of  France.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  there 
is  practically  no  import  trade  in  foodstuffs  in  the  United 
States. 

In  this  country,  however,  agricultural  produce  which 
is  destined  for  export  might  possibly  travel  the  long  dis- 
tance from  Chicago  to  the  Atlantic  Ocean  or  to  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico,  if  efficient  water  routes  were  available.  Without 
at  this  place  going  into  the  question  of  the  amount  of  export 
traflSc  in  foodstuffs,  or  the  relative  cost  of  moving  it  by 
rail  and  by  water  from  the  Middle  West  to  the  seaboard, 
it  can  be  stated  with  certainty,  nevertheless,  that  farm 
products  whose  destination  is  in  Europe  would  not  travel 
from  Chicago  or  Duluth  by  way  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico, 
when  they  could  use  a  route  several  thousand  miles  shorter 
by  way  of  the  Great  Lakes  and  the  Erie  Canal,  or  by 
way  of  the  Great  Lakes,  the  Canadian  canals,  and  the  St. 
Lawrence  River.  It  may  also  be  said  without  fear  of 
contradiction,  that  we  never  will  export  large  quantities  of 
foodstuffs  to  South  America,  for  the  good  reason  that 
the  South  American  continent  is  better  adapted  to  the 
growing  of  agricultural  products  than  is  North  America. 
TraflSc  in  farm  products  between  Chicago  and  New  Orleans 
would  therefore  be  a  negligible  quantity. 

4.  The  commodity  which  it  is  thought  would  make  most 
extensive  use  of  a  waterway  through  Illinois  is  coal.  It 
is  argued  by  some  that  coal  might  be  brought  all  the  way 
to  Chicago  from  Pennsylvania;  that  is,  that  it  would  travel 
down  the  Ohio,  then  up  the  Mississippi  and  Illinois  Rivers, 
and  the  new  water  route  to  Chicago.  As  throwing  light 
upon  the  possibility  of  such  a  development,  two  facts  of 
importance  should  be  mentioned.  First,  but  a  very  small 
part  of  the  coal  which  is  at  present  floated  down  the  Ohio 


374        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

is  sent  up  the  Mississippi  to  St.  Louis,  although  the  depth 
of  the  river  is  eight  feet  for  nearly  the  whole  year.  Second, 
there  is  an  abundance  of  coal  much  nearer  Chicago,  in  the 
Indiana  and  Illinois  coal-fields.  If  any  coal  would  use  the 
waterway  it  would  be  that  from  the  Illinois  fields. 

In  order  to  discover  whether  coal  produced  in  Illinois 
would  be  carried  to  Chicago  and  St.  Louis  by  water,  it  is 
necessary  to  give  attention  to  the  precise  source  and  the 
ultimate  destination  of  this  coal.  As  to  its  source,  it  should 
be  noted  that  it  is  not  located  immediately  upon  the  banks 
of  the  proposed  water  route,  where,  as  in  western  Penn- 
sylvania, it  could  be  loaded  at  once  into  barges.  Much 
the  greater  part  of  it,  at  least,  would  have  first  to  be 
brought  to  the  waterway  by  rail  and  then  be  transshipped 
to  boats.  In  order  to  insure  the  carriage  of  this  coal  by 
water,  therefore,  the  savings  in  haulage  charges,  on  the 
waterway  —  granting,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  that 
there  would  be  savings  —  would  have  to  be  more  than 
suflScient  to  cover  this  cost  of  transshipping.  Now,  since 
the  distance  from  central  Illinois  to  either  Chicago  or  St. 
Louis  is  comparatively  short,  the  savings  in  hauling  by 
water  would  at  best  be  relatively  unimportant.  It  is  a  car- 
dinal principle  in  European  transportation  that,  in  order  to 
offset  the  losses  involved  in  transshipping,  the  savings  on 
the  waterways  must  be  extended  over  a  long  distance.  (It 
should  be  borne  in  mind  here  that  when  we  speak  of  savings 
on  the  waterways  we  are  not  admitting  that  water  trans- 
portation is  cheaper,  all  factors  considered,  than  that  by 
rail.  The  lower  rates  on  waterways  are  usually  due  to 
the  fact  that  they  are  supported  by  the  Government. 
We  are  merely  calling  attention  to  the  consideration  that, 
even  if  there  were  savings  in  particular  cases  so  far  as  the 
mere  hauling  between  two  points  is  concerned,  the  whole 
story  is  by  no  means  told  thereby.  We  must  consider  the 
entire  charge  from  point  of  origin  to  point  of  destination.) 

Let  us  now  consider  the  destination  of  this  coal.   Only 


EIGHT   FEET  FROM  LAKES  TO  GULF    875 

a  very  small  portion  of  it  would  be  used  by  factories 
located  on  the  banks  of  the  Drainage  Canal  and  the  Chi- 
cago River.  The  belief  that  the  district  along  the  Drain- 
age Canal  is  soon  to  become  a  veritable  hive  of  industry  is 
based  on  the  assumption  of  a  deep-water  connection  with 
the  Gulf.  If  ocean  vessels  were  to  come  inland  to  Chicago 
it  might  be  to  the  distinct  advantage  of  industrial  establish- 
ments to  locate  along  the  waterway.  But  manufactured 
products  are  not  profitably  shipped  by  barge  or  canal 
boat,  and  there  would  hence  be  little  inducement  for  plants 
to  locate  near  a  Lakes-to-Mississippi  barge  canal,  so  far 
as  considerations  affecting  the  shipments  of  their  finished 
products  are  concerned.  It  might,  indeed,  be  thought  that 
they  would  so  locate  for  the  purpose  of  receiving  their 
supplies  of  fuel  and  raw  materials  by  water,  but  since  it  is 
absolutely  imperative  that  they  be  in  touch  with  railway 
communication,  it  cannot  but  be  expected  that  they  will 
make  the  determining  factor  in  the  choice  of  a  site  the  ex- 
cellence of  railway  accommodations.  In  support  of  this, 
witness  the  fact  that  everywhere  in  this  country  our  indus- 
tries have  been  built  up  around  the  railways,  and  have 
almost  wholly  disregarded  the  possibilities  of  water  transit. 
Not  until  a  waterway  exists  which  can  be  depended  upon  to 
carry  all  the  traffic  of  establishments,  at  all  times,  and  to  all 
destinations  can  we  expect  to  see  it  attract  them  to  its  banks. 
The  present  industries  of  Chicago,  at  any  rate,  are  for 
the  most  part  not  in  close  proximity  to  the  proposed  route, 
and  it  is  apparent,  therefore,  that  coal  brought  into  Chicago 
by  canal  would  have  to  be  carted  a  greater  or  less  distance 
across  the  city  in  order  to  reach  its  final  destination.  Here 
arises  the  same  consideration  that  was  found  to  be  decisive 
in  London.  ^  "  The  railways  penetrate  every  part  of  Chicago 
with  their  spurs,  sidings,  and  industry  tracks,  and  place 
coal  very  near  if  not  immediately  beside  the  furnace  where 
it  is  to  be  burned.  Delivery  by  vessel  generally  involves 
*  See  chapter  vi. 


376        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

an  extra  handling  at  the  docks  and  a  long  haul  by  team, 
which  frequently  costs  as  much  as  the  entire  transporta- 
tion from  the  mine."  ^ 

In  the  case  of  coal  for  household  consumption,  the  rail- 
ways possess  the  twofold  advantage  of  being  able  to  deliver 
it  in  the  section  of  the  city  where  it  is  needed,  and  of  carry- 
ing it  with  less  breakage  than  could  the  waterw^ay.  Then, 
too,  the  canal  would  be  blocked  by  ice  for  a  considerable 
portion  of  the  year,  and  at  the  very  time  when  coal  is  most 
in  demand  by  the  householders. 

We  find,  therefore,  that  there  would  be  heavy  extra  costs 
at  both  ends  of  the  line,  if  coal  were  shipped  to  Chicago 
by  water.  If  the  Illinois  canal  were  supported  free  of  tolls, 
it  would  still  be  folly  to  suppose  that  the  slightly  lower 
haulage  rates  for  a  distance  of  a  couple  of  hundred  miles, 
which  might  possibly  result,  would  be  sufficient  to  pay  for 
the  cost  of  transshipping  from  the  railroads  to  canal  boats 
and  the  cost  of  a  long  wagon  haul  in  the  city.  To  believe 
that  this  coal  would  be  shipped  to  Chicago  in  large  quan- 
tities by  water  is  wholly  to  ignore  the  history  of  water 
transportation  in  this  and  other  countries. 

Let  us  now  inquire  as  to  the  probable  extent  of  the 
reduction  in  freight  rates  that  may  be  expected  on  this 
canal.  The  following  are  some  average  rates  on  coal  per 
net  ton  by  rail  in  Illinois,  and  by  water  in  Europe  for  similar 
distances :  ^  — 


Distance 

Rate 

Antwerp  to  Charleroi  via  Scheldt  and  canal  .     . 
Streator  to  Chicago  via  Sante  Fe 

Charleroi  to  Ghent  via  Scheldt  and  canals     .     . 
Danville  to  Chicago  via  C.  &  E.  I.  R.  R.  .     .     . 

87.87 
94.00 

110.37 
123.40 

$  .56 

.81 

.66 
.67 

*  Tunell,  in  Report  of  Chicago  Harbor  Commission,  p.  i227. 

^  Ibid.,  p.  235.  These  railroads  entering  Chicago  were  recently  per- 
mitted to  raise  their  rates  on  coal  seven  cents  a  ton.  To  obtain  the  pre- 
sent rates  this  amount  should  be  added  to  the  figures  in  the  table. 


EIGHT  FEET  FROM  LAKES  TO  GULF    377 


Antwerp  to  Paris  via  Scheldt  and  canals 
Duquoin  to  Chicago  via  Illinois  Central 


Antwerp  to  Cologne  via  Rhine    .     .     . 
Wenona  to  Chicago  via  Illinois  Central 


Antwerp  to  Mannheim  via  Rhine 
Eldorado  to  Chicago  via  Big  Four 


Rate 

1.70 
.90 

.55 
.55 

1.10 
1.00 


It  may  be  seen  from  this  table  that  the  railway  rates  on 
coal  in  Illinois  compare  very  favorably  with  the  water 
rates  in  Europe.  It  should  be  recalled  here  that  the.se  water 
rates  are  not  sufficiently  high  to  cover  permanent  charges 
on  the  fixed  capital  invested.  In  most  cases  they  represent 
little  more  than  the  mere  haulage  charges,  the  Rhine  River, 
for  instance,  being  entirely  free  of  tolls.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  railways  in  Illinois  are  attempting  to  earn  profits  on 
their  entire  investment.  In  the  light  of  these  figures  there 
is  little  reason  to  believe  that  the  rates  for  coal  on  a  canal 
through  Illinois,  even  if  no  tolls  were  charged  and  the  canal 
were  supported  out  of  general  taxation,  would  be  any  lower 
than  those  on  the  present  railways.  This  being  true,  and 
with  heavy  extra  costs  at  both  ends  of  the  route  if  the  coal 
were  carried  by  water,  the  case  appears  conclusive  that 
the  railroads  would  continue  to  furnish  Chicago  with  her 
supply  of  coal.  The  situation  at  St.  Louis  is  practically 
the  same.  The  lower  Illinois  and  the  Mississippi,  more- 
over, are  at  present  deep  enough  to  carry  coal  to  St.  Louis, 
but  very  little  of  such  traffic  has  developed. 

It  should  be  observed,  finally,  that  a  large  part  of  this 
coal  in  Illinois  is  owned  by  the  railroads,  —  a  fact  sufficient 
to  dispel  any  lingering  hope  that  it  would  forsake  the  rail- 
ways if  a  water  route  to  Chicago  were  available. 

It  cannot  be  expected  that  any  traffic  in  iron  or  other 
ores  would  develop  along  a  water  route  between  Chicago 
and  St.  Louis,  for  the  reason  that  there  are  no  deposits  of 
ore  in  this  section  of  the  country. 


378        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

5.  The  water  tonnage,  after  coal  and  ores,  which  is 
usually  of  most  importance  is  that  in  building-materials  of 
various  kinds,  sand,  clay,  gravel,  cement,  etc.  It  seems, 
however,  that  a  canal  through  Illinois  would  be  of  little 
use  in  the  transport  of  these  materials. 

In  the  first  place,  building-materials  are  seldom  brought 
from  long  distances.  The  supply  of  sand  within  the  city 
of  Chicago  is  unlimited,  and  excellent  clay  is  near  at  hand. 
Stone  of  good  quality  can  be  found  at  many  places  within 
the  city  limits  and  along  the  Drainage  Canal.  The  Illinois 
Steel  Company  has  a  huge  cement  plant,  just  across  the 
state  line  in  Indiana,  and  Chicago  will  continue  to  receive 
the  greater  part  of  her  cement  supply  from  there.  A  water- 
way connection  from  Lockport  to  the  Mississippi  River 
would  be  of  no  service  whatever  in  furnishing  Chicago  with 
building-materials.  The  Drainage  Canal  and  Lake  Michi- 
gan already  afford  all  the  waterway  service  for  this  sort  of 
traffic  that  is  required. 

Even  were  it  necessary  to  ship  building-materials  to 
Chicago  from  a  distance,  the  railways  would  possess  a 
decided  advantage  over  a  canal  for  that  purpose,  in  being 
able  to  deliver  the  materials  near  the  sites  of  the  build- 
ing operations,  thereby  saving  the  heavy  cost  of  trucking 
within  the  city.  A  builder  in  Chicago,  at  any  considerable 
distance  from  the  Drainage  Canal  or  the  river,  will  say 
without  hesitation  that  the  cost  of  trucking  his  materials 
from  the  river  or  canal  for  several  miles  across  the  city  is 
prohibitive.  This  consideration  accounts  for  the  fact  that 
comparatively  little  of  such  traffic  now  makes  use  of  the 
Drainage  Canal. 

For  similar  reasons  the  opening-up  of  a  through  route 
from  Chicago  to  the  Mississippi  would  not  aid  St.  Louis  in 
this  regard.  The  Mississippi  and  the  Missouri  in  their 
present  state  furnish  sufficient  means  for  carrying  such 
traffic  as  demands  water  transportation.  Again,  few  build- 
ing-materials would  be  shipped  in  from  a  distance. 


EIGHT  FEET  FROM  LAKES  TO  GULF    S79 

Some  local  traffic  in  building-materials  might  be  expected 
to  develop  at  intermediate  points,  but  it  could  not  be  heavy 
at  besty  for  the  reason  that  there  is  comparatively  little 
sand,  clay,  or  brick  requiring  shipment.  The  greater  por- 
tion of  it  is  always  produced  at  home  and  is  carried  for  the 
short  distance  necessary  by  wagons. 

6.  Traffic  in  lumber  presents  another  possibility  for  a 
water  route  between  Chicago  and  Mississippi  River  points. 
In  order  to  ascertain  the  future  of  lumber  as  a  waterway 
commodity,  it  will  be  necessary  to  consider  the  sources  of 
the  lumber  supply  of  the  Middle  West. 

The  states  of  Michigan,  Wisconsin,  and  Minnesota  were 
once  covered  with  what  was  considered  an  inexhaustible 
supply  of  timber.  Millions  upon  millions  of  feet  of  white 
and  Norway  pine  and  of  the  less  valuable  grades  of  timber 
were  in  the  early  days  annually  floated  down  the  streams 
tributary  to  the  Lakes  and  the  Mississippi  to  be  manu- 
factured in  Chicago,  Milwaukee,  Muskegon,  and  other 
Lake  cities,  and  in  Minneapolis,  St.  Paul,  St.  Louis,  and 
many  other  towns  on  the  Upper  Mississippi.  Timber  made 
up  the  great  bulk  of  the  water  traffic  of  the  Northw^est. 
But  in  recent  years  conditions  have  materially  changed. 
Our  forest  resources  have  proved  to  be  far  from  inex- 
haustible; already  great  sections  of  these  Northern  States 
have  become  burned-over  "slashings";  while  the  virgin 
forests  familiar  to  the  preceding  generation  are  almost  a 
thing  of  the  past.  Stream  after  stream  has  sent  down  its 
last  log,  and  lumber  town  after  lumber  town  has  turned  its 
attention  to  some  other  form  of  manufacture.  The  forests 
adjacent  to  the  rivers  were  the  first  to  be  depleted,  and 
what  timber  remains  is  now  so  far  removed  from  the  streams 
that  the  old  method  of  floating  logs  down  them  in  the 
spring  has  been  abandoned.  The  sawmills  have  been  re- 
moved from  the  river  towns  to  new  lumbering  centres, 
inland  near  the  source  of  the  timber  supply.   And  from 


380        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

these  interior  mills  the  manufactured  lumber  is  sent  to 
market  more  advantageously  by  railways,  since  they  obvi- 
ate the  necessity  of  transshipping  en  route. 

Changed  methods  of  doing  business  at  the  mills  also 
partly  account  for  the  increasing  lumber  traffic  by  rail. 
"It  is  now  the  custom  to  sort  lumber  where  it  is  sawed  and 
to  fill  orders  of  consumers  and  country  dealers  directly 
from  the  mills.  These  consignments  generally  go  by  rail. 
Formerly  the  sorting  was  done  by  the  wholesalers  at  the 
great  distributing  centres  about  the  Lakes,  who  bought 
supplies  by  the  cargo  and  often  made  a  large  portion  of 
their  profits  by  a  nice  manipulation  of  the  mixed  stocks 
received."  ^ 

The  exhaustion  of  the  supply  of  the  timber  in  the  region 
bordering  the  Great  Lakes  makes  it  certain  that  there 
would  be  almost  no  lumber  traffic  to  be  shipped  by  water 
from  Chicago  to  points  on  the  Mississippi  River.  The 
receipts  of  lumber  at  Chicago  by  Lake  reached  their  maxi- 
mum as  early  as  1882,  since  which  date  the  total  has  rap- 
idly declined,  as  shown  in  the  table  which  follows.^ 


Year 

Receipts  of  lumber 

1882 

1,872,976,000,000  feet 

1885 

1,504,186 

1890 

1,349,921 

1895 

1,073.847 

1900 

590,270 

1905 

448,163 

1907 

411,947 

The  diminishing  supply  of  lumber  in  the  territory  surround- 
ing the  Great  Lakes  is  becoming  more  and  more  insufficient 
to  meet  the  needs  of  local  consumers. 

But  while  it  may  be  true  that  lumber  would  not  be 
shipped  by  water  from  Chicago  to  points  on  the  Missis- 
sippi River,  is  it  not  likely  that  an  extensive  traffic  in  the 
opposite  direction  would  develop? 

*  Report  of  the  Chicago  Harbor  Commission,  1909,  p.  205.        *  Ibid. 


EIGHT  FEET  FROM  LAKES  TO  GULF    381 

Attention  was  called  in  chapter  v  to  the  decline  of  the 
lumber  traffic  on  the  Upper  Mississippi  River  as  a  result 
of  the  exhaustion  of  the  timber  supply  near  its  tributary 
streams,  and  it  is  consequently  only  necessary  to  state  here 
that  traffic  in  lumber  between  Upper  Mississippi  towns 
and  Chicago  is  not  to  be  expected. 

If  any  lumber  traffic  is  to  develop  on  the  water  route  in 
question  it  must  be  in  lumber  shipped  from  places  on 
the  southern  Mississippi  or  tributaries  to  Chicago.  The 
exhaustion  of  the  timber  supply  in  the  Northern  States  has 
necessitated  the  opening-up  of  the  great  forest  resources 
of  the  South,  and  it  is  believed  by  many  that  if  a  Lakes-to- 
Gulf  waterway  were  constructed,  a  very  extensive  water- 
way traffic  would  develop  between  the  Southern  forest 
regions  and  the  Northern  markets. 

The  bulk  of  the  timber  immediately  along  the  Missis- 
sippi has,  however,  already  been  manufactured.  What  re- 
mains is  almost  entirely  in  the  hands  of  speculators,  who 
are  holding  it  for  a  higher  price  at  some  future  day.  There 
is  at  present  comparatively  little  manufacturing  of  lumber 
carried  on  in  the  towns  on  the  Lower  Mississippi.  The 
mills  have  moved  to  interior  points,  near  the  source  of  sup- 
ply, and  such  lumber  finds  the  railways  the  more  econom- 
ical means  of  shipment. 

There  are  great  quantities  of  pine,  cottonwood,  and  gum- 
wood,  however,  which  are  located  along  the  headwaters  of 
such  rivers  as  the  Arkansas,  the  Ouachita,  the  Black,  the 
Red,  the  White,  and  the  St.  Francis,  western  tributaries 
of  the  Mississippi.  And  until  the  process  of  exhausting 
the  supply  of  timber  along  these  streams  is  completed,  it 
is  possible  that  they  might  serve  as  important  feeders  to 
the  Lower  Mississippi.  Granting  this  to  be  true,  the  ques- 
tion which  concerns  us  here  is  whether  this  lumber  would 
be  sent  to  Chicago  by  water  if  a  waterway  connection 
were  available. 

It  should  be  recalled  that  by  far  the  greater  part  of  the 


382        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

timber  traffic  on  our  rivers  has  been  in  the  form  of  logs. 
The  method  employed  has  been  to  float  these  downstream, 
without  the  use  of  vessels  of  any  kind.  Now,  it  is  mani- 
festly out  of  the  question  to  float  this  timber  up  the  Missis- 
sippi and  the  Illinois  River  for  more  than  a  thousand  miles. 
The  timber  that  is  shipped  north  will  be  mainly  in  the  form 
of  manufactured  lumber. 

The  timber  along  these  rivers  might,  however,  be  floated 
down  to  the  Mississippi  to  be  manufactured  in  towns  along 
its  lower  course,  whence  it  could  be  shipped  by  way  of  the 
river  to  Northern  markets.  The  fact  is,  however,  that  the 
lumbermen  have  preferred  rather  to  build  new  mills  along 
these  tributaries  than  to  float  the  logs  for  long  distances 
down  them  to  cities  on  the  Lower  Mississippi.  The  mills 
are  following  the  tributary  streams  and  keeping  close  to  the 
source  of  the  supply  of  the  timber.  Consequently,  if  this 
manufactured  lumber  is  to  be  sent  to  Chicago  by  water,  it 
must  first  travel  down  these  tributaries  to  the  Mississippi, 
by  boat,  and  then  be  sent  north.  This  process  would 
involve  transshipping  from  the  smaller  boats  on  the  trib- 
utary streams  to  the  larger  vessels  on  the  Mississippi;  or 
else  foregoing  the  advantage  arising  from  the  use  of  the 
large  boats  for  a  part  of  the  journey.  And,  moreover,  it 
would  involve  traveling  over  a  most  roundabout  course  in 
order  to  reach  the  final  destination. 

The  distance  from  the  upper  courses  of  the  rivers  above 
mentioned  to  St.  Louis  or  Chicago  is  two  or  three  times  as 
far  by  river  as  it  is  by  rail.  If  shipped  by  river  this  lumber 
would  have  to  travel  several  hundred  miles  down  these 
tributary  streams  in  a  direction  almost  opposite  that  of 
their  final  destination.  Then  the  extraordinary  sinuosity 
'of  the  Mississippi  makes  the  distance  by  water  from  one 
point  to  another  nearly  as  far  again  as  that  by  rail.  The 
distance  from  the  Upper  Arkansas  River  to  St.  Louis  is 
nearly  four  times  as  far  by  river  as  by  rail.  With  such  a 
^handicap  in  the  matter  of  distance  added  to  that  of  trans- 


EIGHT  FEET  FROM  LAKES  TO  GULF    383 

shipment,  the  river  route  would  be  utterly  unable  to  com- 
pete with  the  railways  for  this  traffic. 

If  there  were  decided  advantages  in  shipping  Southern 
lumber  to  market  by  water,  we  would  expect  to  find  an 
extensive  development  of  water  traffic  between  southern 
Mississippi  points  and  St.  Louis.  Since  the  Mississippi  has 
a  depth  of  eight  feet  as  far  north  as  St.  Louis  for  nearly 
the  entire  year,  there  is  as  much  reason  to  believe  that  the 
water  traffic  to  St.  Louis  should  have  increased  in  recent 
years  as  to  believe  that  it  would  develop  on  an  eight-foot 
waterway  to  Chicago.  The  statistics  below  show  the  re- 
ceipts of  lumber  at  St.  Louis  by  rail  and  by  river  from 
1902  to  1906  inclusive.  They  include  receipts  from  both 
directions,  but  since  there  is  now  comparatively  little  lum- 
ber traffic  on  the  Upper  Mississippi,  they  fairly  represent 
the  situation  as  regards  the  lumber  trade  from  the  South.  ^ 


Byrail,  —  cars     .     .  131,576 

By  river,  —  feet  .     .      51,957,800 


125,847 
33,083,600 


124,045 
21,663,800 


137,083 
11,773,300 


146,741 

5,312,800 


The  traffic  on  the  railways  shows  a  substantial  increase, 
while  that  by  water  has  decreased  with  surprising  rapidity. 
The  amount  carried  by  boat,  moreover,  is  but  a  small 
fraction  of  that  on  the  railways. 

The  same  railway  advantages  are  present  in  the  case 
of  the  lumber  traffic  as  in  the  case  of  coal  and  building- 
materials.  When  it  is  carried  by  rail,  transshipments  are 
unnecessary,  and  at  the  same  time  it  can  be  delivered  as  a 
rule  much  nearer  the  spot  where  it  is  to  be  used.  It  would 
seem  certain,  therefore,  that  very  little  traffic  in  manufac- 
tured lumber  could  be  expected  to  develop  between  Mis- 
sissippi River  points  and  Chicago. 


7.  Cotton  is  another  commodity  which  it  is  believed 
would  make  extensive  use  of  a  waterway  between  Chicago 
*  Report  of  the  Inland  Waterways  Commission,  p.  157. 


384        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  The  development  of  manufactur- 
ing in  the  Middle  West  will  without  doubt  result  in  an 
increasing  proportion  of  the  cotton  supply  of  the  South 
being  sent  north  each  year  to  such  central  points  as  St. 
Louis  and  Chicago.  The  bulky  nature  of  raw  cotton  at 
once  suggests  the  possibility  that  it  would  incline  to  water 
transportation  were  a  water  route  available. 

In  the  chapter  treating  of  the  decline  of  water  transporta- 
tion in  this  country  in  recent  years  attention  was  called 
to  the  heavy  falling-off  in  the  receipts  of  cotton  by  water 
at  New  Orleans.^  The  following  table  shows  that  St.  Louis 
has  had  a  like  experience.  The  statistics  are  for  the  receipts 
of  cotton  by  river  and  by  rail  at  five-year  intervals:^  — 


Year 

By  river  (bales) 

By  rail  (bales) 

1889-90 

1894-95 

1899-00 

1904-05 

13,539 
9.213 
7,172 
8,039 

525,371 
917.073 
873,079 
546,876 

The  receipts  by  water  are  seen  to  be  almost  negligible, 
and  there  is  no  more  reason  to  believe  that  cotton  would 
make  a  more  extensive  use  of  an  eight-foot  waterR'ay  to 
Chicago  than  it  does  to  St.  Louis.  \Miat  is  the  reason  for 
the  failure  of  cotton  to  use  present  waterways  ? 

Attention  was  called  in  chapter  v  to  the  shifting  of  the 
areas  of  cotton  production  after  the  Civil  War.  In  the 
early  days  the  cotton  plantations  were  confined  almost 
entirely  to  the  river  valleys,  and  the  cotton  was  loaded 
directly  from  the  wagons  of  the  farmers  to  the  river  boats. 
But  with  the  development  of  other  means  of  transporta- 
tion in  the  South,  the  culture  of  cotton  has  been  pushed 
further  and  further  back  from  the  banks  of  rivers,  until 
now  the  greater  portion  of  it  is  produced  in  interior  points 

^  See  page  93. 

*  Reportof  the  Inland  Waterways  Commission,  p.  157.  These  statistics 
are  not  kept  by  calendar  years. 


EIGHT  FEET  FROM  LAKES  TO  GULF    885 

which  possess  no  waterway  connection.  It  must  be  col- 
lected by  the  railroads.  Hence  the  familiar  handicap  of 
the  cost  of  transshipment  comes  up  again  and  operates  to 
compel  the  cotton  to  go  all  the  way  to  market  by  rail  when 
once  it  is  on  the  railway  cars.  Cotton  does  not  differ  from 
other  agricultural  produce;  it  is  produced  over  a  relatively 
wide  area,  and  for  this  reason  cannot  advantageously  make 
use  of  water  transportation.  If  cotton  were  produced 
in  Germany  it  would  be  no  more  extensively  shipped  by 
water  there  than  it  is  in  this  country. 

8.  It  is  believed  by  some  that  a  considerable  quantity 
of  certain  kinds  of  manufactures  would  make  use  of  a 
waterway  between  Chicago  and  the  Mississippi.  For  in- 
stance, it  is  thought  that  such  commodities  as  canned 
goods  and  packet  freight,  which  do  not  require  great  speed 
in  delivery,  could  very  advantageously  be  shipped  by  water 
from  Chicago  to  cities  along  the  Lower  Mississippi.  Now, 
the  truth  is  that  shipments  of  this  sort  from  St.  Louis  by 
water  are  negligible,  and  that  the  quantity  shipped  on  the 
Erie  Canal  is  very  small,  and  that  even  this  is  under  the 
control  of  the  railroads.  Railways  may  afford  to  make  use 
of  a  toll-free  waterway  supported  by  the  State,  but  they 
would  never  think  of  undergoing  the  cost  of  constructing 
a  canal  for  this  purpose.  Such  freight  as  this  does  not  make 
up  one  per  cent  of  the  traffic  on  the  waterways  of  Germany, 
and  it  could  not  be  expected  to  do  more  in  this  country. 

Even  though  a  considerable  amount  of  such  traffic  should 
develop,  it  is  by  no  means  clear  why  all  the  inhabitants 
of  the  country  should  contribute  to  the  building  and  the 
maintaining  of  a  waterway  free  of  tolls  (for  if  tolls  were 
charged  it  would  not  be  used  at  all)  in  order  to  benefit  a 
mere  handful  of  dealers  who  chance  to  be  able  to  make 
some  use  of  it.  Unless  a  waterway  can  be  used  extensively 
in  the  transport  of  a  class  of  freight,  the  cheap  carriage  of 
which  affects  the  well-being  of  the  majority  of  the  people. 


386        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

there  is  no  economic  justification  for  the  State's  construct- 
ing it. 

9.  Much  promise  has  been  held  out  for  the  development 
of  an  extensive  trade  with  South  America  as  a  direct  re- 
sult of  the  opening  of  a  waterway  connection  between  the 
Great  Lakes  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  The  trade  routes 
of  the  future  seem  destined  to  swing  from  the  general  east- 
and-west  direction  which  has  prevailed  so  long  and  to  fol- 
low that  of  the  meridian  circles.  A  Lakes-to-Gulf  water- 
way, then,  it  is  urged,  will  in  the  near  future  be  in  the 
very  pathway  of  a  great  traffic  between  the  United  States 
and  the  countries  of  South  America.  With  the  opening- 
up  of  the  Panama  Canal  an  immense  traffic  may  be  ex- 
pected to  develop  between  the  western  coast  of  South 
America  and  our  Middle  Western  States.  In  view  of 
these  prospective  trade  developments  it  is  pertinent  to 
inquire  precisely  what  the  relation  of  a  waterway  eight 
feet  in  depth  would  be  to  the  commerce  with  South 
America. 

It  should  be  called  to  mind,  first,  that  the  belief  that  a 
vast  waterway  traffic  would  develop  between  the  region 
about  the  Great  Lakes  and  South  America  has  been  predi- 
cated upon  an  assumption  of  a  waterway  of  sufficient 
depth  to  permit  the  passage  of  ocean  or  Lake  steamers. 
Such  vessels  were  to  load  at  Chicago  and  proceed,  without 
breaking  bulk,  directly  to  South  American  ports.  Now,  it 
is  plain  that  if  the  Lakes-to-Gulf  Waterway  is  to  be  only 
for  barges,  then  quite  a  different  aspect  is  given  to  the 
situation. 

When  barges  are  employed,  transshipment  to  ocean 
vessels  at  New  Orleans  is  necessary,  thus  destroying  the 
advantages  which  a  through  water  route  possesses  over  the 
broken  journey.  Again,  very  few  manufactured  commodi- 
ties could  be  expected  to  use  a  barge  waterway.  It  is  neces- 
sary, therefore,  to  raise  the  question.  What  sort  of  bulky 


EIGHT  FEET  FROM  LAKES  TO  GULF    387 

produce,  which  alone  could  use  a  barge  waterway,  will  the 
United  States  be  likely  to  ship  to  South  America  ? 

Grain  and  other  agricultural  produce  are  suggested  first. 
The  truth  is,  however,  that  South  America  is  rapidly  gain- 
ing upon  the  United  States  in  the  production  of  grain 
and  other  foodstuffs,  and  possesses  probably  much  greater 
ultimate  capacity  in  this  direction  than  does  the  northern 
continent.  We  cannot,  therefore,  expect  to  witness  any 
traffic  development  of  this  sort  over  the  route  in  question. 

Such  commodities  as  coal  and  building-materials  cannot 
at  present  be  sent  the  great  distances  that  are  here  in- 
volved, on  account  of  their  low  value.  It  may  be  said  fur- 
ther that  South  America  will  never  have  need  of  our 
building-materials,  and  if  the  time  should  come  when  she 
will  demand  coal  for  the  purpose  of  manufacture  the 
United  States  will  not  have  any  to  spare. 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  we  have  no  lumber  for  export, 
and  that  raw  cotton  will  never  be  sent  to  South  America 
to  be  manufactured.  The  trade  from  North  to  South 
America  will  be  confined  to  manufactured  products  and 
these  can  seldom  make  use  of  a  barge  waterway. 

In  one  class  of  manufactures  alone  does  there  seem  to  be 
much  if  any  possibility  of  a  development  of  water  traffic 
in  the  South  American  trade.  A  considerable  amount  of 
heavy  and  cumbersome  structural  steel  and  iron  materials 
are  being  demanded  now  in  South  America  and  these 
might  be  sent  from  Chicago  to  the  Gulf  by  water.  ^  It 
must  be  said,  however,  that  the  bulk  of  these  materials  is 
at  present  sent  to  South  America  from  Europe,  and  there 
is  no  guaranty  that  the  United  States  would  be  able  to 
secure  the  trade  by  means  of  a  waterway  from  the  Lakes 
to  the  Gulf.  The  freight  savings  (to  the  shippers)  on  a 
toll-free  waterway,  might  not  be  sufficient  to  defeat  the 
years  of  persistent  effort  on  the  part  of  the  English  and 
the  Germans  to  cultivate  friendly  trade  relations  with 
1  Transshipment  at  the  Gulf  would  still  be  necessary. 


388        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

South  America.  But  granting  that  we  could  secure  the 
lion's  share  of  this  traffic,  it  is  readily  apparent  that  this 
would  be  of  importance  chiefly  to  the  United  States  Steel 
Corporation. 

As  regards  the  import  trade  from  South  America,  the  pro- 
spect of  the  utilization  of  a  Lakes-to-Gulf  waterway  is  little 
if  any  better.  The  principal  South  American  products  sent 
to  the  United  States  are  coffee,  cocoa,  dyewoods,  nitrates, 
and  guano.  These  are  distributed  over  wide  areas  within 
this  country,  and  the  railways,  in  almost  every  case,  offer 
much  the  more  convenient  means  of  transit,  and  they 
eliminate  the  necessity  of  transshipping  en  route.  Statis- 
tics of  water  transportation  in  this  country  and  others 
reveal  that  such  commodities  as  these  do  not  usually 
travel  by  water.  The  only  import  traffic  on  the  water- 
ways of  Germany  and  France  which  is  important  is  that 
in  grain,  ores,  and  coal  in  Germany,  and  grain,  coal,  and 
wines  in  France.  In  the  absence  of  an  import  trade  of  this 
sort,  the  waterways  are  doomed  to  receive  but  a  scanty 
traffic  at  best. 

The  trade  possibilities  of  the  United  States  with  Mexico 
and  Central  America  are  very  similar  to  those  with  South 
America.  These  countries  offer  a  market  for  our  manu- 
factured products,  and  they  send  us  in  turn  mainly  coffee 
and  fruits. 

The  total  freight  tonnage  passing  between  Chicago  and 
St.  Louis  is  not  heavy  at  best;  and  it  is  shared  by  three 
railroads;  the  Chicago  and  Alton,  the  Illinois  Central,  and 
the  Wabash,  none  of  which  has  approached  the  limit  even 
of  its  present  carrying  capacity.  "During  the  fiscal  year 
ending  June  30,  1904,  the  quantity  of  freight  moved  by 
these  three  roads  from  Chicago  to  St.  Louis  was  449,115 
tons,  and  from  St.  Louis  to  Chicago  was  633,182  tons,"^ 
making  a  total  traffic  of  but  little  more  than  a  million  tons. 
Any  one  of  these  roads  could  easily  handle  this  entire 
'  Peyton,  American  Transportation  Problem,  p.  239. 


EIGHT  FEET  FROM  LAKES  TO  GULF    389 

tonnage  in  ordinary  times,  and  the  struggle  for  traflSc  is 
keen. 

Thus,  from  whatever  angle  we  view  this  situation,  it 
appears  that  there  is  very  little  traffic  which  is  assured  to 
the  waterway.  The  statement  of  the  Army  Engineers  that 
a  waterway  eight  feet  in  depth  would  be  of  sufficient  capac- 
ity to  care  for  all  the  traffic  of  the  region,  prospective  and 
future,  is  unquestionably  true.  But  it  seems  as  equally 
certain  that  the  present  and  prospective  traffic  is  not  suf- 
ficient to  care  for  the  waterway,  that  is,  to  make  its  con- 
struction economically  feasible. 

We  are  committed  to  a  waterway  eight  feet  in  depth 
from  St.  Louis  to  the  Gulf.  Purposes  of  stream  control 
and  the  prevention  of  the  overflow  of  lands  adjacent  to  the 
Mississippi,  combined  with  transportation  considerations, 
in  the  opinion  of  the  Army  Engineers  make  the  securing 
of  such  a  depth  advisable.  Since  the  revival  of  water 
transportation  in  the  United  States  is  at  best  an  experi- 
ment, the  rational  method  to  follow  would  be  to  test  the 
possibility  of  developing  traffic  on  the  Lower  Mississippi 
before  authorizing  the  construction  of  a  waterway  between 
that  river  and  the  Great  Lakes. 

10.  In  the  light  of  the  foregoing  considerations  relative 
to  the  possibilities  of  traffic  development  along  the  route  in 
question,  what  is  to  be  said  of  the  bold  statement  of  the 
advocates  of  a  Lakes-to-Gulf  waterway,  to  the  effect  that 
the  construction  of  such  a  water  route  would  permanently 
relieve  the  congestion  of  freight  traffic  in  thirty -three  great 
states  of  the  Middle  West?  We  have  been  assured  that  a 
waterway  through  the  Valley  would  almost  wholly  remove 
the  necessity  of  extending  the  railway  system  in  a  region 
covering  more  than  half  our  national  area.  We  have  been 
told,  in  so  many  words,  that  to  develop  the  railroads  of  the 
country  to  a  point  where  they  can  meet  the  needs  of  com- 
merce would  require  an  expenditure  of  more  than  five  bil- 


890        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

lions  of  dollars  in  ten  years,  and  that,  on  the  other  hand, 
a  waterway  costing  at  best  a  couple  of  hundred  millions 
would  practically  solve  the  entire  problem.  But  we  have 
found,  alas !  that  the  merest  fraction  of  the  traffic  requiring 
shipment  in  the  Middle  West  is  located  immediately  upon 
the  waterway  in  question;  that  practically  all  of  it  would 
still  have  to  be  collected  by  the  railways;  and  that  hence 
the  additional  railway  facilities  would  none  the  less  be 
required. 

An  all-important  consideration  in  regard  to  the  question 
of  traffic  congestion  should  be  raised  in  this  place,  because 
the  fact  doubtless  still  sticks  in  the  mind  of  the  reader  that 
there  was  a  serious  congestion  of  traffic  on  the  railroads 
only  a  few  years  ago,  and  that  a  recurrence  of  that  condi- 
tion is  not  improbable.  Attention  should  be  directed  to 
the  fact  that  this  congestion  was  primarily  due,  however, 
not  so  much  to  an  insufficient  number  of  cars,  as  to  a  lack 
of  adequate  transfer  facilities  between  different  lines  and 
different  sections  of  the  same  line.  Cars  are  oftentimes 
delayed  for  days  on  sidings  and  in  yards  before  there  is  an 
opportunity  to  switch  them  to  the  proper  tracks.  These 
delays  mean  that  the  existing  cars  are  not  utilized  to  their 
full  capacity,  and  a  failure  to  get  cars  when  they  are  de- 
sired is  almost  always  traceable  to  a  congestion  of  traffic 
at  important  terminal  and  transfer  centres.  If  waterways, 
then,  are  to  relieve  the  congestion  of  traffic  that  sometimes 
occurs,  they  must  do  it  by  relieving  the  tension  at  these 
centres. 

The  fact  seems  to  be  clear,  however,  that  this  they  would 
be  entirely  unable  to  do.  Since  the  greater  portion  of  the 
water  traffic  must  originate  on  the  railways,  transship- 
ments, as  we  have  pointed  out  many  times,  would  be  una- 
voidable. Now,  it  is  a  plain  proposition  that  the  transship- 
ment of  a  cargo  from  a  railway  car  to  a  canal  boat  requires 
more  time  than  the  mere  transfer  of  a  car  from  one  railway 
track  to  another.    In  order  to  relieve  the  congestion  of 


EIGHT  FEET  FROM  LAKES  TO  GULF    391 

traflSc  it  is  necessary  to  shorten  the  time  required  in  mak- 
ing transfers  en  route.  But  the  breaking  of  bulk  that  is 
necessary  in  order  to  use  a  waterway  for  a  part  of  the  dis- 
tance has  a  directly  opposite  effect.  It  greatly  increases 
the  time  required  to  move  traffic  a  given  distance,  and  it 
only  intensifies  the  congestion  at  the  places  of  transfer. 

The  remedy  for  the  congestion  of  freight  traffic  that 
sometimes  occurs  lies  primarily  in  aiding  or  compelling  the 
railways  to  increase  the  number  of  their  cars,  to  construct 
more  sidings  and  yards,  and  to  improve  the  machinery  of 
transfer  at  railroad  centres.* 

*  This  question  of  the  capacity  of  the  railways  to  expand  with  the  need« 
of  growing  commerce  will  be  treated  more  fully  in  succeeding  chapters. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

IMPROVEMENT    OF   THE   OHIO   RIVER 

1.  Closely  related  to  the  construction  of  a  Lakes-to-Gulf 
waterway  is  a  project  for  improving  navigation  on  the 
Ohio  River,  For  several  years  the  Ohio  Valley  Improve- 
ment Association  has  besieged  the  National  Government 
for  appropriations  with  which  to  deepen  the  Ohio  River 
to  nine  feet,  and  to  give  it  a  slack-water  navigation,  by 
means  of  a  system  of  locks,  throughout  the  year.  With  the 
support  of  President  Taft  and  a  Board  of  Army  Engineers, 
appointed  for  the  purpose  of  investigating  both  the  engi- 
neering and  the  commercial  aspects  of  the  case,  Congress 
adopted  in  1910  a  plan  for  improving  the  River  at  a  cost 
of  about  $63,000,000.  Annual  appropriations  are  now  being 
made  in  pursuance  of  this  plan,  and  it  is  hoped  that  the 
improvement  will  be  completed  in  twelve  years. 

The  Ohio  is  unusual  among  American  rivers  in  that  it 
alone  has  retained  a  large  traffic  in  recent  years.  The  sta- 
tistics of  water  traffic  in  coal  at  Cincinnati  show  that  there 
has  been  an  increase  from  56,434,707  bushels  in  1893  to 
62,572,000  bushels  in  1906.'  Though  this  increase  is  com- 
paratively slight,  and  though  the  railway  tonnage  had  in- 
creased relatively  very  much  faster,  the  showing  of  the 
Ohio,  as  compared  with  other  rivers,  has  nevertheless  been 
remarkably  good. 

Again,  the  possibilities  of  an  extensive  future  develop- 
ment of  traffic  on  the  Ohio  appears  much  better  than  it 
does  on  any  other  American  river.  At  its  headwaters  is 
situated  the  great  industrial  region  known  as  the  Pittsburg 
district,  and  along  its  banks,  and  those  of  the  Lower  Missis- 

*  Preliminary  Report  of  the  Inland  Waterways  Commission,  p.  153. 


IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  OHIO  RIVER    393 

sippi,  are  a  large  number  of  industrial  towns  which  carry 
on  an  immense  trade  with  the  Pittsburg  region.  The  Ohio, 
therefore,  Hes  in  the  direction  of  a  hea\y  existing  traffic, 
and  in  a  region  that  seems  certain  to  develop  rapidly  in  the 
future.  These  two  reasons,  the  existence  of  a  large  water 
tonnage  at  present,  and  the  excellent  location  of  the  river 
in  reference  to  trade  routes,  account  for  the  preference 
that  is  being  shown  the  Ohio  River  project.  It  may,  indeed, 
safely  be  said  that  if  an  experiment  had  to  be  performed  in 
water  transportation,  the  Ohio  River  was  well  chosen  for 
the  purpose. 

It  is  by  no  means  clear,  however,  that  an  experiment  of 
this  sort  is  justifiable.  There  are  many  considerations  that 
have  not  been  touched  upon  by  the  advocates  of  the  Ohio 
River  project,  and  there  are  some  comparisons  of  para- 
mount importance  that  seem  not  even  to  have  occurred  to 
those  who  profess  to  have  studied  the  question.  It  is  the 
purpose  of  the  present  chapter  to  direct  attention  to  these 
important  points. 

2.  It  is  necessary,  in  the  first  place,  to  inquire  what  sort 
of  traffic  it  is  hoped  will  develop  upon  the  Ohio  River  when 
the  proposed  improvements  are  completed.  The  Report 
of  the  Ohio  Valley  Improvement  Association,  from  which 
we  quoted  extensively  in  chapter  iii,  indicates  the  gen- 
eral belief  that  a  vast  traffic  in  all  manner  of  produce  will 
inevitably  result  from  an  improvement  of  the  river.  The 
report  pictured  the  benefit  to  the  farmer,  to  the  artisan, 
to  the  manufacturer,  to  the  wholesaler,  to  the  retailer,  —  in 
short,  to  every  class  of  people.  The  Governor  of  Ohio  went 
so  far  as  to  state  that  individuals  may  own  their  own  boats 
and  transport  their  own  traffic,  of  whatever  kind,  to  mar- 
ket. Every  speaker  before  the  last  convention  of  the  asso- 
ciation in  1909,  laid  emphasis  upon  the  great  future  de- 
velopment in  manufacturing  that  is  to  take  place  in  the 
Ohio  valley,  and  urged  the  improvement  of  the  river  as 


394        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

an  indispensable  aid,  both  in  the  assembling  of  the  raw 
materials  to  be  manufactured  and  in  the  marketing  of  the 
finished  products.  The  Board  of  Army  Engineers,  which 
reported  favorably  on  the  project,  came  to  the  conclusion 
that  a  very  extensive  traffic  in  agricultural  produce,  in 
lumber,  coal,  building-stones,  raw  materials  of  all  sorts,  and 
in  general  manufactures  would  unquestionably  be  assured 
if  the  Ohio  were  given  a  depth  of  nine  feet  throughout 
the  year.  It  is  apparent,  then,  that  the  river  is  expected 
to  be  a  general  carrier  of  practically  all  kinds  of  freight. 

3.  It  should  be  obvious  at  once,  that  there  is  no  more 
future  for  the  Ohio  than  for  any  other  river  in  the  carry- 
ing of  the  products  of  general  manufacture.  Precisely  the 
same  sort  of  considerations  would  operate  here  to  prevent 
the  carrjang  of  such  produce  by  water,  as  are  operative 
elsewhere  in  the  United  States,  and  in  Europe,  The  amount 
of  package  freight  on  the  Great  Lakes  is  very  small,  while 
there  is  almost  none  on  the  Erie  Canal,  or  on  the  Lower 
Mississippi.  In  France  and  Germany,  even  where  both  the 
origin  and  destination  of  manufactured  goods  are  along 
the  very  banks  of  waterways,  practically  all  of  such  traffic 
is  nevertheless  shipped  by  rail.  It  is  only  in  the  case  of  cer- 
tain heavy  products  of  manufacture,  as  iron  and  steel,  that 
the  waterways  can  be  of  important  service  to  the  manu- 
facturer. We  may  therefore  dismiss  from  the  consideration 
of  traffic  all  commodities  which  are  of  high  value.  The 
manufactures  of  iron  and  steel  in  relation  to  the  Ohio  River 
will  be  considered  presently. 

4.  The  Ohio  Valley  does  not  export  large  quantities  of 
agricultural  produce,  and  hence  the  Ohio  River  cannot  be 
expected  to  carry  the  products  of  the  farm  to  the  seaboard. 
In  the  carrying  of  agricultural  produce  to  domestic  mar- 
kets, where  relatively  short  hauls  are  involved,  and  where 
the  process  of  collection  and  distribution  necessarily  re- 


IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  OHIO  RIVER    395 

quires  the  use  of  the  railways,  a  waterway,  as  has  been 
proved  time  and  again,  can  be  of  comparatively  little  ser- 
vice. 

Cotton  may  be  placed  in  the  same  category  as  other 
farm  produce.  It  is  no  longer  extensively  grown  near 
enough  to  the  waterways  to  eliminate  the  necessity  of 
transshipment,  and  hence  the  railways  are  the  preferable 
carriers.  It  should  be  recalled  that  cotton  is  no  longer 
carried  on  the  Mississippi  to  any  extent,  and  especially 
northward.  There  is  as  little  reason  to  believe  that  it 
would  be  shipped  north  by  water  to  points  on  the  Ohio. 

5.  Lumber  traffic  on  the  Ohio  presents  no  more  promise 
than  it  does  on  the  Mississippi,  for  reasons  that  have  been 
stated  at  length  elsewhere.  At  best,  the  amount  of  lum- 
ber carried  would  be,  as  it  is  at  present,  extremely  small. 
The  boats  which  now  carry  coal  down  the  Ohio  and  Mis- 
sissippi return  empty,  for  the  most  part.  There  would  seem 
to  be  a  strong  incentive  at  present  to  bring  Southern  tim- 
ber north  to  points  on  the  Upper  Ohio,  in  order  to  furnish 
a  return  cargo  for  these  coal  boats,  but  the  fact  that  prac- 
tically all  of  it,  nevertheless,  comes  north  by  rail  augurs  ill 
for  the  waterW' ay  as  a  carrier  of  lumber. 

6.  In  regard  to  building-materials,  it  may  be  said  that 
the  Ohio  River  in  its  present  state  meets  the  needs  reason- 
ably well.  In  so  far  as  sand,  gravel,  and  clay  can  be  econom- 
ically handled  by  water,  they  can  be  handled  successfully 
in  boats  of  shallow  draft.  Such  traffic  moves  but  short  dis- 
tances at  best,  and  no  through  traffic  can  be  developed.  It 
should  be  remembered,  moreover,  that  the  cost  of  truck- 
ing to  destinations  which  are  at  a  distance  from  the  water- 
way often  make  it  impossible  to  use  a  water  route  when 
one  is  available. 

In  the  case  of  cement,  however,  there  is  much  more  pro- 
mise. There  is  a  very  extensive  vein  of  ferriferous  lime- 


896        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

stone  covering  a  large  area  along  both  sides  of  the  Ohio 
River,  near  Portsmouth,  Ohio.  Several  companies  have 
been  chartered,  and  some  are  already  engaged  in  the  manu- 
facture of  cement  from  this  limestone.  Two  Portland 
cement  factories  have  been  constructed  near  Louisville  in 
the  last  two  years.  ^  Louisville  now  ships  out  annually 
more  than  1,500,000  barrels  of  cement  of  265  pounds  per 
barrel.  In  so  far  as  the  destination  of  this  cement  is  other 
river  towns,  and  in  so  far  as  the  sites  at  which  it  is  to  be  used 
are  not  too  far  distant  from  the  banks  of  the  river,  it  may 
be  shipped  by  water.  There  are  no  statistics,  however,  to 
show  how  extensive  such  a  traffic  might  be. 

7.  Perhaps  the  most  extensive  traffic  development  upon 
an  improved  Ohio  River  that  is  expected  is  in  the  various 
sorts  of  raw  materials  which  enter  into  manufactures  of  all 
kinds.  The  Ohio  Valley  is  becoming  a  great  manufactur- 
ing centre  and  a  vast  quantity  of  raw  materials  is  annually 
consumed  in  the  mills  and  factories  of  the  industrial  cities 
on  the  river.  In  order  to  ascertain  to  what  extent  these 
materials  could  make  use  of  river  navigation,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  consider  their  character  and  their  place  of  origin. 

The  chief  industries  of  Louisville  are  the  manufactures 
of  "agricultural  implements  and  wagons;  cast-iron  pipe 
and  bar  iron,  enameled  bath  tubs,  and  brass  and  iron 
plumbers'  supplies;  staves  and  castings,  clothing,  leather, 
woolen  goods  and  yarn,  fertilizers,  harness  and  saddles, 
refined  vegetable  oils  and  soap,  flour,  vinegar  and  pickles, 
lumber  and  boxes,  structural  iron,  tobacco,  furniture,  terra- 
cotta and  tile,  white  lead  and  paints,  wire  goods,  boilers 
and  ice  machines,  whiskey,  packing-house  products,  ma- 
chinery, woodenware  and  brooms,  and  cooperage."^  "The 
great  proportion  of  the  raw  material,  both  as  to  quantity 

^  Examination  of  the  Ohio  River,  1908,  p.  26.  (Report  of  Special  Board 
of  United  States  Army  Engineers.) 
*  Ibid.,  p.  67. 


IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  OHIO  RIVER    397 

and  value,  used  in  the  industries  referred  to,  comes  from 
Kentucky  and  the  states  surrounding  it,  and  but  a  very 
small  and  almost  inappreciable  quantity  comes  from 
abroad.  The  pig  iron  comes  principally  from  Alabama  and 
Tennessee,  though  some  comes  from  Pennsylvania  and 
West  Virginia.  In  woodworking  industries  the  lumber 
comes  from  Kentucky,  West  Virginia,  Tennessee,  Alabama, 
Mississippi,  Michigan,  and  other  portions  of  the  central 
section  of  the  country.  A  very  large  business  has  grown  up 
here  in  the  last  few  years  in  the  importation  of  mahogany 
logs  from  Honduras  and  other  parts  of  Central  America. 
.  .  .  The  mahogany  logs  are  received  at  Pensacola  and 
New  Orleans  and  shipped  to  Louisville  in  all  cases  by 
railroad.  The  tobacco  for  manufacturing  comes,  to  a  very 
large  extent,  from  Kentucky,  Indiana,  Illinois,  and  Ten- 
nessee, though  some  comes  from  Virginia,  West  Virginia, 
and  Ohio,  and  a  very  little  from  outside  the  United  States. 
The  whiskey  is  made  from  grain  produced  in  Kentucky 
and  the  grain-producing  states.  The  refined  vegetable  oils 
and  soap  are  made  from  cotton  seed  and  crude  oils  com- 
ing from  the  cotton  states  to  the  south  and  southwest  of 
Kentucky.  The  cured  meats  and  packing-house  products 
are  made  from  cattle,  hogs,  and  sheep  received  from: 
Kentucky  and  surrounding  states."^ 

The  manufactures  at  Cincinnati  and  Wheeling  are  in 
general  similar  to  those  at  Louisville.  Wheeling,  however, 
also  manufactures  large  quantities  of  glass,  and  it  is  inter- 
esting to  note  the  source  of  raw  materials  therefor.  "The 
principal  raw  materials  in  the  manufacture  of  glass  are 
sand,  nitre,  soda-ash,  and  lime.  The  sand  comes  from 
Pennsylvania,  West  Virginia,  and  Ohio;  the  nitre  comes 
from  South  America  by  way  of  Baltimore,  New  York, 
Philadelphia,  and  New  Orleans;  the  soda-ash  was  formerly 
made  in  England,  but  American  manufacturers  are  now 
supplying  the  country;  and  there  are  at  present  six  or  eight 
*  Examination  of  the  Ohio  River,  1908,  p.  67. 


398        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

plants  located  in  Michigan,  Virginia,  New  York,  and  Ohio. 
The  lime  comes  principally  from  northern  and  central 
Ohio."  ^  Now,  attention  should  be  directed  to  the  point 
that  most  of  these  materials  are  brought  from  wide  areas, 
and  that  in  the  majority  of  instances  they  are  not  located  im- 
mediately on  the  Ohio  or  its  tributaries.  They  must  be  col- 
lected by  the  railroads  in  the  first  instance;  and  hence  they 
will  naturally  travel  by  rail  the  entire  distance  to  market. 
The  chief  possibility  for  a  water  traffic  in  raw  materials 
is  offered  by  iron  ore,  which  might  be  brought  down  from 
the  Pittsburg  district  to  cities  along  the  Ohio.  This  would 
obviously  furnish  a  very  considerable  tonnage.  Most  of 
the  other  materials,  however,  would  have  to  be  assembled 
by  means  of  the  railways.  In  the  import  of  raw  materials 
from  abroad  the  testimony  of  manufacturers  has  been  al- 
most unanimous  that  the  water  route  by  way  of  the  Missis- 
sippi and  the  Ohio  would  be  of  very  little  importance. 

"8.  The  commodity,  which,  by  all  odds,  is  of  chief  import- 
iance  to  the  Ohio  is  coal.  The  mines  in  western  Pennsyl- 
vania are  located  so  near  the  banks  of  the  Monongahela 
River  that  the  coal  can  be  loaded  directly  into  barges  on 
the  river  without  the  use  of  railroads,  thus  eliminating  the 
cost  of  transshipping.  The  many  industrial  towns  along 
the  Ohio  and  the  Lower  Mississippi  at  the  same  time  af- 
ford a  very  extensive  market  on  the  very  banks  of  the  wa- 
terway. It  should  be  recalled  that  the  coal  which  is  shipped 
down  the  Ohio  is  destined  mainly  for  the  bunkers  of  river 
steamers  and  ocean-going  vessels,  and  railway  coal  yards 
along  the  banks  of  the  Lower  Mississippi.  Truckage  costs 
are  here  unnecessary,  and  hence  in  these  respects  the  wa- 
ter route  is  not  at  the  usual  disadvantage  as  compared  with 
the  railways. 

In  addition  there  are  a  considerable  number  of  industrial 
plants  located  on  the  banks  of  the  Ohio  in  such  cities  as 
^  Examination  qftiie  Ohio  River,  1908,  p.  73. 


IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  OHIO  RIVER    399 

Wheeling,  Cincinnati,  and  Louisville,  which,  since  trans- 
shipments are  unnecessarj',  can  make  use  of  the  Ohio  in  se- 
curing their  supply  of  fuel.  If  navigation  on  the  river  were 
assured  for  practically  the  entire  year,  it  is  not  unlikely 
that  some  establishments  which  now  employ  the  railways 
exclusively  would  make  use  of  the  river.  The  uncertainty 
of  navigation  at  present  is  undoubtedly  a  deterrent  to  the 
use  of  the  water  route. 

9.  Finally,  there  seems  to  be  a  strong  likelihood  that  if 
the  Ohio  were  given  more  reliable  navigation  there  would 
develop  a  considerable  traffic  in  the  heavy  products  of  iron 
and  steel  manufacture.  Replies  to  questions,  sent  out  to 
iron  and  steel  manufacturers  along  the  route  by  the  Board 
of  Army  Engineers  which  investigated  the  project,  indi- 
cate that  they  might  use  the  river  for  the  transport  of  from 
twenty  to  twenty-five  per  cent  of  their  product.  Plants  in 
the  Pittsburg  district  furnish  the  supply  of  structural  ma- 
terials to  many  cities  along  the  Ohio  and  the  Lower  Mis- 
sissippi, and  the  river  would  be  well  adapted  to  the  hand- 
ling of  such  traffic.  Again,  the  export  trade  in  iron  and 
steel  products  with  the  West  Indies,  Mexico,  Central  and 
South  America  will  undoubtedly  furnish  some  traffic  which 
might  use  the  Ohio  and  the  Lower  Mississippi. 

We  find,  therefore,  as  regards  traffic  in  general  that, 
while  the  prospects  of  an  extensive  development  on  the 
Ohio  River  are  much  less  rosy  than  they  appear  to  the 
advocates  of  the  waterway  project,  they  are  nevertheless 
exceptionally  good  as  compared  with  those  on  other  water 
routes  in  this  countr5\  While  the  tonnage  would  be  con- 
fined to  a  relatively  few  commodities,  these  are  of  suffi- 
cient importance  to  insure  a  comparatively  heavy  traffic. 
The  question  of  traffic  is,  however,  only  one  of  the  factors 
to  be  considered.  It  is  necessary  also  to  inquire  at  what 
cost  this  traffic  development  is  to  be  secured  and  whether 
the  resulting  transportation  rates  will  be  sufficiently  below 


400        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

the  existing  rates  by  rail,  and  those  on  the  Ohio  River  in 
its  present  state,  to  justify  the  proposed  expenditures. 

10.  The  project  recommended  by  the  Board  of  Army 
Engineers  which  was  appointed  to  investigate  the  scheme 
calls  for  a  system  of  locks  and  movable  dams,  fifty -four  in 
number,  which  would  give  the  river  a  depth  of  nine  feet 
for  practically  the  entire  year.  The  estimated  cost  of  the 
locks  and  dams  is  $63,731,488.^  In  addition  to  this,  the 
Board  estimates  that  the  initial  cost  of  providing  the  nec- 
essary dredging-plant  would  be  $5,000,000,^  which  raises 
the  total  cost  of  the  project  to  $68,731,488.  This  does  not 
include,  however,  the  cost  of  developing  the  necessary  har- 
bor and  terminal  facilities.  And  it  may  or  may  not  be  the 
usual  underestimate. 

In  order  to  furnish  some  idea  of  the  probable  cost  of 
developing  the  necessary  shipping  facilities  along  the  river, 
a  brief  description  of  the  present  state  of  the  Ohio  River 
ports  is  here  given.  Pittsburg  has  about  thirty  miles  of 
river  frontage  within  the  city  limits,  comparatively  little 
of  which  is  improved.  There  is  very  little  warehousing 
space,  no  belt  railway,  and  almost  no  coordination  between 
rail  and  water  lines. 

At  Cincinnati  there  is  a  river  frontage  of  about  twelve 
miles  within  the  city.  The  paved  public  landings  consist 
of  only  two  blocks,  at  which  are  three  wharf  boats,  owned 
by  water  lines.  Aside  from  about  fifteen  coal  elevators, 
there  is  little  other  transshipping  machinery.  There  is  no 
coordination  between  rail  and  water  lines. 

At  Louisville  there  are  about  5.5  miles  of  frontage. 
There  are  about  2500  feet  of  paved  city  landings,  with  two 
wharf  boats  owned  by  packet  lines,  and  about  a  dozen 
coal  and  sand  "landing-floats."  A  few  coal  elevators  con- 
stitute the  only  transshipping  machinery,  and  there  is  no 
coordination  of  rail  and  water  lines. 

^  Examination  of  the  Ohio  River,  1908,  p.  39.  *  Ibid.,  p.  35, 


IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  OHIO  RIVER    401 

At  Cairo  the  important  frontage  belongs  almost  wholly 
to  the  Cairo  Trust  Property,  a  private  interest,  connected 
with  the  New  York  Central  Railroad.  The  city  owns  no 
frontage,  and  there  are  but  three  wharf  boats,  two  of  which 
are  owned  by  railroads.  There  is  no  coordination  between 
rail  and  water  lines,  and  only  a  little  transshipping  machin- 
ery of  a  crude  sort.^ 

The  development  of  the  necessary  water  shipping  facili- 
ties along  the  Ohio  would  beyond  question  cost  many 
millions  of  dollars,  all  of  which  would  be  fairly  chargeable 
to  the  cost  of  transportation  by  the  river.  Since  statistics 
are  not  available,  however,  we  shall  accept  the  figure  of 
$68,731,488  given  above  as  a  basis  for  the  comparison  which 
we  are  about  to  make. 

11.  The  Board  of  Army  Engineers  undertook  a  compu- 
tation to  show  the  probable  cost  of  transport  on  the  river 
when  improved.  For  the  basis  of  its  computation  it  assumed 
a  traffic  of  3,500,000  tons  of  coal  to  be  moved  in  a  year 
from  Pittsburg  to  Cairo,  a  distance  of  907  miles.  The 
result  of  the  computation  showed  that  a  boat  company 
might  earn  a  profit  of  five  per  cent  on  its  investment  while 
carrying  coal  from  Pittsburg  to  Cairo  at  an  average  rate 
of  43.25  cents  per  ton;^  or  about  0.5  mill  per  ton-mile. 
This  rate  is  observed  to  be  only  about  one  eighth  the  aver- 
age rail  rate  on  similar  commodities.^  If  one  is  disposed 
to  give  careful  attention,  however,  to  what  is  included,  or 
rather  what  is  not  included,  in  the  making-up  of  these 
rates,  he  will  find  that  the  advantage  in  favor  of  the  water- 
way is  not  what  it  appears  on  the  surface. 

In  the  first  place,  this  rate  by  water  is  computed  on  the 
assumption  that  a  given  number  of  boats  and  barges  could 
be  utilized  to  the  limit  of  their  theoretical  capacity.   The 

^  Report  of  Commissioner  of  Corporations  on  Transportation  by  Water 
in  the  United  States,  part  in,  pp.  28-29. 

*  Examination  of  the  Ohio  River,  1908,  p.  35.  •  Ibid.,  p.  18. 


402       WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

report  states  that  this  would  be  a  possible  rate  only  if  the 
freight  offered  itself  "in  thousand-ton  lots  and  with  regu- 
larity sufficient  to  keep  the  boats  moving  at  all  times  except 
during  extreme  floods  and  for  a  few  weeks  in  the  year  when 
ice  may  interfere."  ^  That  is  to  say,  if  the  boats  never  had 
to  wait  for  a  supply  of  traffic  to  ship  or  for  a  demand  for 
traffic  which  was  awaiting  shipment,  and  if  it  was  always 
available  in  thousand-ton  lots,  it  would  be  possible  to 
carry  freight  at  the  cost  given  above.  The  Board  admits, 
indeed,  that  "the  calculated  costs  even  for  the  commodi- 
ties assumed  are  thought  to  be  lower  than  such  rates  would 
be  in  practice,  since  a  constant  supply  and  demand  will 
never  exist." '^ 

Now,  it  is  well  known  that  the  amount  of  traffic  requiring 
shipment  varies  enormously  in  different  seasons  of  the  year 
and  at  any  given  season  demand  for  and  supply  of  traffic 
seldom  precisely  coincide;  while  thousand-ton  lots  are  the 
exception  rather  than  the  rule.  If  railways  could  depend 
on  thousand-ton  offerings  of  freight,  day  after  day,  in  a 
steady  stream,  it  is  apparent  that  the  problem  of  making 
rates  would  be  reduced  to  straight  mathematical  computa- 
tion and  that  the  average  rate  would  be  much  smaller  than, 
probably  only  a  fraction  of,  the  present  average.  It  can- 
not be  doubted  that  the  cost  would  be  at  least  cut  in  two. 
In  the  case  of  the  Ohio  River,  therefore,  it  would  seem  that 
the  actual  rate  would  have  to  be  fully  twice  the  theoretical 
one  given  above.  This  would  raise  the  total  cost  to  at  least 
86.50  cents  per  ton;  or  about  0.9  mill  per  ton-mile.^ 

In  the  second  place,  the  rate  stated  above  does  not  in- 
clude the  cost  of  insurance  of  the  cargo.  Since  a  railway 
always  insures  its  own  cargo  it  will  be  necessary  to  add  the 
cost  of  insurance  to  the  water  rate  if  we  are  to  make  a  fair 

^  Examination  of  the  Ohio  River,  1908,  p.  18.  *  Ibid.,  p.  35. 

'  This  seems  by  no  means  too  high  an  estimate  when  it  is  recalled  that 
the  average  on  the  open  Lakes,  where  large  vessels  can  be  used,  is  0.8  mills 
per  ton-mile. 


IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  OHIO  RIVER    403 

comparison,  for  it  is  all  the  same  to  the  shipper  whether  he 
pays  the  insurance  directly  or  indirectly.  The  insurance 
rates  charged  on  the  Ohio  are  equal  to  one  tenth  of  one  per 
cent  of  the  value  of  the  cargo  insured.^  Taking  the  value 
of  a  ton  of  coal  at  three  dollars,  this  amounts  to  approxi- 
mately three  mills  per  ton.  This  raises  the  above  rate  to 
86.80  cents  per  ton. 

In  the  third  place,  the  rate  quoted  does  not  include 
any  of  the  charges  made  at  river  ports  for  wharfage,  load- 
ing, unloading,  etc.  A  prominent  steamboat  official  has 
said:  "I  believe  that  the  wharfage  question  is  the  most 
serious  one  with  which  the  steamboat  man  has  to  contend. 
This  question  on  the  Ohio  River  involves  a  charge  amount- 
ing to  practically  one  third  of  the  boat's  net  profit."^  It  is 
doubtless  true  at  present  that  independent  owners  of  har- 
bor facilities,  and  municipal  owners  as  well,  often  exact 
unreasonably  heavy  tolls  from  boats  stopping  at  the  vari- 
ous ports  along  the  river.  If  the  Federal  Government 
were  to  assume  control  of  all  the  harbors  and  wharves  these 
charges  might  be  somewhat  reduced,  but  if  they  were  ex- 
pected to  be  self-maintaining  the  tolls  charged  would  still 
remain  of  no  little  importance.  It  is  impossible  to  make  any 
estimates  of  the  probable  cost  of  such  items  per  ton  of 
traflSc  because  the  statistics  are  not  available.  Boats  are 
charged  a  certain  amount  per  trip  at  each  port,  and  the 
total  that  a  given  vessel  would  have  to  pay  on  any  trip 
down  the  river  would  depend  upon  the  number  of  ports 
entered  as  well  as  the  amount  of  the  cargo  carried.  In  the 
absence  of  any  definite  information  on  the  subject  it  will 
be  necessary  to  omit  these  costs  from  our  computation. 

Finally,  the  water  rate  which  we  are  considering  is  not 
calculated  to  cover  any  part  of  the  annual  charges  on  the 
fixed  capital  invested  in  the  waterway  itself.  The  assump- 

*  Report  of  the  Commissioner  of  Corporations  on  Transportation  by  Water, 
part  I,  p.  359. 

*  Ibid.,  part  ni,  p.  338. 


404        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

tion  of  the  Board  of  Engineers  is  that  since  the  waterway 
is  to  be  built  and  maintained  by  the  Government  there  will 
be  no  charges  to  be  set  off  against  the  capital  invested  in  the 
improvement  of  the  river.  It  is  true  that  so  far  as  the  ship- 
per is  concerned  the  cost  of  the  waterway  has  no  effect  on 
the  rate  of  transport,  provided  the  Government  shoulders 
all  the  burden  of  building  and  maintaining  it.  But  the 
same  thing  would  be  true  in  the  case  of  a  railway  under 
similar  circumstances.  If  the  government  were  to  build 
and  maintain  a  railway  free  of  charge,  the  rate  that  could 
be  quoted  to  the  shipper  by  a  railway  carrier  could  obvi- 
ously be  much  lower  than  if  the  railroad  company  itself 
must  provide  the  roadbed,  and  keep  it  in  repair.  The  point 
we  are  making  is  simply  the  familiar  one,  that  it  is  inaccu- 
rate to  compare  rates  which  cover  the  interest  on  the  capi- 
tal investment  in  the  highway  itself,  as  well  as  the  haulage 
costs  proper,  in  the  one  case,  with  those  which  cover  only 
the  direct  haulage  charges  in  the  other.  Let  us  see  what  tolls 
would  have  to  be  charged  on  the  Ohio  were  the  route  to 
yield  returns  on  the  capital  invested. 

As  stated  above,  it  is  estimated  that  the  cost  of  the 
project  to  the  Government  would  be  approximately  $68,- 
731,488.  If  bonds  were  issued  by  the  Government  for  the 
purpose  of  raising  this  capital,  the  annual  interest  rate 
thereon  would  doubtless  amount  to  approximately  three 
per  cent.  But  in  the  present  case  let  us  assume  that  the 
Government  would  pay  for  the  project  out  of  current 
revenues,  and  that  hence  no  annual  interest  charges  on 
borrowed  capital  would  have  to  be  met.  Since  we  are  to 
compare  the  water  rates  with  those  on  profit-earning  rail- 
ways, it  is  necessary  to  assume,  however,  that  the  rate:- 
charged  should  earn  a  reasonable  profit  on  the  invest- 
ment in  the  river.  In  computing  the  rate  which  the  boat 
companies  would  have  to  charge,  the  Board  of  Engineers 
allowed  for  a  profit  of  five  per  cent  per  annum  on  the  cap- 
ital invested  in  the  boats.  We  may  take  the  same  figure  in 


IMPROVEMENT  OF  TPIE  OHIO  RIVER    405 

this  case,  for  it  seems  a  fair  rate  of  return  on  an  investment 
of  this  sort.  With  this  point  settled,  the  following  tabular 
exhibit  may  be  presented,  showing  the  annual  items  that 
should  be  covered  by  tolls  on  the  Ohio  River:'  — 

Interest  on  capital  at  five  per  cent $3,43(),574.40 

Maintenance  of  locks  and  dams 810,000.00 

Dredging 850.000.00* 

Total $5,096,574.40 

*  Report  of  Examination  of  the  Ohio  River,  p.  39. 

Let  us  now  see  what  this  means  in  the  way  of  tolls. 
The  above  estimates  of  the  cost  of  haulage  were  computed 
on  the  basis  of  3,500,000  tons  of  freight  moved  from  Pitts- 
burg to  Cairo,  a  distance  of  967  miles.  This  is  equal  to 
3,384,500,000  ton-miles  of  traffic.  To  cover  $5,096,574.40 
the  tolls  on  this  amount  of  traffic  would  have  to  equal  1.51 
mills  per  ton-mile. 

Translating  the  rate  of  86.80  cents  per  ton,  which  ap- 
peared above,  into  a  ton-mile  rate,  gives  .89  mill  per  ton- 
mile.  Adding  the  toll  of  1.51  mills  per  ton-mile  to  this  gives 
a  total  rate  of  2.40  mills  per  ton-mile  by  water,  rather  than 
merely  0.5  mill,  as  stated  by  the  report  of  the  investigating 
board. 

There  is  yet  another  factor  to  be  reckoned  with,  however, 
before  we  shall  be  in  a  position  to  make  a  comparison  with 
rates  by  rail.  We  must  take  into  consideration  the  relative 
distances  by  rail  and  by  water  between  given  points. 
It  is  obvious,  for  instance,  if  the  distance  between  two 
points  is  twice  as  great  by  water  as  by  rail,  that  the  rate  per 
mile  may  be  twice  as  high  by  rail  as  by  water  and  yet  the 
cost  to  the  shipper  be  the  same  in  both  cases.  This  is  a 
consideration  of  the  greatest  importance,  and  yet  it  is 
almost  universally  omitted  in  making  comparisons  of  rates 
by  water  and  by  rail.  The  distance  from  Pittsburg  to 
Cincinnati  by  water  is  468  miles  as  against  326  miles  by 
way  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad.  Cincinnati  is 
*  Examination  of  the  Ohio  River,  1908,  p.  2. 


406        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

chosen  rather  than  Cairo  here  for  the  reason  that  Cairo 
has  no  direct  rail  connection  with  Pittsburg.^  The  river 
distance  from  Pittsburg  to  Cincinnati  is  thus  1.42  times  that 
by  rail.  Since  traffic  by  water  must  move  1.42  times  as  far  as 
by  rail  to  pass  between  the  same  points,  we  must  therefore 
multiply  the  water  rate  by  1.42  to  place  it  on  a  parity  with 
the  rate  by  rail.  This  would  raise  the  above  rate  from  2.40 
mills  to  3.41  mills  per  ton-mile. 

Let  us  now  compare  this  rate  with  the  railway  charges 
on  coal.  In  1909  the  average  rate  per  ton-mile  on  coal  on 
the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Railroad  was  3.19  mills. ^  The 
Illinois  Central  carries  coal  from  the  southern  part  of  Illi- 
nois to  Chicago  at  an  average  rate  of  3.13  mills  per  ton- 
mile.'  These  roads,  moreover,  pay  interest  on  a  large 
bonded  indebtedness,  an  item  excluded  from  the  above 
computation  of  the  cost  of  transportation  on  the  Ohio 
River.  And  in  the  case  of  the  Illinois  Central  seven  per 
cent  of  the  profits  of  the  road  go  to  the  State  of  Illinois. 
The  average  ton-mile  rate  on  coal  for  the  entire  country  has 
never  been  computed,  but  it  is  probable  that  it  would  be 
less  than  four  mills.*  In  any  case,  it  is  apparent  from  the 
rates  quoted  above  that  it  would  be  easily  possible  for  a 
railroad  to  carry  coal  at  a  less  rate  than  could  the  Ohio 
River  if  the  river  charge  were  calculated  to  secure  a  return 
on  the  capital  invested  in  the  works  of  improvement. 

We  may  also  make  a  comparison  of  the  cost  of  transport 
on  an  improved  Ohio  River  and  on  railways  in  another 

1  The  comparative  distances  from  Pittsburg  to  New  Orleans  show  a 
still  greater  difference.  By  the  Ohio  and  Mississippi  Rivers  the  distance 
is  2220  miles;  while  by  way  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  and  Louisville  and 
Nashville  Railroads  it  is  only  1253  miles. 

^  Report  of  the  Company,  1909. 

'  Report  of  the  Chicago  Harbor  Commission,  1909,  p.  234. 

*  Ton-mile  rate  comparisons  are  seldom  entirely  accurate,  and  are 
often  misleading,  for  the  reason  that  a  ton-mile  rate  depends  upon  the 
amount  of  traflBc  and  the  distance  it  travels,  no  less  than  its  character. 
In  the  present  case,  therefore,  the  results  must  be  regarded  as  representing 
only  approximate  truth. 


IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  OHIO  RIVER    407 

manner  than  by  comparing  rates,  namely,  by  setting  off 
against  the  cost  of  improving  the  river  the  cost  of  build- 
ing a  railroad.  The  estimated  cost  of  the  river  improve- 
ment, exclusive  of  terminal  facilities  of  all  sorts,  and 
of  equipment,  is,  as  stated  above,  $66,731,488.  This 
amounts  to  approximately  $71,000  a  mile.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  average  capitalization  of  the  railroads  of  the 
country,  including  watered  stock,  is  under  $60,000  per 
mile.  The  capitalization  of  certain  roads  in  the  south  cen- 
tral section  of  the  country  is  as  follows:^  — 

Kansas  City  and  Southern $4'6,000  per  mile 

Louisville  and  Nashville 30,000 

Nashville,  Chattanooga,  and  St.  Louis 31,000 

It  is  evident  from  these  statistics  that  the  cost  of  a  rail- 
road in  this  section  of  the  country,  exclusive  of  terminals, 
passenger  stations,  and  rolling-stock,  would  probably  not 
be  over  $35,000  per  mile  at  the  outside.  This  is  about  half 
the  estimated  cost  of  improving  the  river.  Furthermore, 
since  the  distance  by  water  from  Pittsburg  to  Cincinnati, 
for  instance,  is  1.42  times  that  by  rail,  the  advantage  in 
favor  of  the  railway  is  still  greater  than  appears  from  the 
statistics  just  presented.  Making  allowance  for  the  differ- 
ence in  distance  the  comparative  costs  may  be  set  down  as 
follows :  — 


Distance  (miles) 

Cost  per  mile 

Total  cost 

Railway,  Pitts- 

burg to  Cin- 

cinnati     .     . 

326 

$35,000 

$11,410,000 

Waterway, 

Pittsburg    to 

Cincinnati     . 

468 

71,000 

33,228,000 

For  this  given  distance,  therefore,  it  appears  that  the 

estimated  first  cost  of  improving  the  river  is  approximately 

three  times  the  cost  of  building  a  railway.    For  the  full 

length  of  the  Ohio  this  ratio  would  not  be  appreciably 

changed. 

*  From  annual  reports  of  the  roads. 


408        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

But  since  the  Ohio  connects  with  the  Mississippi,  and 
thereby  furnishes  a  through  route  to  the  Gulf,  it  is  perhaps 
not  fair  to  compare  the  cost  of  improving  the  Ohio  with  the 
cost  of  building  a  railway  the  length  of  the  Ohio  alone. 
Assuming  that  the  entire  cost  of  the  water  route  from  Pitts- 
burg to  New  Orleans  is  represented  by  the  expenditures  on 
the  Ohio  alone,  —  in  other  words,  assuming  that  the  Lower 
Mississippi  needs  no  improvement,  —  let  us  see  if  an  advan- 
tage from  the  standpoint  of  cost  is  still  possessed  by  a  rail- 
way. The  rail  distance  from  Pittsburg  to  New  Orleans, 
by  way  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  and  the  Louisville  and 
Nashville  Railways,  is,  as  stated  above,  912  miles.  At  the 
above  rate  of  construction  a  railroad  could  be  built  be- 
tween these  points  for  $31,920,000,  or  for  less  than  half  the 
cost  of  improving  the  Ohio  River  alone. 

The  advantage  that  the  railway  enjoys,  by  virtue  of  its 
lower  cost  of  construction,  it  should  be  added,  is  offset  to 
some  extent  by  the  greater  cost  of  equipment  necessary 
to  handle  a  given  quantity  of  traffic.  The  cost  of  barges 
and  towing  steamers  of  the  thousand-ton  type  averages 
from  ten  to  twelve  dollars  per  ton  of  carrying  capacity;^ 
while  the  cost  of  the  average  freight  car  is  about  twenty 
dollars  per  ton  of  carrying  capacity. ^  If  we  include  the 
cost  of  the  engines  this  figure  would  be  considerably  raised. 
There  is  obviously  some  advantage  here  for  the  water- 
way; but  inasmuch  as  the  cost  of  equipment  is  slight  in 
comparison  with  the  original  cost  of  the  highways  them- 
selves, it  can  by  no  means  be  regarded  as  substantially  off- 
setting the  railway  advantages  that  have  been  noted. 

There  is  a  general  impression  that  a  waterway,  once 
constructed,  needs  thereafter,  in  striking  contrast  with  a 
railway,  comparatively  little  attention.  Statistics,  how- 
ever, give  the  lie  to  such  a  belief.  The  annual  cost  of 
maintaining  the  locks  and  dams  on  the  Ohio  is  estimated  at 

*  Symong,  Engineering  News,  1897,  p.  319. 

*  Delano,  Speech  before  River  and  Harbor  Congress,  December,  1910. 


IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  OHIO  RIVER    409 

$810,000,  and  of  dredging  at  $850,000. »  This  amounts  to 
$1717  per  mile.  Were  the  cost  of  maintaining  wharves, 
docks,  and  other  facilities  included,  this  total  would 
obviously  be  greatly  increased.  As  compared  with  this  the 
cost  of  maintenance  of  way  and  structures  on  the  Wabash 
Railroad  amounted  to  only  $1299.60  in  1909,  and  on  the 
Chesapeake  and  Ohio,  $1450  per  mile  in  1910.^ 

These  rough  general  comparisons  of  the  cost  of  con- 
struction, operation,  and  maintenance  of  the  river  and 
of  a  railway  unquestionably  substantiate  the  conclusion 
reached  by  the  comparison  of  rates  which  was  made  above, 
namely,  that,  everything  considered,  the  cost  of  transport 
on  an  improved  Ohio  would  be  greater  than  on  present 
railroads. 

There  remains  to  be  considered,  however,  one  other 
factor  of  importance,  to  wit,  the  relative  capacity  of  the 
river  and  of  a  railway.  A  decided  advantage  in  favor  of  the 
waterway  here  would  serve  to  upset  the  tentative  conclu- 
sions which  have  been  reached. 

It  is  evident  that  the  capacity  of  the  river  under  the 
proposed  plan  of  improvement  would  be  limited  to  the 
capacity  of  the  locks.  On  this  point  the  Board  of  Engin- 
eers, in  their  report  on  the  project,  estimate  that  it  would 
be  possible  to  move  through  a  lock  as  much  as  20,000 
tons  in  one  and  one  half  hours.  This  they  further  state 
means  a  total  capacity  for  a  year  of  100,000,000  tons.' 
This  enormous  total  capacity  is  evidently  computed 
somewhat  as  follows :  — 

24  hours  =  one  day. 

16  =  number  of  lockages  in  one  day. 

20,000  =  number  of  tons  at  one  lockage. 

16  X  20,000  =  320,000  tons  in  one  day. 

312  =  number  of  days  of  navigation  in  a  year. 

312  X  320,000  =  100,000,000  tons  in  a  year. 

1  See  table  above,  p.  405. 

^  Annual  reports  for  the  years  named. 

»  Examination  of  the  Ohio  River,  1908,  p.  112. 


410        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

It  is  of  course  obvious  that  such  a  total  represents  merely 
a  theoretical  maximum.  If  the  locks  were  utilized  to  their 
full  capacity  every  hour  of  the  day  for  312  days  in  a  year; 
if  there  were  no  necessity  of  returning  the  boats  through 
the  locks  to  the  place  of  starting;  if,  in  a  word,  there  were 
a  steady  stream  of  traflac  all  going  in  one  direction,  then 
100,000,000  tons  might  pass  through  a  lock  in  the  course 
of  a  year.  Suppose  we  compute  in  a  similar  manner  the 
ultimate  capacity  of  a  railroad :  — 

One  trainload  =25  cars  of  40  tons  =1000  tons. 

Speed  =  20  miles  an  hour. 

Trains,  1.5  miles  apart. 

Therefore,  one  train  about  every  five  minutes. 

Or  twelve  trains  per  hour. 

12  X  24  =  288  trains  per  day. 

288  X  1000  =  288,000  tons  per  day. 

288,000  X  365  =  105,120,000  tons  per  year. 

We  may  thus  compute  a  greater  theoretical  capacity  for 
the  railway  than  for  the  river.  Indeed,  were  we  not  con- 
servative in  limiting  the  trainload  to  1000  tons,  a  vastly 
greater  tonnage  would  be  shown  for  the  railroad  than  for 
the  river.  Of  course  in  practice  it  is  probable  that  no  rail- 
road could  handle  so  enormous  a  tonnage  as  this,  but  the 
same  thing  is  equally  true  of  a  river.  We  have  merely 
adopted  this  method  of  computation  for  the  purpose  of 
setting  the  result  off  against  one  obtained  in  a  similar  man- 
ner for  the  river.  The  conclusion  may  fairly  be  drawn,  how- 
ever, that  the  actual  capacity  of  the  Ohio  River  under  the 
proposed  system  of  locks  would  be  no  greater  than  that  of 
an  all-freight  railway. 

The  above  analysis  has  shown  that  if  tolls  were  to  be 
charged  upon  the  Ohio  River  suflScient  in  amount  to 
defray  the  annual  expenses  of  maintenance  and  operation, 
including  interest  on  the  capital  investment,  there  is  little 
doubt  that  the  rates  by  river  would  be  somewhat  higher 
than  those  by  rail  on  similar  commodities.  It  should  now 


IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  OHIO  RIVER    411 

be  further  considered  that  unless  water  rates  are  substan- 
tially lower  than  those  by  rail,  the  traffic  will  seek  the  rail- 
roads. In  France,  for  instance,  a  margin  of  twenty  per 
cent  advantage  in  rates  is  deemed  necessary  to  insure  the 
movement  of  traffic  by  water.  Scores  of  instances  in  this 
country  could  be  cited  where  railways,  on  account  of  their 
greater  "serviceability,"  are  able  to  attract  traffic,  although 
their  rates  are  appreciably  higher  than  those  on  compet- 
ing water  routes.  It  seems  altogether  certain,  therefore, 
that  the  Ohio,  in  the  absence  of  Government  subsidies, 
would  not  be  able  to  meet  the  competition  of  the  rail- 
ways. 

Of  course,  if  the  Government  spends  sixty  or  seventy 
millions  of  dollars  in  improving  the  river  and  a  couple  of 
millions  annually  in  keeping  it  in  repair,  and  if  it  expects 
no  return  on  the  capital  invested,  —  in  other  words,  if  it 
furnishes  a  waterway  entirely  free  to  boatmen,  it  cannot  be 
doubted  that  water  transportation  companies  could  offer 
rates  low  enough  to  divert  certain  kinds  of  traffic  from  self- 
supporting  railways.  But  from  a  broad  economic  point  of 
view  this  by  no  means  indicates  that  the  people's  money 
would  have  been  well  spent,  or  that  transportation  would 
have  been  in  reality  cheapened.  It  would  merely  have 
given  a  few  favored  shippers  the  advantage  of  low  rates  at 
the  expense  of  the  general  taxpaying  public !  ^ 

12.  After  all,  the  real  question  in  connection  with  the 
improvement  of  the  Ohio  River  is  whether  it  would  insure 
substantial  reductions  over  the  rates  of  transport  on  the 
river  in  its  present  state.  Our  analysis  of  traffic  conditions 

*  It  is  usually  argued,  in  defense  of  the  proposition  that  it  is  entirely 
justifiable  to  lower  the  transportation  rates  to  shippers,  by  means  of  sub- 
sidizing water  routes,  that  the  general  public  which  advances  the  subsidy 
in  the  form  of  taxes  reaps  an  indirect  benefit,  much  more  than  sufficient 
to  reimburse  it,  through  a  reduction  in  the  price  of  commodities  resulting 
from  a  lessening  of  freight  charges.  For  a  discussion  of  this  point  see 
chapter  in,  pp.  39-41. 


412        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

above  indicated  that  the  chief  traffic  on  the  river  at  present 
is  in  coal,  and  that  the  possibility  of  an  extensive  future 
development  lies  mainly  with  this  particular  commodity. 
Practically  all  of  the  coal  that  is  shipped  from  the  Pitts- 
burg district  south  to  New  Orleans  goes  by  boat,  the 
present  method  of  transportation  on  the  river  having  re- 
duced the  cost  of  haulage  to  a  minimum.  The  method  is 
described  as  follows:  "A  stern-wheel  steamboat  of  about 
1000  horse  power  will  ordinarily  leave  the  headwaters  of 
the  Ohio  on  suitable  stages  of  water  for  southwestern 
points  with  a  tow  consisting  of  about  12  coal  boats  and  3 
barges.  After  passing  the  Bellaire  Bridge,  96  miles  below 
Pittsburg,  5  more  coal  boats  will  ordinarily  be  added  to 
this  tow,  making  a  total  of  17  coal  boats,  and  3  barges,  the 
cargo  of  which  will  be  about  18,500  tons.  Ordinarily  this 
boat  will  proceed  with  the  above  tow  to  Louisville,  Ken- 
tucky, and,  after  passing  through  the  canal,  will  deliver 
its  tow  to  a  larger  boat.  From  the  canal  at  Louisville  to 
New  Orleans  a  boat  of  the  most  powerful  class  will  tow 
from  30  to  60  coal  boats,  each  boat  being  loaded  with 
about  1000  tons  of  coal."  ^ 

The  rates  charged  are  said  to  be  only  about  four  tenths 
of  a  mill  per  ton-mile,  but  "in  view  of  the  fact  that  the 
same  corporation  owns  the  mines,  the  loading  and  un- 
loading facilities,  the  boats  and  barges,  and  to  some  extent 
the  wharves,  this  rate  is  a  mere  matter  of  bookkeeping, 
and  too  much  reliance  cannot  be  placed  upon  it."  ^  The 
cost  is  nevertheless  in  all  probability  less  than  a  mill  per 
ton-mile.  The  Board  of  Engineers  has  recognized  that  the 
present  method  of  transportation  on  the  river  should  be  in- 
terfered with  as  little  as  possible,  and  for  that  reason  favors 
the  installation  of  movable  rather  than  fixed  dams.  "A 
wide  navigation  pass  is  constructed  in  the  dams,  which  can 
be  lowered  whenever  a  rise  occurs  and  leaves  an  unob- 

*  Examination  of  the  Ohio  River,  1908,  p.  19. 

'  Report  of  National  Waterways  Commission,  Doc.  11,  p.  45. 


IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  OHIO  RIVER    413 

structed  river  through  which  coal  fleets  can  be  moved  as  at 
present."  ^  If  anything,  the  installation  of  the  system  of 
locks  and  dams  would  impede  this  particular  sort  of  navi- 
gation rather  than  aid  it,  and  as  a  consequence  the  transport 
rates  would  be  higher  rather  than  lower  than  they  are  at 
present.  Be  this  as  it  may,  it  at  least  cannot  be  held  out 
that  the  improvement  of  the  river  will  tend  to  increase  these 
through  shipments  of  coal  to  the  South.  Moreover,  the 
capacity  of  the  river  for  purposes  of  this  through  traffic 
will  not  have  been  enlarged.  Finally,  it  is  not  improbable 
that  a  more  extensive  development  of  the  coal  resources 
of  the  South  in  the  future,  particularly  in  Alabama  and 
Tennessee,  will  reduce  the  demand  in  the  South  for  North- 
ern coal.  These  mines  are  comparatively  near  to  New 
Orleans,  and  if  the  contemplated  improvement  of  the 
Tombigbee  River  is  carried  out,  there  will  be  opened 
a  water  route  from  these  mines  to  all  of  the  ports  on  the 
Gulf. 

The  chief  advantage  in  improving  the  Ohio  River  lies  in 
its  furnishing  more  reliable  navigation  on  its  upper  course. 
At  present  during  the  dry  season  there  is  an  inadequate 
depth  of  water,  and  the  proposed  locks  and  dams  would 
relieve  the  situation  by  furnishing  slack-water  navigation 
in  times  of  low  water.  This,  it  is  believed,  would  insure  a 
much  larger  tonnage  on  the  river  than  exists  at  present. 
Of  the  total  river  traffic  passing  through  Davis  Island  Dam 
below  Pittsburg  in  1907  ninety-one  per  cent  was  coal.^  In 
tonnage,  this  amounted  to  2,283,965  tons,  of  which  1,244,- 
720  tons  reached  Cincinnati,  1,154,991  tons  passed  through 
the  falls  of  the  Ohio  at  Louisville,  and  approximately 
1,000,000  tons  reached  New  Orleans.^  A  little  under 
2,000,000  tons,  then,  is  the  amount  of  coal  traffic  pertain- 
ing to  the  Upper  Ohio  River,  proper,  and  the  total  traffic  of 
all  kinds  is  approximately  an  even  2,000,000  tons.     The 

»  Examination  of  the  Ohio  River,  1908,  p.  112.  >  Ibid.,  p.  112. 

•  Report  of  National  Waterways  Commission,  Doc.  11. 


414        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

benefits  to  be  derived  from  an  improvement  of  the  Ohio 
must  be  to  traffic  over  and  beyond  this  amount. 

The  exhaustion  of  the  supply  of  coal  in  mines  imme- 
diately along  the  banks  of  the  Monongahela  is  at  best  only 
a  matter  of  a  few  years,  and  when  such  a  time  arrives  the 
conditions  which  alone  now  make  possible  an  extensive 
traffic  on  the  Ohio  will  no  longer  exist.  The  coal  will  then 
have  to  be  loaded  into  railway  cars,  and  once  in  the  cars 
the  tendency,  as  elsewhere,  will  be  for  it  to  go  all  the  way 
to  market  by  rail  in  order  to  avoid  transshipment  en  route. 
Of  course,  again,  it  probably  would  be  possible  —  if  the 
waterway  were  maintained  entirely  free  of  tolls,  and  if 
merely  nominal  charges  were  made  for  the  transshipments, 
the  deficit  being  met  by  general  taxation,  as  in  Germany 
—  to  compel  this  coal  to  go  by  water  for  a  part  of  the 
distance;  but,  as  shown  above,  such  a  process  would 
obviously  not  have  lessened  the  cost  of  transportation. 

13.  With  the  Ohio  River  becoming  less  important  in  the 
carrying  of  coal,  on  account  of  the  development  of  mines  in 
the  South  and  the  shifting  of  the  source  of  supply  back  from 
the  shores  of  the  Monongahela,  its  future  must  depend 
upon  the  development  of  traffic  in  other  lines.  Now,  in  our 
discussion  of  traffic  conditions  we  found  that  some  traffic 
might  be  expected  in  such  commodities  as  iron  and  steel, 
cement,  and  to  a  very  small  extent  general  manufactures; 
but  these  commodities  would  travel  by  water  only  on  con- 
dition that  no  tolls  were  charged.  With  tolls  sufficient  in 
amount  to  cover  the  expenses  of  operation  and  mainten- 
ance and  to  yield  returns  on  the  capital  investment,  we 
have  found  that  the  cost  of  transport  by  water  is  greater 
than  that  by  rail.  From  the  standpoint  of  transportation, 
therefore,  the  expenditure  of  sixty  or  seventy  millions  of 
dollars  upon  the  improvement  of  the  Ohio  River,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  plan  proposed,  will  be  an  economic  loss  to 
the  nation. 


IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  OHIO  RIVER    415 

14.  It  remains  to  inquire  what  indirect  benefits  in  the 
way  of  prevention  of  floods  and  the  purification  of  water 
supply  would  result  from  the  proposed  improvement  of  the 
Ohio  River.  The  regulation  of  our  natural  waterways 
should  have  these  ends  in  view,  no  less  than  transporta- 
tion, and  accordingly  some  attention  should  be  given  to 
them  in  connection  with  the  project  which  we  are  now 
considering. 

The  plan  of  improvement  proposed  by  the  Special  Board 
of  Engineers  which  examined  the  project  seems  to  be  de- 
signed for  transportation  purposes  alone.  It  should  per- 
haps be  stated  that  the  method  this  board  favors  is  not  the 
one  advocated  by  Hydrographer  Leighton,  of  the  United 
States  Geological  Survey,  which  called  for  a  system  of  res- 
ervoirs at  the  headwaters  and  a  series  of  dams  along  the 
river.  The  Leighton  plan  had  two  main  purposes  in  mind 
in  addition  to  transportation;  namely,  to  prevent  the  an- 
nual floods  which  now  devastate  the  valley,  and  to  enable 
the  development  of  a  large  amount  of  electrical  power  at 
the  dams.  But  this  scheme  was  adjudged  by  the  engineers 
entirely  impracticable.^  Now,  the  present  plan  involves 
neither  the  building  of  reservoirs  nor  the  construction  of 
fixed  dams.  In  order  to  permit  the  present  method  of  coal 
transportation  on  the  river,  it  is  proposed,  as  stated  above, 
to  use  movable  dams  which  can  be  lowered  in  times  of  high 
water.  With  such  a  system  the  river  will  continue  to  rage 
as  it  does  at  present  and  carry  death  and  destruction  down 
the  valley  during  the  seasons  of  melting  snows  and  heavy 
rains.  The  proposed  method  of  improvement  aims  merely 
to  secure  as  reliable  navigation  as  possible  at  as  low  a  cost 
as  possible,  and  is  not  designed  to  prevent  floods. 

The  proposed  plan,  moreover,  will  not  tend  to  purify  the 
water  supply  of  the  Ohio  Valley  and  thereby  prove  an  aid 
to  public  health.  On  the  contrary,  it  may  have  an  oppo- 
site effect.  In  order  to  facilitate  upstream  traffic,  and  in 
1  See  chapter  xv,  p.  330. 


416        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

order  to  insure  an  adequate  depth  of  channel  for  trans- 
portation during  the  summer  months,  it  has  been  deemed 
advisable  to  secure  by  means  of  the  locks  and  dams  slack- 
water  navigation  during  the  periods  of  low  water.  Slack 
water  would  seem  to  be  more,  rather  than  less,  inimical  to 
public  health  than  the  running  water  of  an  open  river. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

THE  ENLARGEMENT  OF  THE  ERIE  CANAL 

1.  The  Erie  Canal  has  played  a  very  important  r61e  in  the 
industrial  development  of  the  United  States.  Constructed 
before  the  age  of  railroads,  it  opened  the  first  real  avenue 
of  commerce  between  the  Atlantic  seaboard  and  the  in- 
terior states,  and  paved  the  way  for  the  settlement  and 
development  of  the  Middle  West.  For  fifty  years  after  its 
opening  in  1825,  it  played  a  very  important  part  in  the  fix- 
ing of  transportation  rates  from  the  entire  West  to  the 
Atlantic  Coast.  The  rates  offered  by  the  water  route  from 
Chicago  to  New  York  laid  the  basis  of  practically  all  east- 
and-west  railway  schedules  east  of  the  Missouri  River. 
No  other  water  route  in  this  country  has  exerted  so  great 
an  influence  on  the  rates  of  transportation  as  the  Erie 
Canal. 

Until  about  1870  the  tolls  levied  by  the  State  of  New 
York  upon  traflSc  over  the  canal  had  jdelded  returns  much 
more  than  suflScient  to  cover  the  cost  of  its  construction 
and  the  charges  for  operation  and  maintenance.  But  the 
competition  of  rival  ports  and  the  fierce  rate  wars  of  com- 
peting railways  played  havoc  with  the  canal  receipts  during 
the  next  ten  years.  TraflSc  declined  so  rapidly  that  in  an 
effort  to  prevent  its  complete  diversion  to  the  railroads  all 
canal  tolls  were  abolished  on  January  1,  1883,  since  which 
date  the  entire  support  of  the  canal  has  been  provided  for 
by  general  taxation. 

The  abolishment  of  tolls,  however,  did  not  check  the 
rapid  decline  of  traffic  that  had  set  in.  Reference  to  the 
charts  on  page  70  shows  that  the  decline  has  continued 
to  the  present  date,  and  that  the  once  important  canal  has 


418        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

ceased  to  be  of  any  considerable  influence  in  trade  devel- 
opment. 

2.  The  people  of  New  York  viewed  with  uneasiness  the 
continuous  decline  of  canal  traffic  in  the  state,  and  as  early 
as  1884  the  New  York  Board  of  Trade  and  Transportation 
called  a  state  convention,  which  was  held  in  the  city  of 
Utica  in  the  following  spring.  The  purpose  of  the  conven- 
tion was  "to  consider  what  steps  should  be  taken  to  secure 
the  permanent  improvement  of  the  state's  waterways."^ 
Out  of  this  convention  grew  the  Canal  Improvement  Un- 
ion, composed  of  influential  commercial  and  manufactur- 
ing interests  in  the  state.  This  union  held  annual  conven- 
tions in  the  interest  of  waterway  development,  and  in  1895 
succeeded  in  securing  the  passage  of  an  act  appropriating 
$9,000,000  for  deepening  the  Erie  Canal  from  seven  to 
nine  feet.  This  sura  proved  utterly  inadequate  to  make 
the  enlargement  contemplated,  and  seems  to  have  been 
entirely  wasted. 

Following  this  useless  expenditure,  there  set  in  a  strong 
reversion  of  public  feeling,  which  came  near  checking  for 
good  the  rehabilitation  of  the  old  canals.  The  New  York 
Board  of  Trade  and  Transportation  again  tried  to  arouse 
public  interest  in  the  question,  but  failed  completely.  Fi- 
nally, they  presented  a  series  of  resolutions  to  Governor 
Roosevelt,  and  on  March  8,  1899,  he  appointed  the  Com- 
mission on  Canals  of  the  State  of  New  York.  The  appar- 
ent indorsement  of  the  canal  movement  by  the  popular 
Governor  served  to  revive  the  waning  interest  in  the  pro- 
ject, and  a  great  state  convention  was  soon  called.  It  met 
at  Utica  in  the  summer  of  1900,  and  with  but  a  single  dis- 
senting vote  adopted  resolutions  favoring  the  substantial 
improvement  of  the  defunct  canal  system. ^ 

1  Canal  Enlargement  in  New  York  State  (Publications  of  Buffalo  His- 
torical Society),  p.  2. 
»  Ibid.,  p.  10. 


ENLARGEMENT  OF  THE  ERIE  CANAL    419 

Meanwhile,  the  State  Committee  on  Canals  prepared  a 
report.  The  question  of  the  feasibility  of  a  ship  canal  deep 
enough  for  ocean-going  vessels,  as  compared  with  a  canal 
adapted  for  barge  transportation  only,  had  long  been  de- 
bated in  New  York.  Major  Thomas  W.  Symons,  of  the 
United  States  Engineering  Corps,  finally  succeeded  in  con- 
dncing  the  state  Committee,  of  which  he  was  a  member, 
to  pronounce  in  favor  of  a  barge  canal  of  1000  tons'  capac- 
ity. By  extensive  computations  he  showed  the  cost  of 
transportation  to  be  materially  less  on  a  barge  than  on  a 
ship  canal,  and  at  the  same  time  substantially  demon- 
strated that,  on  account  of  the  loss  of  time  and  the  in- 
creased dangers  involved,  few,  if  any,  ocean  vessels  would 
use  a  ship  canal  through  New  York  were  one  available. 
It  was  recommended,  therefore,  that  a  barge  canal  12  feet 
in  depth,  with  a  bottom  width  of  75  feet,  should  be  con- 
structed between  Buffalo  and  the  Hudson  River.  The 
route  determined  upon  as  most  feasible  follows  the  present 
Erie  Canal  for  about  a  third  of  its  length,  and  for  the  re- 
mainder of  the  way  utilizes  the  chain  of  lakes  in  the  central 
part  of  the  state.  The  locks  were  to  be  28  feet  wide,  328 
feet  long,  and  11  feet  deep.^  This  law  has  since  been  modi- 
fied, however,  and  the  locks  are  being  built  45  feet  wide, 
328  feet  long,  and  12  feet  deep.^  Since  the  channel  will  be 
in  places  but  75  feet  in  width,  it  follows  that  36  or  37  feet 
will  measure  the  width  of  barges  that  can  be  used  while 
permitting  them  to  pass  each  other.  It  is  probable  that 
the  boats  that  will  be  used  w  ill  be  150  feet  long  by  36  or  37 
feet  wide,  having  a  capacity  of  1500  or  1600  tons.  There 
are  those,  however,  who  favor  tows  of  smaller  barges,  of 
700  or  800  tons'  burden  each,  four  of  which  could  be  locked 
at  once.3 

Following  the  recommendation  of  the  State  Committee 
on  Canals  the  Legislature  of  New  York  passed  an  act  in 

*  Fairlie,  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics,  1904,  p.  290. 

•  Personal  letter  from  the  State  Engineer  and  Surveyor,  •  Ibid. 


420        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

April,  1903,  appropriating  $101,000,000  for  the  purpose  of 
carrying  out  the  work  proposed.  It  then  only  remained  to 
secure  the  sanction  of  the  people  by  a  referendum  vote. 
This  proved  the  most  difficult  part  of  the  entire  project. 

The  New  York  Produce  Exchange  inaugurated  a  re- 
markable campaign  for  the  purpose  of  educating  the  pub- 
lic to  the  benefits  expected  from  the  enlargement  of  the  old 
canal.  Probably  no  other  referendum  vote  in  this  country 
ever  attracted  the  amount  of  interest  that  this  one  did.  It 
was  an  absorbing  topic  of  discussion  in  all  parts  of  the 
state  for  many  weeks  before  voting  day.  When  the  vote 
was  taken  on  November  3,  1903,  it  showed  a  substantial 
majority  in  favor  of  the  appropriation.^ 

It  will  be  of  unusual  interest,  however,  to  analyze  the 
vote  on  the  measure.  "At  the  election,  the  non-canal 
counties  voted  against  the  project  by  large  majorities. 
St.  Lawrence  County,  for  instance,  being  12  to  1  against 
it,  and  Steuben  County  10  to  1  against  it.  .  .  .  For  somr 
unexplained  reason,  Monroe  County,  in  which  Rochester 
is  situated,  and  Onondaga  County,  in  which  Syracuse  is 
situated,  voted  against  it.  The  overwhelming  vote,  how- 
ever, in  the  counties  at  the  two  terminals.  New  York  and 
Buffalo,  made  a  majority  of  245,312  in  the  entire  state  in 
favor  of  the  project  out  of  a  total  vote  of  1, 100,708. "^  The 
vote  of  New  York  City,  especially,  proved  the  deciding 
factor.  "The  project  was  fought  by  the  press  outside  of 
New  York  and  Buffalo  with  singular  unanimity  and  the 
polls  showed  a  crushing  defeat  for  the  improvement  until 
the  returns  began  to  come  in  from  New  York  City,  where 
an  overwhelming  vote  in  favor  of  the  new  waterway  car- 
Tied  the  proposition."^  The  majority  of  the  county  of  New 
York  alone  amounted  to  223,629.'* 

*  For  an  excellent  account  of  the  campaign,  see  Canal  Enlargement 
in  New  York  State,  pp.  66-75,  100-107. 
«  Ibid.,  p.  116. 
»  Qumn.  World  To-day,  1906,  p.  169.  *  Ibid.,  p.  193. 


ENLARGEMENT  OF  THE  ERIE  CANAL    421 

3.  This  analysis  of  the  vote  on  the  canal  appropriation 
measure  illustrates  to  a  nicety  the  play  of  sectional  inter- 
ests. Why  were  Buffalo  and  New  York  so  strongly  in  favor 
of  the  proposition,  in  contrast  to  the  state  at  large  ? 

The  former  city,  by  virtue  of  its  location  at  the  western 
terminus  of  the  canal,  saw  the  possibility  of  developing  an 
extensive  transshipping  business  from  Lake  to  canal  ves- 
sels, and  vice  versa,^  and  also  to  secure  a  larger  portion  of 
the  traffic  shipped  eastward  from  the  Central  States  to 
the  Atlantic  seaboard  than  now  falls  to  her  lot.  The  com- 
mercial interests  of  that  city  accordingly  contributed  large 
sums  to  the  campaign  fund,  and  succeeded  in  getting  out 
a  large  vote  in  favor  of  the  project. 

The  New  York  Produce  Exchange  was,  however,  the 
life  and  soul  of  the  movement.  It  had  long  viewed  with 
concern  the  relative  decline  of  New  York  City  in  the  grain 
trade.  This  was  due,  it  was  averred,  to  the  railway  com- 
bination which  had  given  Baltimore  and  Philadelphia  a 
differential  rate  advantage  over  New  York.  It  was  hoped 
that  an  enlarged  canal  through  the  State  of  New  York 
would  enable  the  metropolis  to  regain  her  former  command- 
ing position;  hence  extraordinary  efforts  were  put  forth  in 
the  city  to  secure  the  passage  of  the  referendum.  The 
circumstance  of  the  ability  of  those  interested  to  control 
a  tremendous  urban  vote  enabled  them  to  carry  the  day 
against  the  wishes  of  the  rest  of  the  state. 

Since  the  expense  of  constructing  the  canal  was  to  be 
borne  by  all  the  state,  since  no  tolls  were  to  be  charged, 
and  since  the  entire  cost  of  operating  and  maintaining  the 
canal  was  to  be  paid  out  of  general  taxation,  Buffalo  and 
New  York  hoped  to  reap  an  advantage  at  the  expense  of  the 
state  at  large.  It  would  be  interesting  to  know  precisely 
the  part  played  in  the  campaign  for  the  passage  of  the 
law  by  politicians  hoping  to  receive  benefits  from  the  spend- 

^  It  has  been  said  that  the  so-called  "  Elevator  Pool  **  was  largely 
instrumental  in  getting  out  the  large  vote  in  favor  of  the  project. 


422        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

ing  of  the  money.  The  estimated  amount  necessary  to 
construct  the  waterway  was  first  set  down  as  $82,000,000, 
but  this  was  raised,  almost  at  the  last  moment,  to  $101,- 
000,000.  This  fact  may  or  may  not  be  significant. 

Attention  should  be  called  to  the  fact  that  it  was  deemed 
necessary,  for  some  unknown  reason,  to  provide  a  channel 
twelve  feet  in  depth^  (eleven  feet  over  the  sills  at  the  locks) 
in  order  to  float  barges  of  1000  tons'  capacity.  As  has  been 
shown  elsewhere  in  this  treatise,  such  a  depth  is  wholly 
unnecessary  to  float  boats  of  that  size.  On  the  Rhine  River 
barges  of  3000  tons'  capacity  are  used  where  the  depth  of 
the  river  is  less  than  eleven  feet,  and  barges  of  1000  tons' 
burden  freely  navigate  channels  with  a  depth  of  less  than 
seven  feet.  Why  must  so  vast  a  sum  of  money  be  expended 
in  giving  the  Erie  a  depth  of  twelve  feet  in  order  to  float 
barges  carrying  only  1000  tons  of  freight  ? 

4.  Construction  work  was  begun  upon  the  canal  accord- 
ing to  schedule,  and  on  February  1,  1911,  the  value  of  the 
work  under  contract  amounted  to  $72,710,553,  and  of  the 
work  actually  completed,  to  $26,387,933.2  xt  was  originally 
hoped  that  the  project  would  be  completed  in  1914,  but 
there  is  now  practically  no  chance  that  the  hope  will  be 
realized.  "Of  the  eighty-one  contracts  that  have  thus  far 
been  let,  thirty-eight  are  noticeably  backward  in  progress, 
and  trouble  may  be  looked  for  on  the  contracts  that  are 
much  behind  the  schedule."^  It  is  too  early  as  yet  to  fore- 
tell with  certainty,  but  it  is  highly  probable  that  the  event- 
ual cost  will  exceed  the  estimate  of  $101,000,000  by  a 
considerable  figure.  It  is  certain  to  do  so  if  the  cost  of 
providing  the  necessary  terminal  facilities  be  included. 

New  York  voted  to  enlarge  the  Erie  before  realizing 
that  terminals  are  absolutely  essential  to  the  success  of 

^  The  amendment  was  explained  above.  This  does  not,  however, 
change  the  nature  of  the  proposition. 

«  Barge  Canal  Bulletin.  February,  1911,  p.  43.  »  Ibid.,  p.  44. 


ENLARGEMENT  OF  THE  ERIE   CANAL     423 

water  transportation,  and  no  attention  was  given  to  the 
cost  of  providing  the  necessary  terminal  equipment.  It 
was  not  until  1909  that  the  question  of  terminals  recei\*ed 
any  particular  attention  in  the  waterways  agitation  in  this 
country.  In  May  of  that  year,  however,  the  State  of  New 
York  appointed  a  commission  for  the  purpose  of  investi- 
gating the  question  so  far  as  the  Erie  Canal  is  concerned. 
The  commission  was  instructed  to  ascertain  what  it  would 
cost  to  procure  the  necessarj'  sites,  if  indeed  they  were  pro- 
curable at  all,  and  to  provide  the  necessary  terminal  facili- 
ties in  both  New  York  and  Buffalo.  Ten  thousand  dollars 
was  appropriated  for  the  purpose,  and  the  commission 
visited  all  the  important  canal  ports  of  the  state.  In  New 
York  City  they  found  that  "the  space  from  the  west  side 
of  Pier  No.  3  to  the  east  side  of  Pier  No.  8,  on  the  East 
River,  and  from  the  north  side  of  Fifty-first  Street  to  the 
south  side  of  Fifty-fourth  Street,  on  the  North  River,  is  re- 
served by  law  for  the  exclusive  accommodation  of  canal 
boats  and  barges  engaged  in  transportation  on  the  Hudson 
River.  The  city  has  gradually  leased  this  property,  how- 
ever, until  now  only  Piers  Nos.  5  and  6,  East  River,  are 
left  for  canal  purposes."^  There  is  almost  no  equipment  at 
present,  and  it  is  evident  that  large  expenditures  will  be 
involved  in  its  provision.  The  commission  has  under 
consideration  a  general  terminal  for  import  and  export 
business,  as  well  as  one  for  local  traflSc.^ 

In  Buffalo  the  terminal  situation  is  well-nigh  hopeless  for 
the  canal.  "About  half  of  the  river  frontage  is  owned  by 
the  railroads,  with  some  small  holdings  by  water  lines.  Of 
the  five  miles  on  the  two  sides  of  the  City  Ship  Canal,  four 
miles  are  owned  by  railroads.  On  the  Lake  front  the  total 
frontage  protected  by  breakwaters  is  about  four  miles,  of 
which  railroads  own  about  three,  subject  to  some  dispute 
as  to  title.  The  city  owns  about  three  fourths  of  a  mile, 
but,  with  the  exception  of  two  blocks,  practically  none  of  its 

*  Report  of  Commissioner  of  Corporations,  p&Tt  ni,  p.  90.    *  Ibid.,  p.  91. 


424        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

frontage  can  be  reached  without  crossing  railroad  property. 
The  city  owns  and  controls  nine  small  docks  at  street 
ends."  ^  It  thus  appears  that  the  railways  almost  com- 
pletely dominate  the  situation.  The  state  must  spend  a 
large  amount  of  money  in  order  to  acquire  the  sites  now 
controlled  by  the  various  roads  in  the  city;  and,  moreover, 
the  way  in  which  the  railway  terminals  of  the  city  have 
been  developed  will  seriously  handicap  the  development 
of  a  convenient  and  adequate  system  of  water  terminal 
arrangements  even  after  the  terminal  sites  have  been 
secured.  It  may  be  possible  to  develop  in  Buffalo  terminal 
facilities  adequate  to  meet  the  needs  of  canal  shipping, 
but  it  is  certain  to  cost  many  millions  in  order  to  do  it. 

A  bill  was  recently  drawn  up  by  a  New  York  Barge 
Canal  Terminal  Commission  providing  for  a  bond  issue  of 
$16,500,000  by  the  state  for  the  purpose  of  constructing 
the  necessary  terminals  along  the  route.  This  became  law 
in  November,  1911.  In  addition  to  this  New  York  City 
has  a  terminal  project,  independent  of  the  state,  which 
calls  for  an  initial  expenditure  of  $12,000,000  on  terminal 
facilities.  These  figures,  which  must  be  regarded  as  only 
tentative  estimates,  make  the  total  cost  of  the  project 
nearly  $130,000,000.2 

5.  Having  thus  briefly  given  the  history  of  the  Erie 
Canal  project  to  date,  let  us  now  turn  our  attention  to  the 
economic  aspects  of  the  situation.  First  in  order  is  the 
question  of  traffic. 

As  usual,  the  advocates  of  this  project  predict  a  universal 
cheapening  of  the  cost  of  transportation.  "Manufactur- 
ers will  be  benefited  by  the  reduction  of  freight  rates  both 
on  raw  materials  and  on  finished  products,  an  advantage 
that  cannot  fail  to  attract  to  this  favored  territory,  not 
only  those  industries  dependent  on  the  metals,  but  count- 

*  Report  of  Commissioner  of  Corporations,  part  iii,  p.  i5. 

*  Barge  Canal  Bulletin,  April,  1911,  pp.  107-108. 


ENLARGEMENT  OF  THE  ERIE  CANAL    425 

less  workers  in  other  metals.  The  farmers  of  the  State  of 
New  York  will  be  benefited  by  the  growth  of  the  capacity 
for  consumption  of  his  home  market  and  by  the  cheapening 
of  transportation  on  his  products  and  of  everything  he 
buys.  The  working  man  will  benefit  through  the  upbuild- 
ing of  manufacturing  industries  throughout  the  state  and 
by  the  reduction  in  the  price  of  the  necessities  of  life  which 
the  lowering  of  the  rates  of  freight  on  the  improved  canal 
will  bring  about,"  ^ 

It  is  unnecessary  to  state  again  the  reasons  why  manu- 
factures do  not  travel  extensively  by  water.  It  is  certain 
that  the  traffic  on  the  Erie  Canal,  as  on  other  waterways, 
will  be  confined  for  the  most  part  to  freight  of  low  grade. 
And,  indeed,  it  is  generally  admitted  by  its  advocates  that 
the  economic  justification  of  the  canal  rests  primarily  upon 
its  ability  to  carry  at  low  rates  two  commodities:  grain, 
and  structural  materials  of  iron  and  steel.  The  lumber 
trade  in  this  section  of  the  country  is  now  unimportant  and 
growing  less  in  amount  each  year,  and  no  hope  of  an  im- 
portant traffic  is  to  be  looked  for  in  this  direction.  We  may, 
therefore,  confine  our  attention  to  the  possibilities  of  an 
extensive  traffic  in  grain  and  in  the  heavy  manufactures  of 
iron  and  steel. 

6.  The  table  on  the  opposite  page  shows  the  decline  in 
the  export  of  wheat  and  wheat  flour  from  the  United  States 
in  the  last  thirty  years. ^ 

This  table  indicates  that  the  export  of  wheat  from  the 
United  States  is  rapidly  declining  relatively  to  production, 
and  that  it  is  even  decreasing  in  absolute  amount.  This 
is  due  not  so  much  to  a  relative  decline  in  the  amount  pro- 
duced as  to  the  heavy  increase  in  the  amount  consumed 
at  home.  The  tremendous  increase  in  urban  population 
in  the  last  thirty  years  has  opened  a  much  larger  domestic 

^  Caned  Enlargement  in  New  York  State,  p.  75. 

'  Report  of  Chicago  Harbor  Commission,  1909,  p.  215. 


426        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

market  for  our  grain.  It  is  now  generally  recognized,  also, 
that  in  a  very  few  years  the  United  States  will  cease  alto- 
gether to  export  wheat  and  flour  and  will  probably  even 
have  to  import  from  Canada.    In  like  manner  corn,  corn 


QUANTITIES  OF  WHEAT  PRODUCED  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND 
OF  DOMESTIC  WHEAT  AND  WHEAT  FLOUR*  EXPORTED  AND  RE- 
TAINED FOR  CONSUMPTION    1880   TO   1908 


Year 
ending 
June  30 

Production  — 
Buahela 

Exports  of  domestic 
—  Bushels 

Domestic  retained 

for  consumption  — 

Bushels 

Per  cent  of 
domestic 
product 
exported 

1880 

448,756.630 

180,304,180 

268,452,450 

40.13 

1881 

498,549,868 

186,321,514 

312,228,354 

37.38 

1882 

883,280,090 

121,892,389 

261,387,701 

81.83 

1883 

504,185,470 

147,811,316 

356,374,154 

29.83 

1884 

421,086,160 

111,534,182 

309,551,978 

26.49 

1885 

512.765,000 

132,570,366 

380,194,634 

25.86 

1886 

357,112,000 

94,565,793 

262.546,207 

26.48 

1887 

457,218,000 

153,804.969 

803,413,031 

33.66 

1888 

456,329,000 

119,624.344 

836,703.656 

26.23 

1889 

415,868,000 

88,600,742 

337,267,258 

21.31 

1890 

490,560.000 

109,430,467 

381,129,533 

22.31 

1891 

399,262.000 

106,181,316 

293,080,684 

26.60 

1893 

611.780,000 

225,665,812 

386,114,188 

36.88 

1893 

515,949,000 

191,912.635 

324.036,365 

37.20 

1894 

396,131,725 

164,283,129 

231,848,596 

41.47 

1895 

460,267,416 

144,812,718 

815,454,698 

31.46 

1896 

467,102,947 

126,443,968 

340.658,979 

27.07 

1897 

427,684,346 

145.124,972 

282,559,374 

33  93 

1898 

530,149.168 

217,306,004 

812,843,164 

40  91 

1899 

675,148,705 

222,618,420 

452,530,285 

32.97 

1900 

547,303,846 

186,096,762 

361,207,084 

84  00 

1901 

522,229.505 

215,990,073 

806,239,432 

41.36 

1903 

748,460,218 

234,772,515 

513,687  703 

31.37 

1903 

670,063,008 

202,905,598 

467,157,410 

30.28 

1904 

637,821,835 

120,727,613 

517,094,222 

18.92 

1905 

552,399,517 

44.112,910 

508,286,607 

7.99 

1906 

692,979,489 

97,609.007 

595,370,482 

14.09 

1907 

735,260,970 

146,700.425 

588,560,545 

19.95 

1908 

634,087,000 

163,043.668 

471,043,332 

25.70 

1909 

664,602,000 

114,268,468 

550,333,532 

17.19  + 

*  Wheat  flour  is  reduced  to  wheat  at  the  rate  of  4>^  bushels  to  the  barrel. 
t  Statistical  Abstract  o/ the  United  States,  1909,  p.  586. 


ENLARGEMENT  OF  THE  ERIE  CANAL    427 


meal,  and  oats  are  not  extensively  exported.  In  the  year 
1908  only  2.17  per  cent  of  the  corn  crop^  and  much  less 
than  one  per  cent  of  the  oat  crop  was  shipped  out  of  the 
country .2  Now  it  is  evident  that  for  purposes  of  distribut- 
ing grain  to  domestic  markets  extending  over  wide  areas, 
the  Erie  Canal  can  be  of  little  service.  Its  usefulness  must 
be  primarily  confined  to  the  export  trade  in  grain. 

Attention  is  now  directed  to  a  second  table,  which  shows 
the  shifting  of  the  areas  of  wheat  production  in  recent 
years.  The  table  gives  the  annual  receipts  of  wheat  at  the 
great  primary  grain  markets  from  1887  to  1910:^  — 


St.  Louis 

Minn.       Dulutb     Milwaukee     Chicago 

Tear 

(In  bushels) 

1887 

14.510,315 

45,504,480 

17.136,000 

9,346,756 

21.848,251 

1888 

13.010,108 

44,552,730 

7,993,000 

8,129.315 

13.438,069 

1889 

13,810,591 

41,734,095 

17,136,000 

7,469,289 

18,762,646 

1890 

11,730,774 

45,271,910 

15,341,000 

8,046,462 

14.248,770 

1891 

25,523,183 

57,811,615 

40,392,000 

10,846,495 

42,931,258 

1892 

27,483,855 

72,727,600 

46.661,000 

15,205,639 

50,234,556 

1893 

14,642.999 

57,890.469 

32.910,000 

12,806,319 

35,355.101 

1894 

10,003,243 

55,000,610 

32,226,000 

8,101,616 

25,665,902 

1895 

11,275,885 

65,436,390 

49,599,000 

9.697,379 

20.637.642 

1896 

12,651,248 

69.568,970 

58,293,000 

9,336,036 

19,933,402 

1897 

12,057,735 

72,801,530 

48,069,000 

9,. 526. 878 

28,087.147 

1898 

14,240,252 

77,159,980 

60.413,000 

13,539,840 

35,741,556 

1899 

10.438,163 

87,961,830 

54.982,000 

12,345,383 

30,971,547 

1900 

19,786,614 

83,312,320 

31,815,000 

10,S48,939 

4S, 048, 298 

1901 

20,860,805 

90,838,570 

47,001,000 

13,050,850 

51.197,870 

1902 

30,667,212 

88,762,120 

39,525,000 

10,360,593 

37,940,953 

1903 

23,533,800 

86,804,070 

29,091,000 

9,031,615 

27,124.585 

1904 

22,797,308 

86.935.980 

26,635,205 

8,240,860 

24,457,347 

1905 

20.684,439 

93.263.910 

31.186,725 

7.576,600 

26,899,012 

1906 

17,361,005 

80,694,580 

41,558,151 

7,832,426 

28,249,475 

1907 

17,473,947 

86,030.990 

55.300,838 

8.947,093 

24.943,690 

1908 

19,258,781 

91,739.900 

53,890,816 

10.943,842 

21,168,442 

1909* 

21,142,317 

81,111,410 

52,867,496 

7,761,305 

26,985,112 

1910* 

19,412,989 

99,721,600 

32,284,956 

10,313,810 

27,540,100 

*  statistics  for  1909  and  1910,  Monthly  Summary  of  Commerce  and  Finance,  Decem- 
ber, 1910,  pp.  1000-07. 

'  Report  of  the  Chicago  Harbor  Commission,  1909,  p.  214. 
2  Ibid.,  p.  2u.  »  Ibid.,  p.  219. 


428        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

This  table  shows  very  distinctly  the  shifting  of  the  centre 
of  wheat  production  to  the  Northwest.  The  receipts  at 
St.  Louis,  Milwaukee,  and  Chicago  are  but  little  greater 
now  than  they  were  twenty-three  years  ago,  while  those  at 
Minneapolis  have  doubled  and  those  at  Duluth  have  about 
tripled  during  the  same  period.  Canada  is  becoming  the 
great  grain  producing  area  of  North  America.  "Six  years 
ago  the  Canadian  Northwest  raised  about  eight  million 
bushels  of  grain.  Last  year  (1908)  its  production  was  in 
the  neighborhood  of  eighty-five  million  bushels."  ^  The 
receipts  of  the  terminal  elevators  at  Fort  William  and  Port 
Arthur  from  1901  to  1909  were  as  follows  t^  — 


1901 

5,959,920 

1906 

56,056,560 

1902 

30,141,536 

1907 

60,553,693 

1903 

41,302.474 

1908 

40,689,868 

1904 

32,080,627 

1909 

58,088,727 

1905 

31,508,617  . 

This  shifting  of  the  area  of  wheat  production  to  the 
Northwest  and  to  Canada  means  that  an  ever-increasing 
portion  of  that  which  is  exported  will  naturally  tend  to 
seek  an  outlet  through  Canadian  ports.  It  is  interesting 
to  note  the  relative  increase  that  has  taken  place  during 
the  past  few  years  in  the  export  of  wheat  from  Montreal 
as  compared  with  that  from  New  York.  Statistics  of  the 
export  of  both  American  and  Canadian  wheat  from  Mon- 
treal are  not  available  prior  to  1907:  — 


Year 

Montreal  * 

New  York  f 

1907 

18,938,061 
30,461,946 
27,061,792 

22,769,338 

1908 

20,578,068 

1909 

12,587,537 

*  Canadian  Trade  and  CommeTce  Reports,  1910,  Session  Papers,  vol.  xuv,  no.  6. 
t  Exports  oj Domestic  Breadstuffs,  etc..  Bureau  of  Statistics,  December,  1909,  p.  4. 

*  Report  of  Chicago  Harbor  Commission,  p.  195. 

'  Canadian  Trade  and  Commerce  Reports,  1910,  Session  Papers,  vol. 
XLiv,  no.  6. 


ENLARGEMENT  OF  THE  ERIE  CANAL    429 

It  is  well  known  that  Canada  has  been  considering  the 
building  oi  a  great  ship  canal  from  the  St.  Lawrence  River 
to  the  Georgian  Bay.  In  case  this  project  is  carried  out 
the  Canadian  route  will  enjoy  some  advantage  from  the 
standpoint  of  distance.  From  Duluth  to  Montreal  by  way 
of  the  proposed  Georgian  Bay  Ship  Canal  the  distance  is 
997  miles,  as  against  1500  miles  from  Duluth  to  New  York 
City.  From  Montreal  to  Liverpool  the  distance  is  3170 
miles,  as  against  3052  miles  from  New  York  to  Liverpool. 
This  shows  the  Canadian  route  from  Duluth  to  Liver- 
pool to  have  an  advantage  of  385  miles. 

The  Canadian  route  would  possess  another  and  more  im- 
portant advantage  from  the  fact  that  the  depth  of  twenty- 
two  feet  proposed  for  the  Georgian  Bay  Ship  Canal  would 
permit  the  passage  of  Lake  vessels.  This  would  make  it  pos- 
sible to  unload  grain  directly  from  the  Lake  boats  to  the 
ocean  vessels  at  Montreal.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Erie 
Canal  is  not  deep  enough  for  the  passage  of  Lake  vessels, 
and  as  barges  cannot  safely  and  economically  navigate 
the  open  Lakes,  it  will  be  necessary  to  transship  the  grain 
from  the  Lake  boats  to  the  barges  at  Buffalo,  and  again 
from  the  barges  to  the  ocean  vessels  at  New  York. 

The  number  of  days  of  navigation  on  the  two  routes 
would  not  vary  materially.  Between  1885  and  1905  the 
average  number  of  days  of  navigation  on  the  Erie  Canal 
was  204.^  It  is  estimated  that  the  open  season  on  the 
Georgian  Bay  route  would  be  215  days,'^  but  this  is  prob- 
ably slightly  overestimated. 

Since  the  port  of  Montreal  is  closed  for  several  months 
each  year,  it  might  seem  that  New  York  would  have  an 
advantage  during  the  winter  months.  But  since  the  Erie 
Canal  is  closed  at  the  same  time,  it  is  apparent  that  the 
railways  of  New  York  would  reap  the  advantage  rather 
than  the  canal.   It  is  doubtful  anyway  if  New  York  City 

*  \Miitford,  History  of  New  York  Canals,  vol.  ii,  p.  1061. 

*  Canal  Statistics,  Canada,  1909. 


430        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

can  take  this  traffic  away  from  Canada,  for  the  Canadian 
railways  can  carry  it  to  the  port  of  St.  John  when  Montreal 
is  closed  to  navigation. 

It  should  be  said  in  this  connection  that  the  Canadian 
Government  seems  determined  to  secure  this  grain  trade 
at  whatever  cost.  In  case  the  Georgian  Bay  Ship  Canal  is 
not  put  through,  the  Government  will  probably  subsidize 
the  railways,  guarantee  them  dividends  if  necessary,  and 
let  them  make  rates  which  will  be  sure  to  draw  the  trade 
away  from  the  United  States.  With  the  advantage  that 
Canada  possesses  from  the  standpoint  of  distance,  this 
would  not  be  a  difficult  thing  to  do.  It  appears,  then,  that 
the  probable  future  outlet  for  the  grain  of  the  Northwest 
will  be  primarily  through  Canada. 

The  second  important  source  of  traffic  for  an  enlarged 
Erie  Canal  is  said  to  be  manufactures  of  iron  and  steel. 
New  York  and  other  cities  on  the  Atlantic  require  enor- 
mous quantities  of  structural  materials  which  it  is  thought 
can  be  most  advantageously  shipped  by  water  from  Buffalo 
when  the  barge  canal  is  opened.  It  is  believed  that  the 
tendency  will  therefore  be  to  develop  great  manufacturing 
plants  at  Buffalo,  since  the  ore  can  be  brought  there  pre- 
cisely as  well  as  to  South  Chicago  or  Lake  Erie  ports.  This 
would  not  only  furnish  an  extensive  canal  traffic,  but  it 
would  give  a  decided  stimulus  to  industrial  development 
in  western  New  York  as  well. 

We  find,  however,  that  conditions  at  Buffalo  are  not 
so  favorable  to  the  development  of  the  iron  and  steel  in- 
dustry as  might  be  expected.  "Nearly  all  the  property 
fronting  on  the  outer  harbor  in  this  city  is  owned  by  the 
railroads,  and  is  not  available  except  to  the  railroads;  no 
private  interest  can  get  in  there.  People  who  want  to  come 
here  and  establish  a  big  industry  and  get  a  piece  of  pro- 
perty where  it  can  be  reached  by  Lake  ships,  canal  boats, 
and  railroads,  can  find  no  place  to  go."^  "So  far  back  as 
*  Report  of  Cammtsaioner  of  Corporations,  part  in,  p.  186. 


ENLARGEMENT  OF  THE  ERIE  CANAL    431 

1904  the  president  of  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Buffalo 
stated:  'At  present  there  is  no  available  land  with  water 
facilities  requiring  extensive  sites  in  or  about  Buffalo.' 
The  New  York  Steel  Company,  recently  organized,  was 
unable  to  get  a  site  in  Buffalo  at  which  ore  could  be  deliv- 
ered by  water  at  present.  Aside  from  two  or  three  small 
pieces  of  land  on  the  Buffalo  Creek  Railroad  there  is  not  a 
single  site,  not  already  taken,  available  for  manufacturing 
purposes,  with  both  rail  and  water  connections,  either  in 
the  city  or  adjacent  to  it."^  The  only  possibility  of  secur- 
ing sites  for  the  erection  of  great  iron  and  steel  plants  is 
along  the  Niagara  River  between  Buffalo  and  Tonawanda.- 
The  contention  that  there  would  unquestionably  be  a 
great  development  of  traffic  in  iron  and  steel  was,  as  is 
usual  in  the  case  of  predictions  of  waterway  traffic,  made 
before  any  investigation  of  the  problem  had  been  under- 
taken. It  is  another  case  where  the  wish  is  father  to  the 
thought,  and  it  proves  once  more  the  absolute  necessity  of 
removing  from  the  domain  of  politics  the  appropriation  of 
large  sums  of  money  for  the  construction  of  public  works. 

7.  But  suppose  it  be  granted,  for  the  sake  of  argument, 
that  there  is  a  large  quantity  of  traffic  available  for  the 
canal  route  in  question.  It  still  remains  to  be  shown  that 
from  a  broad  economic  standpoint  the  project  is  justifiable. 
All  things  considered,  can  the  Erie  Canal  when  enlarged  re- 
duce the  cost  of  transport?  This  is  the  main  point  at  issue. 

The  cost  of  enlarging  the  waterway,  exclusive  of  termi- 
nal facilities,  and  of  the  boats,  is  estimated  at  $101,000,- 
000,  though  it  will  probably  greatly  exceed  that  amount. 
At  that  figure,  however,  the  cost  will  equal  $294,460  per 
mile.  In  contrast  to  this,  the  cost  of  constructing  the  New 
York  Central  Railway  is  given  as  $156,601,150.55,  inclu- 
sive of  terminals,  but  exclusive  of  equipment.'     If   this 

^  Report  of  Commissioner  of  Corporations,  part  iii,  p.  188.    '  Ibid.,  p.  189. 
*  Annual  Report  of  New  York  Central  Railway,  1907,  p.  20. 


432        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

figure  be  correct,  it  appears  that  the  railway  cost  only 
about  $41,000  per  mile. 

The  Erie  Canal  joins  the  navigable  Hudson  at  Albany 
and  thus  makes  a  through  route  from  Buffalo  to  New 
York.  The  distance  from  New  York  to  Buffalo  by  way  of 
the  New  York  Central  is  440  miles.  At  the  above  rate  of 
construction,  therefore,  a  railway  could  be  built  from  New 
York  to  Buffalo  for  $18,223,920,  little  more  than  a  sixth 
of  the  cost  of  enlarging  the  Erie  Canal.  If  the  cost  of  the 
canal  terminals  be  included,  the  proportion  becomes  as 
one  to  seven  or  eight.  At  the  present  day  it  is  probable 
that  a  railway  could  be  built  between  these  two  cities  for 
about  $20,000,000,  if  the  cost  of  providing  the  necessary 
terminals  were  not  included. 

8.  Let  us  now  inquire  as  to  the  capacity  of  the  enlarged 
Erie  Canal  as  compared  with  a  railroad.  It  is  commonly 
believed  that  the  capacity  of  a  canal  is  very  much  greater 
than  that  of  a  railway  and  that  the  disadvantage  of  the 
greater  additional  cost  of  the  former  is  more  than  counter- 
balanced thereby.  The  statistics  employed  in  showing  this, 
however,  generally  proceed  upon  the  assumption  that  the 
canal  is  utilized  to  its  maximum  capacity,  while  the  data 
for  the  railway  are  based  upon  actual  tonnage  statistics. 
Since  a  railway  is  seldom  utilized  to  anything  like  its  full 
capacity,  and  since  the  statistics  chosen  are  usually  those 
of  a  line  which  carries  passenger  as  well  as  freight  traffic, 
the  comparisons  that  are  made  are  wholly  inconclusive. 
Since  the  New  York  Central  is  a  four-track  system,  and 
since  our  problem  is  one  of  comparing  a  canal  with  an  all- 
freight  railway,  we  may  make  a  comparison  of  a  canal  and 
of  a  double-track  railway  devoted  to  freight  traflSc  alone. 

The  capacity  of  the  enlarged  Erie  Canal  is  usually  set 
down  as  20,000,000  tons  per  annum. ^  That  is  to  say,  20,- 
000,000  tons  could  pass  through  each  lock  in  a  year,  or,  in 
^  Fairlie,  Quarterly  Journal  oj  Economics,  1900,  p.  234. 


ENLARGEMENT  OF  THE  ERIE  CANAL    433 

other  words,  pass  by  a  given  point.  Let  us  analyze  these 

figures  and  ascertain  at  how  frequent  intervals  barges 

would  have  to  pass  through  a  lock.  The  following  tabular 

statement  will  serve  to  make  the  point  clear:  — 

200  days  =  season  of  navigation ; 

20,000,000  -^  ^200  =  100,000  tons  a  day; 

1500  tons  =  capacity  of  barges; 

100,000  -H  1500  =  67  barges  per  day; 

16  hours  =  daily  period  of  navigation; 

67  -H  16  =  4   (approximately)  barges  per  hour;  or 

1  barge  every  15  minutes. 

One  or  two  statements  may  require  explanation.  The  sea- 
son of  navigation,  as  stated  on  page  429,  averaged  204 
days  between  1885  and  1905.  Allowing  for  interruptions 
for  repairs,  which  would  be  frequent  with  a  tremendous 
tonnage,  200  days  may  be  taken  as  a  fair  round  number 
that  the  canal  could  be  used  each  season.  It  would  be  im- 
practicable to  navigate  the  canal  at  night,  and  sixteen 
hours  is  a  high  average  of  daylight.  Fifteen-minute  inter- 
vals for  the  passage  of  a  lock  continuously  for  sixteen  hours 
each  day  means  working  on  an  exceedingly  narrow  mar- 
gin, and  it  is  doubtful  if  so  much  as  20,000,000  tons  could 
be  handled  in  a  year.  With  traffic  going  in  both  directions 
it  is  certain  that  more  than  fifteen  minutes  would  be  re- 
quired on  the  average  for  the  passage  of  a  lock.  But  let  us 
accept  this  interval  as  possible  of  attainment.  At  that  rate, 
if  a  steady  stream  of  traffic  were  available  for  sixteen  hours 
a  day  for  200  days  a  year,  the  capacity  of  the  canal  would 
be  20,000,000  annually.  Now,  let  us  compute  in  a  similar 
manner  the  potential  capacity  of  a  double-track  railway 
used  entirely  for  the  carriage  of  freight.  This  computation 
will  differ  from  the  one  made  in  the  preceding  chapter  only 
in  that  there  we  were  considering  a  single-track  road  only. 
We  may  predicate  a  block-signal  system  which  would 
permit  trains  to  run  at  intervals  of  1.5  miles.  Such  a  sys- 
tem is  in  use  on  some  of  our  four-track  systems  at  present. 
At  a  speed  of  twenty  miles  an  hour  a  train  could  thus  be 


434        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

run  about  every  five  minutes.  Taking  the  average  train- 
load  as  1000  tons  (25  cars  of  40  tons  each)  we  may  compute 
the  following  theoretical  maximum  capacity :  — 

12  trains  =  number  per  hour; 

12  X  24  =  288  trains  per  day; 

288  X  1000  =  288,000  tons  per  day; 

288,000  X  365  =  105,120,000  tons  a  year  in  each  direction; 

105,120,000  X  2  =  210,240,000  tons  both  ways. 

This  means  that  if  there  were  a  steady  stream  of  traffic 
from  both  directions  every  hour  in  the  day  for  every  day 
in  the  year  the  road  might  handle  more  than  200,000,000 
tons  of  traffic  in  a  year,  or  ten  times  the  amount  that  could 
pass  through  the  locks  of  the  enlarged  Erie  Canal.  Both 
from  the  standpoint  of  original  cost  and  of  capacity,  there- 
fore, the  advantage  is  seen  to  be  overwhelmingly  in  favor 
of  the  railway. 

9.  There  remain  to  be  considered  the  costs  of  mainten- 
ance and  of  operation  of  the  two  agents  of  transport.  Sta- 
tistics for  such  a  computation  are  not  so  satisfactory  as  one 
could  wish,  but  nevertheless  an  idea  may  be  gained  of  the 
comparative  advantages  in  this  regard. 

The  chief  items  in  the  maintenance  account  may  be 
given  with  some  degree  of  accuracy.  One  of  the  largest 
is  of  course  the  interest  on  the  capital  investment.  At 
three  per  cent  the  interest  on  the  waterway  capitaliza- 
tion of  $101,000,000  amounts  to  $6880  per  mile  of  water- 
way,^ while  the  interest  on  the  capitalization  of  the  New 
York  Central  Railway,  as  given  above,  amounts  to  $1242 
per  mile  of  line. 2  Though  this  comparison  involves  the 
original  cost  of  construction  and  hence  has  already  been 
covered,  it  has  seemed  advisable  to  present  it  here  again 
in  more  concrete  form.  As  to  the  cost  of  maintaining  the 
physical  equipment  of  the  new  canal,  we  have  no  direct 
data;  but  the  Welland  Canal,  fourteen  feet  in  depth,  will 

*  This  is  for  the  440  miles,  which  includes  the  Hudson  River. 
'  Annual  Report  of  New  York  Central  Railway,  1907. 


ENLARGEMENT  OF  THE  ERIE  CANAL    435 

serve  to  give  some  idea  of  the  cost  of  upkeep  of  a  waterway. 
In  the  year  1909,  an  average  year,  the  cost  of  maintenance 
and  renewals  on  this  canal  amounted  to  $5665  per  mile.' 
This  is  as  against  $3296  per  mile  of  line  on  the  New  York 
Central  system.  Together  these  items  give  a  total  of  $12,- 
551  per  mile  of  waterway  as  against  $4528  per  mile  of  rail- 
way. Here  again  the  advantage  is  greatly  in  favor  of  the 
rail  route. 

Statistics  of  the  cost  of  operation  of  canals  in  the  United 
States  are  not  available,  and  if  they  were  they  would  be  far 
from  adequate  to  our  present  purposes  because  the  canal 
traffic  is  very  small  and  the  canals  have  not  been  kept  in  a 
state  of  good  repair.  For  similar  reasons  it  is  difficult  to  set 
ofif  against  statistics  of  canal  operation  those  of  railway  oper- 
ation. The  amount  of  traffic  handled,  the  character  of  the 
country  traversed,  the  method  of  accounting  employed, 
unite  with  various  other  factors  in  determining  the  amount 
of  the  operating  expenses  of  any  road,  and  it  is  hence  im- 
possible to  make  a  reliable  direct  comparison.  All  that  may 
be  said  is  that  the  cost  of  boats,  as  indicated  in  the  preced- 
ing chapter,  is  somewhat  less  per  ton  of  carrying  capacity 
than  the  cost  of  railway  rolling-stock,  and  it  is  probable, 
though  this  point  has  been  frequently  denied,  that  the  di- 
rect cost  of  moving  a  given  ton  a  given  distance  is  some- 
what less  on  a  waterway  than  on  a  railway.  In  the  case  of 
a  canal  where  the  wash  against  the  banks  is  heavjs  where 
the  suction  on  the  bottom  is  considerable,  and  where  there 
are  many  locks  to  pass,  the  greater  economy  of  movement  by 
boat  is  much  more  in  doubt  than  it  is  on  the  open  lakes  or 
freely  navigable  rivers.  It  is  from  the  latter,  however,  that 
the  statistics  purporting  to  prove  the  point  are  usually  taken. 

It  should  be  observed  in  this  connection,  also,  that  the 
cost  of  hauling  a  single  boatload  a  given  distance  cannot 
fairly  be  compared  with  the  cost  of  hauling  a  single  train- 

*  Annual  Report  of  Department  of  Railways  and  Canals  of  Canada, 
1909-10,  p.  15. 


436        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

load  of  equal  weight  the  same  distance.  The  transporta- 
tion business  is  subject  to  the  law  of  increasing  returns  to 
an  unusual  degree,  and  hence  we  must  compare  the  cost 
per  unit  of  the  total  tonnage  carried  by  rail  and  by  water 
respectively.  The  far  greater  capacity  of  the  railway  is  evi- 
dently a  decided  advantage  in  this  regard;  but  of  vastly 
more  importance  than  this  is  the  much  greater  adaptabil- 
ity of  a  railway  to  systematization.  The  very  fact  that  a 
canal  is  usually  operated  by  independent  boat-owners, 
"by  whoever  wishes  to  carry  his  own  produce  to  mar- 
ket," precludes  the  possibility  of  a  systematic  operation  of 
the  route.  At  best,  even  with  a  monopoly  of  traffic  by  a 
single  company,  a  canal,  for  reasons  that  have  been  indi- 
cated elsewhere,  is  inherently  not  so  well  adapted  to  effi- 
cient organization  of  the  carrying  business  as  is  a  railway. 
In  view  of  these  considerations  it  is  by  no  means  certain 
that  the  direct  cost  of  operation  on  the  Erie  Canal  would 
be  any  less  than  on  an  all-freight  railway.  We  may  grant, 
however,  that  the  cost  of  moving  a  given  tonnage  a  given 
distance  is  considerably  less  by  boat  than  by  railway  car, 
and  yet  conclude  that  the  numerous  advantages  of  the 
railway  as  enumerated  above  greatly  outweigh  this  single 
advantage  of  the  canal. 

10.  In  making  the  above  comparison  of  the  cost  of  trans- 
portation on  an  all-freight  railway  and  on  the  enlarged 
Erie  Canal,  we  were  proceeding  on  the  assumption  that 
additional  transport  facilities  between  the  Great  Lakes 
and  the  Atlantic  seaboard  were  indispensable.  The  fact  of 
the  case  is,  however,  that  there  is  no  present  need  of  addi- 
tional transportation  lines  in  this  region.  Additional  termi- 
nal facilities  and  sidings  are  doubtless  necessary,  but  the  ex- 
isting main  lines  are  by  no  means  taxed  to  their  full  capac- 
ity. The  density  of  traffic  on  the  New  York  Central,  for 
instance,  is  only  2,855,610  tons  per  mile,^  which  is  much 
'  *  Annual  Report,  1907,  p.  25. 


ENLARGEMENT  OF  THE  ERIE  CANAL    437 

less  than  that  of  some  of  our  other  roads  which  are  not 
equipped  with  a  four-track  system.  The  purpose  of  the 
canal  is  not  to  provide  absolutely  indispensable  transporta- 
tion facilities;  its  purpose  is  avowedly  to  lower  the  cost 
of  transportation,  either  directly  by  carrying  the  traffic  it- 
self, or  indirectly  by  forcing  lower  rates  on  the  railroads. 
Since  this  is  true,  it  is  then  not  necessary  that  it  be  shown 
that  an  all-freight  railway  could  be  constructed  which 
would  carry  this  traffic  cheaper  than  can  the  canal.  If  the 
aim  is  to  secure  low  freight  rates  by  state  aid  to  trans- 
portation, it  may  be  accomplished  in  a  far  more  econom- 
ical manner  than  by  constructing  a  canal. 

Suppose  that  the  New  York  Central  Railway  were  re- 
lieved by  the  state  from  paying  the  annual  interest  on  its 
bonded  indebtedness  of  $18,223,920;^  suppose,  even,  that 
it  were  relieved  of  the  yearly  fixed  charges  on  the  total  capi- 
talization of  the  road;  suppose,  in  addition,  that  the  state 
should  bear  all  the  expense  of  maintaining  the  way  and 
structures  of  the  road,  amounting  to  $12,462,046  annually; 
suppose  that  the  railway  company  were  relieved  of  its 
present  annual  taxes  on  real  estate,  on  special  franchises, 
on  capital  stock,  on  bonded  debt,  and  on  gross  earnings, 
amounting  in  all  to  $3,439,287;  —  suppose,  in  a  word,  that 
the  New  York  Central  Railway  Company  were  merely 
obliged  to  earn  dividends  on  the  cost  of  its  rolling-stock, 
while  using  the  state's  highway  entirely  free  of  charge,  and 
an  idea  is  gained  of  the  low  freight  rates  that  might  be 
offered  were  the  state  to  extend  to  it  the  same  aid  as  it 
is  to  grant  the  Erie  Canal. 

11.  It  is  unnecessary  to  push  this  question  further.  From 

whatever  angle  we  approach  the  problem  we  find  support 

for  the  contention  that  transportation  by  rail  is  cheaper 

than  transportation  by  canal,  when  there  is  included  in  the 

cost  on  the  canal  the  state-levied  taxes  which  cover  the 

*  The  statistics  in  tbis  paragraph  are  all  from  the  Annual  Report  of  the 
—id  for  1907. 


438        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

original  cost  of  the  highway,  and  the  annual  expense  of 
maintenance.  As  has  been  pointed  out  time  and  again  in 
the  course  of  this  study,  the  fallacy  of  leaving  out  of  the 
computation  of  the  cost  of  transportation  by  water  the 
cost  of  constructing  the  waterway  itself  and  of  keeping  it 
in  a  state  of  repair,  underlies  the  whole  waterways  move- 
ment in  this  country.  Water  transportation  cannot  in  this 
manner  be  proved  cheaper  than  transportation  by  rail;  and 
unless  it  can  be  proved  the  cheaper  mode  of  transit,  the 
construction  of  artificial  waterways,  at  least,  must  be  pro- 
nounced bad  economy. 

To  guard  against  misunderstanding  it  should  be  stated 
that  it  has  not  been  our  purpose  in  the  above  paragraphs 
to  advocate  that  the  State  of  New  York  should  subsidize 
her  existing  railroads,  or  construct  additional  lines  and 
enter  the  field  in  direct  competition  with  the  private  rail- 
ways of  the  state;  though  either  could  doubtless  be  de- 
fended on  the  same  grounds  as  is  the  competition  of 
canals  with  private  railways.  The  attempt  has  merely 
been  made  to  bring  home  to  the  reader  in  as  many  ways 
as  possible  the  truth  that  canal  transportation,  when  all 
factors  are  included,  is  more  costly  than  transportation  by 
rail,  and  that  hence  the  enlargement  of  the  Erie  has  no 
justification  on  economic  grounds. 

By  way  of  summary,  it  should  be  restated  that  this  pro- 
ject was  authorized  through  the  influence  of  sectional  in- 
terests hoping  to  benefit  at  the  expense  of  the  state  as  a 
whole;  that  no  adequate  investigation  of  the  possibilities 
of  increased  traffic  was  ever  made;  that  it  was  decided  upon 
before  the  vital  question  of  terminals  was  apparently  con- 
ceived of;  and  that  absolutely  no  computation  was  made 
of  the  inclusive  cost  of  transport  on  the  enlarged  canal,  as 
compared  with  the  cost  by  rail.  The  enlargement  of  the 
Erie  Canal  is  a  typical  example  of  the  wholly  unscientific 
manner  in  which  Government  funds  are  commonly  voted 
in  this  country  for  purposes  of  public  improvement. 


CHAPTER  XX 

EXPLANATION   OF    THE  WATERWAYS   MOVEMENT   AND 
CONCLUSION 

The  evidence  of  the  foregoing  investigation  has  obviously 
pointed  strongly  against  the  feasibility  of  water  transporta- 
tion in  the  United  States.  Before  stating  our  final  conclu- 
sions, however,  it  seems  advisable  to  attempt  to  explain 
briefly  why  the  waterways  movement  should  have  enjoyed 
such  a  vogue  in  this  country  and  commanded  such  wide- 
spread support.  The  reader  has  doubtless  already  asked 
himself  many  times  how  it  is  possible,  if  the  conclusions 
reached  in  this  investigation  be  sound,  that  a  large  propor- 
tion of  the  American  people  could  have  become  convinced 
that  the  development  of  water  transportation  in  the  United 
States  is  an  imperative  necessity,  and  especially  how  eco- 
nomists, statesmen,  and  men  of  business  could  have  been 
so  badly  misled  in  the  matter. 

In  the  first  place,  it  should  be  observed  that  history  has 
afforded  many  illustrations  of  popular  movements  similar 
to  this  one  for  waterways.  Money  inflation  and  internal 
improvement  schemes,  religious,  prohibition,  and  suffrage 
movements  have  periodically  swept  over  countries  in  re- 
sponse to  emotional  states  which  seem  to  have  been  super- 
induced by  a  combination  of  psychological  influences. 
Even  in  this  very  field  of  canal  building  this  country  has 
already  passed  through  a  veritable  craze,  one  which  cul- 
minated in  widespread  disaster. 

The  remarkable  success  of  the  Erie  Canal,  which  was 
opened  in  1825,  precipitated  a  widespread  movement  for 
internal  improvements,  approximately  covering  the  period 
from  1825  to  1840.  It  spread  not  only  to  those  states 


440        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

which  were  in  need  of  lines  of  communication  with  the 
West,  but  it  led  to  comprehensive  transportation  plans 
within  the  Western  States  themselves.  Pennsylvania, 
jealous  of  New  York,  and  lured  also  by  great  expectations 
of  bountiful  returns,  in  1826  planned  a  vast  system  of 
internal  public  works  —  canals,  turnpikes,  and  railways. 
Little  forethought  was  exercised,  and  the  geographic  dis- 
advantages of  Pennsylvania  in  having  to  build  public 
works  across  mountains  were  almost  wholly  disregarded. 
In  stirring  up  popular  enthusiasm  "reference  was  made  to 
the  advantages  England  had  derived  from  her  canal  sys- 
tem, to  the  stimulating  effect  of  the  Middlesex  Canal  upon 
the  dormant  industries  of  New  Hampshire,"  ^  and,  above 
all,  to  the  beneficent  results  of  the  Erie  Canal  in  the  State 
of  New  York.  "The  advantages  that  would  accrue  to  all 
classes  from  improved  transportation  methods  were  care- 
fully detailed.  The  farmer  would  find  increased  demand, 
brisker  sales,  and  higher  prices  for  his  produce;  the  mer- 
chant, a  wider  field  for  his  business;  the  manufacturer 
and  mechanic,  more  certain  employment  and  better  pay 
for  their  industry;  the  capitalist,  a  better  interest  on  his 
money;  and  the  owner  of  lands  and  houses,  a  rise  in  rents 
of  twenty-five  or  thirty  per  cent."  ^  "It  was  predicted 
that  the  tolls  would  support  the  government  and  educate 
every  child  in  the  commonwealth."  ^  "  Construction  was 
carried  on  for  years  and  many  miles  of  works  were  built; 
but  underestimates  of  cost,  lack  of  traffic,  corruption,  and 
the  panic  of  1837  eventually  carried  the  state  to  bank- 
ruptcy." * 

*  Bishop,  State  Works  of  Pennsylvania,  Publications  of  Yale  University, 
1907,  p.  177. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  178.  »  Ibid.,  p.  174. 

*  "The  total  financial  loss  to  Pennsylvania  on  account  of  the  public 
works  was  $57,824,681,  to  say  nothing  of  a  debt  of  $40,000,000,  which 
remained  unpaid  at  the  time  of  the  sale  of  the  public  works,  and  which 
was  incurred  largely  for  the  construction  of  transportation  improve- 
ments." {Ibid.,  p.  229.) 


EXPLANATION   OF  THE   MOVEMENT    441 

The  first  Governor  of  Michigan  declared  in  1837  that 
**the  period  has  arrived  when  Michigan  can  no  longer, 
without  detriment  to  her  standing  and  importance  as  a 
state,  delay  the  action  necessary  for  the  development  of 
her  vast  resources  of  wealth.  With  a  prudent  and  wise 
forecast  to  be  exercised  by  the  legislature  and  the  people, 
we  cannot  fail  soon  to  reach  that  high  destiny  which  awaits 
us."  ^  The  people  were  assured  that  not  only  would  the  re- 
turns from  the  investments  prove  sufficient  to  pay  off  the 
state  debt  speedily,  but  that  there  would  actually  be  a 
plethora  of  funds  in  the  treasury  which  would  forever  free 
the  inhabitants  of  Michigan  from  the  burdens  of  taxation. 
In  1846  two  strips  of  railway  were  sold  for  $2,500,000, 
and  "here  virtually  ceased  to  exist  all  our  works  of  internal 
improvement.  Nothing  but  the  debris  of  our  airy  castles 
remained,  and  that  only  to  plague  our  recollections."^ 

Illinois  also  went  through  a  similar  period  of  speculative 
building  of  public  works.  In  his  message  to  the  special 
session  of  the  legislature,  begun  December  7,  1835,  Gover- 
nor Duncan  said:  "When  we  look  abroad  and  see  the  ex- 
tensive lines  of  communication  penetrating  almost  every 
section  of  our  sister  states,  when  we  see  the  canal  boat 
and  the  locomotive  bearing,  with  seeming  triumph,  the  rich 
products  of  the  interior  to  the  rivers,  lakes,  and  ocean, 
almost  annihilating  time,  burthen,  and  space,  what  patriot 
bosom  does  not  beat  high  with  laudable  ambition  to  give 
Illinois  her  full  share  of  those  advantages  which  are  adorn- 
ing her  sister  states,  and  which  a  munificent  Providence 
seems  to  invite  by  the  wonderful  adaptation  of  our  whole 
country  to  such  improvements."  ' 

*  Cooley's  Michigan,  p.  291. 

'  Ibid.  The  young  state  of  less  than  200,000  people  plunged  inlo  debt  to 
the  extent  of  $5,340,000  in  attempting  to  build  great  canals  and  railroads. 
Finally,  being  unable  and  unwilling  to  raise  the  necessary  funds  to  run 
the  government,  meet  the  interest  payments,  and  pay  off  their  enormous 
debt,  the  people  of  Michigan  denied  their  obligations  and  repudiated 
the  state  debt. 

•  Davidson  and  Stuv6,  History  of  Illinois,  p.  4S4. 


442        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

All  that  seemed  to  be  needed  to  insure  the  prosperity 
of  Illinois  was  a  comprehensive  system  of  transportation 
routes.  It  was  urged  that  these  routes  could  be  constructed 
on  the  faith  and  credit  of  the  state.  "The  dazzling  scheme 
was  vigorously  agitated.  The  press  espoused  the  project, 
public  meetings  were  held  all  over  the  state,  and  resolu- 
tions, as  the  expressions  of  the  people  in  favor  of  the  scheme, 
were  adopted."  ^  "The  wildest  reasoning  was  indulged. 
Every  theory  that  the  teeming  brain  of  man  could  suggest 
was  brought  into  requisition  to  further  the  success  of  the 
schemes.  Possibilities  were  argued  into  probabilities,  and 
these  latter  into  infallibilities."  ^  "The  manifest  destiny  of 
government  was  portrayed  in  glowing  colors;  deductions 
from  similar  systems  in  other  states  were  made  applicable 
to  Illinois,  and  their  success  driven  home  and  clinched  with 
predictions;  and  who  can  argue  against  prophecy?"' 

Large  appropriations  were  made  for  a  great  system  of 
internal  public  works;  but  only  to  end,  as  elsewhere,  in 
disaster.'*  Bonds  were  sold  until  the  credit  of  the  state  was 
exhausted;  and  the  people  became  unwilling  and  unable 
to  pay  higher  taxes.  In  1841  the  state  defaulted  on  its 
interest,  while  repudiation  of  the  entire  debt  was  long 
imminent. 

In  this  second  waterways  movement,  there  are  to  be 
noted  the  same  popular  demonstrations,  the  same  sort  of 
political  promise  of  great  financial  returns  to  the  state,  the 
same  chimerical  hopes  of  unnumbered  benefits  to  every 

^  Davidson  and  Stuve,  History  of  Illinois,  p.  434. 

«  Ibid.,  p.  435.  3  Ibid.,  p.  439. 

*  In  "An  Act  to  establish  and  maintain  a  general  system  of  internal 
improvement,  February  27,  1837,  the  legislature  went  far  beyond  expect- 
ations and  appropriated  $10,230,000."  (Davidson  and  Stuve,  p.  436.) 
This  was  soon  found,  however,  to  be  only  about  one  half  the  sum  neces- 
sary to  complete  the  grand  scheme.  The  population  of  the  state  in  1835 
was  271,727,  making  a  per  capita  debt  of  over  $37.  Total  collapse  came  in 
1840,  leaving  a  state  debt  from  this  source  of  $14,337,348.  {Ibid.,  p.  448.) 
The  annual  revenue  was  but  $117,821  at  the  time,  no  more  than  necessary 
to  meet  the  ordinary  expenses,  leaving  an  annual  deficit  to  the  state  of 
$830,182  to  augment  the  debt.   {Ibid.,  p.  448.) 


EXPLANATION  OF  THE  MOVEMENT      443 

class  of  society,  and  the  same  reasoning  from  foreign  pre- 
cedent as  existed  in  the  earlier  mania.  In  the  introductory- 
chapter  a  quotation  was  given  from  the  solemn  resolutions 
adopted  at  the  great  New  Orleans  convention  in  October 
of  1909.  These  resolutions  were  the  outgrowth  of  several 
days  of  jubilant  celebrating,  accompanied  by  some  re- 
markable oratory. 

The  Governor  of  Kansas  exhorted  as  follows :  "  Ask  every 
commercial  club  in  the  union  to  work  for  the  advance- 
ment of  every  Congressman  who  favors  the  proposition,  and 
for  the  retirement  of  those  who  do  not."  He  said  that  the 
details  could  be  disregarded.  "  You  are  going  to  have  water 
transportation  in  this  country,  you  will  have  to  get  it,  not 
stand  around  and  question  its  feasibility.  The  question 
of  details  does  not  come  up  in  the  consideration  of  railway 
building,  and  waterways  are  a  better  transportation  pro- 
position than  rails."  The  Governor  of  Missouri  in  a  glow- 
ing speech  said,  "There  are  a  hundred  rivers  flowing  un- 
used past  Missouri.  The  possibilities  of  waterways  exceed 
all  the  questions  in  which  the  American  people  are  inter- 
ested;" while  the  Governor  of  South  Carolina  sounded 
the  keynote  of  the  convention  in  his  telegram,  —  "  We 
want  water,  more  water,  and  deeper  water." 

The  resolutions  themselves  gave  excellent  expression  to 
the  moral  issues  believed  to  be  involved.  "Believing  in 
our  hearts  that  the  needs  of  the  country  and  the  funda- 
mental principles  of  our  government  herein  set  forth, 
involve  moral  no  less  than  material  issues  ...  we  do 
hereby  deliberately  and  firmly  and  in  the  full  realization 
of  our  duties  and  responsibilities  demand  and  direct"  that 
the  waterway  be  constructed  immediately. 

The  junior  Senator  from  Illinois  added  the  final  word, 
and  "argued  possibilities  into  probabilities,  and  these  lat- 
ter into  infallibilities,"  when  he  attacked  the  unfavorable 
report  of  the  army  engineers,  saying:  "I  don't  blame  these 
men  who  have  not  studied  the  problem  thoroughly  for 


444        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

being  cautious.  But  no  one  questions  the  feasibility  of  the 
fourteen-foot  channel  between  Chicago  and  St.  Louis,  or 
of  a  twenty-four-foot  channel,  for  that  matter.  You  may 
investigate  from  now  till  dooms-day  ;  you  may  secure 
what  engineers  you  may;  they  may  study  the  river  and 
the  problem,  and  they  will  be  forced,  on  their  honor,  to 
report  that  a  fourteen-foot  channel  between  Chicago  and 
St.  Louis  is  feasible."  ^ 

At  the  Chicago  convention  in  the  autumn  of  1908  a 
noted  speaker  declared  that  "thirty  great  states  will  en- 
joy the  tremendous  advantages  of  water  transportation. 
Twenty  thousand  miles  will  have  been  added  to  the  coast 
line  of  the  Republic.  The  congestion  of  the  American  rail- 
way system  will  be  cured.  Nearly  every  problem  of  mod- 
ern American  transportation  will  be  solved.  The  era  of 
moderate  freight  rates  will  be  permanently  installed.  And 
the  sea  will  be  brought  to  the  American  farmer."  Forget- 
fulness  of  party  lines,  of  factional  divisions,  and  of  neigh- 
borhood interests  was  urged  for  the  sake  of  the  great 
undertaking.^ 

The  Chief  Engineer  of  the  Chicago  Sanitary  District  is 
credited  with  the  following  statement:  "It  is  my  convic- 
tion that  a  deep  waterway  across  the  State  of  Illinois  would 
be  worth  all  it  could  possibly  cost,  within  the  limits  of  the 
most  liberal  estimates  which  have  ever  been  placed  upon 
it,  even  were  there  no  Mississippi  to  receive  its  affluent 
waters,  and  no  hope  of  ever  floating  a  craft  beyond  the 
line  which  limits  the  sovereignty  of  the  commonwealth."  ' 
And  the  present  Governor  of  Illinois,  like  his  prototype 
of  1835,  has  repeatedly  given  assurance  that  the  proceeds 
from  the  sale  of  water  power  along  the  Lockport-Utica 

^  For  accounts  of  the  convention  see  any  daily  papers  for  the  last  few 
days  of  October,  and  the  first  day  of  November,  1909.  The  above  quo- 
tations are  taken  from  the  Chicago  Tribune  of  November  1,  1909. 

'  The  Chicago  Daily  Tribune. 

*  Report  of  the  Deep  Waterway  Committee  of  the  Chicago  Commercial 
Association,  June,  1906,  p.  3. 


EXPLANATION  OF  THE  MOVEMENT  .445 

stretch  of  the  Lakes-to-Gulf  Waterway  would  in  a  few 
short  years  permit  a  substantial  reduction  of  the  taxes 
which  now  burden  the  good  people  of  Illinois.  The  reports 
of  practically  every  waterway  association  set  forth  in  glow- 
ing colors  the  great  benefits  to  accrue  to  all  classes  of  so- 
ciety, and  especially  to  the  tiller  of  the  soil.^  The  early  craze 
for  internal  improvements  in  the  United  States  is  paral- 
leled at  every  point  by  this  second  agitation  for  waterway 
development. 

We  may  go  further,  however,  than  merely  to  note  the 
parallelism  between  the  present  and  the  earlier  movement 
for  waterways  in  this  country.  Until  very  recent  years 
great  popular  movements  have  been  surrounded  with  more 
or  less  of  mystery;  but  the  science  of  social  psychology  has 
now  furnished  an  explanation  of  such  phenomena.  The 
underlying  principles  may  be  briefly  stated. 

The  forces  tending  toward  a  popular  craze  or  a  group 
spirit  are:  recurrent  suggestion,  broadside  and  voluminous 
suggestion,  and  authoritative  suggestion.  If  the  same  idea 
be  repeatedly  brought  to  the  attention,  it  assumes  some 
degree  of  importance;  if,  in  addition,  it  comes  from  a  great 
number  of  sources,  and  in  difiFerent  forms,  its  importance 
is  very  greatly  enlarged;  and  if  it  be  backed  by  prestige, 
by  authoritative  sanction,  its  force  becomes  well-nigh  irre- 
sistible. Coupled  with  these  principles  of  suggestion  is  the 
law  of  imitation,  impelling  the  individual  mind  to  accept 
the  current  thought  as  perforce  correct.  It  is  the  inherent 
desire  to  be  like-minded,  to  be  one  of  the  majority.  The 
operation  of  these  forces  upon  the  public  mind  results  in 
an  unreasoned  conviction,  a  sort  of  mental  aberration,  in 
which  individuality  is  lost,  or  merged  in  the  anonymity  of 
the  group,  and  the  power  of  thought  is  virtually  inhibited. 
A  mob-mind  has  been  developed  in  which  the  faculty  of 
reason  is  held  in  abeyance,  until  such  time  as  counteract- 
ing influences  may  restore  again  the  normal  condition. 
*  See  pages  16-17. 


446        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

There  is  no  warrant,  moreover,  for  the  belief  that  crazes 
or  waves  of  popular  excitement  are  of  less  common  occur- 
rence in  these  days  of  twentieth-century  enlightenment. 
On  the  contrary,  rather  than  belonging  merely  to  the 
simple-minded  peoples  of  benighted  ages,  they  seem  to 
become  more  and  more  frequent  as  civilization  advances. 
A  complex  society,  widely  disseminated  information,  and 
strenuous  existence  are  particularly  conducive  to  popular 
delusions  rather  than  preventive  of  them.  The  receptivity 
of  the  mind  to  suggestion  is  increased  by  whatever  lessens 
its  vigor  and  its  power  of  discrimination.  Fatigue  and 
nerve  strain  would,  clearly  enough,  then,  prepare  the 
mind  for  a  ready  acceptance  of  fallacious  ideas,  especially 
if  they  offered  alleviation  of  existing  hardships.  "  Every 
line  we  read  or  write,  every  human  face  that  we  see, 
every  conversation  that  we  carry  on,  every  scene  we  per- 
ceive, sets  in  activity  our  sensory  nerves  and  our  brain 
centres.  Even  the  little  shocks  of  railway  traveling,  not 
perceived  by  consciousness,  the  perpetual  noises,  and  the 
various  sights  in  the  streets  of  a  large  town,  our  suspense 
pending  the  sequel  of  progressing  events,  the  constant  ex- 
pectation of  the  newspaper,  of  the  postman,  of  visitors, 
cost  our  brain  wear  and  tear."  ^  Again,  the  overthrow  of 
hallowed  customs  and  beliefs,  leads  to  uncertainty  and  con- 
fusion of  thought,  paving  the  way  for  a  ready  acceptance 
of  all  manner  of  transitory  ideas.  "  In  a  dynamic  society 
so  many  readjustments  are  necessary,  such  far-reaching 
transformations  are  experienced  in  half  a  lifetime,  that  the 
past  is  discredited.  One  forms  a  habit  of  breaking  habits. 
Ancestral  wisdom,  the  teachings  of  social  experience,  are 
refuted  and  discarded  at  so  many  points  that  they  lose 
their  steadying  power.  ^    The  present  age,  with  its  nerve 

^  Cooley,  Human  Nature  and  the  Social  Order,  p.  39. 

2  Ross,  Social  Psychology.  Furthermore,  the  increasing  use  of  the  tele- 
graph and  the  telephone,  the  extensive  travel  of  a  large  portion  of  the 
people,  and  the  daily  newspapers,  carried  even  to  the  homes  of  the  farmers 


EXPLANATION  OF  THE  MOVEMENT     447 

wear,  its  multitudinous  interests,  and  extensive  inter- 
communication, is  peculiarly  productive  of  popular  move- 
ments.^ 

It  is  our  purpose  now  to  apply  these  psychological  princi- 
ples to  the  present  waterways  movement.  Attention  should 
be  directed  to  the  incessant  suggestion  in  public  discussion 
and  in  the  press  that  transportation  upon  our  rivers  and 
canals  should  be  revived.  The  remarkable  conjunction  of 
influences  should  be  recalled,  namely,  the  lingering  glory  of 
our  waterways,  the  widespread  movement  for  the  conserva- 
tion of  all  our  natural  resources,  the  relation  of  waterways 
to  the  reclamation  of  flooded  lands,  to  the  development 
of  water  power,  and  to  sanitation,  the  supposed  remark- 
able cheapness  of  water  transportation,  the  opposition  to 
the  monopolistic  tendencies  of  railways,  the  inadequacy 
of  the  railway  service  to  meet  the  country's  needs,  the 
alleged  benefits  of  waterways  even  to  the  railways,  the 
avowed  advocacy  of  waterway  development  by  railroad 
men,  and  the  extensive  use  of  waterways  in  foreign  coun- 
tries. Finally,  it  should  be  noted  that,  in  addition  to  this 
incessant  and  broadside  suggestion,  the  movement  has 
had  the  active  support  of  some  economists,  and  of  many 
prominent  business  men  and  politicians,  who  have  served 
to  give  the  necessary  sanction  of  authority.  Under  such  a 
cumulation  of  causes  and  combination  of  influences,  it  was 

by  means  of  free  rural  delivery,  have  largely  broken  down  all  group  bar- 
riers. What  formerly  interested  but  a  particular  section  of  the  country 
and  a  particular  group  of  people  may  now  readily  affect  the  entire  nation, 
and  all  parts  well-nigh  simultaneously.  This  is  an  era  of  publics  rather 
than  of  crowds,  due  to  the  facilities  for  the  intercommunication  of  ideas. 
*  It  is  recognized  that  as  man  increases  in  knowledge,  as  he  becomes 
more  rational,  he  grows  proportionally  less  susceptible  to  emotion  and 
delusion.  (See  Hobhaus,  Evolution  of  Morality.)  It  is  a  very  small  frac- 
tion of  our  population,  however,  that  can  be  regarded  as  having  at- 
tained any  considerable  degree  of  rationality.  The  great  majority  is  not 
capable  of  understanding  and  assimilating  the  multitude  of  considera- 
tions and  problems  that  are  constantly  arising.  We  have  a  long  road  yet 
to  travel  before  society  will  have  arisen  above  delusion  and  emotionalism. 


448        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

utterly  impossible  for  the  average  individual  to  weigh  the 
various  arguments  which  were  presented  or  to  subject  them 
to  the  test  of  reason;  and  it  is  not  surprising  that  a  large 
portion  of  the  populace  should  have  grown  excited  over 
the  matter  and  jumped  to  the  conclusion  that  the  indus- 
trial growth  of  the  country  is  fundamentally  dependent 
upon  the  development  of  water  transportation. 

The  objection  may  be  raised,  however,  that  while  it 
is  true  that  the  common  lot  of  mankind  may  thus  easily 
be  carried  along  on  a  wave  of  popular  excitement,  the 
support  of  the  waterways  movement  by  well-educated  and 
prominent  men  cannot  be  satisfactorily  explained  by  the 
principles  of  social  psychology.  This  may  possibly  be  the 
case  in  some  instances,  though  it  has  been  the  experience 
of  the  writer  to  meet  a  great  many  men  of  high  intelli- 
gence who  have  been  drawn  into  this  current  of  popular 
enthusiasm  without  having  given  any  reflection  to  the  sub- 
ject whatsoever.  But  if  it  be  true  that  there  are  some  sup- 
porters of  the  waterways  movement  who  are  not  under 
the  influence  of  popular  excitement,  their  attitude  may 
usually  be  explained  on  other  grounds.  This  is  particu- 
larly true  of  the  real  leaders  of  a  movement  of  this  kind, 
namely,  politicians,  and  other  specially  interested  parties. 

The  politician  may  inaugurate  a  popular  movement  or 
he  may  merely  follow  public  sentiment  and  assume  the 
leadership  when  once  he  has  discovered  the  current  of  popu- 
lar feeling.  In  either  case  he  has  a  distinct  end  in  view.  It 
is  incumbent  upon  a  servant  of  the  people  to  devote  himself 
to  the  interests  of  his  constituency.  If  there  are  no  issues 
of  importance  before  the  public,  it  devolves  upon  him  to 
manufacture  some.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  there  chance  to 
be  questions  pressing  for  solution,  he  must  take  a  stand  and 
attempt  to  secure  wise  legislation.  In  any  case,  upon  the 
expiration  of  his  term  of  office  he  must  be  able  to  point  to 
work  accomplished  if  he  desires  a  reelection.  The  greater 
the  work  performed  the  larger  appears  the  statesmanship; 


I 


EXPLANATION  OF  THE   MOVEMENT    449 

and  the  more  closely  it  appears  related  to  the  welfare  of 
all  the  inhabitants  the  greater  appears  the  honor  due  the 
servant  of  the  people.  Consequently,  the  development  of 
natural  resources  always  furnishes  a  very  attractive  field 
to  the  office-holder  who  would  further  the  interests  of  the 
state.  Doubtless  many  of  our  statesmen,  actuated  by  the 
highest  motives,  but  with  misdirected  zeal,  have  enthusias- 
tically advocated  the  building  of  public  works,  which  re- 
sulted in  great  losses  instead  of  enormous  profits.  But,  on 
the  other  hand,  it  must  be  said  that  too  often  in  our  history 
there  have  been  motives  other  than  those  of  public  service 
actuating  our  men  in  office.  The  expenditure  of  great  sums 
of  public  money  always  carries  with  it  a  large  amount  of 
political  patronage.  That  is,  the  control  of  the  State's  purse 
is  always  of  great  strategic  importance.  For  the  building 
of  the  public  works  contracts  are  given  to  private  con- 
struction companies.  These  contracts  may  be  let  with  the 
distinct  understanding  that  there  is  to  be  given  in  return 
not  only  ordinary  political  support,  but  positive  aid  in 
elections,  by  cash  contributions  to  campaign  funds,  and 
through  direct  influence  upon  the  voting  of  laborers  en- 
gaged upon  the  public  works.  Thus  the  party  machine  is 
strengthened.  It  is  also  true  that  not  infrequently  we  have 
had  politicians  who  were  financially  interested  in  construc- 
tion companies,  or  who  have  held  property  so  located  as  to 
be  enhanced  in  value  by  the  building  of  public  works.  In 
many  ways,  then,  are  politicians  interested  in  enterprises 
which  promise  to  be  a  great  boon  to  society,  and  which 
carry  with  them  the  expenditure  of  vast  sums  of  public 
money.  It  secures  them  lasting  renown  if  benefits  accrue; 
it  gets  votes,  in  any  case,  whether  legitimately  or  illegit- 
imately; and  it  may  in  addition  make  office-holding  profit- 
able. There  is  consequently,  every  incentive  for  men  in 
office,  especially  if  they  be  unscrupulous,  to  create  and 
direct  popular  movements  involving  large  money  outlays. 
For  similar  reasons,  certain  special  interests  may  always 


450        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

be  counted  upon  to  render  valuable  aid  to  the  politician. 
Chief  among  these  are  representatives  of  lumber,  coal, 
and  other  companies  who  hope  to  be  able  to  ship  their 
goods  at  less  cost  to  themselves,  since  on  a  public  water- 
way part  of  the  cost  of  transportation  comes  from  the  gen- 
eral public  in  the  form  of  taxes  to  the  Government,  instead 
of  entirely  from  the  shippers  as  in  the  case  of  a  private  rail- 
way. Second,  there  are  those  who  own,  or  who  expect  to 
secure,  land  which  will  be  enhanced  in  value  because  of 
proximity  to  the  waterway.  Third,  there  are  companies 
which  hope  to  get  control  of  water-power  sites  and  to  util- 
ize the  water  power  created  at  the  expense  of  the  state. 
Fourth,  there  are  contractors  who  hope  to  be  allowed  to 
build  the  works.  Were  there  no  opportunities  for  exorbi- 
tant profits  from  building  public  works,  contractors  would 
still  be  very  desirous  of  securing  such  gigantic  projects  as 
canals  to  build;  and  with  the  possibilities  of  graft  that 
always  exist  in  enterprises  of  this  kind  it  is  not  surprising 
that  contracting  companies  should  join  with  the  others 
and  manifest  real  zest  for  the  waterways. 

The  many  waterway  conventions  that  have  been  held 
all  over  the  countrjs^  the  annual  Lakes-to-Gulf  jubilee, 
and  the  National  Rivers  and  Harbors  Congress  entail  the 
expenditure  of  no  small  amount  of  money.  The  various 
waterway  associations  ^  send  out  great  quantities  of  litera- 
ture and  support  permanent  salaried  officials  at  heavy 
expense.  For  instance,  the  annual  statement  of  the 
Ohio  Valley  Improvement  Association,  September  30, 
1909,  showed  an  expenditure  for  the  preceding  year  of 
$11,232.79.  It  is  obvious  that  those  who  defray  these 
expenditures  are  looking  for  direct  return  on  their  in- 
vestments. 

In  the  State  of  Illinois  the  Lakes-to-Gulf  project  has 
been  inseparably  connected  with  a  political  imbroglio  in 

*  A  list  of  those  held  in  1907  is  given  in  chapter  i,  p.  2,  note. 

*  For  list  of  associations,  see  chapter  i,  p.  3,  note. 


EXPLANATION  OF  THE  MOVEMENT     451 

which  two  rival  leaders  are  struggling  for  supremacy.*  It 
may  be  said,  indeed,  that  waterway  appropriation  is  the 
prize  around  which  has  centred  the  entire  struggle  of 
political  factions  in  Illinois  in  recent  years,  —  a  struggle 

*  The  struggle  has  centred  about  the  junior  United  States  Senator,  and 
the  Governor  of  the  State  of  Illinois.  The  Lakes-to-Gulf  waterways  move- 
ment owes  its  existence  largely  to  the  organizing  ability  of  this  Senator. 
A  few  years  ago,  in  company  with  a  small  group  of  political  friends,  he 
journeyed  all  the  way  from  Chicago  to  New  Orleans  in  a  launch,  organiz- 
ing waterway  associations  in  every  town  of  any  importance  along  the 
route,  and  then  combining  these  into  one  grand  organization,  the  Lakes- 
to-Gulf  Waterway  Association.  The  Senator  has  persistently  contended 
that  the  National  Government  should  take  the  lead  in  building  the  water- 
way through  Illinois,  and  that  all  that  stands  in  the  way  of  federal  grants 
for  that  purpose  is  the  attitude  of  Illinois  in  assuming  independence  in  the 
matter,  and  of  making  appropriations  before  securing  the  aid  of  the  Fed- 
eral Government.  He  argues  that  the  plan  was  originally  intended  to  be  a 
cooperative  affair,  and  that  it  is  consequently  essential  that  the  people 
of  Illinois  should  know  for  a  certainty  that  the  National  Government  is 
going  to  perform  its  part  before  the  state  spends  millions  on  a  waterway 
which  might  never  be  completed.  The  Governor,  on  the  other  hand,  has 
as  persistently  urged  that  the  State  of  Illinois  should  spend  a  large  amount 
of  money  on  the  waterway,  in  the  hope  of  thereby  inducing  the  Federal 
Government  to  aid  in  the  completion  of  the  work.  Illinois  must  prove 
herself  in  earnest  in  the  matter  before  asking  assistance  of  the  Govern- 
ment at  Washington. 

Both,  then,  favor  the  waterway;  they  differ  only  as  to  which  should  take 
the  initiative,  state  or  nation.  A  reasonable  explanation  of  their  respective 
attitudes  might  perhaps  be  found  in  the  fact  that,  if  the  state  takes  the 
initiative,  the  Governor  would  be  able  to  strengthen  his  political  standing 
by  means  of  the  political  patronage  he  would  have  at  his  disposal,  and 
that,  if  the  United  States  Government  should  make  a  liberal  contribution 
for  the  commencement  of  the  work  certain  advantages  of  a  political  nature 
would  go  to  the  Senator. 

It  is  now  a  matter  of  common  report  how  the  Senator  controlled  the 
Schmidt  Bill  in  the  legislature,  and  refused  to  allow  it  to  be  brought  up 
for  final  vote  until  sure  of  enough  votes  to  defeat  it;  how  he  repeatedly 
blocked  all  attempts  of  the  Governor  to  proceed  without  aid  from  the 
National  Government;  and  how  he  gracefully  gave  up  the  idea  of  a 
$16,000,000  appropriation  by  the  Federal  Government,  which  was  at  first 
deemed  absolutely  necessary,  for  any  appropriation  whatever,  however 
small  a  fraction  of  the  original  amount,  as  being  better  than  no  appropria- 
tion at  all.  And  it  is  almost  as  well  known  that  the  Governor  and  his 
friends  entirely  changed  their  conception  of  the  fundamental  purpose  of  the 


452        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

which  has  disgraced  the  very  name  of  the  state.  It  may 
be  added  that  unless  the  whole  question  of  waterways  is 
removed  from  the  domain  of  politics,  and  placed  in  the 
hands  of  impartial  investigating  bodies,  this  country  will 

proposed  waterway  through  Illinois  when  it  became  apparent  that  there 
was  little  hope  of  getting  legislative  sanction  for  the  spending  of  the  state's 
money  until  the  Federal  Government  had  guaranteed  to  6nish  the  project. 

When  the  agitation  for  a  waterway  from  the  Lakes  to  the  Gulf  was  first 
started,  very  little  was  heard  of  the  water-power  aspect  of  the  case.  It  was 
to  be  a  transportation  project  of  such  far-reaching  importance  that  it 
would  relieve  the  traffic  congestion  of  more  than  thirty  states  in  the  great 
Middle  West,  and  for  all  time  solve  the  problem  of  low  freight  rates  from 
the  interior  to  the  seaboard.  The  development  of  a  certain  amount  of 
water  power  was,  indeed,  to  be  an  additional  benefit,  but  comparatively 
little  emphasis  was  at  first  placed  upon  this  phase  of  the  project.  Primarily 
as  a  transportation  project,  therefore,  it  went  before  the  people  of  Illinois 
for  an  appropriation  of  $20,000,000,  to  be  spent  contingent  upon  the 
promise  of  the  United  States  Government  to  furnish  the  funds  for  the 
completion  of  the  work.  The  Senator  is  right  on  this  point;  with  this 
understanding  the  appropriation  was  sanctioned  by  the  people  of  Illinois 
by  a  large  majority. 

But  in  anticipation  of  the  day  when  the  canal  should  be  completed, 
certain  private  interests  secured  possession  of  valuable  water-power  sites 
along  the  route,  hoping  to  reap  large  returns  from  the  sale  of  water  power 
developed  at  the  expense  of  the  state.  This  was  promptly  seized  upon  by 
the  Governor  and  his  friends  as  a  reason  for  the  immediate  expenditure  of 
the  $20,000,000  authorized,  without  waiting  for  the  expected  aid  from  the 
Government  at  Washington;  and  they  are  now  clamorously  contending 
that  the  prime  purpose  of  the  waterway  from  the  beginning  has  been  not 
to  secure  a  transportation  route  but  to  develop  water  power,  and  therefore 
conserve  a  great  natural  resource  of  the  state.  While  it  is  perfectly  obvi- 
ous that  if  the  function  of  the  canal  has  now  become  to  develop  water 
power  rather  than  to  be  used  for  transportation,  the  people  of  the  state 
should  again  be  given  the  opportunity  of  a  referendum  vote,  every  efiPort  is 
•being  made  to  prevent  the  submission  of  the  question  to  such  a  vote, 
because  it  is  morally  certain  that  it  would  now  be  voted  down.  The  advo- 
>cates  of  the  scheme  attempt  to  silence  all  doubts  as  to  whether  suflScient 
water  power  could  be  developed  and  marketed  to  warrant  the  expenditure 
of  so  large  a  sum  as  is  involved,  by  merely  pointing  to  the  fact  that  private 
interests  deem  it  of  sufficient  importance  to  attempt  to  get  control  of  it; 
utterly  ignoring  the  while  that  these  private  interests  would  not  for  a 
moment  think  of  venturing  their  own  money  in  the  construction  of  the 
canal  route.  The  interests  will  profit  only  in  case  the  state  spends  its 
millions  in  opening  the  canal  along  which  the  power  is  to  be  developed. 


CONCLUSION  453 

doubtless  continue  to  waste  its  millions  in  projects  for 
canal  building  and  river  improvement,  the  chief  result  of 
which  will  be  to  enlarge  the  patronage  or  further  line  the 
pockets  of  our  practical  politicians. 

CONCLUSION 

In  concluding  this  study  of  the  comparative  merits  of 
waterways  and  railways  in  the  field  of  modern  transporta- 
tion it  seems  in  place  to  direct  attention  to  the  general 
trend  of  economic  advancement  in  relation  to  the  develop- 
ment of  the  agencies  of  transportation,  and  to  lay  special 
emphasis  upon  certain  important  aspects  of  the  question 
which  we  have  been  considering. 

Economic  progress,  it  is  needless  to  state,  has  been  con- 
ditioned at  every  stage  by  transportation  considerations. 
And  until  very  recent  times  it  has  been  almost  exclusively 
the  water  routes  that  have  mainly  determined  the  indus- 
trial and  economic  development  of  the  world.  It  is  unneces- 
sary to  relate  here  the  part  played  by  the  natural  commer- 
cial highways  of  mediaeval  days  in  the  history  of  that  time, 
or  the  influence  of  trade  routes  upon  the  discovery  and 
settlement  of  the  New  World.  It  is  well  known  that  until 
late  in  the  eighteenth  century  the  commercial  develop- 
ment of  every  country  was  almost  wholly  confined  to  its 
seacoast  or  to  its  navigable  lakes  and  rivers.  But  with  the 
development  of  large-scale  production  and  the  widening 
of  the  market,  which  came  with  the  industrial  revolution 
toward  the  close  of  the  eighteenth  century,  it  became  nec- 
essary to  supplement  the  natural  water  routes  by  artificial 
ones;  and  it  was  not  long  until  the  genius  of  man  showed 
itself  in  the  construction  of  canals,  to  serve  as  connecting 
links  in  a  system  of  natural  water  routes,  and  even  as 
independent  lines  in  themselves. 

The  countries  of  continental  Europe,  England,  and  the 
United  States  all  in  turn  passed  through  a  great  era  of  canal 
building.  The  result  of  these  new  commercial  highways 


454        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

was  to  lower  tremendously  the  cost  of  transportation,  and 
to  spell  the  fate  of  the  old  through  routes  of  travel  by  the 
turnpike  road.  The  industrial  revolution  could  not  have 
been  complete  without  this  supplementing  of  the  natu- 
ral water  routes  by  extensive  systems  of  artificial  canals. 
In  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  particularly, 
the  canals  of  both  Europe  and  the  United  States  were 
of  enormous  influence  upon  economic  development.  The 
cost  of  transporting  goods  for  long  distances  in  sections  not 
favored  by  natural  waterways  became  but  a  fraction  of 
what  it  had  been  hitherto,  and  the  new  regions  opened  up 
by  means  of  canals  enjoyed  long  periods  of  remarkable 
prosperity.  During  these  years,  moreover,  whether  the 
canals  were  privately  or  publicly  owned,  tolls  were  every- 
where levied  upon  the  water  traffic  sufficient  in  amount 
to  cover  not  only  the  entire  cost  of  operation  and  main- 
tenance, but  to  cover  as  well  the  original  cost  of  construc- 
tion of  the  waterway  itself.  Indeed,  since  the  utter  in- 
ability of  the  old-fashioned  stage-roads  to  compete  with 
them  gave  the  canals  a  virtual  monopoly  of  traffic,  they 
were  usually  exceedingly  profitable  sources  of  investment! 

But  in  all  the  principal  countries  of  the  world  anothei 
tremendous  change  took  place  about  the  middle  of  thf 
nineteenth  century.  The  invention  of  the  steam  locomo- 
tive and  the  steel  rail  with  its  great  load-carrying  capacity, 
together  with  the  perfection  of  the  telegraph  and  the 
telephone  and  the  development  of  the  corporate  form  of  in- 
dustrj%  have  ushered  in  a  second  industrial  revolution  per- 
haps even  more  far-reaching  in  its  consequences  than  the 
one  half  a  century  earlier.  Old  methods  of  doing  business 
have  been  almost  entirely  superseded  in  the  last  two  gen- 
erations, and  the  commercial  world  of  to-day  is  as  different 
from  that  of  fifty  years  ago  as  the  latter  was  from  the  world 
of  the  eighteenth  century. 

With  the  development  of  railway  carriers,  industrial 
enterprise,  which  had  hitherto  clung  close  to  the  banks  of 


CONCLUSION  455 

the  waterways,  now  moved  out  from  the  river  valleys  and 
covered  the  entire  area  of  a  country.  The  abiUty  of  the 
railways  to  strike  out  from  the  old  beaten  lines  of  travel, 
to  cross  prairie  and  mountain,  and  to  extend  their  lines  to 
the  farthest  ends  of  a  country,  completely  revolutionized 
commercial  development.  The  railways  spread  like  a  great 
net  over  a  country,  and  almost  no  section,  however  remote 
from  a  navigable  water  route,  is  now  without  more  or  less 
adequate  transportation  facilities.  By  means  of  sidings 
and  spur  lines  they  can  extend  to  almost  every  recess  of 
great  urban  communities  as  well  as  to  the  heart  of  mining 
districts  where  the  depressions  caused  by  exhausted  mines 
make  canal  building  virtually  impossible.  Rapid  and  eco- 
nomical shipment  of  goods  is  no  longer  confined  to  trunk- 
line  water  routes,  aided  by  such  additional  lines  as  the 
physical  character  of  a  country  allows;  for  by  means  of 
a  modern  railway  system  traffic  may  be  sent  to  all  the 
points  of  the  compass,  and  by  virtue  of  the  standard  gauge 
of  tracks  it  may  be  sent  to  any  destination,  however  distant 
from  the  original  place  of  origin,  without  transshipment. 
In  a  modern  industrial  state,  where  division  of  labor  has 
been  carried  to  a  great  extreme  and  where  traffic  is  assem- 
bled from,  and  distributed  over,  widely  separated  areas, 
this  is  of  paramount  importance.  Herein,  indeed,  lies  the 
tremendous  superiority  of  the  railways .  in  the  carrying 
of  traffic  under  modern  conditions. 

We  have  found  from  our  study  that  everywhere,  in  Eu- 
rope no  less  than  in  the  United  States,  there  has  occurred 
pari  passu  with  the  development  of  railways  in  the  third 
quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century  a  rapid  decline  in  the 
amount  of  traffic  carried  on  inland  water  routes.  This 
decline  has  continued  to  the  present  day  in  England  and 
the  United  States,  and  it  has  been  checked  in  the  countries 
of  continental  Europe  only  by  the  extending  of  Govern- 
ment subsidies  to  the  waterways.  In  order  to  prevent  the 
almost  complete  diversion  of  traffic  from  the  waterways  it 


456        WATERWAYS  VERSUS  RAILWAYS 

has  been  necessary  for  Governments  to  assume  all,  or  nearly 
all,  the  fixed  charges  connected  with  water  transportation, 
to  pay  for  building,  equipping,  and  maintaining  the  water 
routes,  and  to  furnish  them  free  of  charge  to  the  water 
carriers.  When  thus  relieved  of  all  save  the  mere  direct 
cost  of  operating  the  boats,  it  is  usually,  though  not 
always,  possible  for  the  water  carriers  to  offer  rates  which 
enable  them  to  compete  with  railways,  which  are  entirely 
self-supporting.  Even  then,  it  is  not  infrequently  necessary 
to  protect  the  waterways  still  further  from  railway  com- 
petition by  arbitrarily  compelling  the  railways  to  quote 
rates  from  twenty  to  fifty  per  cent  higher  than  those  by 
water,  as  is  the  case  in  France  and  Belgium;  and  al- 
though the  cost  of  transportation  by  water,  when  to  the 
rate  charged  by  the  water  carriers  are  added  the  taxes  lev- 
ied by  the  state  in  support  of  the  waterways  themselves, 
is  usually  much  greater  than  that  by  rail,  many  people 
have  still  clung,  strange  as  it  may  seem,  to  the  belief 
that  canal  transportation  is  much  cheaper  than  that  by 
rail. 

There  can  no  longer  be  any  question,  however,  that  so 
far  at  least  as  canals  are  concerned,  the  cost  of  transporta- 
tion, all  factors  included,  is  almost  universally  much  greater 
by  water  than  by  rail.  It  is  only  in  the  case  of  very  short 
canals  which  connect  long  stretches  of  naturally  navigable 
waters  that  they  can  have  any  economic  justification  at 
the  present  time.  While  canals  satisfactorily  served  the 
needs  of  an  earlier  period,  their  day,  like  that  of  the 
sickle,  the  hand-loom,  and  the  spinning-jenny,  is  now  for- 
ever past.  Precisely  as  the  canal  supplanted  the  horse  in 
the  carriage  of  through  freight,  so  in  turn  has  the  railway, 
in  the  course  of  industrial  progress,  come  to  take  the  place 
of  the  canal  in  the  field  of  transportation.  To  attempt  now 
to  return  to  the  antiquated  system  of  transportation  of  a 
half-century  ago,  or  to  make  canals  an  integral  part  of  a 
national  transportation  system,  whether  for  the  carriage 


CONCLUSION  457 

of  high-class  or  low-grade  freight,  it  matters  not,  is  to  at- 
tempt to  turn  backward  the  clock  of  time. 

In  the  case  of  rivers,  however,  the  situation  may  at  times 
be  somewhat  different.  But,  after  all,  river  transportation 
is  usually  analogous  to  that  by  canal,  for  comparatively 
few  of  our  streams  are  really  natural  highways  of  com- 
merce. As  a  rule  they  are  navigable  for  the  purposes  of 
modern  transportation,  in  name  only,  rather  than  in  fact. 
So  long  as  the  cost  of  canalization  of  a  river  amounts  to 
forty,  sixty,  or  a  hundred  thousand  dollars  a  mile,  it  belongs 
in  the  same  category  as  a  canal.  A  river  like  the  Rhine, 
whose  banks  are  firm,  whose  gradient  is  gentle,  whose 
water  supply  is  constant,  and  the  cost  of  regulation  of 
which  is  almost  negligible,  may,  indeed,  be  regarded  as 
a  natural  avenue  of  commerce;  but  a  river  such  as  the 
Mississippi,  with  ever  caving  sides  and  shifting  bottoms, 
with  periods  of  alternating  floods  and  droughts,  and  the 
control  of  which  is,  in  the  opinion  of  engineers,  a  greater 
task  than  the  building  of  the  Panama  Canal,  is  no  more 
to  be  regarded  as  a  natural  highway  of  commerce  than 
any  artificial  channel  whatsoever.  The  test  of  the  com- 
mercial success  of  such  a  river  must  lie  in  the  cost  of 
rendering  it  navigable  for  the  purposes  of  modern  trans- 
portation. Our  investigations  have  indicated  that  it  is 
only  in  rare  instances  that  river  transportation  can  be 
made  as  economical  as  transportation  by  rail. 


THE    END 


i 


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deutsche  Wirtschaftspolitik,  Berlin,  1898. 

9.  Ulrich,  Preussische  Verkehrspolitik  und  die  Staatsfinanzen, 
Berlin,  1909. 

10.  Nasse,  Die  Schiffahrt  der  deutschen  Strome,  Schriften  des 
Vereins  fiir  Sozialpolitik,  Leipzig,  1903. 

11.  Opel,  Die  Kanalfrage,  Leipzig,  1884. 

12.  Rathenau  und  Cauer,  Massengiiterbahnen,  Berlin,  1909, 

13.  Petersilie,  Schiffahrt  und  Giiterverkehr  auf  den  Rhein  wah- 
rend  der  Jahre  1891  bis  1906,  Mannheim,  1908. 

14.  ScHRANZ,  Die  Mainschiffahrt  in  XIX  Jabrbunderts  und  ihre 
kiinftige  Entwickelung,  Bamberg,  1894. 

15.  MAyER,  Schiffahrtsabgaben,  Tubingen,  1906. 

16.  Schranz,  Der  Donau-Main  Kanal  und  seine  Schicksale,  Bam- 
berg, 1904. 

17.  Weill,  Die  Lage  der  Kanalschiffer  in  Alsass-Lothringen, 
Strassburg,  1905. 

18.  Schdlte,  Der  Kanal  von  Heme  bis  zum  Hebewerk  und  von 
Hebewerk  bis  zum  Dortmund.  Nebst  Angabe  liber  den  V'erkehr 
auf  dem  Dortmund-Ems-Kanal,  1902. 

19.  Der  Ausbau  des  Hunte-Ems-Kanal.  Denkschrift  des  nordwest- 
deutschcn  Kanalvereins,  1898. 


462  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

20.  Gerhardt,  Berlin-Stettin  Schiffahrt  Kanal,  Die  Woche,  June 
18.  1910. 

21.  Eltzbacheb.  J.,  German  Problems. 

22.  Eltzbacheb,  P.,  The  Lesson  of  the  German  Waterways,  Con- 
temporary Review,  December,  190^. 

23.  LoTZ,  The  Present  Significance  of  German  Inland  Waterways. 
Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science, 
volume  31. 

24.  Chisholm,  Inland  Waterways,  Geographical  Journal,  July, 
1907. 

25.  McPherson,  Waterways  and  Railways,  Atlantic  Monthly, 
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26.  McPherson,  Transportation  in  Europe,  1910. 

27.  Cl.\pp,  The  Navigable  Rhine,  1911. 

28.  Clapp,  The  Port  of  Hamburg,  1911. 

29.  Meyer,  H.  R.,  Government  Regulation  of  Railway  Rates;  chap- 
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30.  Marlio,  L'AUemandeet  La  Navigation  Int6rieure,  Paris,  1909. 
III.  Railways. 

1.  Schramm,  Grundzuge  deutscher  Eisenbahnpolitik,  Strassburg, 
1887. 

2.  Statistik  der  Giiterbewegung  auf  deutschen  Eisenbahnen. 

3.  Archiv  fiir  Eisenbahnwesen. 

4.  Statistik  der  im  Betriebe  befindlichen  Eisenbahnwesen  Deutsch- 
lands. 

5.  Bericht   ilber    die   Ergebnisse  des   Betriebes    der  vereinigten 
preussischen  und  hessischen  Staatseisenbahnen. 

6.  Schmeidler,    Geschichte    des    deutschen     Eisenbahnwesens, 
Leipzig,  1871. 

7.  Macco,  Die  Entwickelung  des  Eisenbahnnetzes,  Berlin,  1908. 

FRANCE 

1.  Guide  Official  de  la  Navigation  Int^rieure.  Paris. 

2.  Statistique  de  la  Navigation  Interieure,  Paris. 

3.  Bulletins  de  L' Association  du  Congr^s  International  des  Chemins  de 
Fer,  Brussels. 

4.  Le  Receuil  Chaix  (Official  Rate  TarifTs),  Paris. 

5.  Statistique  des  Chemins  de  Fer  Frangais,  Paris. 

6.  Preliminary  Report  of  (U.  S.)  National  Waterways  Commission,  and 
Doc.  no.  16,  1910. 

7.  Report  of  (British)  Royal  Commission  on  Canals  and  Inland  Naviga- 
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8.  CoLSON,  Clement,  Transports  et  Tariffs,  Paris. 

9.  CoLsoN,  Clement,  Revue  des  Questions  du  Transports.   In  Revue 
Politique  et  Parlcmentaire,  Paris. 

10.  McPherson,  L.  G.,  Waterways  and  Railways,  Atlantic    Monthly, 
volume  105.  pp.  433-43. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  4G3 

11.  McPherson,  L.  G.,  Transportation  in  Europe,  1910. 

12.  AcwoBTH,  W.  M.,  Review  of  Kaufmann,  Economic  Journal,  volume 

VIII. 

13.  Bdchler,  F.,  French  Method  of  Controlling  Railway  Rates,  Quar- 
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14.  Meyer,  B.  H.,  Breakdown  of  State  Building  of  Railroads  in  France, 
Journal  of  Political  Economy,  volume  xiv. 

15.  RocHETiN,  Edg^ne,  Paris,  Port  de  Mer.  Journal  des  £conomistes, 
Series  6,  volume  9,  pp.  350-61. 

16.  RussEL,  Government  Ownership  and  Control  of  Railways  in  France 
and  Italy,  Everybody's  Magazine,  volume  xiv,  p.  340. 

17.  Mazoyer,  Emile,  La  Navigation  interieure:  Rivieres  et  Canaux, 
Paris,  1902.  Series  of  articles. 

BELGIUM 

1.  Report  of  (British)  Royal  Commission  on  Canals  and  Inland  Naviga- 
tions, volume  VI. 

2.  Preliminary  Report  of  the  (U.  S.)  National  Waterways  Commission, 
and  Doc.  no.  20,  1911. 

8.  Reports  of  the  Societe  anonyme  du  Canal,  Brussels. 

4.  Annuaire  Statistique  de  la  Belgique,  Brussels. 

6.  Reports  of  the  Minister  of  Railroads,  Post,  and  Telegraph,  Brussels. 

6.  Gand  Belgique  (Canal  de  Terneuyen). 

7.  "Paris,  1900"  —  Royaume  de  Belgique  —  Installations  Maritimes. 

8.  Note  de  renseignements  sur  les  voies  navigables  de  la  Belgique,  Brussels. 

9.  Mouvement  de  la  navigation  interieure  de  la  Belgique,  1905-06. 

10.  Bulletin  Trimestreil  Public  par  le  Bureau  de  la  Statistique  Generale 
du  Ministere  de  I'lnterieur  et  de  I'Agriculture,  1909.  (Information 
concerning  railway  accounts  for  1900  and  for  the  last  four  years). 

11.  Report  of  the  (United  States)  Inland  Waterways  Commission,  1909, 
pp.  389-401. 

12.  McPherson,  Transportation  in  Europe,  1910. 

THE  NETHERLANDS 

1.  Report  of  (U.  S.)  National  Waterways  Commission,  Doc.  no.  18, 

1910. 

2.  Report  of  the  (British)  Royal  Commission  on  Canals  and  Inland 
Navigations,  volume  vi. 

3.  Review  of  the  Navigable  Canals  in  the  Netherlands  (in  Dutch),  Pub- 
lication of  the  Department  of  Waterstaat. 

4.  Preliminary  Report  of  the  (U.  S.)  National  Waterways  Commission, 
1910. 

6.  Mueller,     Friedrich,    Das    Wasserwesen   der    niederlandischen 
Provinz  Zeeland. 

6.  McPherson,  Transportation  in  Europe,  1910. 

7.  Report  of  (U.  S.)  Inland  Waterways  Commission,  1909,  pp.  423-25. 


464  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

LAKES-TO-GULF  PROJECT 

1.  Annual  Reports  of  the  Mississippi  River  Commission,  1880-1908, 
printed  in  Annual  Reports  of  the  Chief  of  Engineers,  United  States 
Army. 

2.  Report  of  the  Sanitary  District  of  Chicago,  September,  1903. 

3.  Report  of  the  Deep  Waterway  Committee  of  the  Chicago  Commer- 
cial Association,  June,  1906. 

4.  Report  on  a  Survey  of  the  Des  Plaines  and  Illinois  Rivers,  House 
Document,  volume  83,  no.  26,  59th  Congress,  1st  Session. 

5.  Report  of  Chicago  Harbor  Commission,  1909. 

6.  The  Illinois  Waterway  Report,  by  the  Internal  Improvement  Com- 
mission of  Illinois,  1909. 

7.  Report  of  National  Waterways  Commission,  Doc.  no.  11,  1909; 
Dixon,  Traffic  History  of  the  Mississippi  River  System. 

8.  Report  of  Special  Board  of  Engineers  on  Survey  of  Mississippi  River 
from  St.  Louis  to  its  Mouth  (the  Fourteen-Foot  Project),  1909. 

9.  Committee  on  Commerce  of  Senate  of  the  United  States,  Testimony 
of  Lyman  E.  Cooley,  January  28, 1910;  of  Lyman  E.  Cooley,  W.  D. 
Hamilton,  and  Edward  Hines,  February  28,  1910;  and  of  William 
H.  Bixby  and  Robert  S.  Taylor,  March  1  and  2,  1910  (61st  Congress, 
2d  Session). 

10.  Report  of  Special  Board  of  Engineers  on  a  Waterway  from  Lock- 
port,  111.,  to  the  Mouth  of  the  Illinois  River,  61st  Congress,  3d  Ses- 
sion, House  Doc.  no.  1374. 

11.  Illinois  Deep  Waterway  Debates,  46th  General  Assembly,  1910. 

12.  Proceedings  of  the  Board  of  Trustees  of  the  Sanitary  District  of  Chi- 
cago, January  26,  1910. 

13.  Althouse,  Water  Power  in  the  Mississippi  Valley,  Annals  of  Ameri- 
can Academy,  volume  31. 

14.  Deneen,  Vast  Wealth  for  the  State,  Technical  World  Magazine, 
April,  1908. 

15.  King,  Commercial  Importance  of  the  Sanitary  Canal  and  Gulf  Wa- 
terway, The  World  To-Day,  September,  1907. 

16.  McGee,  Our  Great  River:  What  it  is  and  may  be  for  Commerce, 
Agriculture  and  Sanitation,  World's  Work,  February,  1907. 

17.  OcKERsoN,  Some  of  the  Engineering  Problems  involved  in  the  Con- 
struction of  a  Deep  Waterway  from  the  Great  Lakes  to  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico,  Association  of  Engineering  Societies  Journal,  February, 
1908. 

18.  Tower,  The  Mississippi  River  Problem,  Popular  Science  Monthly, 
volume  73. 

19.  Walker  and  McCADDEN,The  Precarious  Control  of  the  Mississippi 
River,  World's  Work,  May,  1910. 

20.  Way,  Mississippi  Improvements  and  Traffic  Prospects,  Annals  of 
American  Academy,  volume  31. 

21.  Shelton,  The  Lakes-to-Gulf  Deep  Waterway,  Journal  of  Political 
Economy,  June  and  July,  1912. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  465 

OHIO  RIVER 

Report  of  Examination  of  Ohio  River,  made  by  a  Board  of  Engineers 
of  the  War  Department,  60th  Congress,  1st  Session,  Doc.  no.  492. 
Proceedings  of  Annual  Conventions  of  the  Ohio  Valley  Improvement 
Association,  1894  to  date,  Cincinnati,  Ohio. 

Report  of  National  Waterways  Commission,  Doc.  no.  11,  Dixon, 
Traffic  History  of  the  Mississippi  River  System,  1909. 
Preliminary  Report  of  the  Inland  Waterways  Commission,  1908  (Res- 
ervoir scheme  of  M.  O.  Leighton,  pp.  451-90).  For  debate  on  this 
scheme,  see  Engineering  News  for  following  dates:  May  7,  June  11, 
June  i24,  October  8,  November  4,  and  November  5,  1908. 

ERIE  CANAL 


'1.  Whitford,  Noble  E.,  The  History  of  New  York  Canals,  2  vol- 
umes, Albany,  1905. 

2.  Canal  Enlargement  in  New  York  State,  and  Related  Papers,  Public- 
ation of  Buffalo  Historical  Society,  1909. 

8.  Annual  Report  of  the  Statistician.  Contained  in  Report  of  New  York 
Produce  Exchange. 

4.  Stmons,  Thomas  W.,  55th  Congress,  1st  Session,  House  Document 
no.  86,  on  Commercial  and  Military  Aspects  of  a  Ship  Canal. 

6.  Economy  of  the  Proposed  Deep  Waterway  from  the  Great  Lakes  to 
the  Atlantic.  Engineering  News,  1897,  pp.  315-63  (criticism  of 
Symons's  report). 

6.  Report  of  the  Committee  on  Canals  of  New  York  State,  New  York, 
1900. 

7.  Report  of  Board  of  Engineers  on  Deep  Waterways  between  the  Great 
Lakes  and  the  Atlantic  Tide  Waters,  December  7,  1900,  56th  Con- 
gress, 2d  Session,  House  Document,  no.  149. 

8.  Report  of  State  Engineer  and  Surveyor  on  a  Barge  Canal  from  the 
Hudson  River  to  the  Great  Lakes,  New  York,  1901. 

9.  Report  to  the  Governor  by  the  Advisory  Board  of  Consulting  En- 
gineers on  its  work  relating  to  the  barge  canal,  Albany,  1907. 

10.  Barge  Canal  Monthly  Bulletin,  Department  of  the  State  Engineer 
and  Surveyor,  Albany. 

11.  Report  of  Barge  Canal  Terminal  Commission  of  the  State  of  New 
York,  Albany,  1911. 

12.  Fairlie,  John  A.,  The  New  York  Canals,  Quarterly  Journal  of  Eco- 
nomics, 1900,  pp.  212-39. 

13.  Fairlie,  John  A.,  Canal  Enlargement  in  New  York  State,  Quarterly 
Journal  of  Economics,  1904,  pp.  286-96. 

14.  Fairlie,  John  A.,  Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political  and 
Social  Science,  volume  xxxi. 

15.  Stmons,  Thomas  W.,  The  Future  of  the  Erie  Canal.  Engineering 
Record.  March  19,  1898. 

16.  Bates,  Lindon,  Jr.,  Rebuilding  a  Great  Canal,  Technical  World 
Magazine,  February,  1908,  pp.  622-630. 


I 


INDEX 


Administration  of  waterways,  compar- 
ison of  German  and  American,  266- 
69;  French  and  American,  297. 

Agricultural  produce,  water  traffic  in, 
58 ;  on  New  York  Canals,  75 ;  export 
traffic,  85-86;  in  England,  116,  135;  in 
Germany,  212-13;  in  United  States, 
372-73  ;  on  Ohio  River,  394-95. 

Appropriations,  waterway,  267-68. 

Atlantic  Coast  Inland  Waterway,  7. 

Belgium,  waterways  of,  298-308. 
Benefits,  general,  of  waterways,   16, 

38-41;  134;  158. 
Berlin-Stettin  Canal,  203-04. 
Boat  lines,  control  of,  29;  S3. 
Branch  canals,  unpracticability  of,  56, 

in  England,  131-32. 

Canadian  waterways,  15 ;  325 ;  429-30. 

Capacity,  comparative  railway  and 
waterway,  237 ;  240 ;  409-10 ;  433-34. 

Capitalization,  comparative  railway 
and  waterway,  in  United  States,  49 ; 
in  Germany,  231,  262-63. 

Chicago  Drainage  Canal,  cost  of,  326. 

Coal  traffic,  as  affected  by  speed,  48  ;  in 
United  States,  93-94;  inEngland,  105 ; 
110-14;  135;  on  the  Rhine,  177,  on 
the  "Mark  Waterways,"  197-99;  in 
relation  to  a  Lakes-to-Gulf  water- 
way, 374-77 ;  on  the  Ohio,  398  ;  412-14. 

Columbia  River,  Improvement  of,  8. 

Competition  of  waterways,  to  prevent 
railway  monopoly,  13 ;  analysis  of 
this  doctrine,  27-28  ;  probable  failure 
of,  28-29  ;  policy  in  France,  274-75. 

Competitive  methods  of  railways,  62, 
analysis  of,  79-85;  in  England,  102 ; 
120-21. 

Congestion  of  traffic,  in  1907, 14-15 ;  not 
permanent,  20-24;  in  Germany,  245- 
50;  in  France,  294-96;  in  United 
States,  389-91. 

Cooperation,  railway  and  waterway, 
14;  railway  attitude,  30;  in  Germany 
it  is  compulsory;  232-34;  fallacy  of 
the  idea,  248-50;  in  Belgium,  302-03. 

Cost  of  canals,  262  ;  278 ;  327 ;  false  esti- 
mates of,  129;  149;  328  (note)  ;  361- 
63. 


Cost  of  railways,  49 ;  262-63  ;  407. 

Cost  of  transportation,  analysis  of :  33- 
38;  235-36;  comparative  rail  and 
water  :  12 ;  Dortmund-Ems  Canal 
217-18;  in  Germany,  236-39;  on  Ohio 
River,  401-06  ,  on  Erie  Canal,  434-37  ; 
456. 

Danube  River,  191. 
Decentralization  of  industry,  252-64. 
Deficit  from  water  transportation,  in 

Germany,  230-31 ;  235 ;  in  France,  278 ; 

in  The  Netherlands,  321. 
Dortmund-Ems  Canal,  215-20. 
Dredging,  50,  152,  339. 

Elbe  River,  174;  192  ;  242-43. 

Erie  Canal,  1,  6,  34,  70 ;  enlargement  of, 

417-38. 
Expenditures,    waterway    in    United 

States,  67-69. 

Finow  Canal,  170;  205-06. 
Floods,  51 ;  254  ;  259-60 ;  333  ;  415. 
Forth  and  Clyde  Ship  Canal,  163-69. 
France,  railway  development  273-74. 
France,  transportation  in,  271-97. 

Georgian  Bay  Ship  Canal,  15;  325; 
429-30. 

Germany,  transportation  policy  of, 
170-270. 

Great  Britain,  barge  canals  of,  98- 
145. 

Great  Lakes,  rates  on,  34 ;  not  analo- 
gous to  rivers  or  canals,  41-42 ,  ves- 
sels on,  354-55. 

Harbors,  Manchester,  148 ;  Frankfort- 

on-the-Main,  182-83;  cost  of,  336. 
Hil!,.J.  .J.,  24;325. 
Holland,  the  canals  of,  309-23. 

Ice,  52 ;  259-60. 

Inland  Waterwaj'S  Commission,  the,  2. 

Insurance,  89;  348. 

Interistate  Commerce  Commission,  19; 

28;  65. 

Kaiser-Wilhelm  Canal,  220-22. 
Kiel  Canal,  221-22. 


468 


INDEX 


Lake  Erie  and  Ohio  River  Ship  Canal, 
6. 

Lake  Michigan  and  Lake  Erie  Canal,  6. 

Lakes-to-Atlantic  Deep  Waterway,  6. 

Lakes-to-Gulf  Waterway,  5,  ship  canal, 
324-52;  fourteen  feet,  353-69;  eight 
feet,  370-91. 

Lakes-to-Gulf  Waterway  Association, 
origin  of,  451  (note). 

Lake  vessels,  not  adapted  to  canal  or 
river  navigation,  354-57. 

Lumber  traffic,  in  relation  to  Lakes-to- 
Gulf  waterway,  379-85. 

Main-Danube  Canal,  190;  241, 

Main  River,  181-88;  241. 

Maintenance  and  Operation,  50;  Man- 
chester Ship  Canal,  151-53;  Ohio 
River,  408-0'J;  Erie  Canal,  434-35, 

Manchester  Ship  Canal,  15;  146-62. 

"Mark  Waterways."  193. 

Military  argument  for  waterways,  250- 
52. 

Memel  River,  211. 

Missouri  River,  improvement  of,  6. 

Mississippi  River,  traffic  on,  71. 

Mississippi  Valley  Transportation 
Company,  character  of,  29. 

National  Waterways  Commission,  4  ;43. 
Netherlands,  the,  canals  of,  309-23 
Netze  River.  209. 
North-Sea  Canal,  310. 

Oder  River,  200,  205. 

Ohio  River,  improvement  of,  4;  73;  94; 
392-416. 

Operation  and  Maintenance,  50;  Man- 
chester Ship  Canal,  151-53 ,  Ohio 
River,  408-09;  Erie  Canal,  434-35. 

Packet  Freight.  75. 

Panama  Canal,  42;  327;  351. 

Political  influences,  17;  293;  45;  422; 

448-53. 
Potential  competition,  13;  158. 

Railways,  cost  of,  49;  262-63;  407;  cap- 
italization of,  in  United  States,  49; 
in  Germany,  231 ;  262-63. 

Railways,  organization  of,  87. 


Rates,  comparison  of  French  and 
American  railway,  291;  aee  under  Cost 
of  transportation. 

Reforestation,  332  (note). 

Reservoir  control  of  floods,  330-31 ;  416. 

Rhine-Hanover  Canal,  225. 

Rhine-Marne  Canal,  189. 

Rhine  River,  174;  176-81. 

Rhine- Weser  Canal,  224. 

Rotterdam  Waterway,  311. 

Saar  River,  188. 

Sectionalism,  63-64;  421. 

Size  of  cargo,  144-45. 

South  American  trade.  386-88. 

Special  interests,  favoring  waterways, 
17;  63;  257;  453. 

Speed,  as  affecting  water  transporta- 
tion, 31;  48;  79;  89;  346, 

St.  Mary's  Falls  Canal,  42;  66;  354. 

Suez  Canal,  42;  327;  351. 

Terminals,  control,  by  railways,  81-82; 
on  Manchester  Ship  Canal,  148;  at 
Frankfort -on -the -Main,  184;  in 
France,  284;  in  Belgium,  304;  along 
Lakes-to-Gulf  route,  336-37;  on  Ohio 
River,  400-01;  on  Erie  Canal,  423-24; 
430-31. 

Traffic,  density  of,  61;  263-64,  306;  divi- 
sion between  railways  and  water- 
ways an  economic  loss,  287-90. 

Transshipment,  significance  of,  94-60, 
as  causing  the  decline  of  water  traf- 
fic in  United  States,  91-95 ;  how  ac- 
complished in  Germany,  234-35;  in 
France,  284;  in  Mississippi  Valley, 
372;  389. 

Vessels,  lake  and  ocean,  on  canals  and 
rivers,  344-49 ;  lake,  for  ocean  traffic, 
349-51. 

Vistula  River,  208-09. 

Warthe  River,  209. 

Water  power,  12;  359-69. 

Waterway  traffic,  character  of,  53;  73- 
77;  176;  194-95;  227;  decline  of,  in 
United  States.  69-73;  in  England,  101; 
105-08;  in  Germany,  240^3. 

Weser  River,  213-15. 


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